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1 Introduction
Marcel van der Linden, Hugh Murphy, and Raquel Varela
Seaborne trade is the backbone of the world economy. About 90 per cent of 
world trade is transported by ships. Good reasons for studying shipbuild-
ing and ship repairing labour include the importance of the industry for 
transport and world trade, its linkages to domestic heavy industries, the 
military apparatus, myriad suppliers of f inished goods and services in 
domestic economies, local and regional employment, and its productive 
character. For the labour historian, shipbuilding and ship repair work-
ers are of great interest for at least three reasons. Their worksites are an 
important part of heavy industry, while labour processes at shipyards are 
much more diverse than labour processes in factories with their assembly 
lines and standardised production – shipyards combine many different 
segments of the working class in ever changing configurations. In addition, 
shipyards bring together large numbers – often thousands – of labourers in 
one place, thus shaping the culture and social life of the regions in which 
they are located. And, f inally, these huge working-class conglomerations 
have often played a key role in industrial relations and politics, for example 
during the years of upheaval at the end of the First World War (Petrograd, 
Hamburg, Bremen, Kiel, Belfast, Glasgow, Seattle, Tokyo, Kobe, etc.), or in 
anti-dictatorial struggles, such as the Portuguese Revolution of 1974-1975, 
or the struggles of Solidarność in Poland, 1980-1981.
Underpinning these case studies is the sense that shipbuilding is an 
internationally competitive industry on the supply side, whose expansion 
or contraction is dependent on demand, whether from individual shipown-
ers, ship-owning companies, or state-sponsored shipping lines. Workers’ 
livelihoods, setting aside crude economic nationalism, and protectionist 
tariffs and subsidies dulling competitiveness, are in the medium to longer 
term ultimately dependent on how internationally competitive their respec-
tive industries are. These aspects and their consequences for workers and 
employment relations form this volume’s central theme.
Over the past century and a half, shipbuilding has gone through major 
changes. In the f inal decades of the nineteenth century, Britain became the 
undisputed leader on the global market, producing about three-quarters 
of the world’s output in the 1890s. Shortly after the turn of the century, 
however, Germany and the United States slowly started to increase their 
market share. By the eve of the First World War, Britain’s share had declined 
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to “only” 60 per cent. Shipbuilding was largely based on bespoke production 
methods in those days because specif ications varied greatly, depending on 
the purpose of the ship’s operation. Shipyards could and did adapt their 
production quickly to accommodate changing circumstances, with many 
building warships and merchant vessels in the same establishments, and 
also engaging in ship repair and marine-engine building. Ordinarily, craft 
systems and sub-contracting were used, and relatively limited hierarchies 
ensured suff icient f lexibility. The predominantly skilled workers could 
transition to a different product mix quickly, without needing to be closely 
monitored by their superiors.
Before the 1930s, in craft systems such as shipbuilding, through the squad 
system of work organisation, the highly skilled workers had a major say in the 
important elements of the work process, namely: “(1) the location at which 
a particular task will be done, (2) the movement of tools, of materials, and 
of workers to this work place, and the most eff icient arrangement of these 
workplace characteristics, (3) sometimes the particular movements to be 
performed in getting the task done, (4) the schedules and time allotments for 
particular operations, and (5) inspection criteria for particular operations 
(as opposed to inspection criteria for f inal products).”1 Communication took 
place largely among the manual workers; while there were obviously some 
administrative personnel, they were limited in number and signif icance.
Although shipbuilding is essentially an assembly industry producing 
capital goods, any attempt by entrepreneurs to “rationalise” the tried-and-
tested craft methods had to acknowledge that producing ships was essen-
tially different from, for example, car manufacturing. After all, shipbuilding 
involves producing a small number of products, characterised by their 
specif icity, complexity, and large size. Their specif icity and small number 
virtually precluded mass production, not only increasing production costs 
but also complicating streamlining individual steps in the work process. 
Moreover, experimental production of prototypes was largely out of the 
question – except in some war situations, where governments are willing 
to take major f inancial risks. Because the product is complex in terms of 
the organisation of production, shipyards needed to rely on many supplier 
companies, which varied in numbers depending on the type of ship.
However, these time-craft methods have been increasingly under-
mined since the 1930s. The Great Depression marked the start of a gradual 
transition from what the sociologist Arthur Stinchcombe has called craft 
administration of production to bureaucratic administration of production 
1 Stinchcombe, “Bureaucratic and Craft Administration of Production”, 170.
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– a process that happened in f its and starts and has yet to be completed. 
Several factors were conducive to this course of events. First, technological 
innovations came into play. During the 1930s, welding gradually replaced 
riveting, though it truly got under way only after the Second World War. 
Eventually it superseded riveting as the industry’s principal method of hull 
construction. The process strengthened connections between metal plates 
and sections, resulted in more hydrodynamic and lighter vessels than their 
riveted counterparts, and made the connections impenetrable to water and 
oil. And while riveting ordinarily required at least f ive workers,2 welding 
could be done by individual welders, thereby reducing manpower. It was 
also conducive to semi- and fully automatic machine-welding, especially on 
flat plates, but crucially, to get the best out of the process, welding required 
a reorganisation of production away from the berth to purpose-built sheds 
and building docks, in tandem with ever more sophisticated plant and 
equipment.3
Welding was perfectly compatible with the techniques developed in the 
United States during the Second World War for enabling prefabrication 
of sections. Under the US Emergency Shipbuilding Program, newly built 
shipyards, largely using semi-skilled labour, began assembly of Liberty ships 
to a British design. These were serially produced cargo carriers – and were 
initially intended mainly to replace British ships torpedoed by German 
submarines. Liberty ship construction took advantage of flow-line methods 
of production pioneered in other industries, and sections (“blocks”) of these 
vessels were prefabricated elsewhere and subsequently transported by rail 
or crane to the berth, where they were welded together. The workforce 
was newly trained – largely with no experience of building welded ships. 
As the United States entered the war the shipbuilding yards employed 
women, to replace men who were enlisted in the armed forces.4 During the 
decades that followed, block construction was progressively elaborated. 
The prefabricated segments grew in size, and components (electric cables, 
pipes, etc.) were increasingly installed during the “block stage”, speeding 
up the subsequent assembly.
2 A fully manned riveting squad would comprise a rivet heater (boy), catcher (boy), holder 
on (labourer), and a left- and right-handed riveter (both trade-qualif ied, normally by f ive-year 
apprenticeship in British shipbuilding yards). Payment was by results, that is, number of rivets 
deposited, which were counted on a daily basis by a member of the yard’s administrative staff. 
For this, see McKinlay, “The Interwar Depression and the Effort Bargain”. 
3 For this, see Murphy, “The Health of Electric Arc Welders”.
4 Herman, Freedom’s Forge, 178-180.
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The second major change came about thanks to the rapid rise of the oil 
industry. Between 1938 and 1955 production of crude oil tripled from 250 mn 
to 772 mn metric tons annually.5 This trend obviously increased demand 
for tankers. Tankers were fairly simple structures to build, with long, flat 
surfaces conducive to welding, and did not require extensive outfitting. From 
1956, when President Gamal Abdel Nasser closed the Suez Canal, tanker sizes 
increased to reap economies of scale. With the route from the Persian Gulf to 
Europe now extending around Africa, shipping companies started to build 
considerably larger tankers. In 1959 the first 100,000-ton tanker was launched, 
and around 1980 the f irst 500,000-tonners came into use. “Operating costs 
fell drastically. In 1956 the extra cost of moving one ton of oil around Africa 
instead of through Suez was $7.50. By 1970 the total cost of moving one ton 
of oil from the Persian Gulf to Europe around Africa had fallen to $3.”6
Economic cycles were the third factor. During the extended boom in 
trade from the 1950s to the early 1970s, global demand for ships increased 
continuously. “By lessening the danger of high overhead costs during cyclical 
downswings, stable growth in demand favoured the adoption of larger-scale 
and more capital-intensive methods of shipbuilding. The average size of ves-
sels also increased, and there was a growing acceptance of standard designs 
for tankers, bulk carriers, and cargo ships.”7 Demand for f lexible, highly 
skilled workers declined concurrently. “The larger volume of production in 
individual yards and the greater standardization of output provided a firmer 
basis for stabilizing work f lows, while greater mechanization increased 
the amount of semi-skilled, machine-tending work.” Systematic planning 
techniques reflected this trend.8
As the production process became more bureaucratic, workers lost their 
autonomy. Increasingly, decisions were taken by a central management aim-
ing to plan the production process in the greatest possible detail. Permanent 
channels of legitimate communications were established, thereby enabling 
“routine methods of processing information upward and authoritative com-
munication downward.”9
The world market changed drastically as a consequence of all these 
shifts. German industry, which had initially emerged from the war almost 
in ruins, turned into a force of innovation and rapidly recovered. Sweden 
5 Rostow, The World Economy. History and Prospect, 232-233.
6 Hugill, World Trade Since 1431, 150; Corlett, The Ship.
7 Lorenz, “An Evolutionary Explanation for Competitive Decline”, 923.
8 Lorenz, “An Evolutionary Explanation for Competitive Decline”, 924.
9 Stinchcombe, “Bureaucratic and Craft Administration of Production”, 176.
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became an important producer too, in part because block construction had 
been introduced there early on for civilian purposes. This international 
competition began to erode the market share of the leading shipbuilding 
nation, the United Kingdom, which also had the world’s largest merchant 
fleet.10 The most important newcomer, however, was Japan, which since the 
nineteenth century had formed a shipbuilding industry thanks to massive 
state support and was advancing in tanker construction by the 1930s. At the 
end of the Second World War, shipbuilding was largely destroyed in this 
country as well. Nonetheless, after its defeat, the country progressed very 
rapidly towards recovery. By 1956 Japan had overtaken the United Kingdom 
in shipbuilding output, and by 1965 Japanese shipbuilding output alone 
exceeded that of Western Europe combined.
The rapidly growing world share of Japan ushered in the shift to East Asia. 
Shipbuilding is essentially an assembly industry and therefore one which 
late-industrialising countries have found attractive.11 In the initial stages 
of setting up a shipbuilding industry in such countries, state-supported 
companies imported advanced technology and expertise, and crucially 
directed labour (for example, China, South Korea, Taiwan) to suitable 
locations. As an “industry of synthesis”, shipbuilding is an important 
customer of the steel, foundry, and general engineering industries and, as 
the industry grows, it requires specif ic qualif ications from its workforce. 
The so-called New International Division of Labour, which from the 1960s 
promoted de-industrialisation in the North Atlantic region, leading inter 
alia to the collapse of the textile industry, at the same time accelerated the 
rise of Asian economies, where forceful state intervention was conducive 
to industrialisation. This trend was hastened by the oil crisis in 1973-74. In 
its wake, the tanker market all but collapsed and this had serious ongoing 
effects on the shipbuilding industries of Argentina, Brazil, West Germany, 
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Taiwan, 
and the United Kingdom.12 Between 1974 and 1976 the annual volume of 
ship orders placed worldwide had dropped by more than half and had not 
recovered by the mid-1980s.13
Japanese dominance in shipbuilding came under increasing competi-
tive strain from the 1980s onwards. In the 1990s South Korea attempted 
10 For this, see Murphy, “’No Longer Competitive with Continental Shipbuilders’”.
11 A very good introduction to this topic is Todd, Industrial Dislocation.
12 For an excellent country study on the effects of the tanker market collapse, see, Tenold, 
Tankers in Trouble. See also this volume’s Appendix 1.
13 Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant, 270.
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to overtake Japan in overall output, aided by huge government support. 
Few commentators could have foreseen how successful it would become. 
Without prior experience, South Korea’s major shipbuilder, Hyundai Heavy 
Industries, with British technical and logistical support, began building its 
f irst very large crude carrier in 1973 on a greenfield site at Ulsan. Less than a 
decade later Hyundai was easily the world’s largest shipbuilding firm. Japan, 
in contrast to South Korea, had a far larger domestic mercantile marine, 
and remained the world’s leading shipbuilding nation to the end of the 
century, sustaining its shipyards by building for domestic shipowners, with 
government support for exports; by intensifying concentration of industrial 
groups and retaining their share of a shrinking global market owing to 
strict control of costs and technological eff iciency, and by increasingly 
concentrating on constructing high value-added ships.
During the global economic crisis from 2008 onwards, the People’s 
Republic of China then overtook South Korea in tonnage constructed. The 
cumulative result of all these shifts is that more than 90 per cent of world 
production now takes place in East Asia (Table 1.1).
Labour costs have been an important driving force behind these changes. 
Although average productivity in Japan is presently seven or eight times 
higher than in China, net output cost in China is lower because average wages 
are less than one-tenth what they are in Japan, as can be seen in Table 1.2.
Table 1.1  World shipbuilding market share in terms of construction volume (in 
percentages)
























































































Sources: For 1955-2005: Sohn, chang, and Song, “technological catching-up and latecomer 
Strategy”, 27 (table 1); for 2010: Review of Maritime transport 2011, 147 (table 6.1)
intRoduc tion 21
Other signif icant factors, however, are steel prices and equipment costs. 
In China around the turn of the century labour costs accounted for about 
one-tenth of total production costs, whereas in South Korea and Japan they 
were about a f ifth of the total.14
Of course these global shifts did not occur smoothly. Their consequences 
for local economies and working populations were immense. By the early 
1980s, largely in the face of East Asian competition, shipyards in Western 
Europe had begun to close.15 In the United Kingdom the bulk of the industry 
was nationalised in 1977 only to be broken up and privatised from 1984 
onwards.16 Sweden, often seen by commentators as a real competitor to 
Japan in bulk shipbuilding, after nationalising its shipyards into one state 
holding company in 1977, abandoned the mercantile side of its industry in 
the 1980s. Although state control of shipbuilding in the UK and Sweden was 
ultimately unsuccessful, it was arguably too little and too late in any event. 
In Western Europe as a whole the total number of shipbuilding employees 
declined by nearly half between 1975 and 1985, from 467,000 to 257,900.17
This process of de-industrialisation through closures met with massive 
resistance. The thousands – and possibly tens of thousands – of shipyard 
workers maintained an intricate internal communications network, had 
considerable occupational pride, and wielded considerable bargaining power 
when in full employment. Most trade unions in the shipbuilding industry 
were strong and as such were amenable to pressuring their employers for 
14 Jiang, “Assessing the Cost Competitiveness of China’s Shipbuilding Industry”, 14.
15 For this period, see Stråth, The Politics of De-Industrialization.
16 The f irst British shipbuilding f irm to be privatised was the loss-making Scott Lithgow 
at Greenock and Port Glasgow. By 1990 all other nationalised f irms had been privatised. See 
Johnman and Murphy, Scott Lithgow, and Johnman and Murphy, British Shipbuilding and the 
State Since 1918.
17 Heseler, Europäische Schiffbaukrise und lokale Arbeitsmärkte, 10.
Table 1.2  Average industrial wages and labour productivity in East Asia, 2000 and 
2009 













2000 0.57 0.009 11.38 0.045 14.17 0.071
2009 1.97 0.016 21.29 0.074 20.24 0.121
Source: Jiang, “assessing the cost competitiveness of china’s Shipbuilding industry”, appendix 1, 
27 note: mh = man-hour; cgt = compensated gross tonnage
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better terms and conditions. However, even in the “good years” from 1950 
to 1970, many had regularly struggled to improve their working conditions 
and obtain higher wages.18 The ongoing decline of the “old” shipbuilding 
industry led to several defensive actions. Some of these conflicts became 
known internationally. One such case is the famous “work-in” campaign 
against closing the Scottish Upper Clyde Shipbuilders (UCS) from June 
1971, in which the workers occupied the company emphasising the “right 
to work” but, with the liquidator’s consent, continued to f ill the orders still 
pending at the yard to demonstrate that the company remained viable. 
The struggle was supported through solidarity strikes and demonstrations, 
drawing many tens of thousands of participants, and through numerous 
f inancial donations to the workers’ shop stewards committee from around 
the world.19 In Gijón in Spain the shipyard was converted to a producers’ 
cooperative.20 In Eastern Europe the Polish shipyards in Gdańsk, Gdynia, 
and Szczecin were hotbeds of social unrest in 1980-81.21
The economic crises of the 1970s and their effects on shipping through to 
the 1980s globally led to a structural change in labour processes and labour 
relations. Shipyards in Finland, Italy, France, West Germany, and Norway 
reoriented their productive resources to high-value cruise ships, container 
ships, gas carriers, oil production platforms, tugboats, and offshore supply 
ships where they held a comparative advantage – albeit temporarily, as f irst 
Japanese, South Korean, and now Chinese shipyards have entered these mar-
kets. The centres of production, due to intense international competition in 
the market for relatively unsophisticated ships began to be relocated to East 
Asia and elsewhere. However, Japanese and South Korean f irms had begun 
to directly invest in foreign shipyards, usually by taking minority shares in 
shipyards in countries such as Brazil, China, Finland, France, Norway, the 
Philippines, Romania, and Vietnam. Outsourcing of hull production to low-
cost producers became a feature of modern shipbuilding, with hulls being 
towed for f itting-out elsewhere. Naval warship building is still present in the 
Atlantic region, because governments wish to retain control over production 
of their own military weaponry, and many repairs are performed there.22
18 See, e.g., Cameron, “Post-War Strikes”; Jüres and Kühl, Gewerkschaftspolitik der KPD nach 
dem Krieg; Birke, Wilde Streiks im Wirtschaftswunder. 
19 UCS has been covered extensively in the literature. See, for example, Thompson and Hart, 
The UCS Work-In; McGill, Crisis on the Clyde; Herron, Labour Market in Crisis.
20 See Ruben Vega García’s chapter (Chapter 9) in this volume. 
21 See Sarah Graber Majchrzak’s chapter (Chapter 12) in this volume.
22 Under the Treaty of Rome, warship building is exempt from European Economic Community-
wide competitive tendering. Merchant shipbuilding, on the other hand, is not.
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These methods had a distinct effect on employment and encouraged the 
increased use of sub-contract and f ixed-term labour over the retention of 
permanent mostly unionised workforces. Such was the effect of increased 
international competition that the world’s leading shipbuilder for decades, 
Japan, reorganised its shipbuilding industry to combat South Korean ad-
vances in the market. In April 1976, 23 Japanese shipbuilding companies 
and 51 yards employed in their shipbuilding divisions a total of 110,235 
employees, of whom 28,869 were staff and 81,366 workers. In addition there 
were 31,340 sub-contract workers. By April 2013, the total of employees in 17 
companies and 35 yards had been reduced to 22,295, of which 9,034 were 
staff and 13,261 workers, with an additional 24,218 sub-contract workers.23
This contraction of employment in Japan was mirrored elsewhere and 
also reflected changing technology and methods of construction and as-
sembly, such as block welding in building docks enabling faster delivery of 
ships. These methods of construction required initial heavy and continued 
capital investment in facilities, plant, and equipment, aided in Japan and 
South Korea by the conglomerate structures of f irms and by government aid. 
Such is the huge cost of setting up a greenfield shipyard to be internationally 
competitive that most private companies would baulk at doing so without 
substantial state support. It is likely, then, given the huge costs involved in 
establishing a modern shipbuilding industry, that the three leading ship-
building countries at present, China, South Korea and Japan, which account 
for more than 90 per cent of new orders, will remain so in future, and that 
communist China will increasingly concentrate on sophisticated tonnage.
Social relations in the remaining shipyards have largely changed. In 
many, the various tasks are no longer performed by different groups of 
craft workers employed by one large company but are outsourced. The 
core company has become much smaller and relies on several divested or 
autonomous suppliers. In addition, the core company and suppliers have 
far fewer employees and recruit more f ixed-term or self-employed workers.
* * *
The historiography of these developments since the Second World War has 
been sketchy. For some countries (e.g., Britain, Germany, Sweden), in addition 
to business and economic historians writing thorough business histories 
about shipyards, labour historians have devoted considerable attention to 
23 The Shipbuilders Association of Japan, Shipbuilding Statistics at September 2013, employ-
ment f igures at 1 April 2013.
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work and employment relations of shipbuilding workers, However, research 
is still rudimentary for other countries. This is especially the case for the 
People’s Republic of China, about which remarkably little is known. In some 
cases, historians have examined economic aspects of shipbuilding, but 
have yet to address the social and labour aspects. The second problem is 
that specialists in the history of individual shipyards, regions, or countries 
have thus far communicated little with one another. This is in part due to 
language barriers, as well as to organisational and financial restrictions that 
all too often impede transcontinental academic co-operation.
In 2010 in this context at the International Institute of Social History in 
Amsterdam the idea arose of studying changes in shipbuilding worldwide 
since 1950 with a team of like-minded historians. (The Institute had previ-
ously formed similar teams dedicated to dockers and textile workers, and 
these projects were completed successfully.24) The project was conceived as 
an international-comparative enterprise from a global-history perspective.25 
A team of authors was assembled and at a meeting in Amsterdam in 2013, 
following lengthy discussion, a list of twenty points for consideration was 
adopted for each contributor to address if possible. Together, these points 
reflect the volume’s central themes: the political and economic contexts 
and environments of separate shipyards; the social characteristics of the 
employed workers, and their work, struggles, and cultures; and the power 
relations within and beyond the shipyards.
1 Production
1 What was the role of the shipyard in the national economy?
2 Which type of shipbuilding labour (construction or repair) was 
prevalent?
3 Which kind of ships were/are built in the shipyard(s) and what changes 
in production occurred?
4 What technological developments took place in shipbuilding? How did 
this influence production and labour relations?
24 Davies et al. (eds), Dock Workers; Heerma van Voss, Hiemstra, and van Nederveen Meerkerk 
(eds), The Ashgate Companion to the History of Textile Workers.
25 On global labour history, see, for example, van der Linden and Lucassen, Prolegomena for 
a Global Labour History; Lucassen (ed.), Global Labour History; and van der Linden, Workers of 
the World.
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5 What was the size of the shipyard(s), and what percentages and numbers 
were involved in production?
6 What changes occurred in the nature and extent of production and 
workforce? How can these changes be explained?
7 What was the role of the state in the shipyard(s)? Were they state- or 
privately owned? If private, did the f irm get any kind of subsidies?
2 The workers
1 How were/are shipbuilding workers recruited? What was/is their social 
background? What changes took place and how can they be explained?
2 What was the specif ic age and gender composition of the workforce?
3 What were/are the labour conditions of the workers (hours, payment, etc.)?
4 What were/are the living circumstances of the workers?
5 What are the influences of these workers on the social environment 
they live in?
6a What forms of labour protest occurred? How they were organised and 
who took part?
6b What were/are the labour strategies of resistance to privatisation?
6c What were/are labour strategies of resistance to the relocation?
6d What was/is the role of the unions, workers’ committees, workers’ 
commissions, organisations, in labour struggles?
7 To what extent did a specif ic work culture develop? 
8 To what extent was/is there international solidarity between shipyard 
workers?
3 Production relations
1 How was shipbuilding production organised? What were/is the position 
of the owners/management and workers?
2 What changes occurred in the organisation of the production, and how 
can they be explained?
3 How did specialisation and managerial policy relate to strategies to 
handle crises in the industry?
4 What role did trade unions, employers’ organisations (both national 
and international) and other forms of labour organisation play?
5 What was/is the influence of the state/regime in labour relations and 
labour struggles?
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It was clear from the outset that the data available would be insuff icient to 
answer all these questions: the existing scholarship is far too uneven at this 
time. This is clearly reflected in the present collection of essays. In some 
parts entrepreneurial aspects receive greater emphasis, while in others the 
workers are the main focus.
* * *
Hugh Murphy, in his study of Britain, analyses the relative and then absolute 
decline of volume shipbuilding in what was the world’s major shipbuild-
ing country for nearly a century, against the background of international 
competition and its effects on labour. In an industry with a plethora of trade 
unions, where entry and apprenticeship were strictly controlled, unions 
over time achieved security of employment, better working conditions, 
and a shorter working week. The institutional nature of industrial rela-
tions and its procedural intricacies were not conducive to rapid change as 
the encroachment of international competition became serious from the 
1960s onwards. Only when the industry was in dire straits post-OPEC and 
under nationalisation did trade unions and management attempt a truly 
constructive dialogue. The old method of individual collective bargaining 
was swept aside, and managed contraction of the workforce through a state-
funded redundancy programme was instituted. A change of government in 
1979 eventually ushered in a programme of privatisation in 1984, by which 
stage the rump of merchant shipbuilders remaining under nationalised 
control was rapidly shrinking. By 1990, volume merchant shipbuilding 
in Britain had disappeared in what was a long-drawn-out dénouement. 
The warship-building sector was quickly rationalised, and ship repair was 
only a shadow of its former self. Social provisions ameliorated hardship, 
and workers with industry-transferrable skills, such as electricians and 
plumbers, found alternative employment. Most of the older metal-working 
workforce failed to find alternative employment as the UK economy became 
more service-oriented, and manufacturing declined during the 1990s and 
thereafter.
Johanna Wolf ref lects on the history of the Bremer Vulkan shipyard 
until its closure in 1997, and the West German shipbuilding industry in 
general. Following the relevant historiography she notes how certain nar-
ratives were established as a result of developments in the West German 
shipbuilding industry. The historical situation makes it clear why the 
narrative of decline was sharply pronounced. West German shipbuilding 
workers belonged to one super-union, IG Metall, which had cross-sectoral 
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membership across German industry. Not least through the importance of 
IG Metall in the German economy as a whole, subsidies and aid packages to 
shipbuilding from the federal government and by the regional Länder were 
commonplace, and were used to support mergers and restructurings, and 
latterly to avoid bankruptcies. In her conclusion, she suggests some aspects 
of how comparative approaches and entangled history could generate a 
new impetus.
Tobias Karlsson shows that Kockums in Malmö, Sweden, was one of 
the major ship producers globally in the 1950s and 1960s. The shipyard 
experienced a f inal boom in the early 1970s but could not be saved from 
nationalisation and restructuring in the aftermath of the OPEC oil crisis of 
1973-1974. By 1979, Kockums had been nationalised under the state-owned 
Svenska Varv, and in 1986 production of ships for civilian use ceased at 
Kockums, ending a tradition of more than a century. Karlsson analyses 
how production, workers, and production relations developed at Kockums 
during the period 1950-1986, and notes that Kockums’ national, regional, 
and international importance makes it a relevant case in a global history 
of shipbuilding workers. Around 1960, as in Finland, about 90 per cent of 
the work done in Sweden was by piecework. As the average serial length of 
production became shorter, the costs of rationalisation – for example, in 
the form of excess personnel turnover and absenteeism – became increas-
ingly obvious. Contemporaneously, Swedish shipyards were not immune 
to international competition, but the situation appeared to improve in the 
early 1970s when the industry experienced a boom. Huge investments in 
dry docks and cranes were made in Gothenburg, Malmö, and Uddevalla. 
Capacity increases were supported by the Swedish government. By 1973, 
Kockums was the biggest shipyard outside Japan, and the self-confidence of 
management was at its peak. With the immediate and ongoing effects of the 
OPEC crisis, particularly in very large crude carrier (VLCC) construction, 
boom quickly turned to bust. Kockums did not receive a single order in 
1974. By 1975, the total number of shipbuilding workers in Sweden was at the 
same level as in 1960. Thereafter, there followed a period of rationalisation, 
nationalisation, and plant closures. By 1990, the total number of shipbuild-
ing workers was below 10,000 and corresponded to less than 1 per cent of 
blue-collar employment in the manufacturing sector. The big shipowners, 
who had been close allies to the shipyards, had deserted the industry. Post-
1977, nationalisation and the subsequent restructuring and reductions in 
the labour force were generally accepted by the trade unions. Although 
there were local protests, the main response of the Swedish Metal Workers’ 
Union to demand replacement jobs for redundant workers.
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Hans-Jakob Ågotnes and Jan Heiret give an overview of the path of de-
velopment of the Norwegian shipbuilding industry after 1945, and discuss 
the changing conditions of the labour force and labour relations in the 
industry, both nationwide and in individual workplaces. They posit three 
main questions: what industrial relations were established in the shipbuild-
ing industry, what social relations in the workplace did they correspond 
to, and how did they develop during the differing phases of the post-war 
era? They argue that a basic precondition for the Norwegian shipbuilding 
industry’s growth phase up to the OPEC crisis was continuous productivity 
gains, which they state must be understood as a result not of mechanisation, 
but of changes in the organisation of work, and consider the rationale of 
both investments in heavy mechanical plant and equipment and changes 
in the wage system as a means to organise work more eff iciently. By way of 
case studies they consider the shipyards of Bergens Mekaniske Verksteder 
(BMV) and Stord Verft. Both subsumed into the Aker group of shipyards, 
with Stord concentrating on VLCC construction. Post-OPEC the Norwegian 
government at f irst met the situation with counter-cyclical measures, giving 
f inancial support to the shipbuilding industry. However, by the end of 
the decade the state declared that it would not in the future favour any 
given branches of production. Fortuitously, oil and gas extraction in the 
Norwegian sector of the North Sea gave both the Aker and the Kvaerner 
group of shipyards the opportunity to remain prominent post-OPEC, and 
both successfully diversif ied their production into offshore platforms on 
the back of Norway’s oil and gas boom. By 2002, these two principal groups 
merged. This Aker-owned group was formed in 2004 with the merger with 
the French conglomerate Alstom, with yards at St Nazaire and Lorient. 
But in 2007 Aker sold out of Aker Yards, and the South Korean-controlled 
STX Europe took over. Aker then organised its activities in the offshore 
installations market in the multi-national Aker Solutions. BMV had been 
sold to local interests in 1983, and underwent other changes of ownership 
afterwards. By 2007, the f irm changed its name to the Bergen Group; its 
strategy is to supply high-tech products in shipbuilding and in offshore 
work.
Kari Teräs’s chapter analyses how production reforms and labour rela-
tions of the shipbuilding industry in Turku, Finland, were interrelated in the 
shipyard of Crichton-Vulcan in the post-1945 period. As was the case in the 
UK, production reforms were slowed down by strong craft traditions, which 
characterised the operation of the shipyard until the 1980s. There were 
rigid boundaries between different occupational groups, and each group 
promoted its own interests with regard to separate payment; all essential 
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occupational groups had their own shop stewards. Under these conditions, 
the employees had relatively extensive control over the production process, 
as part of the design work that was still carried out at the factory f loor 
level. As new technology such as welding gained ground in the late 1950s 
and later work processes such as block assembly became more centralised, 
industrial relations began to change. Despite this, however, in the 1970s 
and at the beginning of the 1980s, shipbuilding was the most strike-prone 
branch in the heavy engineering sector and in the Finnish economy as a 
whole. Only at the end of the 1980s was the idea of abandoning piecerates 
accepted by workers at the Turku shipyard. The markets and employment 
levels of Finnish shipyards fell nearly a decade later than their Western 
competitors as the Finnish shipyard crisis did not start until the late 1980s. 
Exports to the USSR, hitherto a staple of the industry, began to decrease, 
and the shipyards were unable to find a substitute market. To compound the 
situation, the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991 brought to an end most 
of the bilateral trade between the countries. Throughout the recession the 
state refused to pay direct production subsidies to the shipyards. Thereafter, 
the Turku yard was subject to numerous changes of name and ownership 
including Norwegian, South Korean, and now German control. To date, its 
future remains uncertain.
Sjaak van der Velden examines the highly unionised Dutch shipbuild-
ing industry, which grew steadily to the end of the 1950s and peaked in 
the mid-1970s. Nominal wages rose year after year until the mid-1970s as 
well. Strike frequency was very high during the 1950s, declined during the 
1960s, rose again in the 1970s, and then returned to the level of the 1950s. 
Since the mid-1960s shipbuilding had been confronted by the full force of 
international competition. The Dutch state became involved and urged 
mergers of the big companies (“the seven sisters”) to reap economies of scale 
and scope. These mergers did not result in Dutch shipbuilding remaining 
competitive, and job losses ensued, though the yards could still occupy 
some vibrant market niches. As in the UK, social provisions ameliorated 
the effects of unemployment.
Giulia Strippoli, Davide Tabor, and Luciano Villani examine the histori-
cal prof ile of Sestri Ponente shipyard, Genoa, in relation to three themes: 
employment and labour composition; production trends and changes in 
the organisation of work; and workplace struggles that took place during 
the Republican period to aff irm the role of the workers in the company, 
and to avoid the closure of a highly productive shipyard. The importance of 
the local Italian context in which the shipyard stands seems to go beyond 
the issue of employment, embracing the physiognomy of a territory in its 
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broadest sense, embedded in cultural and communal identity processes 
over a long period. This identity has flourished in the past two centuries 
and has been forged around the knowledge and special skills learned and 
passed down through generations by the Sestri Ponente shipyard workers. 
Although many of its constituent elements remained intact, Sestri Ponente 
eventually declined as a result of economic, productive, and social changes, 
but the construction of cruise liners under the state-owned Fincantieri gave 
the yard an alternative to closure.
José Gómez Alén’s study of Bazán-Ferrol in Galicia encompasses the 
growth of Spanish shipbuilding and the struggles of workers in the Francoist 
era to influence their collective futures. The percentage of Spanish output 
produced in the shipyards in Ferrol-Bazán and the nearby ASTANO shipyard 
at Fene more than doubled during the mid-1960s rising from 20 per cent of 
the Spanish total in 1964 to 43 per cent in 1967. ASTANO had been laid out 
for VLCC construction, and in the post-OPEC climate it and much of the 
industry suffered from lack of demand and overcapacity, which required 
reorientation of productive resources of Bazán- Ferrol to both mercantile 
and naval work to the internal market for the Spanish navy. Modernisation 
of the yard’s facilities and retraining of the workforce to undertake more 
demanding warship construction ensued. The building of a new dry dock 
gave the option of lucrative repair work. In the run-up to Spain’s accession 
to the European Union in 1986, Bazán-Ferrol did not remain unaffected. 
The company thereafter implemented a series of measures to reduce pro-
duction costs and to reduce its workforce, which gradually diminished in 
successive viability plans until 1999 when the Plan for the Future gave 2,125 
workers early retirement. In 2000, the Spanish government commitment 
to the restructuring of the public shipbuilding sector led to Bazán-Ferrol 
joining the newly created state conglomerate IZAR, founded in December 
2000 following the merger of Astilleros Españoles SA (AESA) and Empresa 
Nacional Bazán. IZAR’s activities were spread throughout Spain and it 
had around 10,700 employees. Around half of the sales concerned warship 
production. Its component companies contained loss-making shipyards, 
and then profitable yards such as Bazán-Ferrol had to take a share of the 
losses of IZAR as a whole. Spanish government attempts to prop up IZAR 
through subsidies occasioned an investigation by the European Union 
Commission, which ruled in October 2004 that state aid to IZAR was not 
compatible with EC state aid rules and had to be recovered. In response, 
the Spanish state transferred IZAR’s warship-building yards to a new 
public company, Navantia, owned by the state-holding company, Sociedad 
Estatal de Participaciones Industriales (SEPI). The former Bazán-Ferrol 
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shipyard building was to be supplemented by the old ASTANO shipyard 
at Fene. Navantia also had yards at Cadiz, San Fernando-Puerto Real, and 
Cartagena. Under Navantia, Bazán-Ferrol concentrated on warship work 
for the Norwegian and Australian navies, while workers’ representatives 
attempted to stabilise employment around a core group of workers. Today 
the future of Navantia Bazán-Ferrol-Fene is uncertain.
Rubén Vega García traces the history of shipbuilding in Gijón, Asturias, 
before and after the Franco dictatorship, through its various reincarnations 
and changes of ownership. What is apparent throughout is the extraordinar-
ily antagonistic and confrontational nature of labour relations as Gijón 
shipbuilding struggled to remain in business in the decades following the 
1970s through to the formation of a new company (Naval Gijón) in 1985 
and beyond, resulting in widespread social unrest as strikers barricaded 
parts of the municipality on a regular basis and strike leaders were arrested 
and imprisoned. Naval Gijón closed its gates and ceased all activity on 
31 May 2009. In the following months, its facilities were dismantled, and 
cranes and gates that enclosed the dry dock were scrapped. The speed that 
administrators of property exhibited in this scrapping and the passive 
attitude shown by the authorities seemed to indicate a desire to erase as 
soon as possible the most visible vestiges of an uncomfortable memory 
starring an extraordinarily confrontational collective of workers.
Jorge Fontes establishes the context for the opening of the giant Setenave 
shipyard some 40 km south of Lisbon and 12 km from Setúbal. Estaleiros 
Navais de Setúbal was off icially formed on 6 August 1974 at Mitrena in 
Setúbal to cope with increased demand, both for ship repairing and 
shipbuilding, and in the latter case was expected to undertake VLCC 
construction. This strategy was dashed by the continuing effects of the 
world economic crisis of 1973-1974; the company commenced operations 
on 16 June 1975, by which stage it had been nationalised by the Portuguese 
state. From the outset Setenave built ship hulls and block sections of oil 
tankers for Swedish shipyards, which were then towed to Sweden to be 
f itted out. In this international division of labour, Setenave provided a 
cheap and flexible labour force and Swedish yards retained overall control 
including design. The shipyard was initially projected to build VLCCs on 
its own account, but the contraction of the world market post-OPEC forced 
this change in strategy. Subsequently, a decision to readapt the shipyard 
towards ship repairing activities was crucial to the economic survival of 
the enterprise, repairing not only VLCCs but also other types of ships as 
well as oil platforms, or even assisting shipyards in the former Portuguese 
colonies. The election of a neo-liberal government in 1987 paved the way 
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for the denationalisation of the Portuguese economy, and by 1989 Setenave 
was acquired by a private company, Solisnor, a consortium between Lisnave, 
Soponata, and a Norwegian company. Solisnor managed the Mitrena facili-
ties for f ive years, after which control was passed to Lisnave, which closed 
its own shipyard on the south bank of the Tagus and focused solely on 
Mitrena, reorienting it to ship repair, modernising its facilities from 1997, 
and adding three Panamax-size drydocks at the turn of the millennium. 
Fontes traces the evolution of labour relations in the shipyard through 
various social pacts and changes of ownership and product orientation. 
Under Lisnave, the yard was reoriented solely towards repair and conversion 
work, a strategy confirmed in 2000 when the Lisnave shipyard in Margueira 
was closed. That f lexibility of labour was pursued was indicative of the 
company’s strategy. With a high average employee age, Lisnave instigated 
a youth training programme. In response to opposition from trade unions, 
Lisnave formed a new company in 2009 to hire all future employees, Lisnave 
Naval Services (LDA). This fundamentally changed labour relations in the 
company and remains the case today.
Raquel Varela and Ana Rajado trace the history of the Rocha shipyards 
in Lisbon including Lisnave to 1974. They note that Lisnave was from 1967 
(when a new shipyard at Margueira was opened with the aid of Dutch and 
Swedish shipbuilding f irms) to 1984 the locus of Portugal’s highest concen-
tration of workers (at its peak it had 9,000 permanent employees), and that 
Lisnave’s workers played a seminal part in the Portuguese social revolution 
of 1974, when 7,000 workers marched in the streets of the capital against 
the Popular Front government. These popular protests eventually led to the 
establishment of a new Portuguese Constitution in 1976. However, political 
instability remained a feature of Portuguese government. It was also in 
these shipyards during the early 1980s that the f irst company agreement 
that helped consolidate the social pact in Portugal was signed. Portugal’s 
accession to the EU in 1986 altered the political and economic dynamics 
of the country. However, by the 1990s, the model of restructuring applied 
in Lisnave saw a massive replacement of workers on standard terms and 
conditions of employment (guaranteed working week, agreed wages and 
conditions, pensions etc.) towards more precarious short-term contracts, 
and increased use of sub-contractors. The closure of Margueira in 2000 
and the move to one location at Mitrena, to concentrate on ship repair 
and conversion, led to an increasing emphasis on precarious employment 
practices as older workers with consolidated rights retired.
Sarah Graber Majchrzak’s chapter on the state-owned (from 1946) Lenin 
shipyard in Gdańsk, Poland, concentrates on production relations and 
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workers’ conflicts in the 1970s and 1980s, and the shipyard’s iconic status 
in the changing political landscape of Poland before and after the founda-
tion of the Solidarność (Solidarity) labour movement there in 1980. Like 
Romania, Poland was an original member of COMECON, and orders from 
the Soviet Union in the immediate post-war period and thereafter aided 
the Polish shipbuilding industry but also challenged it. As in Romania, in 
the People’s Republic of Poland the means of production were the property 
of the state. Thus, the profit motive was absent, but f irms had to bargain 
with the centralised state for resources, materials, plant, investments, and 
workforces etc., to maintain or increase output. Accordingly, there was 
a year-on-year lack of certainty of the level of resources f irms would be 
allocated. Scarcity, and management’s responses to it, influenced the labour 
process and labour relations in the Polish shipbuilding industry. In the 
centralised bureaucratic system, management accumulated resources to 
win workers’ support to fulf il planned targets, and demanded from the 
workers at least minimal co-operation to secure the plan’s fulf ilment. In 
turn, workers expected management to secure their living standards, and 
to enhance workplace conditions. Management largely ceded production 
to workers; and compensated for their insuff icient control of output by 
the bargaining process with the state. Accordingly, labour standards were 
lax. Throughout the 1960s the Polish economy, with its emphasis on heavy 
industry, stagnated in other sectors, notably agriculture. Shortages became 
commonplace. By December 1970 workers at the Lenin shipyard went on 
strike, but their protest was brutally repressed by the Gomulka regime, 
and resulted in signif icant fatalities. These events prompted a change 
of leadership in the Polish Communist Party, and a change of economic 
priorities, with a willingness to seek co-operation from the workers. The 
process of modernising the Polish economy was to be pursued by import-
ing Western know-how and technology, and drifting away from economic 
orientation towards the Eastern bloc. The ambitious aim was to integrate 
Poland into the global market by modernising its economy. This, in train, 
for a time brought moderate liberalisation at every social level and led to 
growth in the level of consumption and average incomes. From the mid-
1970s onwards the economy contracted after the global economic crisis 
sparked by the oil price rises of 1973-1974. Exports stagnated and the costs 
of imports rocketed. The consequent recession was not due only to external 
factors but also to the internal problems of the Polish planned economy. 
Decades of underinvestment, barriers to innovation, a corrupt bureaucratic 
elite, rigid management, and a general disorganisation prevalent in the 
economy contributed to the socio-economic problems of the late-1970s. 
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Accordingly, at the Lenin shipyard, the modernisation programme that 
had begun post-1974 stalled and remained unfinished, and productivity 
decreased dramatically. By the advent of the 1980s the Polish economy 
had stagnated, and in the summer of 1980 workers at the Lenin shipyard 
embarked on a major strike, which soon spread to other shipyards. The 
strikers’ most important demand was to legalise an independent free trade 
union. Ultimately, in August 1980, the f irst independent union, Solidarność, 
was founded. The union was allowed to operate until 13 December 1981, 
when General Wojciech Jaruzelski proclaimed martial law; most of the 
union activists were arrested and the union was again forbidden. The 1980s 
proved economically and politically challenging for Poland and the Lenin 
shipyard, which was threatened with closure from 1988; a year later Poland 
abandoned communism and embraced free market capitalism. The state 
took a 60 per cent share in the Lenin Shipyard, with the workers taking 
40 per cent, with the yard renamed the Gdańsk Shipyard. Thereafter, the 
yard was more successful, but the situation changed from 2005 onwards 
and experienced a radical turn in 2008 when the EU Commission on 6 No-
vember 2008 concluded that state aid granted to the shipyards in Gdynia 
and Szczecin was in breach of EC state aid rules and had to be repaid. 
Contemporaneously, the looming global economic crisis, which had begun 
in the USA in 2008, hit the Polish shipbuilding industry hard. Due to this 
and the ending of state subsidisation, the Gdynia (2009) and the Szczecin 
Shipyards (2011) were closed and all their machinery was sold off. Since then 
the Gdańsk Shipyard has hovered on the edge of bankruptcy, work has been 
intermittent, and the workforce has been drastically reduced.
Constantin Ardealanu’s chapter on shipbuilding in the Danubian port city 
of Galaţi, which remained the centre of Romania’s shipbuilding industry 
throughout the socialist era, highlights the all-encompassing nature of 
state control of industry in Romania. From 1947, the communist authorities 
imposed an ambitious programme of industrialisation. Romanian industri-
alisation closely followed the Soviet model; COMECON membership gave 
Romania a ready market, although a more nationalist-centred approach 
had emerged by the late 1950s, as political relations between Bucharest 
and Moscow gradually strained. About half of Romania’s total capital 
investments were directed towards developing industrial facilities, with 
four-fifths allocated to the heavy and machine construction industry, as the 
basis of further economic progress. Between 1950 and 1965 industry grew 
6.5 times and heavy industry 8.2 times. Following Nicolae Ceauşescu’s ac-
cession to power in 1965, Romania took a more independent course towards 
industrial independence. Ambitious growth targets meant that industry had 
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to be further streamlined and modernised, a goal aided during the 1970s 
with Western funding, technology and know-how. By this stage, the Soviet 
decision of curtailing transfers of shipbuilding licences forced Romania to 
further invest in developing its shipbuilding industry by constructing a 
national riverine and maritime fleet to diminish the country’s dependence 
on foreign ships, increase its exports, and earn hard currency. Each shipyard 
had a clear specialisation in a strongly centralised shipbuilding industry. 
Galaţi was to build ships of 20,000-25,000 dwt and to gradually increase 
its capacity to vessels of 38,000-40,000 dwt as the yard was modernised. 
Romania’s intent to build up its shipbuilding industry led to shipyards 
being built from scratch at Tulcea, Mangalia, and Hârşova, enabling the 
country to enter VLCC construction for export purposes. Ceauşescu’s 
regime, backed up by his secret police, the Securitate, became increasingly 
dictatorial, and an export drive that began in the early 1980s to reduce 
foreign debt led to internal dissent as shortages of food and other essentials 
intensified. By December 1989 the Romanian people could no longer endure 
Ceauşescu’s tyranny, and his regime was overthrown, with Ceauşescu and 
his wife executed by an army f iring squad. Clearly, with Romania in a state 
of revolutionary f lux, the old shibboleths that had sustained the Galaţi 
shipyard and that had resulted in the exponential growth of the city were 
no longer applicable. The workforce now had to face the harsh realities of 
Western and East Asian competition and cuts to jobs. During the 1990s in 
an extremely diff icult market, the yard survived by building ship hulls for 
Western contractors, and was f inally privatised in 1999, when 99 per cent 
of the shares were purchased by the Dutch Damen Shipyards Group.
Robin Dearmon Muhammad sets the trajectory of the high cost and 
protectionist US shipbuilding industry in the f irst half of the twentieth 
century in context; she then explores the impact of the declining industry 
on shipyard workers after 1950. During this period US industrial workers 
faced many challenges particularly as urban de-industrialisation led to wage 
stagnation and accelerated unemployment. However, US shipyard workers 
who remained employed were also among the highest-paid industrial work-
ers in the country. As US merchant shipbuilding declined, the role of federal 
government and specif ically the US Maritime Administration (MARAD) 
became increasingly important as private output of large merchant ships 
rapidly diminished by the end of the twentieth century. For the shipyard 
workers who remained in the industry, an increased dependence on federal 
naval contracts meant comparatively stable wages, but at the expense of 
shrinking employment. Moreover, labour legislation in the late twentieth 
century extended protections and forms of redress to US shipyard and other 
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industrial workers, but such protective labour policies proved inadequate 
for many who worked in welding and other shipyard trades. She examines 
how and why US shipbuilding shifted from supporting both private and 
naval production to an almost exclusive reliance on naval shipbuilding, 
and demonstrates the transformation of the US shipyard worker during 
the late twentieth century.
Cintia Russo’s chapter analyses the growth and survival of one of the 
oldest and largest ship repair yards in Argentina, Talleres Dársena Norte 
(TANDANOR), founded in 1879, and today known as the Complejo Industrial 
Naval Argentino (CINAR). In addition to contextualising the history of the 
Argentine shipbuilding industry, she highlights the roles played by the state 
and by trade unions. In addition to its symbolic status as one of the oldest 
shipyards in Argentina, TANDANOR was the f irst to be privatised in 1991, 
following a neo-liberal agenda, which encompassed privatisation of state-
owned companies, market deregulation, and commercial liberalisation. 
The yard continued under private ownership until 1999, when it reverted 
to workers’ control until renationalisation in 2007. After 1950, TANDANOR’s 
unions were Peronist in inclination and their belief in the state and industry 
interests coalescing in a form of national corporatism remained. Follow-
ing the army-led coup d’état of March 1976, union activists were targeted 
repeatedly and persecuted by off icial and paramilitary repression. During 
the military dictatorship (1976-83), TANDANOR had a strong link with the 
interests of the Argentinean navy, and controls on the workers and the work 
process within the shipyard were intensif ied. After renationalisation, in 
2009 TANDANOR and the Almirante Storni shipyard formed the Complejo 
Industrial Naval Argentino (CINAR), a company 90 per cent owned by the 
Argentinean Ministry of Defence, with 10 per cent of its equity in the hands 
of workers. Russo sees TANDANOR as a representative example of the peaks 
and troughs of the Argentinean economy.
In her chapter, Juliana Frasso concurs with Cintia Russo that the devel-
opment of the shipbuilding industry in Argentina was characterised by 
strong state intervention. She adopts a case-study approach in analysing 
Argentina’s largest and most signif icant state-owned shipyard: Astillero 
Rio Santiago (ARS) and highlights the most signif icant developments in 
production, employment, working conditions, and industrial relations at 
the shipyard in the last half-century. In doing so, she traces the history of 
ARS, its relationship with the National Industrial Policy and the role of 
the state. She describes the characteristics of production and organisa-
tion of labour in the shipyard, working conditions and the features of the 
internal labour market, and the specif ic work culture built around the 
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shipyard, highlighting the material and symbolic aspects that supported 
it, and analyses the recent history and current characteristics of labour 
relations in the company. She also focuses on two key points in the history of 
labour disputes in the shipyard: workers’ strategies during the last military 
dictatorship in Argentina (1976-1983) and resistance to privatisation in the 
1990s. Lastly, she reflects upon developments in ARS, remarking on the 
current organisational and productive challenges, and the place that social 
actors (especially unions) have within the enterprise.
Claudiana Guedes de Jesus’s chapter analyses the changes that took place 
in labour relations and activities within the Brazilian shipbuilding industry 
during the recovery period in activity in the main shipyards from the late 
1990s onwards. She describes the beginning of and subsequent increase 
in the regional employment decentralisation process in the country’s 
shipbuilding industry; and considers variables, mainly those linked to the 
number of jobs, school level attained, time working in the same company, 
age and wage rates, and analyses information regarding manpower costs 
and productivity. The Brazilian shipbuilding industry’s recovery relied on a 
significant increase in the number of jobs to satisfy mainly domestic demand 
in shipbuilding and offshore work. Improved certainty in the provision of 
domestic orders gave rise to an increase in the need for trained manpower 
linked to shorter work contracts and to the hiring of younger individuals as 
well as to lower salaries and the use of outsourcing programmes. With the 
exception of China, Brazil has lower manpower costs and a lower number of 
engineers relative to the total number of employees in the industry globally. 
The recovery of the Brazilian shipbuilding industry has been marked, sub-
stantially aided by demand from Petrobras/Transpetro. Guedes concludes 
that a potentially new era for the shipbuilding industry in Brazil, which 
goes beyond the “recovery period”, is possible, not only in fulfilling domestic 
demand but also in reducing dependence on foreign technologies.
Elina G. da Fonte and Luisa Barbosa Pereira’s chapter analyses how 
labour relations developed in the shipyards Caneco/Rio Nave and Mauá 
(Rio de Janeiro) from 1950 to 2011, with emphasis on production relations 
and workers’ conditions. They also reflect on the essential role of the state 
in the Brazilian shipbuilding industry; the labour process under different 
conditions, including military rule; the prof ile of the workers and their 
culture; forms of collective resistance; and the trajectory of their trade 
unions. They aim to show the centrality of Caneco/ Rio Nave and Mauá 
to the development of the shipbuilding industry in Brazil. Although both 
are privately owned shipyards, government f inancial support was vital to 
their continued survival. Despite the huge changes that took place in the 
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Brazilian shipbuilding industry from the 1950s until today, shipbuilding 
workers did not lose their degree of autonomy and have retained a distinct 
workers’ culture: it is a culture of solidarity, that has made them one of the 
most important categories of workers in Brazil, and that, in recent years, 
aided them in improving their terms and conditions of employment through 
various forms of collective action. Foreign direct investment in shipbuilding 
was encouraged. By 1978, Brazilian shipbuilding output, largely due to VLCC 
construction at the Japanese-owned Ishibrás and Dutch-owned Verolme 
shipyards, was second only to that of Japan. A year later, the shipbuilding 
workforce in Brazil comprised 39,155 workers. This high point of activity 
did not last. A prolonged recession ensured from the late 1980s and 1990s 
resulting in dwindling orderbooks and underutilisation of capacity, and 
from the mid- to late 1990s onwards the vast majority of workers in all 
Brazilian shipyards lost their jobs. By 1998, with a mere 149,117 dwt delivered, 
only 1,880 workers were employed. During the 1990s neo-liberal approaches 
to the economy were in the ascendancy. Subsidies and government financial 
support to the shipbuilding industry had ended in the late 1980s. The politi-
cal situation changed only in the 2000s, when the government of president 
Lula da Silva introduced a strong policy to rebuild and reorient the Brazilian 
shipbuilding industry through support from the state-owned Petrobras.
Lisa Milner’s chapter on Cockatoo Island Dockyard, Sydney, Australia’s 
largest post-First World War Commonwealth employer, highlights the 
complexity of its trade union membership, where, although there were 
twenty-two trade unions on site, most workers were covered by six. Com-
pulsory arbitration of disputes had been in force since 1906, but despite 
this there was a long history of demarcation and industrial disputes. The 
dockyard went through a number of changes of ownership, but from 1946 
to 1986 it was owned by the British shipbuilder Vickers Armstrong (later 
Vickers Ltd). Prior to this, workers were essentially casualised, as was 
the case in the United Kingdom, but this precariousness of employment 
was largely ameliorated in times of high demand, particularly during the 
two world wars. As was the case in the UK, Australian shipbuilding and 
repair workers were highly unionised and membership gave exclusive 
entry to the workplace. From 1946, however, the old casualised system of 
recruitment was replaced by a union-administered roster system, which 
led to a more equitable distribution of work for union members in the 
dockyard. The dockyard’s post-war history was nevertheless characterised 
by antagonistic industrial relations, and by the end of the 1970s the global 
effects of competition began to have a marked effect on its prospects. 
The Australian federal government’s decision to privatise its shipbuilding 
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and repair functions in the 1980s marked a turning point for Cockatoo 
Dockyard, but one that led to closure rather than renewal. In 1989, with 
the threat of closure imminent, the workforce occupied the dockyard for 
14 weeks, an action which only delayed its eventual closure. By 1992 the 
dockyard had closed, bringing to a permanent end in to shipbuilding and 
repair on Cockatoo Island, where industrial relations where perhaps the 
most disputatious in the nation.
S. Fahimuddin Pasha’s chapter studies the Indian shipbuilding industry 
with special reference to Maharashstra. Although there has always been 
some shipbuilding in India after independence, the industry’s upturn took 
place in the early 1970s. The government then tried to unify and synergise 
shipbuilding activities, but this did not lead to the results anticipated, due 
to poor management and excessive bureaucracy. A change occurred in the 
1990s, when the government opted for a neo-liberal approach. The year 
2002 was a watershed: the government introduced a subsidy scheme and 
so-called public-private partnerships. These changes are illustrated for the 
Bharati Shipyard Ltd (BSL), the second-largest private-sector shipbuilding 
company in India. The composition of the workforce changed considerably: 
prior to the 1980s most workers had been employed on a permanent basis, 
but afterwards workers were increasingly migrants hired by sub-contractors 
on a temporary basis.
Nicola Mocci examines the modern trajectory of Thai shipbuilding. He 
concludes that in newly industrialising countries shipbuilding has often 
been a primary source of export potential, and therefore of foreign currency 
accumulation. However, in order to reach these objectives and to build ships 
to suff icient scale, a great deal of initial and subsequent working capital is 
needed either from private, or in most cases, from state sources. In theory, 
technology and suff icient know-how can, to a large extent, be bought in 
or acquired, and labour, which in an Asia country is usually plentiful, can 
be trained to attain the desired objectives. In the Thai case, however, he 
points out that the state has made a different choice, concentrating its 
resources on other economic activities, and causing the de facto retreat of 
what used to be a main and Asia-wide competitive industry. Mocci points to 
the labour situation in the reduced shipbuilding industry that is presently 
active in Thailand. He notes that the majority of the country’s shipyards, 
large, medium, or small, have deliberately chosen to organise their work on 
a family level, adopting a paternalistic attitude, whose off icially declared 
aim is to improve direct training, safety, and ultimately worker productivity. 
However, he further notes that these dynamics clearly often have another 
effect, namely, the depoliticisation of workers through the constant erosion 
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of the rights of their organisations, which simultaneously prevents any of 
the evident underlying labour conflicts from rising to the surface.
Takeshi Haraguchi and Kazuya Sakurada note that from the 1950s ship-
building was seen as a fundamental industry for Japan’s pursuit of high 
economic growth. Thereafter until the oil crisis of 1973-74, the Japanese 
shipbuilding industry continued to progressively expand its share of the 
world market, dominating with more than 50 per cent of world shipbuilding 
production until rationalisation and reorientation of its productive facilities 
became critical in the coming decades. They clarify particular character-
istics of the Japanese shipbuilding industry, in light of its experience of 
dramatic expansion and decline, and focus on two areas: f irst, the 1970s, and 
second on the labour market, particularly the lower labour market. Their 
rationale is that the basis of shipbuilding expansion in Japan was formed on 
sub-contract labour, and in the mid- to late 1970s these labourers were the 
f irst to be sacrif iced in the restructuring of the shipbuilding industry. They 
explore how the production system of the post-1945 Japanese shipbuilding 
industry was formed and how it shifted, examining aspects of national 
policy, corporate systems, and technological innovation. Focusing on the 
1970s, they discuss how shipbuilding labourers engaged in resistance, and 
what kind of opposing strategies were taken by employers in response to 
this. Finally, they consider Osaka’s riverside shipbuilding industry as a case 
study and discuss specif ically how the capital/labour conflict played out. 
Moreover, by focusing on Kamagasaki, known as a lower labour market in 
Japan, they clarify what relations exist between the shipbuilding industry 
and the lower labour market.
Wonchul Shin outlines the evolution of labour relations of Hanjin Heavy 
Industries (HHI) located on Youngdo island near Busan, the largest port 
city in South Korea. Initially formed by Japanese capital in 1937 as Choseon 
Heavy Industries Inc. (CHI), to build and repair steel ships; after the defeat of 
Japan in the Second World War, CHI became a semi-state-owned enterprise 
and was renamed Korea Shipbuilding and Engineering Corporation (KSEC) 
in 1950. In 1968, KSEC was privatised, retaining its name. In 1989, the Hanjin 
industrial conglomerate took over KSEC, which had gone bankrupt, and set 
up HHI. Until the huge Hyundai shipyard was established at Ulsan between 
1972 and 1974, HHI’s Youngdo shipyard was the largest in South Korea. 
By the millennium, HHI had become one of the world’s top shipbuilders, 
especially in the large container ship market. In tandem, from 2007, HHI 
operated another shipyard at Subic Bay in the Philippines. Faced with the 
decreased demand for shipbuilding since the 2008 world f inancial crisis, 
HHI has reduced its workforce at the Youngdo shipyard, which unleashed 
intRoduc tion 41
intense labour disputes from 2010 to 2012. Instead of modernising Youngdo 
shipyard, HHI sought to build larger vessels at lower costs in the Subic 
shipyard. In tandem with outlining the evolution of labour relations at 
HHI, this chapter also highlights major changes in labour relations at the 
shipyard, focusing on the enterprise (f irm-specif ic wage bargaining) union 
system, sub-contracting arrangements, and militant unionism, which are 
major features of South Korean shipbuilding labour history.
The regional coverage provided by the various chapters is clearly far from 
perfect. At present, as we have observed, China is the world’s leading ship-
building nation by volume and is likely to retain this status in the years 
to come. Given China’s current position in shipbuilding, the omission of 
a chapter in this book on Chinese shipbuilding labour presents a sizeable 
lacuna. Despite our attempts to locate a suitable Chinese scholar, these 
efforts were ultimately in vain. As there is a lack of research in English on 
Chinese shipbuilding, we have included a short explanatory chapter on 
China, and on four other countries in which we were unable to identify suit-
able scholars: the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Although 
this chapter is far from exhaustive, it offers the reader perspective and a 
sense of comparison. For Argentina, Brazil, Portugal, and Spain we have 
included two chapters per country because the shipyards studied in the 
separate chapters differed markedly (private vs state-owned, shipbuild-
ing vs ship repair, etc.). Given the seminal impact of the oil price shocks 
on shipbuilding and employment therein in the 1970s and 1980s, we have 
included an appendix on this as well as an appendix on the latest available 
shipbuilding statistics to give added context.
In analysing labour relations, labour conditions, composition of the 
workforce, workers’ recruitment, workers’ living conditions, labour cultures, 
labour conflicts, organisation and leadership, shifts in production, techno-
logical developments and subsequent influence on production and labour 
relations, the role of shipyards in national and international economy, 
government policies and regulations, and the social and economic effects 
and impacts on closely knit communities of workers of closures of shipyards, 
this collection of essays offers an international perspective on a largely 
underresearched area of study.
Labour history is also important for the study of social history in general, 
whether by emphasising workers’ roles and identities in the workplace, or by 
highlighting neglected groups such as sub-contracted or agency workers. It 
is hoped that this project will lead to new avenues of research applicable to a 
wider audience than just labour historians, although we offer a contribution 
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to the history of labour itself, in a global perspective. In a second volume 
we hope to relate the many case studies to each other.
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2 Labour in the British shipbuilding 
and ship repairing industries in the 
twentieth century1
Hugh Murphy
This extensive chapter presents an overview of labour in the British 
shipbuilding and repair industries in the twentieth century in the overall 
context of relative and then absolute decline of these industries in light of 
international competition.
Up to 1914, with f irst-mover advantages, the British shipbuilding and ship 
repairing industries had long been mature industries, with shipbuilding 
being more concentrated, and labour being interchangeable in these areas 
on an inter-f irm basis according to supply and demand.2 However, the 
1 Shipbuilding is basically an assembly industry. From the days of iron and then steel construc-
tion it required a great deal of organisation of individual trades and processes within shipyards. 
Shipbuilders were primarily responsible for around 30 to 35 per cent of the f inished product, i.e., 
the ship’s hull; the rest – main engines, steering gear, propellers, auxiliaries, derricks, electrical 
f ittings, etc. – at the outf it stage was usually sub-contracted to various f irms and trades. The 
in-house percentage rose to around 50 per cent if f irms owned their own main engine shops, 
foundries, and joinery shops. The process of building a merchant ship usually began with 
reviewing enquiries to build from shipowner/s and/or shipbrokers before either proffering a 
stock design or designing a vessel to f it anticipated requirements before tendering for contracts. 
A historical basis of cost accounting was normally used to come up with a reliable estimate of 
labour and material costs plus an element for prof it. The decision on whether or not to tender 
for a particular type of ship or ships was dependent on the product mix building in any one 
yard or yards and the amount of work in hand. If a tender was accepted then negotiations over 
contract/s began, and design and building plan/s were formulated. If agreed, materials were 
then purchased and production drawings drafted. Production normally began with the laying 
of the keel and then the erection of the frames and shell plating by the hull trades. Each of 
these building milestones triggered stage payments to shipbuilders, ensuring liquidity. For a 
description of the functions of ship repair, see the Glossary. Many British shipbuilding f irms 
had their own ship repair berths.
2 The two main areas of concentration of f irms were the Rivers Clyde in the west of Scotland 
and the Tyne, Tees, and Wear on the north-east coast of England. Together, these areas accounted 
for over one-half of the labour force engaged in shipbuilding. On the upper Clyde for example, 
owing to a high concentration of f irms within a relatively small geographic area close to the 
centre of Glasgow, mobility of labour between f irms was commonplace. On the other hand, on 
the lower reaches of the Clyde at Greenock and Port Glasgow, it was less so. The lower Clyde 
employers enforced terms and conditions that were less generous than their Glasgow-based 
counterparts. Other important centres of shipbuilding activity employed workers who were less 
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major shipbuilding f irms also had ship repairing and conversion work as 
well as marine engineering facilities for general engineering work and for 
building slow-speed marine diesel engines.3 The latter were mostly built 
under licence from foreign patents, and some large marine engine build-
ers did operate independently from shipbuilders.4 Ship repairing was also 
undertaken independently from shipbuilding on the Rivers Tyne, Mersey, 
Humber, and Thames, the Bristol Channel, Falmouth-on the south-western 
approaches, and generally on the east coasts of England and Scotland. 
In addition, all shipbuilding, ship repair. and marine slow-speed engine 
building f irms belonged to national employers’ associations.5
geographically mobile; these were Barrow-in-Furness (Vickers) and Birkenhead (Cammell Laird) 
on the north-west coast of England, Southampton (Vosper and Thornycroft) on the south coast, 
and Leith, Grangemouth, Dundee, and Aberdeen on the east coast of Scotland. Another major 
f irm was geographically isolated: Harland and Wolff at Belfast in Northern Ireland. However, 
this f irm also had interests in shipbuilding, ship repair, and marine engineering on the Clyde, 
and ship repairing in Liverpool, London (mostly marine engineering), and Southampton. For 
the British shipbuilding industry at the national level in the twentieth century, see Pollard and 
Robertson, The British Shipbuilding Industry, Johnman and Murphy, British Shipbuilding and 
the State Since 1918, and Jones, Shipbuilding in Britain. There are numerous uncritical individual 
company-sponsored histories. These usually celebrate centenaries or other signif icant an-
niversaries of f irms. Two examples of these are Scotts of Greenock, 250 Years of Shipbuilding; 
and Stephen of Linthouse, A Record of Two Hundred Years of Shipbuilding. Exceptions to the 
normal rule are a company-sponsored work by the business historians Michael Moss and John 
Hume – see Moss and Hume, Shipbuilders to the World: 125 Years of Harland and Wolff – and by 
the maritime historian, Ian Johnston – see Johnston, Ships for a Nation, 1847-1971: John Brown 
& Company. An example of an independent academic business history study of a shipbuilding 
f irm is Johnman and Murphy, Scott Lithgow, which analyses the history of the lower Clyde 
shipbuilders, Scotts of Greenock, from 1711 and Lithgows of Port Glasgow from 1874 to their 
merger in 1970 and eventual demise by 1993. For a shipbuilding district, see Clarke, Building 
Ships on the Northeast Coast. Clarke covers, in much detail, the Tyne, Tees, Wear, and other 
north-east coast shipbuilding centres.
3 For ship repairing and slow-speed marine diesel engine building at the national level, see 
Buxton, “The British Ship Repair Industry”, Johnman and Murphy, “The Development of the 
British Ship Repair Industry”, and Johnman and Murphy, “The Rationalisation of Slow Speed 
Marine Diesel Engine Building in the UK”.
4 Only one British shipbuilder, Wm Doxford, based on the River Wear, licensed the building of 
their patented opposed-piston-type slow-speed marine diesel engines to British and American 
shipbuilders. Other British shipbuilding f irms, in addition to building Doxford engines under 
licence, mainly built continental slow-speed marine diesels under licence from Burmeister 
& Wain (Copenhagen) and Sulzer (Winterthur). The largest non-shipbuilding marine-engine 
building f irms were George Clark and North Eastern Marine on the Rivers Tyne and Wear, 
Parsons Marine Turbine, Wallsend, Richardsons Westgarth at Hartlepool, Middlesbrough, and 
Sunderland, and John G. Kincaid at Greenock.
5 Employers’ organisations at local and district level preceded national combinations of 
employers. Local shipbuilders’ associations existed on the major shipbuilding rivers of the 
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Labour and trade unions in British shipbuilding and ship repair 
prior to 1945
What is immediately apparent to the serious student of the British ship-
building and repair industries is that these activities did not conform to 
easy assumptions about the growth of managerialism in industry generally 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and consequent 
organisation of production and supervisory control resulting in increasing 
use of technology and consequent deskilling of the workforce. Ship produc-
tion, per se, did not lend itself to standardisation of product. Built to order 
for individual owners and ship-owning f irms, ships were largely bespoke 
in nature. Indeed, the sheer size and versatility of the British shipbuilding 
industry – which held 80 per cent of the world market for ships during 
the late nineteenth century and, on the eve of the First World War, 60 per 
cent of all tonnage launched – facilitated almost every whim of British 
shipowners, whose ships comprised the world’s largest mercantile f leet, 
the British Mercantile Marine.6 British shipbuilders also dominated the 
export market for merchant ships and warships, and their highly skilled 
workers were the most productive in the world using craft-based labour-
intensive methods of production. Indeed, the industry’s productivity easily 
outstripped that of its competitors.7 Mechanistic processes such as the 
Clyde, Tyne, Tees, and Wear and at many other centres of shipbuilding such as Aberdeen, Barrow, 
Belfast, and Hull, and on the Thames and Mersey. In succession to the disbanded National 
Federation of Shipbuilders, the Shipbuilding Employers Federation (SEF, est. 1899) dealt with all 
labour matters at the national level. The Shipbuilding Conference (est. 1928) was the industry’s 
trade association. The Dry Dock Owners and Repairers Central Council (DDORCC, est. 1910) dealt 
with labour and policy matters for federated ship repairing f irms, and the National Association 
of Marine Engineers (NAME, est. 1938) represented engine builders. The Papers of the SEF, 
Shipbuilding Conference, DDORCC and NAME are held in the Shipbuilders and Repairers 
National Association Papers, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, collections. The SRNA 
was wound up on the nationalisation of the shipbuilding and repairing industries in July 1977.
6 Unless otherwise stated, all tonnage statistics are from Lloyd’s Register of Shipping Annual 
Returns.
7 Using craft-based labour-intensive methods of production, British shipyard productivity 
easily outstripped its competitors. By 1900, productivity at 12.5 tons output per capita in British 
shipbuilding was twice that of American yards, three times that of Germany and over six times 
that of French yards. See Pollard, “British and World Shipbuilding”, 433. As Reid has noted, ships’ 
plates made up to 30 per cent of the national output of the British steel industry up to 1914. See 
Reid, The Tide of Democracy, 23. This encouraged British f irms to specialise and invest further 
in the production of shipbuilding steel plates and sections. The steel industries of Germany and 
the USA at most devoted only 5 per cent of output to ships’ plates, and these plates were more 
expensive. Moreover, in comparison to Britain the shipbuilding industries of Germany and 
the USA were high-cost activities. In the industry, the bulk of its then-major method of metal 
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introduction of hydraulic and pneumatic riveting machines and tools 
common to other metal-working industries did not on the whole have a 
great impact on shipbuilding.8 The structure of the industry was atomistic; 
f irms ranged from huge vertically integrated conglomerates such as Vickers, 
Beardmore, Cammell Laird, John Brown, and from 1918 onwards Lithgows 
Ltd, to medium-sized and small-scale family-controlled enterprises.9 The 
nature of f irms and intense competition locally and regionally between 
them for labour often militated against united employer action against 
craft unions. Although the Shipbuilding Employers’ Federation (SEF) was 
the national body for labour matters from 1899, it set a national plain-time 
rate for skilled and unskilled workers only in 1930.10 Local and regional 
employers’ associations pre-dated the SEF, and by 1900 seven local courts 
of arbitration had been set up in shipbuilding districts with independent 
chairmen who could make morally binding decisions on demarcation issues 
in cases of deadlock. Even a comprehensive national agreement between the 
SEF and a federation of shipyard trade unions in 1908 (the Edinburgh Agree-
ment), which came into effect in 1909, delegated resolution of demarcation 
disputes to local courts of arbitration.11
joining, riveting, was still done by hand – although f irst hydraulic and, later, pneumatic methods 
of riveting had been partially introduced. Riveting relied more on strength than on skill and 
was therefore vulnerable to mechanistic replacement methods; however, these methods were 
generally opposed by organised labour, and were in many cases technically diff icult to achieve 
because of restricted yard layouts. 
8 Reid notes that hydraulic methods of riveting were of little use in widely dispersed working 
environments such as shipyards; were impossibly heavy to move around; and had a tendency 
to distort plates and allow water ingress. Hydraulic methods’ use was restricted to heavy in-
ternal structures in shops, and by 1900 was being used on under 5 per cent of shipyard riveting. 
Pneumatic riveting equipment was easier to move around but, because of doubts over its not 
producing a tight enough bond on ships’ plates, it was restricted to lighter structural items and 
superstructures. By the 1920s it accounted for only 25 per cent of shipyard riveting. See Reid, 
“Employers: Strategies and Craft Production”, 41.
9 There had been concentration and vertical integration in the British shipbuilding industry 
as a result of the passing of the Naval Defence Act of 1889, which allowed the private shipbuilders 
to off icially enter a market (predominantly as mixed naval and mercantile builders) which, 
hitherto, had been largely, but by no means exclusively, reserved for government-controlled 
Royal Dockyards. For Vickers, see Trebilcock, The Vickers Brothers, and Scott, Vickers; for Cam-
mell Laird, see Warren, Steel, Ships and Men; for Beardmore, see Hume and Moss, Beardmore; 
for John Brown, see Johnston, Ships for a Nation, 1847-1971: John Brown & Company; for Lithgows, 
see Johnman and Murphy, Scott Lithgow.
10 Jones, Shipbuilding in Britain, 177. 
11 Pollard and Robertson, The British Shipbuilding Industry, 168. Seven local boards were in 
operation on the Tyne, Tees, and Wear, in Birkenhead, and on Clydeside: Jones, Shipbuilding 
in Britain, 163. The Edinburgh Agreement had three parts: part 1 dealt with arrangements for 
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Unsurprisingly, the British ship repair industry was also the world’s larg-
est; and its fortunes, as was the case with the marine-engine building sector, 
were inextricably linked to that of the nation’s shipping and shipbuilding 
industries. During the First World War, in common with shipbuilding, 
Britain’s ship repairing sector expanded rapidly and the volume of repairs 
rose exponentially.12 Aside from the larger shipbuilding f irms which had 
extensive ship repairing facilities, specialist ship repairers whose opera-
tions differed widely in scale, either owned dry docks (normally known as 
graving docks) and repair berths, or operated from publicly owned docks 
and berths. Like shipbuilding, the private repair workforce was casualised 
and was expected to work at short notice. In the repair sector, this form of 
work organisation suited both employers and, to a large extent, a section of 
their workforce who did not want to be tied down to one establishment for 
varying periods of time. On the whole, ship repairing was less volatile than 
shipbuilding as demand for its services was largely conditioned by the size 
of the extant stock of shipping. Those large shipbuilding f irms which had 
repair functions used them to even out fluctuations in shipbuilding demand 
by utilising overheads and labour that otherwise would have been unused.
Craft unions, many of their members organised in squads, their functions 
strictly demarcated, dominated the production process in shipbuilding 
and also in the ship repair sector. In the hull trades, dominated by the 
Boilermakers’ Society (the United Society of Boilermakers and Iron and Steel 
Shipbuilders), a form of supervisory control was exerted by squad leaders 
who in turn were hired and overseen by foremen who had been promoted 
from the ranks of the skilled workforce. Higher management control was 
basically left to a small cadre of middle managers appointed by owners. 
Payment of labour was determined by a plethora of time rates, piecework, 
price-agreed contracts, bonuses, and allowances to particular trades; and 
the form of employment, owing to the cyclical nature of the demand for 
ships, was essentially casualised.13 Termination of employment was usually 
discussing questions in relation to general f luctuations in wage rates; part 2 dealt with local 
matters; and part 3 provided a mechanism to determine general questions (excluding wages) 
on an inter-district basis. The agreement was to last three years and could be terminated at six 
months’ notice. It was reviewed again in 1913 and renewed, but owing to the outbreak of the 
First World War it was placed in abeyance until 1919. 
12 For the First World War, see, for example, Robinson, “How Ship Repairing Helped to Win 
the War”. In the interwar period, Smith’s Dock Co., Ltd, claimed to be the largest dry dock 
owners and repairers in the world. For an overview of shipbuilding, see Murphy, “The British 
Shipbuilding Industry During the Great War”.
13 Ships’ platers, who were at the apex of the hull trades, belonged to the Boilermakers’ Society, 
as did angle iron smiths and riveters. Platers, the highest paid of the hull trades, were organised 
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at one day’s notice and in some cases at one hour’s notice, and the average 
working week up to January 1919, when there was plenty of work available, 
was 54 hours; thereafter it was reduced to 47 hours.14
What control trade unions had externally in shipbuilding and repair was 
in determining who had the right to enter these industries. Both industries 
ran on the principle of the pre- or post-entry “closed shop”; that is, a potential 
entrant already had to belong to a recognised trade union or had to join one 
post-entry. Historically, owing to the low levels of education of the work-
force, the division of labour in shipyards was strictly demarcated, which 
gave rise to myriad disputes over which trade had the right to undertake a 
particular job or process and – more importantly for the long-term future 
of autonomous trade unions, of which there were around twenty-seven in 
the British shipbuilding industry in 1912 – to retain the right to exclusively 
dominate it. In short, shipyard work was inherently sectionalised, and 
trade unions within it, particularly the Boilermakers’ Society, which largely 
controlled the hull trades, mirrored that sectionalism and strictly enforced 
entry to particular trades.15 Long-held animosity since the days of transition 
from wooden to iron and then steel shipbuilding between the shipwrights 
and boilermaking trades always bubbled under the surface, as did that 
between shipwrights and joiners.16 Unions were also allowed to control 
in squads of skilled (including angle iron smiths) and unskilled (platers’ helpers) men, although 
the numbers varied in different shipyards and districts. Commensurately, plating squads were 
much smaller in ship repair. Riveting squads comprised the principal method of metal joining 
in the industry. 
14 The Amalgamated Engineering Union members in shipbuilding were locked out by employ-
ers for a period of thirty weeks from July 1897 over a demand for an eight-hour day. It was the 
most costly trade dispute in shipbuilding in the whole of the nineteenth century, and continued 
employers’ attempts to impose their will on shipbuilding and engineering workers in a period 
when laissez-faire attitudes were particularly strong in shipbuilding. See Pollard and Robertson, 
The British Shipbuilding Industry, 162. From the beginning of the lock-out, membership of the 
Engineers Employers’ Federation, which stood at 180 f irms, expanded to 702 at its close. See 
Zeitlin, “The Internal Politics of Employer Organization”, 56. It should be noted, however, that the 
engineering function in British shipyards, mostly marine-engine building, was nonetheless an 
important part in shipbuilding, but was small in relation to engineering factories and workshops 
in the wider British economy. 
15 In 1912 a national Demarcation Agreement between employers and twenty-three trade 
unions was reached, which applied to both engineering and shipbuilding trades. Crucially, the 
Boilermakers’ Society was not party to the agreement, nor were some other smaller unions. The 
history of the Boilermakers’ Society (founded 1834) has been written by Jim Mortimer, a former 
head of the Advisory, Arbitration and Conciliation Service (ACAS), made a statutory body in 1976 
under the Employment Protection Act, 1975. See Mortimer, History of the Boilermakers’ Society. 
16 Traditionally, joiners were confined to working on wood less than 1.5” in thickness and used 
hammers and planes. Shipwrights undertook heavier woodwork with adzes and mallets. 
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entry of apprenticeships and the ratio of them to skilled tradesmen. Indeed, 
trade unions traditionally saw apprentice labour as a means for employ-
ers to undermine wages of time-served tradesmen (usually f ive years as 
indentured apprentices). Typically, the demand for workers varied widely 
according to the stage in the production process reached. For example, the 
boilermaking trades, angle iron smiths, riveters, platers, and, much later, 
welders were almost exclusively concerned with the construction of iron 
and, later, steel hulls. The f itting-out trades such as joiners, electricians, and 
plumbers were also highly unionised, but were more generally employable 
outside shipbuilding, particularly in construction of houses and in the 
building trades generally.
Although demarcation disputes between trades were commonplace, their 
effects were less signif icant in terms of working hours lost than was the 
case with general disputes, with the employers’ organisations resorting to 
the general tactic of the lock-out and therefore closing their establishments 
until workers returned to work on conditions less favourable than those 
which began the dispute. Extended lock-outs also had deleterious effects 
on trade union f inances.17 The adversarial and ultimately corrosive nature 
of industrial relations in shipbuilding and repair gave rise to an endur-
ing level of suspicion in employer-employee relationships bordering on 
hatred, which only got worse in the largely depressed interwar period. Such 
dispute resolution that was in place was often circumvented by unoff icial 
(non-trade union sanctioned) disputes. However, the extreme subdivision 
of labour in British shipyards was not mirrored in continental shipyards, 
where there was more interchangeability of workforces. Trade unions in 
Dutch shipbuilding, for example, were not delineated on a craft basis: they 
embraced all classes of workers, skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled, and the 
six unions in Dutch shipbuilding were organised on a religious-political 
basis.18 Both Dutch and German shipbuilding workforces worked longer 
hours in a week (54 hours) and for less pay than their British counterparts 
(47 hours).
17 There were national lock-outs in 1897-98, 1907, and 1908 (twice), and in September 1910 
the employers enforced a national lock-out of the Boilermakers’ Society at one day’s notice. 
The lock-out lasted for two months before the employers agreed to meet union delegates, and 
continued for another f ifteen weeks. The f inancial effect on the Boilermakers’ Society meant 
that they had to suspend the payment of unemployment benef it to its members for three years. 
See Pollard and Robertson, The British Shipbuilding Industry, 162.
18 Glasgow Herald, 30 December 1925. The six were: the Social Democrats, the Syndicalists, 
the Bolshevists, the Christians (Protestants), the Roman Catholics, and the Neutrals. 
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Nonetheless, attempting to adequately quantify whether lower wages and 
working longer hours elsewhere severely disadvantaged British shipyards is 
diff icult. Piecework (performance related to pay) was far more common on 
the continent than in Britain, and continental shipyards were more capital-
intensive.19 One could of course determine absolute levels of wages from 
national statistics to make a general case. British shipbuilders, however, con-
sistently laid the blame largely on their “diff icult” and overpaid workforce.20
The First World War
By state legislation from 1915, compulsory settlement of disputes lasted 
to the end of the First World War, and in 1919 the industry returned to the 
observance of pre-war agreements. Beforehand, the successful prosecu-
tion of war meant that the government demanded a less confrontational 
approach to industrial relations in what was a period of full employment. 
To ensure military victory, the production of munitions of war to the full-
est output possible in the broadest sense, including shipbuilding and the 
protection of skilled labour, was paramount. In this regard, employers’ 
organisations were secondary: the Treasury Agreements of 17-19 March 1915 
were a bilateral compact between the state through the chancellor of the 
Exchequer, David Lloyd George, the president of the Board of Trade, Walter 
Runciman (a shipowner), and trade union leaders, which inter alia, guaran-
teed restoration of pre-war practices. However, for the duration of the war 
only, it also allowed dilution of the workforce to include semi-skilled and 
female workers at skilled rates of pay.21 This agreement directly led to the 
Munitions of War Act, 1915, which prohibited employer lock-outs, strikes (the 
latter still occurred but on an unoff icial basis, particularly on Clydeside), 
and the restriction of output. It also instituted controlled establishments, 
which prevented traditional mobility of labour in shipbuilding districts.22
19 On piecework undertaken in continental shipyards, see Jones, Shipbuilding in Britain, 78-79. 
Piecework is a form of employment in which a worker is paid a f ixed rate for each unit produced 
or action performed regardless of time.
20 When addressing the House of Commons Commercial Committee in 1925, the leading 
British shipbuilder, Sir James Lithgow, stated: “our lower hours and higher wages” had burdened 
British shipbuilding, “with a much greater cost than our world competitors”. See Johnman and 
Murphy, British Shipbuilding and the State Since 1918, 24.
21 Clause 6 of the Treasury Agreement provided for the relaxation of trade practices, “solely to 
work for war purposes during the war period. Operations on which skilled men are at present 
employed, but which by reason of their character, can be performed by semi-skilled or female 
labour, may be done by such labour during the work period”. 
22 Munitions of War Act, 1915, 5&6 Geo.5, ch.54.
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The Interwar Period
British shipowners lost nearly 9 mn gross registered tons (grt) of shipping 
during the First World War due to enemy action. A short-lived post-1919 
replacement boom, resulting in a record launching output of the British 
shipbuilding industry of 2 mn grt in 1920, soon gave way to a collapse in 
freight rates.23 Thereafter, the industry’s prospects were largely poor as 
worldwide shipbuilding capacity, much of it built up abroad during the 
First World War for nationalistic reasons as British shipping lost many of its 
traditional markets, exceeded demand. Those larger f irms in the industry, 
primarily the mixed naval and mercantile builders which could normally 
have expected some counter-cyclical respite by gaining naval work, were 
severely affected by international naval limitation treaties, f irst in 1921 
and later in 1930 limiting the construction of warships to an agreed ratio.24 
Consequently, for the British shipbuilding and -repairing industries, the 
interwar period was largely one of contraction.
When freight rates collapsed in 1921 skilled and apprentice employees 
in the 29 member f irms of the Clyde Shipbuilders Association totalled 
42,209. With the collapse in demand for ships this f igure had fallen in 1923 
to 19,115, about 51 per cent of the 1913 f igure. When labourers are included, 
overall male unemployment in Clyde shipbuilding in 1923 stood at 32,000. 
In April of that year the spectre of an employers’ lock-out once again raised 
its head, this time over the Boilermakers’ Society’s refusal to sign a nation-
ally agreed overtime clause. The resultant lock-out lasted seven months.25 
Consequent upon the 1921 depression in trade, wages were substantially cut 
and bonus payments, a feature of the last years of the war, were ended. With 
23 Shipbuilding is particularly vulnerable to fluctuations in the volume of world trade. Capacity 
cannot be rapidly adjusted to changes in demand, which are immediately ref lected in the level 
of freight rates. 
24 The Washington Naval Treaty of 1921 secured parity of f leets between Britain and the United 
States and a margin of superiority over Japan both in terms of capital ships (battleships, aircraft 
carriers, and heavy cruisers) without the need for large expenditure on new construction. The 
treaty also provided for the cancellation of four British battlecruisers already on order but also 
allowed the building of two battleships of up to 35,000 standard displacement tons within a 
decade. The London Naval Treaty was an agreement between Britain, Japan, France, Italy, and 
the United States signed on 22 April 1930, which regulated submarine warfare and limited 
warship building. It remained in operation until 1936. A second London Naval Treaty was signed 
by Britain, France, and the United States on 25 March 1936. Beforehand, both Japan and Italy had 
withdrawn from negotiations. For this period, on shipbuilding, see Peebles, Warshipbuilding 
on the Clyde. 
25 Johnman and Murphy, “An Overview of the Economic and Social Effects of the Interwar 
Depression”, 234.
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a substantial number of berths empty due to low demand, trade unions were 
obviously in a weak position, and wages and conditions continued to be cut. 
By January 1923, as Leslie Jones has noted, labour’s wartime gains had been 
substantially lost and money wages had reverted almost to their 1914 level.26
The labyrinthine complexity of wage rates, bonuses, allowances, and 
piecework rates in shipbuilding trades and the differing interpretations 
and practices in diverse shipbuilding districts put on them are diff icult 
for non-specialist historians to comprehend. The sheer amount of time 
expended on pricing jobs and ensuring compliance to previously agreed 
rates of output, hours worked, and bonus payments applicable obviously 
indicated the need for some root-and-branch reform. However, the extant 
system suited employers, who knew that in times of weak demand they 
could cut wages and conditions; conversely, when demand was high, labour 
could and did demand increases in wages, which were met, but mostly 
only in part.27 This boom-slump mentality pervaded the industry – organ-
ised labour was inured to periods of unemployment – and owners were 
particularly risk-averse to installing expensive capital equipment as no 
shipbuilder wished to be left with this equipment unused when the next 
slump inevitably came. Moreover, any introduction of labour-saving devices 
or processes would inevitably lead to trade union confrontation over staffing 
levels, allowances, conditions, etc.28
Rather than press for increased capital equipment use in shipyards, the 
owners had begun to look at reinterpreting work practices to further cut 
wage costs and improve productivity. The first occasion that an order from a 
major British ship-owning firm had gone abroad obviously gave them reason 
to do so. By 1925, a Joint Enquiry into Foreign Competition and Conditions in 
the Shipbuilding Industry between the SEF and the trade unions had been 
established. The enquiry was occasioned by Furness Withy ordering for the 
round-the-world service of its subsidiary, the Prince Line, f ive motor ships 
26 Jones, Shipbuilding in Britain, 190.
27 A good example of this is the reversal of the 1923 situation when output picked up through 
1925-27. By 1927, weekly time rates were 37 per cent above the pre-war level for a cadre of skilled 
workers; rates for semi-skilled were 50 per cent above and for unskilled 65 per cent above pre-war. 
Average earnings for all pieceworkers in July 1927 were 90 per cent, higher for an average 41-hour 
week. See Jones, Shipbuilding in Britain, 193-194. It should be noted that the standard working 
week remained at 47 hours.
28 The National Archives, Kew, London (hereafter NA), T160/59. Destitution in the insured 
shipbuilding workforce was largely mitigated by National Insurance out-of-work payments 
(unemployment relief) from the state. As a senior off icial, R.W. Peck of the Scottish Health 
Board, put it, the casualised labouring classes had gained relatively most from unemployment 
relief, which had ensured at least a regular supply of food. 
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from a German shipyard, Deutsche Werft AG of Hamburg. The German 
tender at £850,000 was £60,000 less for each ship than the lowest tender 
from a British shipyard, £1,150,000.29 The Furness Withy order provoked 
an entirely predictable storm of apoplexy from British shipbuilders and 
shipyard trade unions. The enquiry, reported on an interim basis in 1925, and 
later in June 1926. The employers put forward three proposals for securing 
greater interchangeability of the workforce without infringing on the broad 
principles of craftsmanship. None were accepted by trade unions and no 
action was taken.30 There were also the usual allegations of unfair foreign 
competition fuelled by subsidy, which conveniently ignored government 
assistance to British shipbuilding and shipping under the Trade Facilities 
Acts, begun in 1922 and which were to be renewed until 1927.31
From almost all of the interwar period to the outbreak of the Second 
World War, unemployment in shipbuilding and ship repair remained stub-
bornly high and well above the average for all industries for most of this 
period. In the aftermath of the General Strike in 1926 precipitated by an 
employers’ lock-out of more than 1 million coal miners, further conciliatory 
measures were ushered in but wage demands persisted. A new claim for 
higher wages in 1929 resulted in a signif icant breakthrough on wages in 
the interwar period, the introduction of a national uniform plain-time 
29 Johnman and Murphy, The British Shipbuilding Industry, 23. Deutsche Werft promised 
delivery of the f irst ship in ten months – the lowest British tender promised delivery in fourteen 
months. For Furness Withy, see Burrell, The History of Furness, Withy and Company Limited, 
95. All f ive motor ships of 6,734 grt were completed in 1926. Subsequently, it was reported that 
Deutsche Werft had built the ships at a loss.
30 National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, Shipbuilders and Repairers National Association 
papers (hereafter NMM SRNA), Joint Enquiry into Foreign Competition and Conditions in the 
Shipbuilding Industry, Report, June 1926, 11 and Interim Report, October 1925.
31 The Trade Facilities Act, 1921 (TFA), empowered the Treasury, on the recommendation of an 
Advisory Committee, to guarantee, in respect of interest or principal or both, loans calculated to 
promote employment in the United Kingdom. The aggregate capital amount of loans in respect 
of which guarantees might be given was not to exceed £25,000,000. The Treasury, in accordance 
with the act, agreed to guarantee such loans to a prescribed limit. The loans in question were 
raised by borrowers from various private sources, and there was no question of the Treasury 
making any payments unless and until it had to implement any of its guarantees. The Trade 
Facilities Act was renewed and its upper limit extended on occasion until it f inally expired in 
March 1927. By May 1927, the f inal limit of £75 mn for TFA guarantees had almost been reached, 
with £74,251,780 already pledged. Of this total the amount of guarantees to the shipbuilding 
industry was £21,640,585 comprising 29.1 per cent of the total and making shipbuilding the 
largest beneficiary of the acts: British Parliamentary Papers (hereafter BPP), House of Commons 
Off icial Report, vol. 206, col. 918, 16 May 1927. For a full analysis of the Trade Facilities Acts and 
their effects on British shipbuilding and shipping, see Johnman and Murphy, “Subsidy and 
Treasury”.
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rate in 1930. Although national wage agreements had been in force since 
1908 on a voluntary collective bargaining basis, there were numerous 
hangovers from the old system of district and local rates of pay leading to 
considerable variations in time rates. Custom dictated the negotiation of 
separate craft rates, which not only maintained wage differentials between 
skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled workers (labourers) but also resulted 
in different rates between and within districts. The lack of uniformity 
of wage rates industry-wide was therefore a prime factor in wage parity 
claims. The 1930 agreement abandoned separate craft rates and brought 
in a uniform plain-time rate for skilled and unskilled workers, but not for 
semi-skilled workers. The latter category was to be given the same advance 
as the unskilled to preserve differentials. Those districts where rates were 
higher than the uniform rate were given time to iron out diff iculties where 
the introduction of the new time rate would have resulted in hardship. The 
new uniform plain-time rate was accepted without serious industrial action 
and, given the worldwide depression consequent upon the Wall Street crash 
in October 1929, incidentally a “boom” year for British shipbuilding, this 
was hardly surprising. The uniform plain-time rate was strengthened in 
1931 by reductions in pieceworkers’ earnings through simplif ication and 
consolidation of piecework rates, which gave a closer correlation between 
output and earnings. Wages remained steady until 1936, when the pressure 
of rearmament began to tell and, as Jones noted, time and piecework rates 
rose accordingly up to 1938.32 Nevertheless, although the introduction of a 
national uniform plain-time rate was important, it in no way guaranteed 
the completion of the then 47-hour working week.
Contemporaneously, with the establishment of the uniform plain-time 
rate by the SEF in 1930, representatives of the industry’s trade association, 
the Shipbuilding Conference, had been formulating a scheme of rationalisa-
tion, as they put it, in the face of increasing world capacity and subsequent 
competition. With aid from the Bank of England, a rationalisation vehicle, 
National Shipbuilders Securities Ltd (NSS), was formed in 1930.33 By 1938, 
NSS had eliminated, through a series of restrictive covenants against any 
return to shipbuilding, one-third of the industry’s shipbuilding capacity. No 
consideration was given that this capacity, much of it made redundant by a 
general increase in the size of ships, would have been closed in any event. 
Moreover, its activities in closing yards led to heavy localised unemploy-
ment, with the closure of Palmers on the Tyne sparking the Jarrow hunger 
32 Jones, Shipbuilding in Britain, 192-198, discusses wage rates in this period in detail.
33 For NSS, see ibid., 133-140. See also Slaven, “Self-Liquidation”. 
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march to London and leaving an unemployment rate of 70 per cent in that 
town alone.34 NSS was essentially a price-protective measure in the sense 
that remaining f irms, faced with less competition, could raise prices: in 
this regard its activities were faux rationalisation. By this stage, however, 
the mixed naval and mercantile shipbuilders had returned to profitability 
owing to rearmament in anticipation of a coming war.
Up to this point the situation for labour in mixed naval and mercantile 
shipyards had improved. The naval race to build capital ships meant many 
years of work, actual and potential. However, for the mercantile-only yards, 
demand still lagged. Attempts by the British government to stimulate 
demand for mercantile tonnage through a short-lived scrap and build 
scheme from 1936 had provided some respite, but in effect had not solved the 
industry’s fundamental problems in relation to international competition. 
Indeed, the industry’s trade association, the Shipbuilding Conference, had 
informed the government in secret in 1938 that British shipbuilding could 
no longer compete with continental builders on the fundamental issues of 
price and delivery.35
For shipbuilding and ship repairing labour, the 1920s and the bulk of the 
1930s had been very diff icult in terms of job security or, more correctly, the 
lack of it. At the nadir of the interwar depression in 1933, some 60 per cent 
of all workers in British shipbuilding and repair were unemployed and in 
Scotland the f igure was 77 per cent.36 In contrast to other industrialised 
countries, however, social welfare provisions for the unemployed in Britain 
were more advanced.37 It is plain that the uncertain nature of demand 
meant that employers saw labour as a variable rather than a f ixed cost 
of production – thus the burden of unemployment was placed f irmly 
34 For this, see Wilkinson, The Town That Was Murdered.
35 NMM SRNA 5 / H3, Summary of a Memorandum by Sir Amos Ayre on conditions existing 
in the shipbuilding industry at December 1938.
36 Percentages of unemployed are compiled from Ministry of Labour publications, various 
years.
37  In the interwar period, Britain had a relatively advanced welfare system compared to 
many of the other industrialised countries. In 1911, a compulsory national unemployment and 
health insurance scheme had been put in place by the Liberal government, funded through 
contributions from government, employers, and workers. Initially, the scheme applied only to 
certain trades, but in 1920 it was expanded to include most manual workers. The scheme ran 
on the level of contributions made rather than according to need, and was payable only for 15 
weeks; thereafter, recipients had to rely on poor law relief or charitable help. In August 1931, 
the 1911 scheme was replaced by a fully government-funded unemployment benef it system that 
paid out according to need rather than the level of contributions, but was determined by means 
testing of claimants to ensure that they had no hidden earnings, savings, or other sources of 
income.
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on the workforce. Employers’ strategies in the 1930s, NSS rationalisation 
exempted, included closing down shipyards completely until demand 
was re-established, sometimes for periods of f ive years or more.38 Many 
unmarried workmen in particular left the industry for good or emigrated.39 
For those left attached to the industry, the major technical change during 
the interwar period – the adoption and more widespread diffusion of 
electric arc welding in place of the industry’s principal method of metal 
38 See Johnman and Murphy, “An Overview of the Economic and Social Effects of the Interwar 
Depression”, 246.
39 Ibid., 225 and 234. Skilled emigration to the United States alone from 1921 to 1930 accounted 
for over 18,500 male Scots metalworkers and engineers – the largest outpouring of an occupa-
tional group to any overseas destination. In the wake of the passing of the Empire Settlement 
Act of 1922 there is substantial evidence of Clyde shipyard workers emigrating to Canada in 
particular. 
Table 2.1  Incidence of unemployment in selected industries, December 1921 to 
June 1939 (percentage of insured workpeople unemployed) 




Iron and steel Coal mining
dec. 1921 16.2 36.1 36.7 11.1 
dec. 1922 12.2 35.6 22.1 4.6
dec. 1923 10.7 34.2 17.1 2.4
dec. 1924 10.9 31.9 27.6 7.9
dec. 1925 10.5 36.9 24.4 11.3
dec. 1926 11.9* 42.2 34.5 10.2*
dec. 1927 9.8 21.5 22.7 17.3
dec. 1928 11.2 30.3 19.8 19.1
dec, 1929 11.1 23.3 22.0 14.6
dec. 1930 20.2 45.1 50.6 19.7
dec. 1931 20.9 60.1 45.4 24.6
dec. 1932 21.7 63.5 45.1 29.2
dec. 1933 17.6 54.5 28.6 25.7
dec. 1934 16.1 46.0 23.7 23.2
dec. 1935 14.2 37.2 17.5 19.4
dec. 1936 12.2 26.9 12.1 16.4
dec. 1937 12.2 22.9 11.0 11.5
dec. 1938 12.9 22.5 24.5 14.4
June 1939 9.7 19.6 9.6 13.1
notes: * exclusive of persons who were disqualified from unemployment benefit on account of the 
coal mining dispute commenced on 1 May 1926 
in September 1937 a revised procedure for counting the unemployed was introduced. 
Source: Ministry of labour publications
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joining (riveting) – threatened the extant methods of division of labour. 
Unsurprisingly, the employers’ attempts to make welding a semi-skilled 
occupation were f iercely resisted by the Boilermakers’ Society which 
eventually captured, through a series of unoff icial strikes, aggressive 
recruitment, and a coherent national strategy, the process for its own 
members against competing trade unions.40 They were substantially aided 
40 From 1932 onwards discussions between the Shipbuilding Employers’ Federation and trade 
unions on a more widespread adoption of electric arc welding in shipbuilding were concentrated 
on the employers’ attempts to introduce a new class of “ship welder”. New entrants would be 
subject to enforced wage rates to keep any growth in wages containable as the process of welding 
gained more widespread application. The employers’ attempts induced a series of strikes by 
the Boilermakers’ Society on the Clyde and Tyne. The Boilermakers’ Society, in the end, gained 
control of the process and thwarted the employers’ attempts to isolate it. The initial schemes to 
introduce ship welders are analysed through the medium of SEF Circular Letters by McGoldrick, 
“Crisis and the Division of Labour”. See also Johnman and Murphy, “Welding and the British 
Shipbuilding Industry”, and Murphy, “The Health of Electric Arc Welders”.
Table 2.2  World and British mercantile output 1920-1938: tonnage launched (000 
tons)
Year Britain % of world World output % British output 
for export
1920 2,056 35.1 5,862 18.2
1921 1,538 35.3 4,357 17.4
1922 1,031 41.8 2,467 15.7
1923  646 39.3 1,643  1.9
1924 1,440 64.1 2,248 21.5
1925 1,085 49.5 2,193 13.8
1926  640 38.2 1,675  8.0
1927 1,226 53.6 2,286 20.2
1928 1,446 53.6 2,699 18.9
1929 1,523 54.5 2,793 17.0
1930 1,479 51.2 2,889 31.6
1931  502 31.0 1,617 10.0
1932  188 25.9  727  9.0
1933  133 27.2  489  3.3
1934  460 47.6  967  8.4
1935  499 38.3 1,302  7.4
1936  856 40.4 2,118  6.9
1937  921 34.2 2,691  6.6
1938 1,030 33.9 3,034  9.3
Source: lloyd’s Register annual Returns, various years
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in this by two factors: employer disunity and rearmament, the latter en-
suring a return to consistent prof itability. Taken together, these factors 
eventually led to the crumbling of the employers’ plans and the adoption 
of a payment-by-results scheme and recognition by employers that the 
Boilermakers’ Society had the right to control the process.41 Such had been 
the advance of foreign competition during the interwar period that, by 
December 1938, Britain’s percentage share of world shipbuilding output 
had slumped to 29 per cent, half the amount of 1914. Unemployment in 
British shipbuilding and repair in comparison to other basic industries 
is shown in Table 2.1.
Throughout the interwar period there had been a persistence of 
oversupply in shipbuilding and repair in relation to demand. It would 
be frankly ludicrous to assume that British shipbuilding would have 
kept or added to its 1914 percentage share of world output of 60 per cent 
indefinitely. Other countries, notably, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
France, Italy, and Japan, had built up their shipbuilding industries and 
to greater or lesser extents reserved the building of their f leets to their 
domestic industries. British shipbuilding exports, by def inition, had to 
suffer accordingly.
British shipbuilding’s failure to reform its work organisation and re-
inforce its previous lead in design and construction of ships would have 
telling effects. By the outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939, 
both the British shipbuilding and ship repairing industries were qualita-
tively and quantitatively weaker than they had been in 1918. Management 
and workforces were on the whole old, and equipment was largely outdated 
in comparison to more capital-intensive continental yards. Moreover, 
the war, its longevity, and its immediate aftermath would mask British 
shipbuilding and repair’s fundamental weaknesses: lack of international 
competitiveness, lack of investment, and inherently corrosive industrial 
relations.42
41 McGoldrick, “Crisis and the Division of Labour”, 179.
42 Clydeside, the most important centre for warship building and passenger liner construction, 
had long been a battleground between unions and employers. Relationships in the other major 
centre of British centre of shipbuilding activity, the north-east coast of England, were on the 
whole better. A good indication of how Clydeside shipbuilding employers saw their workforces 
came to light in a Mass Observation study of 1942, when interviewers of one particular un-
named employer were “subjected to two-hour tirade against these animals”, and several other 
prominent employers displayed “an almost pathological hatred of their workmen”: NA CAB 
102/379 Industrial Relations and Welfare in Admiralty Establishments and Contractors Works: 
unpaginated draft. 
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The Second World War
Shipbuilding and repair quickly came under the command of the British 
Admiralty, with three owners of private shipbuilding and repair f irms 
in overall supervisory control of merchant shipbuilding by 1 February 
1940.43As in the First World War, output was heavily skewed towards naval 
craft and warships, and ship repair was again vitally important.44 As such, 
new construction of mercantile tonnage had lower priority, and orders for 
merchant ships were placed in the USA and in Canada.45 The shipbuilding 
employers again had to co-operate with trade unions in the national inter-
est and not in their own. Strikes, although outlawed, still occurred, and 
dilution of the workforce again took place with unskilled men and women 
entering employment, but only after unemployed tradesmen had done 
so and only after the transfer of former employees from other industries 
had taken place.46 During the war and indeed the interwar period, the 
highest incidence of strikes in the munitions industries as a proportion of 
the workforce employed took place in shipbuilding.47 The numbers of strikes 
during the war, by year, are given in Table 2.3.
As in 1915, the trade unions were party to legislation in 1942 which, after 
the war, would restore their pre-war practices.48 Dilution of labour – male 
and female – did not have any measurable effect on shipbuilding and repair, 
43 Sir James Lithgow, of the Port Glasgow mercantile shipbuilders, Lithgows Ltd, was appointed 
Controller of Merchant Shipbuilders and Repairs based at the Admiralty. Sir Amos Ayre of 
Burntisland Shipbuilders, Fife, was appointed as his deputy. Sir Lawrie Edwards of Middle Docks 
on the Tyne was given responsibility for ship repair. For British shipbuilding and repair during 
the Second World War, see Johnman and Murphy, British Shipbuilding and the State Since 1918, 
ch. 3. See also Ayre, “Merchant Shipbuilding During the War”. For warship building, see Buxton, 
Warship Building and Repair During the Second World War. For the war at sea, see Roskill, The 
War at Sea. 
44 For ship repair, see Edwards, “The War Effort and Organisation of British Shiprepairing”. 
From January 1941 to June 1945 an annual average of 800,000 grt of shipping was permanently 
withdrawn from service solely due to repairs. In all a huge total of 180 mn grt of cargo-carrying 
shipping was restored to service, although many of these repairs were of a routine nature. More 
workers were employed on mercantile repairs than new construction for the duration of the 
war; see NA CAB 102/440 Merchant Shipping and Repairs, vol. II. 
45 See Johnman and Murphy, “The British Merchant Shipping Mission to the United States”. 
For the American shipbuilding effort, see Lane, Ships for Victory. For Liberty ships, see Elphick, 
Liberty. See also Lindberg and Todd, Anglo-American Shipbuilding in World War II; for Canada, 
see Pritchard, A Bridge of Ships.
46 For the role of women, see Murphy, ‘From the Crinoline to the Boilersuit”.
47 Inman, Labour in the Munitions Industries, 394.
48 Restoration of Pre-War Trade Practices Act, 1942 5&6 Geo.6.
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nor did any general or specific move towards interchangeability of trades.49 
Indeed, shipbuilding and repair were not deemed to be essential industries for 
the control of labour until March 1941, when the Essential Work (Shipbuilding 
and Repairing) Order came into force. There was, however, virtually no change 
in the course of the war in the proportion of labour recognised as skilled 
in shipbuilding.50 It was hardly surprising, therefore, given the shipbuilding 
industry’s record of low investment in the interwar years, that two official 
investigative reports in 1942 laid bare its fundamental shortcomings.51 Arising 
from these reports, there began what the military historian Correlli Barnett 
has described as a remarkable feat of re-equipment during the war.52 By far the 
most important and far-reaching change during the war was the extension 
of electric arc welding in shipyards and associated plant, extensively funded 
by the Admiralty. By September 1943, at which stage the Battle of the Atlantic 
against the German U-boat threat had turned in the Allies’ favour, 90 per cent 
of shipyard welding schemes had been completed or were nearing completion.53
49 Johnman and Murphy, British Shipbuilding and the State, 69. In 1942, f ifteen Clydeside 
shipbuilding f irms had no dilution whatsoever in their hull trades.
50 After a slight drop from 50 per cent in 1940 to 47 per cent in 1942-43, it rose again to 48 per 
cent by the end of the war. See NA CAB 102/47 Labour Requirements and Supply, Shipbuilding 
and Engineering, 1939-1945, 191. This master copy in draft was used by Peggy Inman for her 
off icial history: Inman, Labour in the Munitions Industries.
51 NA ADM 1/11892 Labour in Mercantile and Naval Shipyards (Barlow Report to the Ministry 
of Production), July 1942. Barlow expressed a damning conclusion that “a degree of complacency 
among all concerned permeates the whole f ield of production”: NA BT 28/319 Report to the Ma-
chine Tools Controller on the Equipment of Shipyards and Marine Engineering Shops (Bentham 
Report), September 1942. Bentham recommended “exceptional f inancial consideration … to 
deal with improvements in plant”, and improvements in welding, craneage and prefabrication. 
52 Barnett, The Audit of War, 119.
53 Johnman and Murphy, British Shipbuilding and the State Since 1918, 82-83.
Table 2.3  Strikes in the British shipbuilding industry, 1939-1945
Year No. of strikes 
 beginning in year
No. of workpeople 
involved
No. of working days 
lost
1939  39  4,300 37,000
1940  65 10,100 37,000
1941 147 27,300 110,000
1942 111 42,000 192,000
1943 196 32,000 137,000
1944 199 44,000 370,000
1945 186 27,700 143,000
Source: na caB 102/877
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Later in the war, as the invasion of Europe loomed, the shipbuilders began 
to discuss the competitive position of the industry after the war. Unsurpris-
ingly, they looked back before they looked forward; with Amos Ayre of 
Burntisland Shipbuilding stating that “the unions must be told what the situ-
ation was in 1938”.54 However, early in 1945, the Clyde shipbuilder Sir Maurice 
Denny presciently stated that modernisation was an absolute necessity and, 
if not undertaken quickly, its absence would result in our “bequeathing 
to our successors the same legacy of strife, frustration and comparative 
stagnation that has been on the whole a characteristic of our industry in the 
past”.55 As a result of these discussions the employers formed a Committee 
on Improved Shipbuilding Practice and a sub-committee on Methods of 
Shipbuilding Construction, the latter spawning four sub-committees.
As the war neared its end, however, the employers once again began to 
insist of their pre-war right to hire and f ire at will. On Clydeside, employers 
paid off older tradesmen in the Boilermakers’ Society and were making a 
concerted drive to rid themselves on the obligations imposed upon them 
by wartime regulations, in order “to return to the old starvation method of 
applying discipline”.56 From the point of view of the Boilermakers’ Society, 
however, just as they had wrested control of welding during rearmament, 
they did likewise on staff ing levels on new technology such as automatic 
welding machines during the war and shipyard trades generally remained 
non-interchangeable. New technology altered the quantity of labour 
required, not its type.
War losses of British ships of 200 grt and larger numbered 1,719 and 
totalled 8,738 mn grt – around half the mercantile f leet af loat in 1939; 
however, some of this lost tonnage had been made good by new construction 
during the war and by ship purchases from abroad. Nonetheless, British 
tonnage was 3.5 mn grt less than in September 1939.
The post-1945 situation
Given that the competitive position in 1938 was worrying, if not yet fatal for 
British shipbuilding and repair, then the immediate post-war years presaged 
continuing prof itability as large numbers of ships were reconverted to 
mercantile use and new construction began. The prospect of continuing 
54 NMM SRNA 4/P11 Committee on Improved Shipbuilding Practice, 1944-45, shorthand notes.
55 NMM SRNA 4, P11/3 Sub-Committee on Welding, Denny to Ayre, 6 February 1945. 
56 NA LAB 8/662 Efforts to Secure a More Eff icient Use of Labour Supply in the Clydeside Area 
and in the Shipbuilding Industry, report for August 1944 to Reporting Off icer, Scotland.
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profits and returning to private rather than the national interest led to the 
employers’ sub-committees begun in 1944 withering on the vine, and ship-
builders once again competing against each other rather than meaningfully 
co-operating on making the industry more internationally competitive. 
The Shipbuilding Employers’ Federation duly returned to its pre-war posi-
tion of determining labour matters and reinforcing its apparent obsession 
with procedure, and the trade unions returned (but were in a much better 
position than was the case in the majority of the interwar period) to the 
standard adversarial industrial relations that had bedevilled the industry 
beforehand. The big difference for labour was that this time, in a reversal 
of what had occurred post-1920, they did maintain their wartime gains in 
wages and conditions and indeed increased earnings in the favourable post-
war climate. Britain’s major pre-war competitors, the Allied-occupied Axis 
powers of Nazi Germany and imperial Japan, their economies in various 
states of temporary ruination, were not allowed to return to ocean-going 
shipbuilding in the immediate post-war period, and their economic stock 
was also subject to reparations and demolition.57
It did not require remarkable prescience, however, to forecast that when 
they did, and when suff icient prof its were made, more capital-intensive 
methods of production replacing outdated plant and equipment were likely 
to dominate. Moreover, concentration on fewer and, in all likelihood, larger 
ship types such as tankers and bulk carriers would result. Indeed, the les-
sons learned from multiple production techniques, welding of sections 
and plates, standardisation of products and equipment, prefabrication 
techniques, non-demarcated labour, and better shipyard layouts to facilitate 
production by reducing bottlenecks, as practised in the USA’s emergency 
wartime shipbuilding programme, were likely to be copied elsewhere.
British shipyards, many of them dating from the days of wooden shipbuild-
ing, were on the whole spatially constrained and had grown in a haphazard 
manner – no British shipbuilder with a full orderbook even contemplated a 
greenfield shipyard site in the post-war period. Intrinsically, British shipbuild-
ers still feared world overcapacity and the violent fluctuations in demand that 
had characterised much of the interwar period.58 Moreover, the industry’s 
57 NMM SRNA Report of Executive Board of Shipbuilding Conference, 15 November 1946. At 
this stage little had been done towards the destruction of shipbuilding facilities in Germany. 
Some plant had been removed from Kiel, and the large gantries at the Blohm and Voss shipyard 
had been blown up. 
58 For example, see Stephen, “Full Employment in British Shipyards”: “No industry has had such 
a record of booms and slumps in the past as has British shipbuilding … history has shown quite 
clearly that wars have had … a very adverse effect on British shipbuilding”. Stephen pointed out 
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leaders, wholly against a return to merchant shipbuilding by the Axis powers, 
also feared that the USA’s plans for European reconstruction would inevitably 
result in a reversal of reparations policy and agitation for a return to German 
ocean-going ship construction for export. In this, they were to be later proved 
correct.59 As for a return to Japanese ocean-going shipbuilding, Britain was 
in a much weaker position owing to American occupation of Japan.
This however, was some years off. In the interim, the situation in the 
market for ships was somewhat skewed as large numbers of American war-
time emergency-built Liberty ships and tankers as well as Canadian-built 
emergency ships came on to the market. From 1 July 1945 to 30 June 1953, 
11 mn tons of American shipping, chiefly Liberty ships, were transferred 
to foreign registers, with an estimated 1.56 mn tons going to British ship-
owners.60 The many ships remaining from what can only be described as a 
remarkable shipbuilding effort by the USA post-Pearl Harbor, predicated 
on speed of construction and maximum output of standard ships at high 
labour costs, were consigned to the US Reserve Fleet, which was, in terms of 
tonnage laid up, the largest in the world.61 British shipbuilders and -repairers 
that as a result of the post-1918 boom the industry had expanded to 133 per cent of its pre-1914 
capacity, having available less than its pre-1914 demand.
59 NMM SRNA Report of the Executive Board of the Shipbuilding Conference, 26 May 1949. 
Resulting from the Potsdam Conference of 17 July to 2 August 1945, Allied restrictions on any 
return by German shipbuilding to ocean-going ship construction were imposed. German 
companies were, in the interests of improving the European and German economy, allowed 
to develop a coastal f leet restricted to 1,500 grt per vessel, later raised to 2,700 grt. The extent 
of coastal f leet building was estimated to be at a limit of 517,000 grt, including 360,000 grt of 
dry cargo vessels. German shipowners were also allowed to purchase tankers of not more than 
7,700 grt from abroad up to a total of 100,000 grt, and dry cargo vessels of not more than 7,200 grt 
up to a total of 300,000 grt. Demolition of plant and equipment in German shipyards also took 
place. In May 1949 it was reported that a United States decision had been made that Japan should 
retain 38 shipyards with an annual capacity of 800,000 grt, a third of which had been previously 
scheduled for reparations. As the Shipbuilding Conference Executive Board noted in July 1949, 
Japanese ship repairing and shipbuilding appeared to be developing without restriction as part 
of General Douglas MacArthur’s policy of reviving Japan as an industrial nation. Accordingly, the 
Shipbuilding Conference anticipated severe competition in the very near future. By December 
1949, as the Executive Board noted, all restrictions on Japanese shipbuilding had been lifted. By 
this stage German shipbuilding had also been allowed to construct ocean-going ships (excluding 
passenger liners) and tankers up to 7,200 grt.
60 Sturmey, British Shipping and World Competition, 130-131.
61 The US National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) was established under Section 11 of the 
Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946, to serve as a reserve of ships with value for national defence 
purposes. These ships could be activated to meet shipping requirements during national emer-
gencies. At its peak in 1950, the NDRF had 2,777 ships laid up in Atlantic and Pacif ic seaboard 
and Gulf of Mexico anchorages.
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following reconversion of existing tonnage, then concentrated on restoring 
the British Mercantile Marine to its pre-war tonnage totals and repairing 
ships on a more normal basis.
During the war, and up to April 1946, the employers awarded f ive in-
creases in wages, and another three were awarded as a result of National 
Arbitration Tribunal awards to workers in shipbuilding and repair. In 1947, 
no wage increases were awarded, but following a Court of Enquiry, the 
normal day-shift working hours were reduced from 47 hours to 44 hours per 
week; this took effect from March. As Jones has noted, the shorter working 
week was introduced without any changes in basic rates and this, in effect, 
meant an increase in the rate per hour for timeworkers and also allowed 
all classes of workers to increase earnings for the same number of hours 
worked.62 In 1948, the Boilermakers’ Society submitted a motion to the 
Labour Party Conference calling for the nationalisation of the shipbuilding 
and ship repairing industries. A year later, the society’s president, Ted Hill, 
noted the drastic effects of the interwar depression, the loss of a third of 
berths to NSS, and subsidisation of the industry at home and of shipbuilding 
abroad. To Hill it made little sense to leave the industry in the hands of 
owners who would cut it until it no longer remained viable and then take 
public money to build it up again.63
Given the temporary post-1945 advantages that British shipbuilding 
had over its major competitors, Germany and Japan, some academics have 
pointed to the 1950s, considering the subsequent history of decline, as the 
crucial decade for the industry’s international competitiveness.64 Setting 
aside that every decade – and indeed year – is important in international 
competition, the 1950s was certainly a decade when the industry failed to 
match foreign competition in price, delivery, credit terms, and, crucially, 
meaningful investment in modernisation and expansion of its facilities to 
encompass new methods of production. The later debate on the relative 
and then absolute decline of British shipbuilding fell into two camps: those 
who blamed it on institutional rigidity and those who supported a more 
traditional management failure thesis.65
62 Jones, Shipbuilding in Britain, 199.
63 Monthly Report (Boilermakers’ Society), January 1949. 
64 Lorenz, Economic Decline in Britain, 132-136. Lorenz identif ies the 1950s as the key decade 
but leaves it to others to research its consequences. Barnett, The Audit of War, 123, states that the 
years 1951-54 were “commercially crucial”. See also Hilditch, “The Decline of British Shipbuilding 
Since the Second World War”, 129.
65 The main thrust of the institutional approach to decline is given in an influential collec-
tion of essays, Lorenz and Wilkinson, “The Shipbuilding Industry, 1880-1965”, and by Lorenz, 
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With full employment in British shipyards for some years to come, no 
British shipbuilder, given the industry’s record of booms and slumps in 
the interwar period, could have foreseen what would become from 1948 
onwards a near 25-year period of continuous economic expansion and a 
concomitant huge increase in the volume of seaborne trade. Up to 1965 
the world merchant fleet doubled, but the British Mercantile Marine grew 
by only 16 per cent.66 Concomitantly, shipyard wages and earnings rose for 
timeworkers and pieceworkers in the industry; and by December 1949 the 
British Mercantile Marine had been restored to its pre-war tonnage level. 
Earlier, from 1 October, government licensing of British ship repairing had 
also been ended, freeing up ship repair yards to take orders from any source, 
but licensing of shipbuilding remained.67
Prior to this, the ending of a steel price subsidy had elicited complaints 
from Norwegian and Swedish shipowners over the differential in price 
being passed on to them on existing contracts made before the ending 
of the subsidy.68 This and huge difference in ship prices resulting from 
wartime and post-war inflation resulted in increased dissatisfaction from 
shipowners.69 Norway had been British shipbuilding’s premier export 
market in the interwar period, absorbing one-third of British shipbuilding 
Economic Decline in Britain. Lorenz and Wilkinson emphasise the relatively small scale of 
British shipyards, the extent of family ownership, the craft structure of the work process, and 
trade unions as key elements in the industry’s decline. Lorenz (Economic Decline in Britain) also 
points to a lack of trust between management and workforce as a key element in institutional 
rigidity, and introduced a behaviourist theory of bounded rationality as an explanatory model. 
The main thrust of the managerial failure thesis is evident in the work of Anthony Slaven. See for 
example Slaven, “Management Policy and the Eclipse of British Shipbuilding” and “Marketing 
Opportunities and Marketing Practices”. Managerial failure is also examined in the works of 
Johnman and Murphy cited throughout this chapter. However, there is no generally mono-causal 
paradigm of decline. Institutional rigidity and management failure explanations are not mutu-
ally exclusive. It is more of a question of what particular weight is attributed to one or the other. 
66 The world merchant f leet expanded from 29,340 vessels totalling just over 80 mn grt in 1948 
to 41,865 vessels totalling more than 160 mn grt in 1965. The British Mercantile Marine in 1948 
comprised 6,025 vessels totalling just over 18 mn grt. By 1965 the number of vessels had fallen 
to 4,437, although tonnage had expanded to 21.5 mn grt, but Britain’s percentage of the world 
f leet had dropped from 24 to 13 per cent. 
67 This cancelled the Restriction of Repairs of Ships Order of 1940.
68 NMM SRNA Shipbuilding Conference Executive Board Meeting, 28 July 1949, Letter from 
Swedish Shipowner to Chairman of Shipbuilding Conference, and Letter from Norges Reder-
forbund (Norwegian Shipowners’ Association), 9 July 1949.
69 NMM SRNA 8/S47 “The Shipping Outlook”, a speech by Erling D. Naess to the Norwegian 
Club, New York, 14 May 1947. Naess compared 1939 and 1947 prices of a 9,000-grt cargo liner 
capable of 16 knots and a 12,700-dwt tanker capable of 14 knots, Naess calculated that prices 
had risen by 250 per cent and 240 per cent respectively. 
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exports. However, as credit terms and mortgaging ships became more and 
more important in the post-war period, the Norwegian market for British 
shipbuilding, which had had accounted for 40 per cent of all British launch-
ings for foreign account between 1948 and 1956, contracted signif icantly 
after 1956.70
The 1950s: competition intensifies
By 1950 the most urgent demands of post-war reconversion and new 
construction had in part been met, and by the end of the year it had been 
forecast that some 188 berths in British shipyards would become vacant 
and that 75,000 workers would be unemployed as a result. However, the 
prospects of the industry brightened with the onset of the Korean War, 
and consequently a commodity boom, a large increase in freight rates, 
general re-armament, and a signif icant increase in demand for tanker 
construction, which now represented more than 42 per cent of all tonnage 
under construction in British yards.71 New orders for all shipping in 1951 
totalled 4,152 mn grt, an all-time record, and total orders at December 
1952 stood at 6,661 mn grt. This level of orders in hand presaged four to 
f ive years of work for British shipyards and increased work for the ship 
repair sector.
Despite the wartime expansion of welded construction techniques, the 
bulk of British shipbuilding yards remained committed to riveting as the 
principal method of metal joining of ships’ plates. In 1950-51 only 3.8 per cent 
of British shipbuilding launching output was of all-welded construction, 
but it follows that the proportion of partly welded tonnage would have 
been considerably higher. The corresponding f igures in 1950 for the USA 
(albeit a closed market) at 80.3 per cent and Sweden (open market) at 37.8 
per cent are instructive.72 After the war, British shipbuilders saw a def inite 
future for riveting and were on the whole reluctant to make a full transition 
from riveting to welding, as this would imply a full-scale and therefore 
costly reorientation of their productive facilities away from the berths to 
fabrication sheds to take advantage of prefabrication of flat ships’ plates and 
sections that welding offered. Moreover, production planning to maximise 
70 For the Norwegian market for British shipbuilding in detail, see Johnman and Murphy, “The 
Norwegian Market for British Shipbuilding”. For credit and ship mortgages, see Johnman and 
Murphy, “‘A Very British Institution’”.
71 Jones, Shipbuilding in Britain, 204-208, describes the effects of tanker construction in detail.
72 Hilditch, “The Decline of British Shipbuilding Since the Second World War”, 131, calculated 
from the trade journal, Shipbuilder and Marine-Engine Builder, 1950-51.
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welding output and co-ordination of individual trades, materials, stock, and 
sub-contractors in a sequential manner all implied a greater deal of higher 
management control than had hitherto been the case. The modernisation in 
production processes that had occurred in British shipbuilding had mostly 
been undertaken piecemeal during the Second World War. But overall, as 
the First Lord of the Admiralty had warned in March 1944, the dangers of 
the “fossilisation of ineff iciency” in British shipyards were very real. This 
sentiment was echoed by the Wartime Cabinet Reconstruction Committee, 
which presciently noted that British shipbuilding would have eight to ten 
years’ grace to increase eff iciency before international competition became 
formidable.73
With an orderbook glutted with mercantile orders from the Korean 
War onwards, prof its rose accordingly and investment in f ixed assets cor-
respondingly dropped. Andrew Schonfield noted in 1958 that expenditure 
on plant and equipment can hardly have been suff icient to cover normal 
wear and tear and obsolescence in British shipyards. For an industry 
that was producing an average of £120 mn per annum, expenditure of 
£4 mn per annum on f ixed assets – “such a low f igure” – indicated “that 
someone was trying to get out of a business and in the meantime was 
determined to spend as little as possible on it”.74 In terms of share divi-
dends, a representative sample of thirteen f irms between 1945 and 1956 
paid average share dividends of more than 10 per cent, distributing over 
£2.6 mn per annum – over half what the industry was spending on f ixed 
assets. Moreover, taking capital investment as a proportion of net output 
in British shipbuilding and repair and other industries from 1949 to 1957, 
shipbuilding and repair averaged under half of the all-industry average, 
and in terms of share price index for manufacturing at the end of 1949 to 
October 1956, with 1949 at 100, shipbuilding easily came out on top at 288 
at October 1956.75
These levels of prof its and the distribution thereof did not escape the 
attention of trade unions, who understandably demanded increases in pay 
on an annual basis through the aegis of the Confederation of Shipbuilding 
and Engineering Unions (CSEU). Wage rises were duly negotiated and as 
usual met in part. However, a claim for an increase of 10 per cent in wage 
rates, which rumbled on through a series of job conferences from October 
1956 to March 1957, was rejected by the employers, and resulted in the f irst 
73 Barnett, The Audit of War, 123, quotes the First Lord.
74 Schonf ield, British Economic Policy Since the War, 42.
75 Johnman and Murphy, British Shipbuilding and the State Since 1918, 117-118.
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national strike for thirty years. The strike began on 16 March 1957 and lasted 
until 4 April, when the Ministry of Labour convened a Court of Inquiry into 
the dispute. Subsequently the CSEU agreed a rise of 11 shillings per week 
(6 per cent) with the employers, but with conditions attached including a 
one-year standstill on wage claims.76
The year 1956 proved to be one of foreboding for Britain, not only for its 
ill-advised invasion of Egypt on 5 and 6 November in collaboration with 
France and Israel over the nationalisation and closure, by President Gamal 
Abdel Nasser, of the Suez Canal Company and Canal in July 1956. The inglori-
ous withdrawal at American insistence in December f inally ended any 
pretensions that Britain still retained great-power status in the world and 
also reflected the weakness of the British economy.77 The Suez crisis drove 
up tanker charter rates and led to a boom in tanker orders. That year Japan 
took over Britain’s mantle for the f irst time as the world’s foremost producer 
of ships (mainly on tanker construction) and remained in that position 
for the rest of the twentieth century.78 The Japanese shipbuilding industry 
had learned from the American wartime shipbuilding production methods 
practised at Daniel Ludwig’s National Bulk Carriers leased facility at the 
former naval shipyard at Kure.79 From the 1960s to the 1970s Japan secured 
more than half the international market for ships. Japanese shipbuilders had 
the capital through their links to keiretsu (huge family-controlled banking 
and industrial combines) and the technology – most of which it purchased 
from abroad, and a workforce that did not command wages rendering them 
uncompetitive.80 Crucially, Japanese shipyards built tonnage for Greek and 
76 Jones, Shipbuilding in Britain, 200-201.
77 In the aftermath of the Suez debacle, the Conservative Party prime minister, Anthony 
Eden, resigned on 9 January 1857 and was replaced by his foreign secretary, Harold Macmillan. 
For Suez, see Eden, Full Circle, Eisenhower, The White House Years, vols I-II, and Macmillan, 
Tides of Fortune and Riding the Storm. A more recent book on Suez containing a large selection 
of government documents released under the thirty-year rule is Gorst and Johnman, The Suez 
Crisis.
78 From April to September 1955, tankers accounted for 83 per cent of tonnage ordered in 
Japan, mostly for American and other owners for Panamanian and Liberian registration. 
79 For Ludwig’s enterprise, see Davies, “The Role of National Bulk Carriers in the Advance of 
Shipbuilding Technology in Post-War Japan”. See also Chida and Davies, The Japanese Shipping 
and Shipbuilding Industries, 111-114.
80 The leading keiretsu (called zaibatsu before the Second World War) are Mitsui, Mitsubishi, 
Dai Ichi Kangyo, Sumitomo, Sanwa, and Fuyo. They gained a position in the Japanese economy 
with no exact parallel elsewhere. In 1937 the four leading zaibatsu controlled directly one-
third of all bank deposits, one-third of all foreign trade, one-half of Japan’s shipbuilding and 
maritime shipping, and most of the heavy industries. After 1945, the break-up of the zaibatsu 
was announced as a major aim of the Allied occupation, but in the 1950s and 1960s groups 
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American owners who utilised the fast-growing flag of convenience fleets 
of Liberia and Panama during the 1950s and 1960s. They offered quality 
vessels at economic prices and on time, and shipowners naturally ordered 
from them. By the end of the 1950s, shipbuilding in Japan contributed 10.6 
per cent of its total exports.81
In response to Japan’s ascendancy, the president of the Shipbuilding 
Conference, Sir James McNeill, noted in a letter to the First Lord of the Admi-
ralty, Viscount Hailsham, that “all time record launchings were established 
by [West] Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and Norway [which] indicated 
a def inite comparative trend”. In McNeill’s view, British shipbuilding was 
facing a crisis.82 Table 2.4 shows the precipitous decline of the British ship-
building in the export market for ships in the 1950s and the rise of Japan 
and West German competition.
For almost the entire period from 1945 to 1958, there had been a seller’s 
market in shipbuilding. Yet, British shipbuilding output had remained 
largely static: its share of overseas orders had declined, and British shipown-
ers increasingly ordered from overseas. Moreover, the major growth market 
segments after 1945 – increasingly large crude oil tankers and bulk carriers 
– had largely passed British shipbuilders by. On the whole the industry had 
remained wedded to producing to order for the British mercantile marine, 
had taken easy profits, and largely failed to re-invest them in modern plant 
and equipment. From 1958, by which stage the post-Suez spike in freight 
rates had waned, to 1961, a buyer’s market reigned; the spectre of heightened 
foreign competition was all too real, and the likelihood of increased and 
heavily localised unemployment loomed.
based on the old zaibatsu re-emerged as keiretsu. The decision on the part of these groups in 
the post-1945 era to pool their resources greatly inf luenced Japan’s subsequent rise as a global 
economic power. 
81 Allen, A Short Economic History of Modern Japan, 231. 
82 Johnman and Murphy, British Shipbuilding and the State Since 1918, 112.
Table 2.4  Shipbuilding percentage shares of the world export market
Years UK Japan West 
Germany
Sweden France Netherlands Others
1948-50 35 2 0 18 0 6 38 
1951-55 22 11 15 13 2 9 29
1956-60 7 32 21 12 6 6 17 
Source: Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, various years
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The 1960s: consolidation of trade unions, and the state intervenes and 
directs
In the three years from 1958, British shipbuilding held its share of world 
shipbuilding launchings at around 15 per cent but its output remained static. 
Government, through its Shipbuilding Advisory Committee (SAC), which 
comprised shipbuilders (Shipbuilding Conference), shipowners, and trade 
unions, was well aware of the industry’s concerns, but remained uncom-
mitted to its entreaties. Indeed, the independent SAC chairman, Sir Graham 
Cunningham, had resigned in March 1960 in complete frustration over the 
shipbuilders’ attitudes to forming a sub-committee to further examine its 
problems.83 An original report (at the later suggestion of the shipbuilders, 
heavily amended) on the industry’s research and development efforts from 
the Department of Scientif ic and Industrial Research (DSIR) castigated its 
record but had not yet been published. A leaked précis of its contents was 
published by The Times in October.84
An SAC sub-committee Report on Prospects of 19 April 1961, couched 
in the usual generalities, could agree on only one recommendation, the 
provision of credit terms by government. In November 1961, a government-
commissioned report on British shipowners ordering from overseas yards 
from the accountants, Peat Marwick Mitchell and Company, was published. 
It pointed out that the main reasons for ordering from abroad were price, 
price and delivery date, price and credit facilities, guaranteed delivery date, 
and UK shipbuilders’ unwillingness to install foreign-built main engines. 
The report concluded that the availability of credit, spreading payment 
for ships over several years, did not appear in most cases to be of primary 
importance.85
That the SAC and Peat Marwick were at odds, at least on the issue of 
credit, was obvious. Total employment had fallen from 80,954 in 1957 to 
63,477 in 1961 with unemployment in shipbuilding and repair averaging 
83 NA BT 291/49 Resignation of Sir Graham Cunningham from SAC, 16 March 1960; The Times, 
24 March 1960; to limit political damage, the government quickly appointed Sir James Dunnett, 
Permanent Secretary at the Department of Transport, as chair of the SAC and established a sub-
committee to look at the industry’s prospects. As The Times stated, this justif ied Cunningham’s 
views.
84 Hogwood, Government and Shipbuilding, 45-49. The original report’s contents noted that 
the industry’s record on productivity and modernisation was woeful, production control was 
primitive, and the total research effort and development effort were insuff icient. It is hardly 
surprising, therefore, that the shipbuilders demanded amendments to the report and got them. 
85 Shipbuilding Orders Placed Abroad by British Shipowners.
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5.2 per cent at November 1961 against a national average for all industries 
of 1.7 per cent.86 According to the Shipbuilding Conference, the state of the 
orderbook in the f irst three quarters of 1962 amounted to a post-war low 
of 317,000 grt, with third-quarter orders reaching only 34,000 grt. British 
shipbuilding had taken less than 8 per cent of orders in 1962 against West 
Germany’s 12.7 per cent, and Japan’s 30 per cent.
Given that Britain’s launchings and completions were considerably down 
while those of its competitors were rising, the industry through the Ship-
building Conference fell back on its 1930s solution – capacity reduction – and 
proposed a scheme to purchase yards whose owners wished voluntarily to 
get out of the industry with funds of £1.5 mn earmarked for this purpose. The 
conference envisaged that through these means and a levy on the surviving 
companies it would relieve the industry of 20 to 25 per cent of its capacity 
before going to the government for further assistance.87 Subsequently, the 
conference scheme did not get off the ground because of legal diff iculties, 
but discussions with government continued on a modif ied redundancy 
scheme, which was eventually rejected by the conference in April 1963.88
The 1960s was to prove a challenging decade for the trade unions in 
shipbuilding and repair; with orders on the whole scarce, much more at-
tention would be put on productivity relative to pay awarded. The DSIR 
report of 1960 noted that no improvement had taken place in gross tonnage 
produced per worker employed between 1946 and 1959. Indeed, average 
construction times (months) during the period 1957-59 were the UK nine-
teen, West Germany ten, Sweden nine, and Japan eight. These differences 
between the UK and its major competitors were too wide to be explained 
entirely by differences in the type of ships built.89 The industry-sponsored 
86 NA BT 292/67 Standing Committee on Shipbuilding and Ship-repairing, Survey of unemploy-
ment at November 1961.
87 NMM SRNA Report of AGM of Shipbuilding Conference, 18 October 1962. It was considered 
that Shipbuilding Corporation Ltd, as a company wholly owned by the Shipbuilding Conference, 
provided a suitable means of operating the scheme if a statement of its objects was amended. 
If the conference took over Shipbuilding Corporation’s holding in the Ship Mortgage Finance 
Company, the corporation would have some £1.5 mn available at the f irst stage. It would be 
essential to obtain from the Board of Trade a redundancy company certif icate under the Income 
Tax Act, 1952, so that, apart from other considerations, levies paid by contributors would be 
allowed for taxation purposes in their accounts. See NA BT 291/1 Note of a Meeting with the 
Shipbuilding Conference, 31 July 1962.
88 NA BT 291/2 Note of a meeting between Vice-Admiral J. Hughes Hallet, Joint Parliamentary 
Secretary to the Minister of Transport, and the Shipbuilding Conference, 26 April 1963.
89 Department of Industrial and Scientif ic Research, Research and Development Requirements 
of Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering, 7.
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Patten Report on Productivity, which reported in February 1962 and whose 
members visited three shipyards in the Netherlands, four in West Germany, 
six in Scandinavia, and a representative seven in the UK, noted that there 
could be no doubt that flexibility and interchangeability of labour and the 
freedom of management to decide manning levels of individual machines 
and jobs to suit circumstances had signif icant effects in reducing labour 
costs of ships built in foreign shipyards.90
Beforehand, the long march towards a negotiated 40-hour week pro-
gressed on 28 March 1960, when the working week was reduced from 44 
hours (in situ since 1947) to 42 hours. Mostly ad hoc modernisation of many 
shipyard facilities had begun or was being contemplated, with much talk of 
unidirectional flows of materials from stockyard to berth to enable more ef-
f icient construction and quicker delivery times.91 No British shipbuilder yet 
contemplated anything on the scale of Götaverken’s new Arendal shipyard 
in Gothenburg, opened in 1963 at a cost of £40 mn, with no problems of 
demarcation, flexibility, or interchangeability of labour, and set up for block 
assembly of ships’ (mostly tankers up to 120,000 dwt and bulk carriers) 
sections in quick time undertaken under cover.92
In the interim, blacksmiths’ and shipwrights’ representatives, with their 
numbers falling, contemplated merging their unions with the Boilermak-
ers’ Society. For the latter, representing the hull trades as a more or less 
single entity was an attractive proposition; it would allow more control 
over members and increase its negotiating power with employers. For the 
employers it was two fewer unions to negotiate with and theoretically would 
result in fewer problems with demarcation disputes, which continued to 
disrupt production in most yards. The Boilermakers’ and Blacksmiths’ had 
merged on 29 September 1962, and in a ballot of shipwrights, blacksmiths, 
and boilermakers in January 1963 amalgamation of shipwrights under 
the Boilermakers’ Society was agreed. This came into effect from October 
90 Productivity and Research in Shipbuilding, Report of the Main Committee under the 
Chairmanship of Mr James Patton OBE to the Joint Industry Committee, 26 February 1962, 2. 
By f lexibility, Patton meant the freedom of a worker to undertake any kind of auxiliary work 
to progress his own job, and by interchangeability of labour the freedom to assign men to work 
outside their normal trade group.
91 The trade journal, Fairplay, noted on 5 October 1961 in a special supplement on 250 years of 
shipbuilding by Scotts of Greenock that the f irm had completed its f irst all-welded ship, Caltex 
Edinburgh, only in 1956. Another trade journal, Shipbuilder and Marine Engine Builder, March 
1963, hailed the advent of f low-line production at John Brown, Clydebank, when in fact Japanese, 
Scandinavian, and European shipyards had used similar techniques of materials f low for many 
years beforehand.
92 Olsson, “Big Business in Sweden”. 
laBouR in tHe BRitiSH SHipBuilding and SHip RepaiRing induStRieS 77
1963, the new union titled as The Amalgamated Society of Boilermakers, 
Shipwrights, Blacksmiths. and Structural Workers.93 By 1964 the new Boil-
ermakers’ Society, with the motto “Unity Is Strength”, had 119,577 members, 
with the Boilermakers’ section accounting for 90,853, the Blacksmiths’ 8,829 
and the Shipwrights’ 19,895.94
With discussions between the industry and government continuing 
throughout 1962 and 1963 on the industry’s prospects, the f irst shipbuild-
ing casualty of real note was the shipbuilder, repairer ,and marine engine 
builder, Wm Gray of West Hartlepool, which voluntarily liquidated in 
1962.95 Gray’s was followed into liquidation in 1963 by perhaps the most 
versatile of all British shipbuilding and marine engine building f irms, Wm. 
Denny Bros of Dumbarton.96 In the same year the lower Clyde shipbuilder, 
Wm Hamilton’s Glen yard at Port Glasgow, was closed and its premises 
incorporated into the neighbouring Lithgows Ltd. During 1962 the loss-
making Harland and Wolff, Belfast, had decided to close its three upper 
Clyde shipbuilding and repair yards, A & J Inglis at Pointhouse and D & W 
Henderson at Meadowside in 1962 and Harland and Wolff, Govan, in 1963. 
Thereafter, its shipbuilding operations were confined to its high-cost Belfast 
base. The year 1964 saw the voluntary liquidation of the tanker specialist, 
Blythswood Shipbuilding, on the upper Clyde, the dredger specialists, 
Simons and Lobnitz, at Renfrew, and the closure of the former specialist 
destroyer builder, J. Samuel White’s East Cowes yard on the Isle of Wight.97 
One could, and should, view these closures as entirely rational business 
decisions given intense foreign competition.
93 Tuckett, The Blacksmiths’ History, 362-366; Mortimer, History of the Boilermakers’ Society, vol. 
III, 160-162; Dougan, The History of the Shipconstructors and Shipwrights Association, 326-328. 
94 Mortimer, History of the Boilermakers’ Society, 264.
95 Wm Gray, founded in 1874, collaborated with Marcus Samuel, the founder of Shell Oil, to 
build from 1892 eight oil small tankers capable of transiting the Suez Canal. The f irst, Murex, 
was built on extended credit terms. This allowed Samuel to build up a f leet in a relatively short 
period of time at low cost, and gave Gray’s shipyard and engine works employment for an 
extended period. Gray’s launched its last ship in 1961 and continued repair work into 1962. 
96 Denny’s personif ied the versatility of British shipbuilders. It had built clipper ships, 
cross-Channel ferries, f lotilla craft, Clyde steamers, cargo liners, sloops, destroyers, and the 
D2 hovercraft. By 1964, however, its shipyard could no longer accommodate the seemingly 
inexorable rise in the size of ships, and the f irm was voluntarily liquidated. For Denny ships, 
see Lyon, The Denny List.
97 Blythswood’s shipyard was established in 1919 at Scotstoun with the prof its of the sale of 
Dunlop Bremner of Port Glasgow to Lithgows Ltd. Blythswood closed in 1964 and its premises 
were acquired early in 1965 by a neighbouring shipyard, Yarrows Ltd. For Yarrows, see Borthwick, 
Yarrows. White’s continued its marine-engine building facilities at East Cowes into 1965. For J. 
Samuel White, see Williams, White’s of Cowes. 
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Nonetheless, the level of closures, actual and potential, and resultant 
levels of unemployment in the industry had begun to worry government. 
The general rise in ship size affecting largely spatially constrained shipyards 
obviously had an effect, as did the amount of capital expenditure required 
to increase the size of berths and docks. However, the steadily declining 
share of world output evident since 1947 (see Table 2.5) was particularly 
evident, and no real industry plan had been devised to combat foreign 
competition, particularly from Japan, Sweden, and West Germany. A short-
term response to the industry’s problems came in May 1963, when the 
Conservative government announced a Shipbuilding Credit Scheme of one 
year’s duration and provided £30 mn at the Government Lending Rate for 80 
per cent of the cost of a ship and loans which could be extended up to ten 
years. In the course of the year the f inancial limit was twice extended up 
to a total of £75 mn, and by October 1964 the scheme was fully subscribed, 
with 67 vessels from British shipyards on order totalling 892,000 grt.98 At 
98 Johnman and Murphy, British Shipbuilding and the State Since 1918, 141.
Table 2.5  World and United Kingdom launchings of merchant ships, 1947-1964
Year World UK UK share as % of world
No. 000 grt No. 000 grt
1947 741 2,093 341 1,193 57.0
1948 840 2,303 340 1,176 51.1
1949 899 3,126 320 1,267 40.5
1950 990 3,489 275 1,325 38.0
1951 1,002 3,639 261 1,341 36.9
1952 1,065 4,394 254 1,303 29.7
1953 1,134 5,095 220 1,317 25.8
1954 1,223 5,251 253 1,409 26.8
1955 1,437 5,315 276 1,474 27.7
1956 1,815 6,670 275 1,383 20.7
1957 1,950 8,501 260 1,414 16.6
1958 1,936 9,270 282 1,402 15.1
1959 1,808 8,746 274 1,373 15.7
1960 2,020 8,356 253 1,331 15.9
1961 1,990 7,940 247 1,192 15.0
1962 1,901 8,375 187 1,073 12.8
1963 2,001 8,539 160 928 10.9
1964 2,147 10,264 179 1,043 10.2
note: 100 grt and above. World figures exclude uSSR, east germany, and china. 
Source: Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, various years
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best, the scheme accelerated orders when they were much needed as the 
industry struggled to hold its share of the market.
Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee Report, 1965-1966
With the election in 1964 of a new Labour government after thirteen years 
of Conservative Party rule, yet another inquiry on shipbuilding and marine 
engine building, but not ship repair, was commissioned by the president 
of the Board of Trade, Douglas Jay, with a remit to increase the industry’s 
international competitiveness.99 Crucially, the SIC, which reported in 
March 1966, did not contain any shipbuilders and was chaired by the 
chairman of the Dunlop Rubber Company, Reay Geddes. Members of the 
SIC visited shipyards and marine engine building works in Denmark, 
Sweden, Norway, West Germany, the USA, and Japan, in tandem with visits 
to the largest twenty-seven f irms in the United Kingdom. On the labour 
side, the report’s authors acknowledged that management and unions 
had failed in their attempts to negotiate constructively and that at a time 
when skilled labour was scarce it was wastefully employed. Furthermore, 
it was also noted that shipyard workers and trade unions should believe 
in the reality of a fresh start “if they are ever to compete with Swedish 
and Japanese workers’ willing response, steady effective work, and pride 
in their job”.100
The effectiveness of “ruthlessly eff icient” Japanese tanker building 
specialists was such that, as one leading British shipbuilder, Ross Belch of 
Lithgows Ltd, observed, if Lithgows built a 52,000-dwt tanker for £2,500,000 
then Japanese yards would undercut them on price by £500,000, and even 
if Lithgows paid out nothing in wages it still could not undercut Japanese 
competition.101 In 1966, the tonnage output, largely tankers, of f ive ship-
yards of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in Japan exceeded that of the British 
99 Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee 1965-1966 Report, Cmnd. 2937, March 1966 (London, HMSO, 
1966). Its remit was to establish what changes were necessary in organisation, the methods of 
production, and any other factors affecting costs to make the shipbuilding industry competitive 
in world markets; to establish what changes in organisation and methods of production would 
reduce costs of manufacture of large main engines of ships to the lowest level; and to recommend 
what action should be taken by employers, trade unions, and government to bring about these 
changes. The SIC was concerned with shipyards regularly building ships of 5,000 grt and above 
(or warships of equivalent value). Its ambit therefore amounted to twenty-seven of the sixty-two 
extant shipyards in the UK. 
100 Ibid., 10. 
101 Johnman and Murphy, Scott Lithgow, 151.
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shipbuilding industry combined, and one yard, at Nagasaki, had exceeded 
the entire launching output of Clyde shipyards.102
The SIC report did however mark a watershed in the industry’s fortunes. 
It criticised the industry’s short-term attitude to markets, men, and money 
and its insuff icient influence over its customers and suppliers. It saw the 
industry’s weakness in its fragmented structure; thus its major recommen-
dations included grouping of f irms on river centres to increase economies of 
scale, scope, and specialisation and a major rationalisation of marine engine 
building f irms. Funds would be provided by a new three-man Shipbuilding 
Industry Board (SIB) subsequently established by the Shipbuilding Industry 
Act, 1967, empowered to provide grants and loans to facilitate grouping of 
shipbuilding f irms, and whose operation would be at arm’s length from 
government, which nonetheless would be providing the funds. Like the 
SIC, the SIB did not contain shipbuilders and was tasked to “promote the 
ability of the shipbuilding industry in the United Kingdom to compete in 
world markets”. Its remit did not include ship repair.103
During the SIC reporting stage, one of the six major shipbuilders in Britain 
and Glasgow’s largest shipyard, the Fairf ield Shipbuilding and Engineering 
Co. Ltd of Govan, entered receivership in October 1965.104 Although the f irm 
had an orderbook of some £20 mn, its major creditor, the Bank of Scotland, 
had called in a floating charge on the company of £1 mn and in so doing had 
secured f irst-creditor status. There then began a trade union campaign to 
save Fairf ield and its marine engine building arm, David Rowan and Sons. 
Fairf ield, which had modernised its facilities, had taken on a number of 
sophisticated contracts with tight delivery times.105 The final loss occasioned 
on one vessel, Nili, a 7,500-grt ferry for a Swiss-Israeli consortium f inally 
delivered in June 1965, was £1.5 mn for late delivery and cost overruns.106 
The Labour government stepped in and rescued the shipyard, but not David 
102 Greenock Telegraph, Review of 1966: Shipbuilding, 26 December 1966. 
103 Its members were: William Swallow, Chairman of Vauxhall Motors; Anthony Hepper of 
Thomas Tilling group; and Joe Gormley, a senior off icial of the National Union of Mineworkers. 
104 The others were Harland and Wolff, Belfast, Cammell Laird at Birkenhead, Swan Hunter 
and Wigham Richardson on the Tyne, and Vickers at Barrow and the Tyne, and John Brown at 
Clydebank on the upper Clyde.
105 Fairf ield, under control of the Port Glasgow-based Lithgow Group, had begun a system of 
prefabricating ship sections under cover in a new fabrication hall and had reduced their berths 
from six to f ive to allow ships of broader beam to be built and to allow space for travelling cranes 
to be installed. By 1960, £3 mn had been spent on modernisation. See the company’s centenary 
booklet, Fairf ield Shipbuilding and Engineering Co., Fairfield, 1860-1960.
106 Glasgow City Archives, Mitchell Library, Glasgow, UCS 2/I/8 Fairf ield Board Minutes, 1965.
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Rowan and Co., and a new company, Fairf ields (Glasgow, 1966) Ltd, was 
formed in January 1966.
Under the chairmanship of Ian Stewart and with government approval 
and support, Fairf ield became a proving ground for a new type of industrial 
relations, the “Fairf ield Experiment”, which promised high and stable earn-
ings, management-union co-operation through a yard council, f lexibility 
within the workforce, increased productivity, and no strikes.107 As K.J.W. 
Alexander and C.L. Jenkins noted, the aims of the “experiment” were never 
clearly or comprehensively set out “so that the criteria against which success 
or failure are to be judged are themselves in doubt and may be disputed”.108 
However, the voluntary abandonment of the strike weapon was not achieved 
but restrictive practices were substantially reduced. Manpower planning 
was restricted by the size of the yard and the inherited building programme; 
thus the “experiment” could not lay claim to have greatly reduced fluctua-
tions in the demand for labour.109
In the interim a number of schemes had been proposed to enlarge ship-
yards to enable them to enter the large tanker construction market. One 
proposal by Lord Aberconway, Chairman of John Brown at Clydebank – to 
divert the River Clyde at Newshot Isle and build an entirely new facility 
there capable of building super-tankers at a cost of some £29 mn with the 
new yard expected to take some three and a half years to build – did not get 
the support of the SIC or the Board of Trade.110 Geddes wrote, off the record, 
to Aberconway in January 1966 that there was no indication of a return on 
capital and that insuff icient research had been undertaken on the likely 
demand for large ships.111 Indeed, when published, the SIC Report was less 
than enthusiastic about the market for giant ships and exposed the fallacy 
of yard-based solutions to the problems of the industry as a whole. Moreo-
ver, there were no grounds for assuming that any new shipyard built on a 
greenfield site would be an economic investment. Neither did it f ind that 
the benefits of constructing ships in building docks, as practised in Japan 
107 For the experiment, see Alexander and Jenkins, Fairfields. For the Fairf ield collapse 
generally and the experiment, see Paulden and Hawkins, Whatever Happened at Fairfields. See 
also Johnman and Murphy, Scott Lithgow, 152-156. Sir James Lithgow had saved Fairf ield from 
bankruptcy by purchasing the company in 1935, and the f irm remained part of the Lithgow 
group of companies up to receivership on 15 October 1965. 
108 Alexander and Jenkins, Fairfields, 209. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Johnston and Murphy, “The Newshot Isle Project”, 213, 215.
111 Glasgow University Business Archives Centre, Thurso Street, Glasgow, UCS 1/22/38 Letter 
from Aberconway in reply to correspondence from Geddes, 24 January 1966. 
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and Sweden, would outweigh the heavy initial capital investment outlay.112 
Thus, in perhaps the most important inquiry into the British maritime 
industries in the twentieth century, there was no vision whatsoever save 
a wish to group f irms in accordance with Japanese practice; to increase 
eff iciency of existing resources; and to rationalise marine engine building 
in the face of intense foreign competition.
In November 1965 there were around 140,000 employees in British ship-
building and repair, of which some 53,000 were employed in the 27 shipyards 
subject to the SIC Report.113 Given that major changes were envisaged in how 
shipbuilding and repair would be conducted in future at the level of the 
f irm and with a renewed emphasis on increasing productivity, it followed 
that a concomitant change in how the shipbuilding and -repair industries 
conducted industrial relations would ensue. Any change, however, should 
be seen against a background of government-inspired prices and incomes 
restraints – anathema to trade unions which existed to improve the terms 
and conditions of their memberships, and in particular to increase their 
wages. A move by the CSEU to work towards a 40-hour rather than a 42-hour 
working week (in situ since March 1960) in shipbuilding and repair, with 
no reduction in pay, had begun in May 1963, but was rejected by the SEF in 
October. Consequently, the CSEU imposed an overtime ban from 25 No-
vember. Negotiations were reopened on 3 December and by 17 December 
an agreement on a general rise in wages and reduction to a 41-hour week 
from 1 December 1964 with a further reduction to a basic 40-hour week 
from 5 July 1965 was reached.114 Throughout the negotiations the SEF had 
promoted the idea of greater f lexibility among the workforce. This was 
outside the remit of the CSEU and within the ambit of individual unions. 
All the CSEU could do was to recommend to its constituent members that 
they engage in talks with employers on flexibility.
An informal discussion between the SEF and Shipbuilding Conference 
had taken place with the CSEU on 25 November 1965. The employers voiced 
their concerns on the parlous financial state of the industry, the heavy losses 
being incurred on f ixed-price contracts owing to large increases in costs, 
particularly of direct labour, and “the loss of control by union leaders at yard 
level and the resultant state of virtual anarchy in labour relations in the yards”. 
Dan McGarvey, the president of the Boilermakers’ Society, and his other union 
colleagues had offered “no denial of the situation explained and had admitted 
112 SIC Report, paras 97-99, 135-137, 245-246, and p. 74. 
113 SIC Report, para. 342.
114 Mortimer, History of the Boilermakers’ Society, vol. III, 168-171.
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that effective Trade Union control of labour had been lost”.115 In effect, national 
collective bargaining had been superseded by local and yard-based bargaining, 
enabling shop stewards to win pay improvements over and above nationally 
negotiated minimum standards. The dichotomy between national and local 
collective bargaining for wages and conditions was in fact a long-standing 
problem in shipbuilding and ship repair for the entire century to date, and 
one not susceptible to quick solution by employers and unions.
By 1966, a Joint Industry Consultative Committee was set up comprising 
employers and trade unions to discuss various matters including general 
policy but not wages and conditions of employment. This coincided with the 
SIC Report’s wish “that employers and employees should urgently review 
their past attitudes, establish mutual confidence at all levels, and make 
a fresh start”.116 While laudable, this, given the past record of industrial 
relations, was highly unlikely, and was not aided by a separate, tentative 
SIC suggestion that f ive unions might cover all shipbuilding operations.117 
Nevertheless, in August 1966, the Boilermakers’ Society signed a new agree-
ment with the SEF designed to eliminate demarcation disputes.118
From 1966 onwards progress on grouping of f irms on river centres 
had been sporadic. On the Tyne, the major shipyard, Swan Hunter, led 
the grouping effort there, with the River Wear yards conducting separate 
talks. On the Clyde, where the SIC Report had recommended not more 
than two groups, negotiations on mergers and SIB funding through grants 
and loans had begun between Scotts and Lithgows on the lower Clyde, and 
between f ive shipyards on the upper Clyde, John Brown, Stephen, Connell, 
Fairf ield, and Yarrow, bringing to a premature end the Fairf ield experiment 
in industrial relations. The three other major geographically isolated f irms, 
Cammell Laird at Birkenhead, Vickers at Barrow, and Harland and Wolff, 
Belfast, resisted grouping. Nonetheless, what came to be known as the Swan 
Hunter group had been established by 1968 as had Upper Clyde Shipbuilders. 
Clearly, the problems of merging disparate f irms with separate ownership, 
product mixes, management and accounting systems, plant and equipment, 
labour agreements, etc., against a background of increasing and in fact 
unrelenting foreign competition would be diff icult.119
115 SRNA NMM Report of a Meeting of the Executive Board of the Shipbuilding Conference, 
2 February 1966, item 5. 
116 SIC Report, 163, recommendation 87. 
117 Ibid., recommendation 95.
118 Mortimer, History of the Boilermakers’ Society, vol. III, 228-229.
119 For this period, see Johnman and Murphy, British Shipbuilding and the State Since 1918, 
158-190.
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In 1967, a signif icant change in industrial relations from the employ-
ers’ side took place with the creation of a new Shipbuilders and Repairers 
National Association (SRNA) amalgamating the SEF, the Shipbuilding 
Conference, and the Dry Dock Owners’ and Repairers’ Central Council 
in a central labour and commercial policy organisation. With grouping 
of f irms now taking place, representation on the SRNA reflected this new 
reality. The SRNA represented all the major f irms and covered around 95 
per cent of all employees in shipbuilding and around 80 per cent in ship 
repair. It conducted national negotiations with the CSEU and individual 
trade unions mainly to establish minimum rates of pay and conditions of 
service. With groups of f irms now extant, these were obviously big enough 
to conduct the bulk of their own industrial relations without undue recourse 
to the SRNA. Nevertheless, the largest groups in the industry were also 
predominant on the SRNA management and industrial relations commit-
tees, holding twenty-seven of twenty-nine places. Contemporaneously, with 
the establishment of the SRNA, a new National Procedure for Avoidance 
of Disputes had been agreed with the CSEU that formalised the position 
of elected shop stewards to represent their fellow workers only if they had 
been in continuous employment in shipbuilding for not less than one year 
and in ship repair three months.120
April 1967 saw the liquidation of the Firth of Clyde Dry Dock Company, 
which had opened its Inchgreen Dry Dock at Greenock only in November 
1964. When proposed, the dry dock was to be the largest in the UK and the 
sixth-largest in the world, with dimensions of 1000 ft by 150 ft and water to 
a depth of 30 ft. It was however, undercapitalised from the start and beset 
by labour diff iculties and management inadequacies. The company soon 
got into diff iculties, and was liquidated at a loss of £2.4 mn to the taxpayer. 
It was purchased by the two major shipbuilding yards in the area, Scott 
and Lithgow, in May 1967, at a price of £1.1 mn (it had cost £4.6 mn to build) 
for its f ixed assets, which also included a 1300-ft repair quay, jetty, and a 
tank-cleaning installation.121
This at least kept a major ship repairing facility on the lower Clyde. Dur-
ing 1967 and 1968 there was also a long dispute in the South Wales ship 
repairing industry where the employers had given notice of their intention 
to end some existing agreements. Subsequently, the District Committee of 
the CSEU had agreed a number of new agreements with employers that were 
120 NMM SRNA, Procedure for Avoidance of Disputes: Memorandum of Agreement between 
the SRNA and CSEU, 14 August 1967.
121 For this, see Johnman and Murphy, “No Light at the End of the Dock”.
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not acceptable to the Boilermakers’ Society. However, other unions were 
willing to work under the new agreements, so the employers locked out the 
boilermakers and members of the shipwrights’ union who supported them. 
Eventually a compromise was reached which restored employment but 
under changed conditions.122 This protracted dispute showed that certain 
ship repairing employers were more hard-nosed than their shipbuilding 
counterparts and that the sectionalised nature of trade unionism in the 
repair sector was more acute than that pertaining in shipbuilding.
On 19 May 1969, a National Demarcation Procedure Agreement was 
signed by employers and the CSEU.123 This agreement f inally revoked and 
122 Mortimer, History of the Boilermakers’ Society, vol. III, 234. 
123 The signatories were: the SRNA, the Amalgamated Society of Boilermakers, Shipwrights, 
Blacksmiths and Structural Workers, National Union of Furniture Trades Operatives, National 
Union of Metal Mechanics, Electrical, Electronic and Telecommunications Union-Plumbing 
Trades Union, Amalgamated Union of Engineering and Foundry Workers, National Union of 
Sheet Metal Workers, Coppersmiths, Heating and Domestic Engineers, Amalgamated Society 
of Wood-Cutting Machinists, Amalgamated Society of Painters and Decorators, Association of 
Patternmakers and Allied Craftsmen, and the Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers. Disputes 
at yard level were to be reported by shop stewards to foremen, who would then report to man-
agement, who would convene a meeting between the representatives of each class of worker 
involved. If no agreement was reached within a period of 48 hours then the dispute would be 
referred to the district level; if no resolution at this stage was acceptable to management within 
another 48 hours, then the dispute was referred to an independent arbiter, whose decision was 
binding on all parties including management. 
Table 2.6  British and Japanese mercantile completions in global comparison 
1963-1970 (000 grt)

















1963 3365 2891 6256 1216 1053 2269 36.27 625 471 1096 17.52
1964 2757 4524 7281 1157 2607 3764 51.70 525 283 808 11.10
1965 4539 4876 9415 2269 2617 4886 51.90 735 547 1282 13.62
1966 6083 4657 10740 3762 2733 6495 60.47 721 353 1074 10.00
1967 8001 3756 11757 4752 2465 7217 61.38 1041 147 1188 10.10
1968 7790 5154 12944 4835 3514 8349 64.50 824 222 1046 8.08
1969 7082 7272 14354 4421 4747 9168 63.87 781 48 829 5.78
1970 7725 7914 15639 4998 5012 10010 64.01 821 503 1324 8.47
Source: Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, various years
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replaced the General Demarcation Agreement of 1912 and on this occa-
sion was signed by the Boilermakers’ Society. Clause 16 of the agreement 
stipulated that demarcation disputes “shall not give rise to any stoppage of 
work of either a partial or a general nature or to any other form of industrial 
action”. Up to April 1971, of thirty-four cases in which the Boilermakers’ 
Society was involved, twenty-four had gone to independent arbitration.124 
Earlier, in December 1969, the CSEU had agreed with the SRNA to reduce 
the period of apprenticeship in shipbuilding and repair from f ive to four 
years starting at the age of 16 – the apprenticeship to begin before 17 years 
of age.125
By the end of the 1960s, as Table 2.6 shows, British shipbuilding had 
further slipped behind the industry leader, Japan, which had almost dou-
bled its market share over the decade, in two important sectors of modern 
shipbuilding, dry cargo and tanker construction.
The 1970s: the almost fatal decade
Before the general election of June 1970, the shipbuilding and -repairing 
arm of the Laird Group of companies, Cammell Laird at Birkenhead, was 
in deep trouble. Losses on shipbuilding work taken on at unremunerative 
prices were mounting, and the company faced a critical liquidity problem. 
An order from Peninsular & Oriental, their biggest customer, for four 24,000-
dwt chemical tankers for its Panocean subsidiary, was expected to result in 
a minimum loss to Cammell Laird of £2 mn. By May, P&O were unwilling to 
negotiate contracts or take shares in Cammell Laird.126 By mid-May, however, 
the Labour government through its Industrial Reorganisation Corporation 
had granted Cammell Laird through its parent company, the Laird Group, 
£6 mn to save its shipbuilding arm. A director of the SIB, Barry Barker, 
noted that apart from skilled labour and certain berths there were no other 
assets worth preserving, this despite an £18 mn modernisation programme 
begun in 1956, not all of which was committed to shipbuilding.127 Barker 
estimated that reorganisation and modernisation of the shipyard would 
124 Commission on Industrial Relations, Report No. 22: Shipbuilding and Shiprepairing, August 
1971. 
125 Mortimer, History of the Boilermakers’ Society, vol. III, 238.
126 Shipbuilding and Shipping Record, 8-15 May 1970. 
127 A major part of modernisation at Cammell Laird was the excavation of half a million tons 
of rock and earth to create a new graving dock. A 100-ton gantry crane was also purchased. See 
Cammell Laird Magazine, March 1960. 
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cost between £11 mn and £13 mn.128 P&O were persuaded to cancel the order 
for four chemical tankers, and a rescue plan was announced by Cammell 
Laird and the IRC.129 All but three of the seventeen directors were replaced, 
including the chairman, and 50 per cent shares in the shipyard were to be 
held by the public trustee on behalf of the workers; the other 50 per cent 
share was held by the reconstructed Laird Group as a trade investment, 
with no further say in management of the shipyard.130
In the same period that Cammell Laird was saved, Upper Clyde Shipbuild-
ers was also in deep f inancial trouble. The election of a new Conservative 
government in June 1970 did not augur well, as it was apparently committed 
to a “no lame ducks” industrial policy. When the Shipbuilding Industry 
Board that had been created in 1967 to dispense grants and loans decided 
before the 1970 general election not to lend UCS any more money, the La-
bour government directly lent UCS £7 mn; in so doing it and the SIB held 
48 per cent of UCS shares. By June 1971, UCS informed the Conservative 
government that it required another £5 mn-£6 mn in the form of grant or 
equity subscription to save the f ive shipyards under its control. The govern-
ment refused this plea, and the company had little choice but to appoint a 
provisional liquidator. However, the government then agreed to contribute 
towards the expense of keeping all employees on the payroll until 6 August 
1971 to allow a report of experts to examine future prospects for mercantile 
shipbuilding reconstruction on the upper Clyde.131 The three-page report was 
published on 29 July 1971 and concluded that it should be possible to form 
a contracted but viable company from the ashes of UCS. The government 
accepted the report’s conclusions and advanced the provisional liquidator, 
Robert Courtney Smith, £4 mn.132
Earlier, in February 1971, the Conservative government, in line with 
policy it had made in opposition, had allowed UCS’s only naval builder, 
Yarrow – the UK’s premier builder of frigates – to leave the consortium 
and advanced it a loan from the Ministry of Defence of up to £4.5 mn for 
128 NA FV 37/134 Note on Cammell Laird, 24 April 1970; Johnman and Murphy, British Shipbuild-
ing and the State Since 1918, 116, 212-213.
129 Panocean eventually ordered four less-sophisticated vessels from the Norwegian state-
owned shipyard, Horten Werft, in July 1973. See Murphy and Tenold, “Strategies, Market 
Concentration and Hegemony”, 299. 
130 Warren, Steel, Ships and Men, 290-291.
131 Report of the Advisory Group on Shipbuilding on the Upper Clyde, 1-3. 
132 Johnman and Murphy, British Shipbuilding and the State Since 1918, 187; the report concluded 
that any continuation of UCS in its present form would be wholly unjustif ied and, indeed, could 
cause serious and widespread damage. 
88 HugH MuRpHy 
working capital. Yarrow also inherited a construction hall costing £1.5 mn, 
one of the few items of capital expenditure by UCS. The Working Party’s 
conclusion to concentrate production at two of the remaining four yards in 
UCS, with the probability that up to 6,500 jobs would be lost, sparked the 
famous UCS work-in, when workers led by two communist shop stewards, 
Jimmy Airlie and Jimmy Reid, occupied the four yards and continued to 
work under the overall supervision of the liquidator.133 In the end, by 1972, 
the famous John Brown yard at Clydebank was in part saved when the 
president of the Boilermakers’ Society, Dan McGarvey, and John Service of 
the CSEU led a trade union delegation to Texas and persuaded Marathon Oil 
of Houston to build jack-up oil rigs at Clydebank, but with a much reduced 
workforce, changed industrial relations, and substantial government aid. 
The shipyard of Alexander Stephen at Linthouse, which had excellent 
steelwork facilities, was closed with its facilities earmarked for integration 
in a new company. The two remaining companies, the old Fairf ield yard 
at Govan and the Connell Yard at Scotstoun, were saved and would be 
renamed Govan Shipbuilders and Scotstoun Marine respectively, with the 
government providing a £35 mn injection of cash over f ive years to ensure 
the future of the company. The decision between the government and 
Marathon dragged on longer than anticipated. This was mainly due to two 
facts: Marathon was intent on getting maximum assistance; and there was 
also still the matter of agreements to be sorted out between it and the trade 
unions. Negotiations with Marathon were concluded by 6 September, and 
one week later Govan Shipbuilders became a reality.
By this stage, the ship repair sector was also in trouble. Vickers had closed 
their repair yard at Hebburn on the Tyne because of continuing losses with 
the disappearance of 1,000 jobs. In South Wales, the Prince of Wales Dry 
Dock Company substantially reduced its activities through redundancies at 
Swansea and Port Talbot. In June 1971 Harland and Wolff ceased operations 
at North Woolwich and Tilbury on the Thames with the loss of some 700 jobs 
mostly in engineering, although another Thames repair f irm, Green and 
Silley Weir, absorbed some 200 men into their ship repair facilities. Harland 
and Wolff retained its ship repair facilities at Liverpool and Southampton 
for voyage repairs, and the largest shipbuilder and ship repairer in the UK, 
Swan Hunter, concentrated on major repairs at its yards on the Tyne and 
Tees. By May 1973, PA Management Consultants had reported that the UK 
133 For the work-in and the general situation at UCS, see, for example, Thompson and Hart, 
The UCS Work-In; Buchan, The Right to Work; Herron, Labour Market in Crisis; and Foster and 
Wolfson, The Politics of the UCS Work-In.
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ship repair sector had consistently declined over the course of a decade with 
output (at 1972 prices) falling from £120 mn in 1961 to around £60 mn in 
1972, and employment declining from 35,000 to 17,000 men with the sector’s 
turnover accounting for just 0.02 per cent of gross domestic product. PA 
concluded that there was a strong case for the operation of only one major 
ship repairer per estuary.134
Ship repair was far more fragmented than shipbuilding: out of a total of 
75 companies and groups, just 12 employed 90 per cent of the workforce; the 
leading seven ship repair companies, which included four shipbuilders and 
repairers, accounted for around half the numbers employed, with some 60 
companies out of a total number of 180 (at August 1972) accounting for 90 
per cent of those employed. Apart from the seven leading companies, only 
one other, British United Trawlers (formed in 1969), employed more than 
1,000 workers.135 Ship repair was also far more geographically fragmented, 
and on river centres there had been mergers, particularly on the Tyne where 
NECS (North East Coast Shiprepairers), an amalgamation of Middle Docks 
and Brigham and Cowan, had taken over the Mercantile Dry Dock Company 
at Jarrow in 1966. In 1970, NECS was purchased by the aviation, shipping, 
shipbuilding, and leisure conglomerate, Court Line.
Commission on Industrial Relations Report, 1971
August 1971 saw the publication of a Commission on Industrial Relations 
Report on shipbuilding and ship repairing, which had been commissioned 
by government to comment on developments and to make recommen-
dations after the SIC Report of 1965-66. Both the employers through the 
SRNA and the trade unions though the CSEU opposed the setting up of the 
commission, arguing that the industries had been examined enough in the 
recent past. However, once the commission had been formally announced 
on 8 January 1970, the SRNA co-operated fully; by the end of March the 
CSEU did likewise.136
The commission noted that the number of employees in mid-1970 was 
around 110,000 with approximately 75,000 employed in shipbuilding and 
35,000 in ship repair. There were, in addition, around 15,000 employed in 
engineering activities linked to shipbuilding and repair companies. Of the 
manual workforce, 35 per cent in shipbuilding and 20 per cent in ship repair 
134 The UK Ship Repair Industry, 3, 4, 5, 10, 11, 13. 
135 Commission on Industrial Relations, Report No. 22: Shipbuilding and Repairing, 16-17. 
136 Ibid., 4, 5.
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were employed in the steel trades. Overall, craft workers accounted for 68 
per cent of the labour force in shipbuilding and 60 per cent in ship repair. Of 
the 110,000 employed in shipbuilding and repair some 18,500 occupied staff 
positions and around 4,000 were in supervisory grades. Thirteen companies 
or groups covering around 55 yards employed over 85,000 workers or more 
than 75 per cent of the total workforce; 56 per cent of the workforce was 
over 40 years of age, and more than a quarter had been employed by their 
current f irm for more than 15 years.137
The commission can be seen as a logical extension to an earlier Royal 
Commission report, chaired by Lord Donovan, which reported in 1968 and 
was predicated on government concerns over the levels of unofficial strikes 
and wage inflation and by reports of economically damaging “restrictive 
practices” in the wider economy. Its off icial remit was “to consider rela-
tions between managements and employees and the role of trade unions 
and employers’ associations in promoting the interests of their members 
and in accelerating the social and economic advance of the nation, with 
particular reference to the Law affecting the activities of these bodies”. The 
commission’s report presented a “two systems” analysis of British industrial 
relations, identifying the “formal system” involving negotiations at industry 
level between the off icial institutions of trade unions and employers’ con-
federations and the “informal system” involving shopfloor-level bargaining 
between workers, shop stewards, and managers. According to the analysis, 
industrial conflict could be attributed in part to conflict between these two 
systems, between the assumptions and norms of the formal system and the 
practical realities of the informal. The commission argued that, whether or 
not it was supposed to, shopfloor bargaining existed, and that employers 
had lost control of the workplace because of their refusal to recognise the 
reality of shopfloor bargaining. The recommendations of the report can be 
summarised by the phrase “the formalisation of plant- and company-level 
industrial relations”, a process through which management should grant 
recognition and off icial status to shop stewards, the elected workplace 
representatives of workers, and work with them to draw up codif ied and 
written agreements at plant and company level.138
The Commission on Industrial Relations raft of recommendations on 
shipbuilding and ship repair included the establishment of joint councils 
representing all manual workers on a standing basis; these councils were 
137 Ibid., 13-24.
138 Report of the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations (1968) Cmnd 
3623. 
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to be responsible for all negotiations and disputes at the company level. 
Company and district procedure agreements should be negotiated and cover 
at least union recognition and representational rights and shop steward 
numbers, functions, and facilities. On the management side it urged that 
companies should review their industrial relations strategies at board level 
and that their personnel departments should be strengthened.139 Whether 
the conduct of industrial relations in shipbuilding and ship repairing mir-
rored those recommended by Donovan is open to question; it was to a large 
extent already in train in these industries.
Booz-Allen and Hamilton Report 1972
By 1973, another major report into the British shipbuilding industry, British 
Shipbuilding 1972 by the consultants Booz-Allen and Hamilton International 
BV; had been published by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry.140 
In stark contrast to the SIC Report, Booz-Allen painted a depressing pic-
ture: between 1967 and 1971 tonnage launched in UK yards had remained 
static and the percentage share of UK tonnage launched, relative to world 
launches, had fallen to just 5 per cent. New orders in 1971 were at their lowest 
level since 1967, and in the third quarter of 1972 just 22,000 grt of shipping 
had been ordered. Overall, the industry was uncompetitive with interna-
tional competition in terms of price, delivery, labour relations, technological 
development, and capital investment. Moreover, the extent of international 
competition coupled with rapid inflation in the cost of labour and raw 
materials had severely affected British shipbuilders’ f inancial performance, 
and had made the industry generally dependent on government support 
and assistance.141
Booz-Allen also noted that the number of employees in shipbuilding and 
repairing had changed little since 1967 and that skilled labour accounted for 
42 per cent of the total employed. Unoff icial strikes in the shipbuilding and 
marine engineering sector through days lost per thousand employees were 
around three times the national average for all industries and services in 
1969, and five times in 1971. However, as a result of the National Demarcation 
139 Commission on Industrial Relations, Report No. 22: Shipbuilding and Repairing, 141-143. 
140 A White Paper on Industrial and Regional Development published in March 1972 announced 
a decision to undertake an appraisal of the long-term prospects of the British shipbuilding 
industry. The consulting f irm of Booz-Allen and Hamilton were commissioned and presented 
their report, subsequently edited to remove conf idential material by the Department of Trade 
and Industry, on 1 February 1973.
141 Booz-Allen and Hamilton, British Shipbuilding, 1972, 1. 
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Agreement of 1969, working days lost through demarcation disputes in the 
two years 1970-71 amounted to only half a per cent compared with 32 per 
cent in the period 1967-69.142
The major structural change recommended by Booz-Allen was to con-
centrate warship production in just three companies – Vickers at Barrow 
(nuclear submarines), Yarrow at Scotstoun (frigates), and Vosper Thornycroft 
at Southampton and Portsmouth (frigates and fast patrol craft) – as in the 
report’s view there would be a large excess of warship-building capacity 
relative to domestic demand by 1976 and foreign orders would not com-
pensate. This had potentially dire effects on the three large f irms capable 
of naval and mercantile building, Swan Hunter, Cammell Laird, and Scott 
Lithgow, all of which had posted substantial losses in the years preceding 
the report, but which Booz-Allen recognised could continue as mixed naval 
and mercantile builders until 1976, but no later.143
Three UK shipyards enter the giant tanker market
Both Swan Hunter and Scott Lithgow had entered the VLCC market with SIB 
funding after the SIC Report, as had Harland and Wolff at Belfast.144 Between 
1967 and 1973, demand for tanker tonnage outstripped supply, particularly 
because of the long Japanese orderbook, tempting these f irms into this 
market segment. Moreover, much of the tanker market was speculative, 
meaning that owners would order tonnage with the expectation of selling 
it for a higher price on completion. This product specialism favoured the 
steelworking trades but the increasing amount of steel used in construction 
made its long-term storage in shipyards and shot blasting of steel plates 
paramount to counteract inflationary rises in the price, and also utilised 
recently modernised plant and equipment. However, such was world 
competition that many contracts had been taken on a f ixed-price basis 
and, with increasing inflation in the wider economy averaging 6 per cent, 
the long trading cycle of individual f irms, and the costs of modernisation, 
tanker construction had proven to be unremunerative. The tripling and then 
quadrupling of the crude oil price by the OPEC cartel in 1973-74 consequent 
142 Ibid., 169.
143 Ibid., 12, 13. 
144 Ibid., 87. Harland and Wolff had incurred severe f inancial losses from 1965 to 1969. With the 
aid of an SIB loan of £8 mn, the company undertook a period of heavy capital investment includ-
ing the construction of a giant building dock. Further grants totalling £7 mn were advanced by 
the SIB but losses continued; in 1972 the Northern Ireland Ministry of Commerce advanced a 
loan of £3.5 mn to the company, purchased £4 mn of equity, and provided a grant of £14.15 mn. 
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upon the fourth Arab-Israeli war of October 1973 led to a slump in demand 
for oil and the cancellation of orders for 60 mn dwt of tankers and the 
laying-up of 100 mn dwt of these vessels.145 Internationally, shipbuilding 
launches dropped threefold: from nearly 36 mn grt launched in 1975 to 
12 mn grt in 1979. Orders in British shipyards stood at 4.4 mn grt in 1973 
but collapsed to 67,000 grt in 1975. This was indicative of the lag effects of 
the oil crisis, with world production of oil tankers peaking in 1974-1975 as 
shipbuilders tried desperately to fulf il orders which were too far along the 
process of construction to cancel.
PA Management Consultants report on ship repair, 1973
In 1973 the Conservative government commissioned yet another report 
on the United Kingdom ship repair industry from PA Management 
Consultants, which was published in May.146 The report was vague about 
remedial solutions, save to emphasise that investment, which it considered 
necessary for the industry, would not be forthcoming from the private 
sector, and to advise individual ship repairers to take the initiative to 
make applications for government aid. The report showed that the ship 
repair industry had consistently declined over the previous decade, with 
employment halving. It suggested that the major f irms on the main estuar-
ies should be encouraged and identif ied a number of major obstacles to 
growth. They included outdated facilities of many ship repairers, which did 
not compare with those of their rivals on the continent and which would 
become even more unsatisfactory in the longer term. It also identif ied 
unsatisfactory labour relations and the impact of this upon international 
competitiveness.147
Clearly, the British ship repair industry remained fragmented and 
had a rapidly declining workforce. The level of capital investment in the 
industry has been nothing short of disastrous and there was an urgent 
need for massive capital expenditure to bring about a rapid modernisation 
of ship repairing yards. Under private ownership it has been an industry 
generally noted for outdated, run-down facilities and poor working 
conditions.
145 For the tanker crisis, see Stokes, Ship Finance, and Ratcliffe, Liquid Gold Ships. For its effect 
on Norway, see Tenold, Tankers in Trouble. 
146 The UK Ship Repair Industry. 
147 Ibid.; see also Johnman and Murphy, “The Development of the British Ship Repair Industry”, 
100-101. 
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Maritime Fruit Carriers
It was reported in August 1973 that Yaacov Meridor’s Maritime Fruit Car-
riers (MFC) had ordered twenty-four tankers from Swan Hunter and that 
a separate company, Swan Maritime, would be formed by MFC and Swan 
Hunter.148 Earlier in January, through a subsidiary company, MFC had 
ordered six ULCCs from Harland and Wolff at Belfast; this was just one of 
thirty-six companies registered in the UK by MFC.149 Later in September, 
two VLCCs were ordered from Scott Lithgow. Given the size of these orders 
in total, alarm bells should have been sounded.150 Such was the favourable 
148 Maritime Reporter, August 1973: “Maritime Fruit Orders 24 Tankers in Venture with Swan 
Hunter”: “Maritime Fruit Carriers Company Limited has announced that it has completed 
f inancial arrangements for its joint venture with Swan Hunter Group Limited of Great Britain. 
The joint company, known as Swan Maritime Company Ltd., was established to engage in the 
purchase, sale, leasing and f inancing of vessels and has already executed shipbuilding contracts 
with Swan Hunter Shipyards for the purchase of 24 oil tankers. The vessels involved range in 
size from 31,000 deadweight tons to 261,000 deadweight tons and are scheduled for delivery 
from 1974-1978. They are eligible for receipt of British Government guarantees to f inance 80 
per cent of the cost price of each vessel, providing it f lies the British f lag, and 80 per cent of the 
sale price of each vessel sold for export. Swan Maritime also holds options for the construction 
of additional tankers which would be delivered in 1978-80. Swan Maritime will be capitalized 
at approximately $26.5 million; its shares will be owned 65 per cent by Maritime Fruit Carriers 
and 25 per cent by Swan Hunter Group, the largest shipbuilders in Great Britain. In addition, 
10 per cent has been reserved for Hutchison International Company Ltd. of Hong Kong, with 
whom negotiations are currently in progress. Maritime Fruit Carriers’ equity investment in 
Swan Maritime has been primarily funded by a loan from the First National Bank of Boston 
for $25 million.” In the event, MFC came to own 75 per cent of Swan Maritime. The real f igure 
ordered was 26 tankers.
149 These were ordered by a subsidiary of MFC, the Glasgow-based Island Fruit Reefers Shipping 
Company, on 31 January 1973 to take advantage of generous British government subsidies for a 
f ixed price of £150 mn. In the event Harland and Wolff built two of the six ULCCs on order; the 
remaining four were cancelled (much to the relief, no doubt, of MFC). Both were completed in 
1978 as Coastal Corpus Christi and Coastal Hercules. However, owing to a dispute initiated by 
the eventual owners, the Coastal States Gas Corporation of Houston, Texas, during depressed 
market conditions for bulk-oil transportation, Harland and Wolff laid up the two tankers in 
Scotland at Loch Striven for two years while arbitration rumbled on. By 1980 the two tankers 
sailed for cleaning at Lisnave in Lisbon and then to their owners with all the equipment on 
board that the owners had initially claimed to be defective. See Moss and Hume, Shipbuilders 
to the World: 125 Years of Harland and Wolff, 452, 468, 473. MFC had sold its 50 per cent interest 
in companies controlling the two 333,000-dwt ULCCs to Coastal States by March 1976; see 
The Guardian, 11 March 1976. The vast majority of the thirty-six companies registered were 
single-ship entities, each having share capital of £100 (the minimum required by company law 
in the UK). For the full list, see TNA MT73/571 Swan Maritime.
150 MFC’s activities, including the sale of tanker newbuilding contracts, the use of tax-
postponement devices to prof itably sell tax-depreciation allowances to third parties, and MFC’s 
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amount of subsidy pertaining that, by 1972, government guarantees to 
shipowners who agreed to build ships in Britain totalled £454 mn; by the 
end of 1975 this f igure had reached £858 mn.151 However, the dire state of 
British shipbuilding in 1973 and political considerations thereon at this 
stage militated against any serious inquiry into how MFC could afford 
such a large order – worth some £300 mn – which far exceeded its assets. 
Indeed, the British government helped to oil the deal with substantial 
subsidies to MFC.152 By 1976 when MFC f inally went bust, the total MFC 
tonnage on order in Swan Hunter, Harland and Wolff, and Scott Lithgow 
shipyards amounted to 35 per cent of all British shipbuilding industry orders 
in hand.153 This dire state of affairs further encouraged the workforce to 
embrace nationalisation.
The long march towards nationalisation of shipbuilding and repair
July 1974 saw the collapse of the Court Line group of companies, which by 
this stage included aviation and leisure interests in addition to Appledore 
Shipbuilders in North Devon, North East Coast Shiprepairers, and Doxford 
and Sunderland Shipbuilders. The Labour government, anxious to preserve 
employment, stepped in and effectively nationalised these companies, 
saving some 9,000 jobs.154 With Cammell Laird, Govan Shipbuilders, and 
Harland and Wolff also effectively nationalised, only two large SIC Report-
inspired groups, Swan Hunter and Scott Lithgow, remained under private 
control.
From the general election of February 1974 the new Labour government 
was committed to nationalising shipbuilding, repair, and marine-engine 
building companies. This was reaff irmed in the second general election of 
that year in October, and subsequently a bill to nationalise the shipbuilding 
very high level of borrowing with charter payments and reefer mortgages as security must have 
been known to the government; a cautious approach should thus have been taken. Of course, 
on the other hand, there was no law concerning high gearing of companies. 
151 TNA MT73/571 Figures cited in letter to Stanley Clinton Davis, MP, Department of Trade, 
27 June 1976.
152 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, House of Commons, Deb. Vol. 916, cc 184-5w, 27 July 
1976. Ten MFC shell companies received investment grants under Section 5 of the Industrial 
Development Act, 1966, and two shipbuilders received construction grants under Section 11 of 
the Industry Act, 1972, in respect of thirteen ships.
153 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, House of Commons, Deb. Vol. 905, cc 385-6w, 12 Febru-
ary 1976, gives the f igure of 35 per cent.
154 For the reasons behind the collapse of Court Line, see Department of Trade, Court Line, 
Final Report. 
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and aircraft industries was presented to Parliament in the spring of 1975. 
However, it failed to make it through the 1974-75 session of Parliament. 
Reintroduced in November 1975, the bill was later successfully challenged 
on the grounds of hybridity. Consequently, twelve ship repair f irms (three 
of which were publicly owned) were omitted from the nationalisation 
process.155
Despite the growing market challenges facing the industry – which, after 
OPEC, was experiencing the worst depression since the early 1930s – the 
period from 1974 to 1977 was characterised by internecine political bicker-
ing over nationalisation. The debate soon descended into an ideological 
dogfight in Parliament that unduly delayed the process not least because of 
the Labour government’s insistence in combining aircraft and shipbuilding 
in the same bill. It also had a serious impact on the shipbuilding industry’s 
ability to survive against withering international competition. High infla-
tion, which stood at 25 per cent in 1975 alone, in tandem with f ixed-price 
contracts, ate into the industry’s profitability. Overstaffing was widespread, 
and owners of the remaining privately owned shipbuilding and -repair 
f irms were reluctant to commit to capital expenditure with the spectre 
of nationalisation looming. The owners, through the SRNA, who were in 
regular touch with the Conservative opposition in Parliament, virulently 
opposed state control. Conversely, the shipyard trade unions – with their 
members’ jobs at stake – were almost messianic in their desire for nationali-
sation. By the time nationalisation actually took place, however, most f irms 
in the industry were unprofitable and faced an uphill f ight to survive.156
During the latter part of the nationalisation process, NECS had closed 
the River Wear ship repairer, T.W. Greenwell, in 1976, with the loss of several 
hundred jobs.157 Strikes such as one at Cammell Laird at the beginning of 
1977, where more than 4,000 men were laid off because 450 platers and 
shipwrights had struck for another £2 per week, were characterised by The 
Economist as “a peculiar form of ritual suicide”.158 Such was the severity of 
155 The legislative process towards nationalisation is explained in Keesing’s Contemporary 
Archives, 13 May 1977. At f irst the bill was declared hybrid, as Yarrow was included but Marathon 
at Clydebank was not. The act gained Royal Assent on 17 March 1977, with a vesting day of 1 July 
1977 for the nationalised company, British Shipbuilders Plc.
156 Warren, Steel, Ships and Men, 296. In its last full year before nationalisation Cammell Laird 
lost £9.2 mn on a turnover of £34 mn; over the last nine months to March 1978 it lost £26 mn. In 
1978 Cammell Laird’s new construction hall was completed, two years behind schedule and at 
a cost of £32 mn to the British taxpayer.
157 For the ramif ications of this closure, see Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, House of 
Commons, House of Commons Deb. Vol. 857, 9 April 1976.
158 The Economist, 15 January 1977.
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Japanese competition that late in 1976 Japanese yards were quoting prices 
as much as 60 per cent lower than UK tenders.159 Such was the dire state 
of British shipbuilding and indeed to some extent that of West European 
shipbuilding in general, the fact remained that Japan had the capacity to 
produce all of the world’s shipbuilding capacity requirements by itself.
The British shipbuilding industry nationalised
Before British Shipbuilders Plc was established, the long road to nationalisa-
tion frustrated the original Organising Committee so much so that the Chief 
Executive Designate, Graham Day, who since 1971 had been managing direc-
tor of the loss-making Cammell Laird, had left the Organising Committee 
in December 1976 in protest against the length of time taken to nationalise 
shipbuilding. Day noted that, “By early action we could have assisted a 
restructuring and a stabilisation with the minimum disruption for the indi-
vidual yards and the maximum preservation of genuine job opportunities.”160
Subsequently, a new Organising Committee was established, and British 
Shipbuilders Plc was formed on 1 July 1977 as a result of the Aircraft and 
Shipbuilding Industries Act, 1977, which nationalised nineteen shipbuilding, 
f ive slow-speed diesel manufacturing companies, and three apprentice-
training companies in Britain, with Harland and Wolff, Belfast – which 
was effectively nationalised in any event – exempted. A further six ship 
repair companies asked to be nationalised after July and these, and one 
more shipbuilding f irm, Ailsa Shipbuilding of Troon, Ayrshire (added in 
1978), comprised British Shipbuilders. Admiral Sir Anthony Griff in was 
appointed chairman and a civil servant, Mike Casey, chief executive. Col-
lectively, British Shipbuilders accounted for 97 per cent of British merchant 
shipbuilding capacity, 100 per cent of its warship-building capacity, 100 
per cent of slow-speed diesel engine manufacturing, and approximately 
50 per cent of ship repair capacity. From 1 July 1977 to 1 March 1978, Brit-
ish Shipbuillders employed on average some 86,600 employees, 44,800 of 
whom were employed on merchant and mixed naval construction, 20,000 
on specialised warship construction, 8,500 in ship repair, 5,600 on marine 
engine building, and 7,700 on general engineering and other activities. Of the 
86,600 employees, 24,000 were located in Scotland and the rest in England.161
159 Financial Times, 16 December 1976.
160 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, House of Commons, Deb., vol. 922, 9 December 1976, 
col. 628.
161 British Shipbuilders Plc Annual Report and Accounts, 1977-78, 37. 
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British Shipbuilders Plc was set up with no common f inancial reporting 
system or corporate plan save that it was to be organised into four divi-
sions: merchant shipbuilding, warship building, ship repair, and marine 
and general engineering. Crucially, with some exceptions, its constituent 
companies were still being run by the same people who had presided over 
the near-collapse of the industry under private control.162 Not surprisingly, 
British Shipbuilders attempted from the outset to bring its constituent com-
panies under a standardised system of f inancial reporting and to impose 
cash limits on constituent companies. Under the act establishing British 
Shipbuilders, companies were to be treated as individual prof it centres 
under a decentralised management system – a cataclysmic error on the part 
of politicians passing the act, as it allowed local management, especially 
the cosseted warship-building f irms which operated under conditions of 
imperfect competition, to initially ignore the centre.163
Originally based in London, Britsh Shipbuilders subsequently moved to 
Newcastle upon Tyne – the same city in which the Boilermakers’ Society had 
their headquarters. In the f irst f inancial reporting period from 1 July 1977 
to March 1978, British Shipbuilders posted a loss of £108 mn before tax and 
after receipt of Intervention Fund monies. Unsurprisingly, a substantial part 
of that loss arose from contracts taken before nationalisation.164 Given the 
perilous market situation, the government in consultation with the Com-
mission of the European Economic Community had, under the Industry Act 
of 1972, established a Shipbuilding Intervention Fund (SIF) to aid British 
Shipbuilders to attract orders against Far Eastern competition by bridging 
the price gap between European and Asian prices. In February 1977, £65 mn 
was set aside for this purpose, and by 1978 the amount was raised to £85 mn 
subject to annual negotiations with the EEC Commission.165
SIF assistance was initially intended as a temporary aid for merchant 
shipbuilding only and was provided for contracts taken on a non-profit basis 
162 Owners of companies that were nationalised were compensated at 1974 share values. 
163 Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries Act, 1977. Clause 5 (2): “of seeking the largest degree, 
consistent with the proper discharge of its functions, of decentralisation of management and 
decision-taking to separate prof it centres in the shipbuilding and ship repairing areas of Great 
Britain, and in particular of Scotland and Wales and, without prejudice to the generality of 
the foregoing, in relation to sales, pricing, production, the formulation and implementation 
of investment programmes, manpower planning and management, industrial relations, and 
responsibility for f inancial performance.”
164 British Shipbuilders Annual Report and Accounts, 1977-78.
165 Ibid.; see Chairman’s and Chief Executive’s Reports. The Industry Act of 1972 had initially 
offered shipowners credits and shipbuilders tapering construction grants to 1975, most of which 
had been used to alleviate losses on f ixed-price contracts.
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to maintain capacity. Only by way of SIF assistance could British merchant 
shipyards be kept in business against Far Eastern competition. With the 
aid of the SIF, British Shipbuilders, broadly, concentrated on survival by 
attempting to weather the storm of international competition and reduced 
demand in the hope that it would once again pick up in the early 1980s.166 
This was almost exactly the position taken by the European Commission, 
with its various directives on shipbuilding subsidies up to and throughout 
the 1980s and beyond. However, simultaneously, the commission reduced 
capacity in the expectation it would not. As Bo Stråth noted, the two posi-
tions were mutually incompatible.167
Late in 1977, negotiations were at an advanced stage between British 
Shipbuilders and the Polish government about an order for twenty-two 
cargo vessels and two crane ships.168 In order to secure the business, the 
government agreed to give a subsidy from the SIF of not more than £28 
mn.169 British Shipbuilders provided f inance to the joint venture company 
not with public funds, but with funds borrowed on the commercial market, 
and a Eurodollar loan of $65 mn was raised from a consortium of banks 
without government guarantee.170 However, the Polish deal was threatened 
by an overtime ban in support of a pay parity claim with the Boilermak-
ers’, imposed by outf it trades at Swan Hunter, which had been promised 
a number of the Polish ships. British Shipbuilders, as a precondition to 
placing the Polish order in their various merchant yards, required trouble-
free production. Workers at Austin and Pickersgill on the River Wear had 
refused to accept any reallocated ships from Swan Hunter, but workers at 
Smiths Dock on the River Tees had agreed to accept two ships. In the end, 
after a three-month delay hoping that the Swan Hunter situation would be 
resolved, Govan Shipbuilders (which, it will be recalled, had survived only 
due to a massive government cash injection as a result of the UCS work-in 
1971) agreed by February 1978 to take reallocated ships after Govan shop 
166 Before December 1977, a £28 mn subsidy for a deal for twenty-four ships for Poland came out 
of the £65 mn SIF budget. After allowing for that commitment, in December there still remained 
around £10 mn uncommitted from the fund. Up to that point, the fund had been to secure orders 
for forty-eight ships. See BPP, House of Commons, Deb, vol. 941, col. 74, 12 December 1977.
167 Stråth, The Politics of De-Industrialisation, 22. 
168 To facilitate this deal British Shipbuilders took a 50 per cent stake in Anglo-Polish Shipping 
Venture Ltd, a company registered in Poland. The joint venture company would bareboat charter 
the ships to the Polish Steamship Company for periods of thirteen to f ifteen years.
169 The deal included a guarantee of export credit by the government’s Export Credit Guarantee 
Department, a normal part of any export transaction. The amount of the guarantee met the 
normal EEC and OECD requirement of not more than 70 per cent of the export price.
170 British Shipbuilders Annual Report and Accounts, 1977-78. 
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stewards had been apprised of CSEU policy. At a mass meeting of 3,000 
workers only 4 voted against.171 No British seaman would be employed on 
these ships, which would operate under the Polish f lag. Indeed, nearly 
half of the engines were to be built in Poland as were the propellers and 
shafts, and anchor and chain cables, with decks to be built in Norway. 
The deal showed in stark terms just how bad the situation was for British 
Shipbuilders.172 Throughout the Polish ships episode, the CSEU had argued 
in terms of the survival of the industry as a whole, and the experience 
certainly persuaded them to embark upon national rather than yard-based 
collective bargaining.
Even if the constituent companies of British Shipbuilders were at this 
stage semi-autonomous, by January 1979 industrial relations were not. On 
nationalisation on 1 July 1977 to the end of 1978 the industry was subject to 
168 separate collective-bargaining agreements on wages and salaries; by I 
January 1979 it was subject to one with a single negotiating date – a remark-
able achievement but one which also reflected the gravity of the competitive 
position, which the trade unions involved were all too aware of. Just as 
British Shipbuilders became operational, the employers’ organisation, the 
SRNA, disbanded. Nationalisation fundamentally changed the dynamics 
of industrial relations in the industry. Under the Aircraft and Shipbuilidng 
Industries Act, British Shipbuilders was committed to a form of industrial 
democracy mainly of a consultative nature. Monthly discussions with the 
CSEU Shipyard Negotiating Committee were instituted to discuss and 
exchange views over a wide range of British Shipbuilders activities. In its 
f irst year of operations a number of agreements were made, including a 
new procedure for the avoidance of disputes, and following discussions 
with the government and the CSEU a special redundancy payments scheme 
was instituted under the Shipbuilding (Redundancy Payments) Act, 1978.173 
Indeed, one former trade unionist, Ken Griff in, had been made deputy 
chairman of British Shipbuilders, and three active trade unionists, Fred 
Baker of the General and Municipal Workers Union, Les Gregory of the 
Electrical, Electronic and Telecommunications and Plumbing Union, and 
John Hepplewhite of the Boilermakers’ Society, had been made part-time 
board members.174
171 Foster and Wolfson, Politics of the UCS Work-In, 405, 424-425. 
172 See BPP House of Commons, Deb, vol. 941, col. 63, 12 December 1977. 
173 A separate scheme was instituted for those leaving the industry over the normal retirement 
age.
174 Register of Interests, British Shipbuilders Plc Annual Report, 1977-78. 
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By March 1979, a Phase 1 Agreement consisting of eighty-four pages on 
wages and salary readjustments and a deal on productivity (self-f inancing 
bonus deals) had been agreed with the CSEU. Wages were now determined 
nationally for all shipyards, repair establishments, and marine engineering 
works, rather than by the previous system of local collective bargaining. 
Yard shop stewards, as a result of this deal, were now more reliant on na-
tional union officials and the CSEU.175 Moreover, the promotion through the 
so-called social contract between the Labour government and trade unions 
urging centrally agreed maximum wage increases (in reality a government-
imposed pay freeze) further eroded the power of yard shop stewards.
Six months after the Phase 1 Agreement, British Shipbuilders and the 
CSEU signed the Blackpool Agreement in August 1979, by which the CSEU 
accepted the reality of a cut in job numbers but only if there were no 
compulsory redundancies. In other words, employees had to volunteer for 
redundancies at favourable levels of remuneration. That contraction of the 
workforce was necessary given the ever deceasing market situation was 
now beyond doubt. The agreement estimated 6,000 redundancies, initially 
by paying off the long-term sick, natural wastage (employees leaving for 
other jobs, retirement, and death) and by transferring surplus labour on 
an inter-yard basis, plus a ban on adult recruitment; the remainder would 
be by voluntary redundancy. Simply put, the nationalisation process had 
been fully supported by the trade unions, but consensus was now under 
considerable strain by impending yard closures and the need to increase 
productivity. The latter – through a series of frankly bogus productivity 
deals prior to nationalisation to get around government price and income 
policies – meant that British shipbuilding workers were the least productive 
of the major shipbuilding nations in 1977.176
Since nationalisation, the demand for newbuilding had been in steep 
decline. Sweden, so often held up as an exemplar of modern shipbuild-
ing methods, marketing, and productivity, had also been affected by the 
post-OPEC crisis and Japanese competition, and nationalised the bulk of 
its shipbuilding industry under a holding company, Svenska Varv, in 1977, 
this despite its workforce being the most productive in the world.177 The 
175 British Shipbuilders Plc Report and Accounts, 1978-79, Chairman’s and Chief Executive’s 
Reports. 
176 Fairplay, 24 August 1978, 61. In 1977, Sweden topped the productivity table, followed by 
Japan, West Germany, Denmark, France, Italy, and Britain. Swedish shipyard workers were 3.67 
times more productive than their British counterparts.
177 The large Kockums yard at Malmö was nationalised in 1979. Subsequently, in 1986, the 
Swedish government decided to cease all merchant shipbuilding. 
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Swedish shipbuilding industry had no interest subsidy, and two of its largest 
shipyards, Eriksberg and Gotaverken, faced huge losses, not because of lack 
of orders but through currency speculation to compensate for the lack of 
interest subsidy. Both f irms had f inanced suppliers’ credits, given in US 
dollars, with low-interest loans given in Swiss francs. In 1974 the dollar 
began to depreciate, and neither yard had insured against the currency 
risk. The Swedish government stepped in to save these two large f irms 
from bankruptcy and introduced a guarantee facility to f inance ships on 
account, assuming they would be sold on completion. As Cees de Voogd has 
noted, this turned into a f inancial disaster for all concerned. Svenska Varv 
announced its intention to close shipyards in 1978, sparking widespread 
social and political discontent. The government postponed the closure of 
shipyards but the reduction in capacity continued. Employment had halved 
from 24,000 in 1975 to 12,000 in 1980, and by 1985 was further reduced to 
3,000. At 1990 only 553 employees were left in the Swedish shipbuilding 
industry.178
Japan had also been badly scarred post-OPEC. As the world’s leading 
tanker builder it suffered the brunt of cancellations and was left with a 
great deal of redundant capacity relative to the large amount of docks 
capable of building VLCCs and ULCCs at its disposal. In 1974, Japanese 
shipbuilding received only eleven VLCC orders, all of which were taken in 
the f irst quarter of that year; this against f ifty-four VLCCs and forty-one 
ULCCs in 1973.179 By 1978, the Japanese Ministry of Transport had introduced 
a rationalisation scheme with the full co-operation of its shipbuilding 
industry. A year earlier there had been a number of spectacular failures 
due to f inancial insolvency. The year 1978 saw Japan commit 71 bn yen 
to the Japan Development Bank to subsidise interest payable on loans for 
ships ordered in Japan. In combination with low interest rates provided to 
Japanese shipowners, this effectively trimmed 20 per cent of the price of 
a newbuilding. July saw the inception of a rationalisation scheme. It was 
agreed that 35 per cent of the capacity to build vessels of 5,000 grt and 
over available in 1974 would be withdrawn from use. A special fund of 36.8 
bn yen was set aside for shipbuilders, and a scrap-and-build scheme was 
instituted (which resulted in 1 mn grt of extra orders). By the end of 1979, 
employment, direct and indirect, had been reduced to 162,000 from its 1973 
peak of 253,000, in part due to the elimination of 60 berths and building 
docks. By 1981 Japan’s oversupply problem had been partly alleviated but 
178 De Voogd, “Public Intervention and the Decline of Shipbuilding in the Netherlands”, 251-252. 
179 Todd, Industrial Dislocation, 8.
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output remained around half that of a decade earlier.180 Towards the latter 
part of the 1980s, under pressure from government and with shipbuild-
ing capacity exceeding demand, Japanese shipbuilders formed industry 
coalitions that later coalesced into production groups with the object of 
aligning capacity to perceived markets – in other words matching supply 
with demand. By the end of decade these arrangments had been waived, 
but eight large groups formed the vanguard of Japan’s attempts to remain 
the world’s leading shipbuilder.181
Table 2.7 follows on from Table 2.6 and shows a further decline in UK 
shipbuilding performance in two important sectors and a signif icant drop 
in Japanese share of the market owing to new entrants such as South Korea.
The 1980s: from nationalisation to privatisation and statistical 
irrelevance
Under its second chairman, Robert Atkinson, appointed in May 1980, British 
Shipbuilders Plc was restructured in October into f ive trading divisions 
according to product profile: merchant shipbuilding, warship building, en-
gineering, ship repair, and offshore. The last division, comprising Cammell 
180 Ibid., 53-71; Todd explains this period in extensive detail. 
181 Ibid., 236. 
Table 2.7  British and Japanese mercantile completions in global comparison 1971-
1980 (000 grt) 

















1971 9725 8410 18135 6311 4808 11119 61.31 793 441 1234 6.80
1972 11585 7704 19289 7753 5108 12861 66.68 820 371 1191 6.17
1973 10604 11480 22084 6565 8096 14661 66.39 840 221 1061 4.80
1974 5490 11419 16909 3949 7558 11507 68.05 423 456 879 5.20
1975 10303 23202 33505 4251 12739 16990 50.71 579 590 1169 3.49
1976 12948 20378 33326 6397 9472 15869 47.62 734 767 1501 4.50
1977 15496 11623 27119 8798 2911 11709 43.18 583 437 1020 3.76
1978 12074 5828 17902 5551 756 6307 35.23 500 633 1133 6.33
1979 8854 5209 14063 3101 1596 4697 33.40 396 295 691 4.91
1980 8140 4811 12951 2964 3129 6093 47.05 339 88 427 3.30
Source: Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, various years
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Laird and Scott Lithgow, at a stroke took two mixed naval and mercantile 
yards out of naval construction altogether and also brought them out of the 
ambit of the SIF. Atkinson quickly recognised the need for more centralised 
f inancial control but continued the mistake of his predecessor by leaving 
production and productivity deals to the constituent companies, which 
inevitably would lead to inter-yard friction and hostility, especially between 
the loss-making merchant yards and the profitable warship yards. He did, 
however, centralise marketing. The Thatcher government’s 1979 manifesto 
had promised to denationalise shipbuilding but it did not feel confident 
enough to do so before 1984, particularly because of the very real threat of 
a total implosion of the largely unprofitable merchant shipbuilding sector 
and the likelihood that private investment in it would not be forthcoming. 
Initially, it pledged f inancial support continuing until 1981 contingent 
upon rationalisation and a return to viability, but trading losses after the 
intervention fund subsidy continued: more than £45.5 mn in 1978-79 and 
£110 mn in 1979-80.182
The only substantial prof it-earners were the three specialist warship 
yards, Vickers, Vosper Thornycroft, and Yarrow. By the end of 1981, however, 
the number of engine-building companies had been reduced from f ive to 
two. Employment had been reduced to 66,747 and ship repair had been 
reduced from 6 to 4 f irms. Of these, Tyne Shiprepair (an amalgamation of 
NECS and Swan Hunter Shiprepairers) had incurred losses of £8 mn, and 
Grangemouth Dockyard had suffered a seious decline in its traditional 
business.183 As Lewis Johnman has noted, from 1 July 1977 to November 1980, 
the industry consumed £316 mn in public dividend capital and £105.5 mn 
in Shipbuilding Intervention Fund monies, and was still unable to match 
prices quoted by competitors.184
In April 1980, British Shipbuilders informed the CSEU that Caledon 
Shipbuilding (part of an SIC Report-inspired merger of the Henry Robb 
shipyard at Leith on the River Forth and Caledon Shipbuilding at Dundee 
on the River Tay in 1968) had to close. This was obviously against the spirit 
of the Blackpool Agreement with its rejection of compulsory redundan-
cies. British Shipbuilders did, however, by means of voluntary redundancy 
and a process of attrition, scale down the Caledon workforce to just over 
250. By September 1981 they sought to close the yard, with compulsory 
182 British Shipbuilders Annual Report and Accounts, 1978-79 and 1979-80.
183 British Shipbuilders Annual Report and Accounts, 1981-82. 
184 Johnman, “The Privatisation of British Shipbuilders”, 6, quoting House of Commons Trade 
and Industry Report, Memorandum submitted by British Shipbuilders, 2 December 1981.
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redundancies, but met with resistance from 145 of the men affected, who 
occupied the yard. A three-day strike ordered by the CSEU in support did 
not get the support of all other shipyards and did not take place. Caledon 
was duly closed down at the end of 1981, and Henry Robb limped on until 
early 1984 when it also closed, bringing to an end 600 years of shipbuilding 
on the River Forth.
By 1982, given the attrition rate of yard closures and its subsequent drop 
in membership, the Boilermakers’ Society had been looking to amalgamate 
with a larger trade union and in so doing retain its internal structures. There 
were some in the society who wished it to amalgamate with a larger craft 
union such as the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers. However, 
talks continued with two other general (unskilled) unions, the Transport 
and General Workers’ Union and the General and Municipal Workers Union 
(GMWU). The latter represented the bulk of unskilled labour in shipbuilding 
and ship repair, and by August an amalgamation between the Boilermakers’ 
and the much larger GMWU had been realised. The new union would be 
known as the General, Municipal, Boilermakers and Allied Trades Union.185 
It was richly ironic, given the hierarchical structure of trades throughout the 
history of British shipbuilding, that its major craft union, the Boilermakers’ 
Society, with its messianic protection of craft privileges and pay differentials 
throughout its lifetime, would eventually amalgamate with an unskilled 
union.
Not only was British shipbuilding suffering from Japanese competition, 
by this stage, a comparatively new entrant, South Korea, had increasingly 
won world market share; in 1982 this stood at 12 per cent, and new yards 
capable of building sophisticated high-value tonnage had also come on 
stream.186 From March 1972 onwards, under the military dictatorship of 
Park Chung-hee and with trade unions under state control, the Hyundai 
Construction chaebol (family-owned conglomerate) had formed Hyundai 
185 Mortimer, History of the Boilermakers’ Society, vol. III, 353-354. 
186 A good example was Daewoo’s Okpo facility at Keoje Island, Pusan, a yard designed by 
A & P Appledore to construct virtually any type of ship, plant or offshore structure. Daewoo 
took over Okpo from KSEC in December 1979 when the yard was 25 per cent f inished; it was 
f inally completed in January 1981. See Jonnson, Shipbuilding in South Korea, 82. In the two years 
to 1982, the yard had constructed a series of four stainless steel chemical tankers, a series of 
six semi-submersible drilling rigs and speciality plant, including a barge-mounted seawater 
treatment plant for US oil companies operating in Alaskan waters. As Todd noted, the Okpo 
yard “was nothing less than a masterpiece of shipbuilding ingenuity”. It employed 8,100 men and 
had a building dock of 530 m in length equipped with a Krupp crane capable of lifting 900 tons 
(then one of the two largest shipbuilding cranes in the world). See Todd, Industrial Dislocation, 
187-188. 
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Heavy Industries (HHI) and began to construct, with state support, a huge 
shipbuilding complex at Mipo Bay, Ulsan, which was completed in June 1974. 
It was designed to construct f ive VLCCs per year with the aid of the British 
consultants A&P Appledore, the lower Clyde shipbuilders, Scott Lithgow, 
and slow-speed diesel marine engine builders, Kincaid, who provided 
training and production drawings. Prior to this Korean shipbuilding had 
ranked seventieth in the world, with only one state-owned company of any 
note whatsoever, Korean Shipbuilding and Engineeing Company (KSEC), 
and with an annual capacity of just 250,000 grt in 1973. South Korea aimed 
for an annual output of 1.9 mn grt in 1976 and a huge 9 mn grt by 1985.187
Shipbuilding and steel were seen as instruments to stimulate national 
industrial growth and even though the tanker market sank post-OPEC, 
South Korea determined to increase its market share despite its output 
projections, which were wildly optimistic. South Korean output (HHI and 
KSEC only) in 1976, in terms of tonnage launched, amounted to 625,950 grt 
(UK: 1.304 mn grt) and in 1985 (HHI, KSEC, Daewoo, Samsung) 2,750,536 
grt (UK: 145,000 grt). South Korea, therefore, as Lars Bruno and Stig Tenold 
have noted, had expanded rapidly with huge state commitment in a period 
characterised by capacity reduction elsewhere.188 Initially dependent on 
technology transfer and foreign know-how, the South Korean industry 
quickly assimilated this, overcame technlogical barriers, and nurtured its 
own technological capability; by utilising low labour costs and repression of 
the labour force, it quickly gained market share and useful foreign currency.
By 1979, two other chaebols, Daewoo and Samsung, had also entered 
shipbuilding. However, the industry did experience problems in the mid- to 
late 1980s largely as a result of years of taking export contracts at below-cost 
prices. By mid-1988, HHI, KSEC, Daewoo, and Samsung, had reputedly 
run up debts to USD $4.5 bn, and the industry’s workforce had contracted 
from 75,000 in 1984 to 51,000. By the end of 1988, labour unrest, strikes, 
and the granting of unsustainable pay rises, and severe price competition 
with Japanese shipbuilding, had all affected the industry’s prof itability. 
In April 1987, KSEC requested protection from its creditors, and in 1988 
Daewoo Shipbuilding was rescued by its banks. A strike at HHI, Ulsan, in 
1989 lasted more than three months and resulted in USD $760 mn in lost 
production. That year, KSEC was sold out of bankruptcy protection to the 
Hanjin chaebol.189
187 Todd, Industrial Dislocation, 18.
188 Bruno and Tenold, “The Basis for South Korea’s Ascent in the Shipbuilding Industry”. 
189 Todd, Industrial Dislocation, 196-198.
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The industry’s plight was not aided by the state’s inclination not to 
provide f inancial assistance, rapidly rising labour costs, and Japan’s new 
low-interest export f inancing in support of Japanese shipbuilders. However, 
both the South Korean and Japanese shipbuilding industries – at that stage 
the world’s most competitive – were expected to increase profitability in 
the early 1990s as older ships in world fleets needed replacing. By the end 
of 1989, it was strongly suspected that collusion between Japan and South 
Korea was de facto allowing new orders to be parcelled out between them.190 
In South Korea, Daewoo Shipbuilding posted its f irst prof it in 1991 and in 
1994 it merged with Daewoo Heavy Industries. With the onset of the Asian 
f inancial crisis in 1997, liquidity in shipbuilding became crucial to service 
accumulated debts from the rapid expansion programmes undertaken by 
South Korean chaebols. Daewoo Shipbuilding was restructured in 1999 and 
at the end of 2000 was demerged from Daewoo Heavy Industries. By 2001, its 
reconstruction was complete, the company becoming Daewoo Shipbuilding 
and Marine Engineering.191
By the end of 1982 British Shipbuilders had closed half of its merchant 
shipbuilding capacity, and the terms of the British Shipbuilding Act, 1983, 
gave the government the required means to compel British Shipbuilders 
to begin a process of the privatisation of its remaining companies.192 Losses 
for 1982-83 totalled £117 mn mainly due to the the Offshore Division. A new 
chairman, Graham Day (who, it will be recalled, had resigned from the 
original Organising Committee of British Shipbuilders) was appointed in 
succession to Robert Atkinson with a specif ic brief to reduce losses and pri-
vatise the profitable elements of British Shipbuilders, the warship yards.193
From 2 April 1984 the number of British Shipbuilders divisions was 
reduced from f ive to two to prepare for its eventual size and shape after 
disposals and privatisation. Tyne Ship Repair and Grangemouth Dockyard 
had been sold and the remaining two ship repair companies, Falmouth and 
Vosper Shiprepairers, were now up for sale. Now only warship-building 
and merchant and composite building yards formed the core capability, 
190 Ibid., 197. 
191 See www.dsme.co.kr.
192 British Shipbuilding Act, 1983, c. 15, section 2: “the Secretary of State may, after consultation 
with British Shipbuilders, by order, give to it directions – (a) to discontinue or restrict any 
of its activities or to dispose of any of its property, rights and liabilities; or (b) to secure the 
discontinuance or restriction of any of the activities of a wholly owned subsidiary of British 
Shipbuilders or the disposal of all or any of its property, rights and liabilities or the winding up 
of any such subsidiary.” 
193 For this, see Johnman and Murphy, British Shipbuilding and the State Since 1918, 231-232.
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reflecting the progressive withdrawal from ship repair, offshore, and marine 
and general engineering.194 Earlier in March, British Shipbuilders biggest 
loss-maker, Scott Lithgow, became the f irst constituent company to be 
privatised – sold to the industrial conglomerate Trafalgar House Plc for a 
knockdown price of £12 mn. After the sale, Trafalgar House received £36.649 
mn in June 1985 from British Shipbuilders in compensation for continuing 
problems with completing a semi-submersible drilling rig. A record trading 
loss of £161 mn in the 1983-84 reporting year for British Shipbuilders was 
almost entirely due to losses in its Offshore Division. The entire adventure 
begun by Robert Atkinson in 1981 into offshore semi-submersible drilling 
rig construction at Scott Lithgow and Cammell Laird had been disastrous.195
Privatisation
Thereafter, British Shipbuilders began the privatisation of its constituent 
companies in earnest by selling off its warship yards, its two remaining ship 
repair companies, Falmouth Shiprepair Ltd and Vosper Shiprepairers Ltd (sold 
in 1984 and 1985 respectively), and engine-building and general engineering 
companies. Brooke Marine at Lowestoft was redesignated as a warship yard 
and sold in 1985 to a management buyout, as was Vosper Thornycroft at 
Southampton and Portsmouth. Yarrow was also sold in that year to the 
conglomerate GEC-Marconi. In 1986 Smiths Dock on the Tees was closed, as 
was Clark Kincaid’s Wallsend engine works, Vickers at Barrow was sold to yet 
another management buyout and was rebranded Vickers Shipbuilding and 
Engineering Ltd (VSEL), which also included Cammell Laird, redesignated 
as a warship yard in 1984 after the collapse of the Offshore Division, and sold 
to VSEL for a nominal £1. Swan Hunter had also been designated a warship 
yard and was privatised in 1986 by another management buyout, as was Hall 
Russell at Aberdeen. Redesignation of four of the seven yards above (three, 
Yarrow, Vosper Thornycroft, and Vickers, were already designated warship 
yards) precluded all seven from accessing SIF monies.196
The year 1986 also saw the sale of the small Ailsa shipyard at Troon 
to the Perth Corporation. Ailsa was purchased by the Yorkshire-based 
194 Merchant and composite comprised British Shipbuilders merchant and engine building 
facilities and included yards engaged in both merchant and warship construction, such as Swan 
Hunter.
195 For this period, see Johnman and Murphy, “A Triumph of Failure”.
196 The Shipbuilding Intervention Fund existed for thirty-six years and at one point accounted 
for a third of the cost of a ship. It was f inally abolished throughout the European Union from 
1 January 2001. 
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Cathelco in 1996 and, after completing a £20 mn order from the Ministry 
of Defence for ten landing craft, closed in 2000. In 1988 Govan Shipbuilders 
was sold to the Norwegian conglomerate, Kvaerner, for a paltry £6 mn, 
with the loss of 500 jobs and with British Shipbuilders picking up the 
redundancy costs, allowing Kvaerner access to the SIF. This left British 
Shipbuilders with only one major merchant shipbuilding facility, North 
East Shipbuilders Ltd (NESL) at Sunderland, and the much smaller ship-
yards of Appledore-Ferguson at North Devon and Port Glasgow, and Clark 
Kincaid’s engine works at Greenock. By 1989, Appledore, Ferguson, and 
Clark Kincaid had been privatised, and NESL’s Pallion (the locus of a large 
construction hall) and Southwick shipyards closed in a backstage deal with 
the European Union Commission as a counterpart for aid. Counterpart 
funding was designed to assist those areas where shipbuilding closed, in 
this case, Sunderland, but only on condition that no future shipbuilding 
be conducted.197
The remaining assets of NESL were then privatised in 1989 as A & P 
Appledore International, and were utilised for ship repair. The NESL closure 
ended volume merchant shipbuilding in Britain. In contrast, ship repair and 
conversion, most of it undertaken in former assets of British Shipbuilders, 
survived in part, and largely returned to the casualised system of labour 
which had characterised it beforehand. The result of privatisation had been 
an income to British Shipbuilders of £125.5 mn while costs had been £234.8 
mn – leaving a negative balance of £109.3 mn. All told, British Shipbuilders 
Plc, from July 1977 to 1989, cost British taxpayers more than £2 bn.198 In 1975, 
British shipbuilding had employed 48,000 employees in newbuilding; by 
1990 the f igure stood at 6,000. The comparative f igures for the Netherlands 
and West Germany for employees engaged in shipbuilding in 1975 were 
21,000 and 47,000 respectively. By 1990 these numbers had been reduced 
to 4,000 and 15,000 respectively. In 1975, Japanese shipbuilding, at 256,000 
employees, employed far more workers than the UK, West Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Sweden combined (141,000). By 1990, however, shipbuild-
ing employment in Japan had contracted markedly to 89,000.199 From 1977 
197 For this period in more detail, see Johnman, “The Privatisation of British Shipbuilders”, and 
Johnman and Murphy, British Shipbuilding and the State Since 1918, 234-236. 
198 Johnman and Murphy, British Shipbuilding and the State Since 1918, 240. British Shipbuild-
ers Plc continued to exist as a shell corporation under statute law, accountable for liabilities 
arising from its operation until 2013. From March 2013, any remaining liabilities passed to the 
Department of Innovation and Skills.
199 Figures from De Voogd, “Public Intervention and the Decline of Shipbuilding in the Neth-
erlands”, 252.
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onwards, British shipbuilding had marched towards statistical irrelevance. 
Table 2.8 shows British shipbuilding’s decreasing market share during the 
1980s.
In attempting to sum up the labour situation in British Shipbuilders from 
nationalisation to privatisation, one has to conclude that closures occurred 
with, on the whole, surprisingly little opposition from trade unions. In part 
this was due to quasi-nationalisation of a substantial part of the industry 
prior to 1977, the initial welcoming of full nationalisation by all trade unions 
concerned, the pseudo-corporatist structure of the British Shipbuilders 
Plc Board, the smugness of those employed in the warship division that 
somehow they were immune from competitive pressures, and the rather pi-
ous hope that an industry that had monumentally failed to confront foreign 
competition from the 1950s onwards could, in some mysterious way, rise 
phoenix-like from its competitive torpor. Concurrently, from 1980 onwards, 
the Conservative government passed a series of employment laws aimed at 
undermining trade union rights and weakening employment protection.200
During the years of British Shipbuilders control, strikes did of course 
occur, but those that did were of short duration, and closures and diminu-
tion of the workforce were easily bought off by generous redundancy terms. 
By 1979-80, days lost to industrial disputes were about one-seventh of the 
national average and, in the following two reporting years, days lost were 
less than 1 per cent of those available.201 In the spring of 1981, the CSEU 
concluded an agreement for a 7.5 per cent wage rise and for the introduction 
of a 39-hour working week effective from 1 April 1982. Following a period 
of wage freeze, in the autumn of 1983, British Shipbuilders proposed to the 
CSEU radical alterations to traditional working practices to pave the way 
for a “step-change improvement in productivity”. After lengthy negotia-
tions, the CSEU agreed to these changes in exchange for an unconsolidated 
across-the-board increase in wages by a supplement of £7 per employee per 
200 The Employment Act, 1980, outlawed secondary action by unions against an employer 
who was not directly a party to a given trade dispute, and the def inition of a trade dispute was 
narrowed to encompass only disputes between workers and their own employer. The Employ-
ment Act, 1982, banned “union-only” clauses in contracts, and made it far easier to gain court 
injunctions against industrial action by trade unions. Trade unionists were also banned from 
refusing to work with non-trade unionists and from refusing to handle work from non-trade 
union companies. The Employment Act, 1988, required separate workplace ballots in certain 
disputes and outlawed industrial action to establish or enforce a “closed shop”. It legislated on 
the prevention of union discipline against persons ignoring a strike call even though the strike 
call was supported by a ballot.
201 British Shipbuilders Annual Report and Accounts, 1979-80, 1980-81, 1981-82.
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week from January 1984 subject to the conclusion of local agreements. This 
was known as the Phase 5 Agreement.202
By March 1985, even British Shipbuilders headquarters staff had been 
further reduced to ninety-four employees, reflecting the changing composi-
tion of the constituent yards, cost reductions, and transfer of responsibilities 
to the operating level. This was an 18 per cent reduction over the reporting 
year, and man-days lost as a result of strikes totalled less than 0.2 per cent of 
those available. A Phase 6 wage settlement valued at 4.4 per cent of the total 
paybill was reached in 1984, offset by overall productivity improvements. 
Another cause for concern was that just over 90 per cent of merchant vessels 
on order throughout the world were scheduled for delivery in 1986. Indeed 
the market for newbuilding was in its ninth year of no real growth, with 
prospects little better. As Day noted, “unless more responsible policies 
are adopted in South Korea and Japan it is diff icult to see how any Euro-
pean shipyard can maintain its capacity even at the present drastically 
reduced levels”. He hoped that Far Eastern governments would require 
their domestic shipbuilders to tailor capacity, prices, and sales f inance 
to responsible f inancial criteria.203 In relation to South Korea, this was 
wishful thinking at best, and with Japan it was only marginally less so. With 
the government-ordered privatisation of British Shipbuilders constituent 
202 British Shipbuilders Annual Report and Accounts, 1982-83, 1984-85; Mortimer, History of the 
Boilermakers’ Society, vol. III, 389-390. By this agreement, provisions were made for f lexibility 
and interchangeability of composite groups of workers within shipyards.
203 British Shipbuilders Annual Report and Accounts, 1984-85. 
Table 2.8  UK and World shipbuilding launches, 1980-1990 (000 grt)
Year UK World UK as a % of world
1980 244 13,935 1.8
1981 339 17,066 2.0
1982 528 17,290 3.1
1983 527 14,888 3.5
1984 191 17,732 1.1
1985 145 17,247 0.8
1986 238 14,914 1.6
1987  46  9,770 0.5
1988  91 11,977 0.8
1989 100 13,041 0.8
1990  79 14,894 0.5
Source: Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, various years
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warship f irms proceeding apace, British Shipbuilders had the unenviable 
prospect of losing its prof itable core and being left with an unprofitable 
rump of mercantile-only yards.
Privatisation proved to be the means by which the British state anni-
hilated its maritime industries. The axis between the state and merchant 
shipbuilding, evident for most of the twentieth century, was now irretrevi-
ably broken. Simply put, the state wanted rid of shipbuilding. In the course 
of the next decade, slow-speed marine-engine building manufacturing 
would also be annihilated, and the aim of promoting competition in warship 
building would be stymied by the creation of a quasi-monopoly.
The 1990s: the long goodbye
Clark Kincaid, British Shipbuilders’ last engine works, sold to the HLD 
Group in 1989, was acquired by the Norwegian conglomerate Kvaerner 
in 1990 and was renamed Kvaerner Kincaid. It was sold to Scandiaverken 
in 1999 and closed in 2000, bringing to an end marine engine building in 
the once great maritime town of Greenock. Hall Russell, in receivership, 
was sold again in 1989 to A & P Appledore (Aberdeen) but closed in 1992, 
as did Brooke Marine at Lowestoft. Scott Lithgow closed in 1993, posting 
the largest single loss on a contract in the history of British shipbuilding. 
Scott Lithgow’s disastrous entry into the large offshore structures market 
ultimately cost British Shipbuilders Plc £228 mn in losses and legal action 
by Trafalgar House Plc.204
In 1993 there occurred a bitter four-week strike over pay by 1,300 workers 
at GEC Marconi Marine’s yard at Scotstoun (formerly Yarrow Shipbuilders). 
There had been no pay increase since 1991 and on 5 March 1993 the striking 
workers voted overwhelmingly to return to work. The action was initiated 
by an unprecedented 97 per cent vote of the manual workforce to strike, 
against the recommendations of shop stewards and union off icials, and 
was the f irst strike over pay for nearly twenty years at the Scotstoun yard.205
In 1994, Swan Hunter entered receivership.206 It was subsequently 
purchased by a Dutch entrepreneur, Jaap Kroese, ensuring its survival 
204 Johnman and Murphy, Scott Lithgow, 340-341.
205 The Independent, 6 and 21 February 1993. A full orderbook offered the strikers maximum 
leverage after more than a decade of redundancies, the grudging surrender of craft rights, and 
a two-year wage freeze. For an analysis of this strike, see McKinlay and Taylor, “Privatisation 
and Industrial Relations in British Shipbuilding”. 
206 For an analysis of the factors leading up to receivership, see Johnman, “Public Intervention 
and the Hollowing out of British Shipbuilding”. 
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on a much-limited scale until 2006, when it ceased shipbuilding. VSEL 
closed Cammell Laird at Birkenhead in 1993 (Cammell Laird was thereafter 
purchased and reverted to ship repair and conversion but closed in 2001).207 
VSEL was acquired by GEC-Marconi in 1995 as part of Marconi Marine 
to join Yarrow. By 1999, a mega £7.7 bn merger of two British companies, 
Marconi Electronic Systems (a defence, electronics, and naval subsidiary 
of the General Electric Company Plc) and British Aerospace (manufacturer 
of aircraft, munitions, and naval systems) resulted in the creation of BAe 
Systems in November 1999. Thus one company at the end of the century 
monopolised nuclear submarine construction at the former VSEL yard at 
Barrow and frigate construction at Scotstoun, and leased from Clydeport, 
on the withdrawal of Kvaerner from shipbuilding in 1999, the last merchant 
yard of any signif icance on the British mainland at Govan.208
Conclusions
The demise of almost all British merchant shipbuilding f irms, the bulk of 
ship repair f irms, and marine-engine building f irms linked to shipbuilding 
in the twentieth century owed much to an inability to meet international 
207 Part of the Birkenhead shipyard site was leased by the Coastline Group as a ship repair 
facility. Coastline eventually bought part of the shipyard and adopted the Cammell Laird 
name, before f loating on the London Stock Exchange in 1997 and acquiring dockyards on the 
Tees and Tyne and a former Royal Dockyard at Gibraltar. The late withdrawal from a £50 mn 
ref it contract for the Costa Classica cruise ship by Costa Crociere, a division of Carnival Cruises 
of the USA, tipped Cammell Laird Shiprepairers into receivership in April 2001. The Tees, 
Tyne, and Birkenhead yards were acquired by A & P Shiprepair Group in 2001. The Gibraltar 
dockyard was sold to a local management buyout. In 2005, A & P sold the Birkenhead yard to 
Northwestern Shiprepairers and Shipbuilders (NSS). Peel Holdings, owners of the Mersey Docks 
and Harbour Company, which owned a 50 per cent stake in NSS, acquired the Cammell Laird 
site and surrounding land in 2007 to facilitate a property development although NSS continued 
to maintain a long lease on the shipbuilding site. In November 2008, NSS, having acquired the 
Cammell Laird name earlier, was renamed Cammell Laird Shiprepairers & Shipbuilders Ltd. 
In February 2008 it was announced that the company had won a £28 mn Ministry of Defence 
contract to ref it and overhaul the Royal Fleet Auxiliary ship, Fort Rosalie. In January 2010, a 
£44 mn order for the f light deck modules of the Royal Navy’s new aircraft carrier, HMS Queen 
Elizabeth, was announced. Cammell Laird returned to shipbuilding with an order from Western 
Ferries for two ferries for its Clyde route in June 2012, for delivery in August 2013. 
208 After 1985 Vosper Thornycroft had become known as the VT Group and later concentrated 
its activities at Portsmouth. In 2008 BVT Surface Ships was created as a joint venture combining 
the shipbuilding and naval support business of VT Group and BAe Systems yards on the upper 
Clyde. By the end of March 2010, Babcock International (which had taken over the former Royal 
Dockyard at Rosyth) had acquired the VT Group. 
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competition head on. From a position of unrivalled supremacy prior to 
1914, British shipbuilding and repair’s future prospects altered signif icantly 
during the protracted conflict of the First World War and in the mostly 
depressed interwar period.
Obsessed with reducing its capacity and utterly failing to alter its at-
omistic structure, its extant system of industrial organisation, inter-f irm 
competition, and low levels of capital investment, the industry limped 
towards the Second World War in a far worse position than it had found 
itself in 1914. The war masked the industry’s fundamental problems and 
served to maintain its inherent contradictions.
After 1945, ad hoc solutions applied sticking plaster to a fundamentally ill 
patient too weak to collectively challenge Japanese, German, and Swedish 
competition and of insuff icient backbone to force change in the bitter 
climate of industrial relations it had largely fostered for its own ends. By 
1958, when the long seller’s market in shipbuilding had come to a jarring 
halt, f irms had on the whole failed to read market trends evident elsewhere 
in the construction of larger oil tankers and bulk carriers. Modernisation 
schemes were largely piecemeal.
No British shipbuilder had the vision or the capital to contemplate a 
shipyard such as Arendal in Sweden or, later, Ulsan in South Korea. Large 
swathes of the British shipbuilding and ship repair industries increasingly 
looked to the state during the 1960s and 1970s for salvation; and an industry 
that had always abhorred nationalisation reluctantly embraced it, by which 
stage most of it was uncompetitive on price, delivery, and credit and teeter-
ing on the edge of bankruptcy in any event.
Nationalisation did little more than prolong the larger part of the indus-
try’s agony, and privatisation hastened its death throes. All of this proved, 
at great expense and to no great purpose, merely suff icient to keep alive 
a warship-building capability and a semblance of competition, which as 
the century ended had moved towards quasi-monopoly. BAe Systems with 
Babcock International and Thales UK at present are completing an aircraft 
carrier but, as this work has advanced, BAe announced in November 2013 the 
loss of 1,775 jobs and the closure of its Portsmouth shipyard in 2014. Around 
800 of these jobs will be lost at BAe’s shipyards at Govan and Scotstoun in 
Glasgow, which employ around 3,700 workers, the largest concentration 
of shipbuilding workers in Britain. These yards are now building three 
ocean-going offshore patrol vessels for the Royal Navy, with the f irst to be 
delivered in 2017, by which stage it is hoped that orders for a new generation 
of frigates will be won. Although the referendum on Scottish independence 
on 18 September 2014, if a yes vote had occurred, would have impacted on 
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this – no UK government would build warships in a foreign country – the 
fact that the majority of the Scottish electorate voted no gives some hope 
that new warship orders will eventually accrue. Nonetheless, the vast major-
ity of the shipbuilding workforce in Great Britain is now wholly dependent 
on government largesse in a protected market. Just how far the mercantile 
side of the industry has sunk is witnessed by the South Korean Daewoo 
shipbuilding group winning an order in November 2013 worth £425 mn 
from the British government for four 37,000-ton MARS (military reach 
and sustainability afloat) f leet tankers for delivery in 2016 – a mere drop 
in the ocean for South Korea, who at May 2014 have some 774 merchant 
ships on order.209
As the twenty-f irst century unfolded, South Korea overtook Japan as the 
world’s pre-eminent shipbuilder and in turn has been usurped by China 
in terms of volume, but not value. State sponsorship of shipbuilding has 
basically become a game of high-stakes poker. The countries with the 
deepest pockets and the willingness to throw huge amounts of money to 
their shipbuilding industries come out on top. Take Japan, South Korea, and 
China. What is apparent is that the latter two countries began their road to 
ascendancy by building relatively unsophisticated tonnage such as tankers 
and basic bulk carriers, with South Korea being far more export-oriented 
in its approach to the market. However, as their industry grew, indigenous 
f irms began to build more sophisticated tonnage such as chemical and 
gas carriers, container vessels, and the like. It is likely that China, now the 
world’s second-largest economy and as of 2014 vying for f irst place with the 
USA, will, for nationalist reasons, keep South Korea in second place, simply 
because it will pour huge f inancial resources into its industry, particularly 
as it expands its naval forces. That China now builds sophisticated tonnage 
should worry Japan, as the latter has concentrated on the sophisticated end 
of the market as increasingly has South Korea.
What both Japan and South Korea (the latter to a lesser extent) fear is 
that Chinese costs for labour, materials, etc., will continue to be heavily 
subsidised in order to undercut competitors and to ensure China tops the 
world output league. As to labour in these countries, the tendency over 
time is for wages to rise, but government subsidies to f irms ensure that 
rising wage levels do not translate into higher costs for the product. On 
the demand side, shipping f irms mostly are price- and delivery-conscious: 
209 BBC News, 6 November 2013. South Korean f igures from Clarksons Shipping Intelligence 
Network: May 2014.
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shipbuilders know this and to get the work they often tender at unrealistic 
prices.
At present, with the exception of Japan – for most of the century an 
experienced builder of warships – South Korea and China are quickly catch-
ing up in warship construction, a f ield where West European countries and 
the USA still enjoy a comparative advantage as they do with cruise-liner 
construction. One must conclude in summarising the wider lessons of 
shipbuilding in the twentieth century that East Asian countries better 
understood the nature of capitalism than their West European counter-
parts. Are the workers in East Asia in the same boat as their dwindling 
European fellows? All governments to varying extents have bailed out 
their shipbuilding industries, some of which have been leakier than others: 
the trick for workers is to recognise which particular part of the industry 
in which to sell their labour over time in order to maximise their earning 
potential, and to raise their living standards – no easy task.
3 Bremer Vulkan
A case study of the West German shipbuilding industry and 
its narratives in the second half of the twentieth century
Johanna Wolf
Introduction
The author Wolfgang Kiesel commented on the closure in 1997 of Bremer 
Vulkan AG,1 placing its fall within the overall context of the decline of the 
European shipbuilding industry.2 More than half of Bremer Vulkan’s 23,000 
workers would lose their jobs in the near future. Beforehand, the company 
had attempted to compete against withering international competition 
but without government aid it was not strong enough to survive any longer. 
In general, particularly in the large tanker and bulk carrier markets, the 
West European shipbuilding industry had been overtaken by South-east 
Asian competitors for quite some time as the virtual collapse of merchant 
shipbuilding in the United Kingdom and Sweden demonstrated.3
The Bremer Vulkan shipyard was the last major shipyard in Bremen. 
Earlier, in 1983, AG Weser, the second Großwerft in Bremen, had had to close, 
and in the following years other medium-sized and smaller companies ex-
perienced a similar fate. Bremen had therefore to deal with great challenges. 
The region had been dominated by shipbuilding for centuries and had to 
look, like many other industrial regions in this period, for alternative forms 
of economic activity. Like other West German shipyards, Bremer Vulkan 
had been affected by the decline in demand since the mid-1970s. The history 
of Bremer Vulkan is similar to the transformations in the West German 
shipbuilding industry in general. But the workers and works council par-
ticipated in the developments and took the initiative on co-determination. 
There were numerous confrontations, such as wildcat strikes and protests 
against collective redundancies, ultimately to no avail.
In this chapter I reflect on the history of the Bremer Vulkan shipyard in 
particular, and the West German shipbuilding industry in general. Following 
1 The company, at the time of its closure, was owner of several shipyards in West and East 
Germany. With the events of 1989-90 it had taken over two major shipyards in East Germany.
2 Kiesel, Bremer Vulkan, 7.
3 See the chapters by Hugh Murphy (Chapter 2) and Tobias Karlsson (Chapter 4) in this book.
118 JoHanna WolF 
the relevant historiography I point out how certain narratives were estab-
lished as a result of developments in the West German shipbuilding industry. 
The historical situation makes it clear why the narrative of decline was 
sharply pronounced. In my summary, I suggest some aspects of how com-
parative approaches and entangled history could generate a new impetus.
The West German shipbuilding industry and its history
After 1950, the West German shipbuilding industry had retained and 
expanded its output beyond its interwar performance, and by 1960 it had 
become a major shipbuilding nation. The introduction of technological 
innovations, such as welding, block building, and rationalisation, made 
the shipbuilding industry more cost-eff icient, faster, and cheaper – and 
therefore internationally competitive. In the 1970s, the f ive largest German 
shipyards (Großwerften) together had a 70 per cent share of the turnover in 
West German shipbuilding.4 The craft had been passed on through genera-
tions, and the connectedness of the regional population to the shipyards 
was apparent at the ship-naming ceremonies that were celebrated as major 
events. Alongside large shipyards, medium-sized and smaller ones existed 
close to the others, occasionally supplementing the work of the large ones 
in times of high demand. These regional conglomerates were economically 
successful because of the benefits of reduced transport costs as well as those 
brought by face-to-face contacts between supplier and customer.5
The f irst “miracle” of West German shipbuilding production was con-
nected to the stronger demand for oil. The closure of the Suez Canal between 
1967 and 1975 led to a greater demand for big tankers to reap economies of 
scale because of the need to sail longer distances in the seaborne trade.6 Due 
to the positive situation, the shipyard workers improved their wages and 
4 Stråth, The Politics of De-Industrialisation, 26. Stråth named AG Weser and Bremer Vulkan 
in Bremen, the Nordseewerke in Emden, Blohm & Voss in Hamburg, and the Howaldtswerke 
Deutsche Werft with yards in Kiel and Hamburg.
5 In this regard, Daniel Todd applied the theory of “clusters” by Michael Porter (Porter, “Loca-
tion, Competition, and Economic Development”) to the example of the British shipbuilding 
industry and showed how the yards that were in regional clusters prof ited f irst; see Todd, “Going 
East”. Today, the formation of clusters is observed for South Korean companies too; see Hassink 
and Shin, “South Korea’s Shipbuilding Industry”. For the German shipbuilding industry, Todd’s 
assumption is not yet under investigation, but may be of interest as a comparative approach of 
economic agglomerations and their functioning.
6 Götz Albert stressed that this boom was mainly triggered by speculative demand; see Albert, 
Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und Krise der deutschen Schiffbauindustrie, 89.
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working conditions. Although the shipbuilding industry has always been 
affected by fluctuations, short-time working or overtime can compensate 
for this. The huge IG Metall trade union, representing the interests of most 
shipyard workers, implemented the Works Constitution Act and fought 
continuously for an increase in wages.
The year 1973 halted the positive development of the West German 
shipbuilding industry, and the f irst OPEC oil crisis in the autumn of 1973 
had signif icant consequences for it. Consequent upon the Arab-Israeli War 
in October 1973, OPEC reduced the deliveries of crude oil, leading to a rise 
in oil prices of about 70 per cent in the same month. This long-lasting high 
price of oil dramatically diminished Western consumption, and the tanker 
market collapsed in the second half of 1974. Because of the orderbook, the 
collapse in demand took some time to work its way through, although there 
were cancellations and a great deal of tonnage was laid up. The f irst signs 
of change could be recognised in the second half of the 1970s. Due to the 
decline in orders, the numbers of permanent staff had to be minimised, 
and mergers and shipyard closures followed in the early 1980s, increasing 
the numbers of unemployed in coastal regions. In this situation, IG Metall 
was forced to adjust its strategy. Instead of wage claims, the trade unionists 
demanded job security and the reduction of weekly working hours as well 
as a long-term structural policy for the region.
In much of the research during the events in the 1970s and 1980s, the crisis 
was a central issue.7 Although the oil crisis was a major explanation for the 
shipbuilding crisis, another was the change in production. Some studies 
show that by focusing on large shipbuilding, like container ships and tank-
ers, specialisation in smaller vessels, such as yachts or ferries, was lost – a 
resource that would have been an important competitive advantage during 
the entry of new shipbuilding countries. Furthermore, the studies indicate 
that, through technological rationalisation, reduction in the workforce 
started earlier.8 When the work process was automated, fewer workers 
were needed, and the crisis of the 1970s simply accelerated this. Some 
authors argue that the internationally highly linked shipbuilding market 
had received a new impetus of interconnectedness by the industrialisation 
of so-called developing countries since the 1970s.9
7 See, for example, Robert Kappel, “Bremer Schiffbau im Strudel der Weltschiffbaukrise”; 
Albert, Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und Krise der deutschen Schiffbauindustrie, 102; Heseler and Kröger 
(eds), “Stell Dir vor, die Werften gehörn uns...”.
8 Stråth, The Politics of De-Industrialisation, 7; Albert, Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und Krise der 
deutschen Schiffbauindustrie, 103–104; Kloberg, Werftensterben in Hamburg, 36.
9 Porter, Globaler Wettbewerb; Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant.
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Götz Albert wrote one of the few books questioning the “crisis narrative” 
of the 1970s. Unlike in other books, Albert’s thesis is that the West German 
shipbuilding industry was already in crisis in the late 1950s and gained only 
a short-term boost from the construction of large vessels and container 
ships. This short-term recovery was ended by the ongoing effects of the 
mid-1970s recession in world trade. His argument is represented in the 
numbers of West Germany’s global market share of shipbuilding, which 
averaged from a post-1945 high of 19.5 per cent to 14 per cent between 1952 
and 1963. It dropped down to around 7 per cent between 1964 and 1975, and 
to 4 per cent from 1976 to 1990.10
A specif ic f ield of research about the shipbuilding industry addresses 
the consequences for the labour market and society.11 The research pro-
jects investigating this have changed over several years. They observed 
shipyard workers in their workplaces and the impact of automation and 
rationalisation; and they interviewed workers about their explanations for 
the development of the German shipbuilding industry and their personal 
perspective.12 From optimistic analyses in the early 1970s, when the strikes 
were interpreted as a renewed “rebellion of the labour movement”, the 
studies evolved to seeing evidence about the “decline of the working class” 
and the “disappearance of industrial society” up to the 1980s.13 An analysis 
by Edgar Einemann showed that the workers were aware of the situation 
in the late 1970s as a crisis, but interpreted their own work perspective as 
still optimistic. They thought the short cyclical downturn would soon end 
in an economic upswing.14 Workers saw no solution in forging any kind of 
solidarity between the shipyard employees. When thinking about wildcat 
strikes and spontaneous activities, they decided on no action because they 
feared dismissals.15 They criticised low-wage policies and profit interests but 
could not deduce solutions for a broader mobilisation strategy. Additionally, 
10 Albert, Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und Krise der deutschen Schiffbauindustrie, 102.
11 Heseler, “Stell Dir vor, die Werften gehörn uns ...”; Kappel, “Bremer Schiffbau im Strudel der 
Weltschiffbaukrise”.
12 Einemann, Industriearbeiter in der Wirtschaftskrise; Schumann et al., Rationalisierung, 
Krise, Arbeiter; Zoll et al., Krisenbetroffenheit und Krisenwahrnehmung.
13 Hien, Am Ende ein neuer Anfang? See also the follow-up research f ive years later: Hien, 
Ein neuer Anfang wars am Ende nicht. Some of them end with criticism directed at the lack 
of political strategy on the part of the Länder and the state governments. Both had failed to 
promote the establishment of alternative industries in the region until too late to offer redundant 
shipbuilders other job opportunities; see Heseler, “Stell Dir vor, die Werften gehörn uns ...”; Kappel, 
“Bremer Schiffbau im Strudel der Weltschiffbaukrise”.
14 Einemann, Industriearbeiter in der Wirtschaftskrise, 180.
15 Ibid., 181.
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they insisted on the state as the most important actor in creating solu-
tions, being aware of their helplessness against withering international 
competition. From their perspective the trade unions could not secure 
steady employment nor could the state control the global market.16
While the remaining German shipbuilding industry had developed 
positively from the late 1990s to the mid-2000s, little new literature 
appeared.17 There are statistics, but no long-term interpretations of the 
data.18 In co-operation with the Institut Arbeit und Wirtschaft, Agentur 
für Struktur- und Personalentwicklung, and IG Metall Küste, surveys 
are carried out on all German shipyards on an annual basis.19 The results 
provide information on the situation of the German shipbuilding industry 
and employment in the sector. While the world market between 2000 and 
2011 largely developed positively with the shares of f irst South Korea and, 
latterly, China increasing, output in Germany, in comparative terms, was 
statistically insignif icant, its share dropping from 4.5 per cent in 2000 to 
0.8 per cent in 2011.20 But shipbuilding production fluctuates from year to 
year, and the trend is not an ever-falling curve. However, medium-sized 
shipyards also play a role, as they compete as producers of specialised 
vessels in the global market in the twenty-f irst century, such as the Meyer 
Werft shipyard in Papenburg.21
In addition to the emergence of these niche producers, European co-
operation by way of industry associations also plays a role. Recent research 
has given these changes special attention.22 European shipbuilders have in-
creasingly looked for co-operation and associations between yards through 
16 Ibid., 185, 205.
17 There are a small number of books that dealt with the situation of the East German shipyards 
during the 1990s and their future through the merger of the two German markets; see for 
example: Heseler and Löser, Die Transformation des ostdeutschen Schiffbaus.
18 Organisations that conduct surveys regularly include, for example: AgS-Monitoring Schiff-
bau; SEAEurope Market Monitoring; IHS Fairplay; Lloyd’s Register of Shipping/EU Commission.
19 A survey was published in September 2013: Ludwig and Wolnik, Beschäftigung, Auftragslage 
und Perspektiven im deutschen Schiffbau (2013).
20 Kühn et al., Beschäftigung, Auftragslage und Perspektiven im deutschen Schiffbau (2012), 
11. The f igures in themselves involve a diff iculty. When interpreting the data only national 
developments are considered, although the f igures vary from company to company. This problem 
seems especially important if the company has multiple locations in different countries or if 
several companies helped to build a single ship, but only the delivery is calculated as production.
21 Meyer builds passenger ships and cruise liners and says the company “enjoys an excellent 
reputation internationally regarding this f ield”; see www.meyerwerft.de/en/meyerwerft_de/
schiffe/kreuzfahrtschiffe/kreuzfahrtschiffe.jsp (accessed 3  March 2014); see also a book 
published by the shipyard: Schwerdtner, Meyer-Werft.
22 See for example Ludwig and Tholen, Schiffbau in Europa, here 13.
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cross-company and cross-national human resource management, product 
development, labour division productivity, and shared f inance models.23
Social scientif ic studies on the West German shipbuilding industry are 
similar to those of other West European industrial countries. It turns out 
that there were precursors to these developments, such as in the United 
Kingdom,24 or when the shrinking demand in shipbuilding led to different 
conclusions, as in Sweden, where declining competitiveness resulted in an 
early restructuring of the shipbuilding regions.25
Studies on other countries, however, are quite different, when the in-
dustry began to develop only in the 1970s and 1980s or was not affected by 
the crisis in this way. Japan, for example, succeeded in keeping its leading 
position in the world shipbuilding market in the latter half of the century 
not least through high domestic demand, but did nevertheless reorganise its 
productive capacity as South Korea gained greater market share. In Japan, 
the integration of high-tech production processes that had been developed 
and tested by research institutions enabled rapid and inexpensive produc-
tion of ships.26 South Korea established itself during the “West European 
shipbuilding crisis” as a new competitor. In the “crisis year” 1973 the f irst 
ship was built by Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI), and ten years later it 
was the world leader in the shipbuilding industry, through a controlled 
industrial policy of the government under Park Chung-hee and the influ-
ence of large, diversif ied business groups called chaebols.27
There is reason to assume that the crisis in the shipbuilding industry 
was a West European phenomenon in the 1970s and 1980s.28 The literature 
supports this notion. Here, the main issue is how “the periphery” assumed 
23 For example until February 2012, all European shipbuilding nations were members of the 
European shipbuilding association CESA (Community of European Shipyards Associations). 
CESA represented the shipbuilding industry from seventeen member states (Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, and United Kingdom). In February 2012, CESA merged with 
the European Marine Equipment Council (EMEC) into the association Ships and Maritime 
Equipment Associations of Europe (SeaEurope).
24 See, for example, Pollard and Robertson, The British Shipbuilding Industry, Jones, Shipbuild-
ing in Britain, and Johnman and Murphy, British Shipbuilding and the State Since 1918. For the 
long view, see Slaven, British Shipbuilding 1500-2010.
25 See Chapter 3 in this book.
26 For Japan, see Davies, Japanese Shipping and Shipbuilding in the Twentieth Century.
27 For South Korea, see Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant. This book has much information on the 
rise of Hyundai Heavy Industries, which went on to become the world’s leading shipbuilding 
company. See also Jonsson, Shipbuilding in South Korea, and Bruno and Tenold, “The Basis for 
South Korea’s Ascent in the Shipbuilding Industry”. 
28 Stråth, The Politics of De-Industrialisation, and Todd, Industrial Dislocation.
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the position of leadership of the world market by overwhelming traditional 
industrialised countries’ market shares in the world shipbuilding industry. 
When concentrating on that question, there is a tendency to summarise 
Europe as a homogeneous area, where similar processes would have taken 
place. This tendency towards homogenisation can be found not only for 
Western Europe, but also for newly industrialised countries, in which case 
it manifests in the terms the “Asian challenge” or “Asian tigers”.29 They 
would have succeeded in gaining increasing market shares by maintaining 
relatively low labour costs and high government subsidies, and therefore 
had risen as “global players” while driving their high-cost “Western competi-
tors” out of the market for at f irst relatively simple but latterly increasingly 
sophisticated vessels. How this narrative about the decline of the European 
shipbuilding industry can be resolved in new issues will be discussed at 
the end of the chapter.
A brief history of the Bremer Vulkan shipyard
The Bremer Vulkan shipyard, founded in 1883, was situated on the bank 
of the River Weser in the suburb of Vegesack in the north of Bremen, and 
was one of the largest shipyards belonging to an ever growing shipyard 
group until its closure under a cloud of f inancial mismanagement in 1997.30 
Beforehand, the European Commission had instituted proceedings on 
state aid over misappropriation of funds by Bremer Vulkan arising from 
its takeover of two East German shipyards, Meerestechnik Werft (previously 
named Mathias-Thesen-Werft) and Volkswerft, which were privatised in 
1992 and 1993 respectively.
Bremer Vulkan was a successful company. The shipyard quickly recov-
ered from the Second World War and the early years of Allied regulation 
of output, and successfully entered the market.31 But changes arose when 
29 See, for example, Todd, “Going East”, 260. Nonetheless, in the South Korean case, researchers 
attempted to question the narrative of a “sudden miracle” or less convincingly to deny the charges 
against high government subsidies; see Jonsson, “Shipbuilding in South Korea” (PhD); Hassink 
and Shin, “South Korea’s Shipbuilding Industry”.
30 Due to Bremer Vulkan’s size and its exceptional end, three books on the company have 
been published: Behling and Thiel, Bremer Vulkan; Kiesel, Bremer Vulkan; Thiel, Die Geschichte 
des Bremer Vulkan. Additionally, books describing the Bremen shipyard region from a social-
historical point of view have been published, see Kuckuk, Unterweserwerften; Kuckuk, Die A.G. 
“Weser” in der Nachkriegszeit. On Bremer Vulkan, see also Roder, “Der Bremer Vulkan”.
31 Thiel, Die Geschichte des Bremer Vulkan, 30.
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Bremer Vulkan faced difficult market conditions at the end of the 1950s. This 
corresponds to the developments in the German shipbuilding industry as a 
whole. In common with other large shipbuilding companies, the manage-
ment decided to invest in the production of big container ships. It seems 
that building a new dry dock for ships up to 300,000 dwt, and subsequent 
additions to plant and equipment, led to success in the following years, 
proving the original decision to expand was sound. Looking at historical 
maps of the River Weser, one can f ind countless yards located there.32 The 
smaller shipyards functioned as suppliers for the larger ones: almost the 
entirety of Ronnebeck shipyard’s production output, for example, went to 
Bremer Vulkan from 1971 onwards.33 During the peak stage of production in 
1968 Bremer Vulkan received 70 per cent of its orders from abroad, including 
customers from the United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark.34
From the end of the 1970s Bremer Vulkan experienced diff icult market 
conditions through managerial errors in estimating, pricing, delays in 
construction, and cost overruns, examples being the contract for the big 
cruise liner Europe and the construction of frigates for the German navy. 
The contract for building the frigates was only achieved because of a miscal-
culated tender that underbid the leading naval shipbuilder, Blohm & Voss.35 
These orders generated losses of approximately DM 300 mn, which led to 
government rescue operations in the early 1980s. Without the injection 
of Länder and federal aid, the shipyard would have been obliged to seek 
bankruptcy proceedings.36 When the most important shareholder, Thyssen-
Bornemisza, sold its shares, a portion of these went to the Hanseatische 
Industriebeteiligungsgesellschaft, a public company owned by the Land 
Bremen in December 1981.37
Being aware of the diff icult f inancial situation of Bremer Vulkan in the 
early 1980s, the federal government called for a new approach to the eff i-
ciency of the shipbuilding industry in the Bremen region. The Bremen Senate 
commissioned several consulting f irms to produce an expert report on the 
shipyards of Bremen (Werftgutachten). When negotiations about a merger of 
AG Weser and Bremer Vulkan became serious, the Bremen Senate requested a 
32 In a recently published book by Klaus auf dem Garten, on the smaller and medium-sized 
enterprises in Bremen, it becomes clear to what extent the shipyards were inter-linked; see auf 
dem Garten, Boote, Yachten und Kleinschiffe aus Bremen, 96.
33 Ibid.
34 Kiesel, Bremer Vulkan, 75.
35 Heseler, “Vom Tankerboom zum Werftenverbund”, 218.
36 In several articles in the 1980s Heseler argued against the reactions of the Bremen Senate.
37 Heseler, “Vom Tankerboom zum Werftenverbund”, 219.
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substantial proposal by the two shipyards. On the basis of the Werftgutachten 
the shipyards proposed two models. While AG Weser insisted on a merger, 
Bremer Vulkan introduced a version without the other Großwerft. Since a 
merger, according to the Werftgutachten, would have meant a loss of DM 14.3 
mn, the Bremen Senate opted for the closure of AG Weser in 1983.38
Merger processes between Bremer Vulkan and other medium-sized 
shipyards in the region, like the Seebeckwerft, the Lloydwerft, and the 
Schichau-Werft, were completed by 1987. Regional associations appeared 
to be a proven method of business organisation, allowing companies to 
benef it from synergies for development and production, and economies 
of scale and scope, but their success or failure is reliant on a steady flow of 
future orders and proactive responses to competition.39 After the federal 
government had started with Case Assistance (Wettbewerbshilfen) in 1987, 
Bremen followed with Restructuring Aids (Umstrukturierungshilfen) in 
the same year for the restructuring of the shipyard region of Bremen. 
With a specif ic restructuring concept the Land Bremen decided on a more 
extensive diversif ication: 30 per cent was to be put into investment in 
non-shipbuilding production, and newbuilding was reduced to 51 per cent 
of the overall capacity.40
The subsequent years of Bremer Vulkan were marked by a phase of diver-
sif ication and expansion. With the advent of German reunif ication Bremer 
Vulkan grew by acquiring smaller mechanical engineering and electronic 
companies as well as two East German shipyards. The Meerestechnik-Werft 
(MTW) in Wismar was taken over in 1992. In 1993, Bremer Vulkan obtained 
a majority stake of the Volkswerft in Stralsund.41 With the focus on East 
Germany, the West German part of the Bremer Vulkan group had been left 
behind; and f inancial diff iculties of the shipyards in Bremerhaven became 
more and more apparent. In this situation the Bremen Senate exerted pres-
sure on Bremer Vulkan, commenting on a concept of the Unterweser region 
that should draw attention to the “old” base of the company.42 Under this 
38 On 20 May 1996 the Bürgerschaft (state parliament) of Bremen established a parliamentary 
committee on Bremer Vulkan. The inquiry committee submitted its report on 16 October 1998; 
see Bremische Bürgschaft, Drucksache. The investigation focused not just on the merger plans, 
but mainly on the Bremer Vulkan group in the following years and the events surrounding its 
bankruptcy in the 1990s.
39 However, in reading the available literature, I f ind there is a lack of analysis as to why these 
strategies evolved.
40 Kappel, “Bremer Schiffbau im Strudel der Weltschiffbaukrise”, 239.
41 Bremische Bürgschaft, Drucksache, 196.
42 Ibid., 320.
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pressure, the board of Bremer Vulkan developed a new f inancial concept 
in September 1994 that implemented the dismantling of the expansion, 
the sale of shares in the company, and rigid austerity – including a strict 
prohibition on entering into new investments. But this failed as the prob-
lems already ran too deep, and the mismanagement of the board of Bremer 
Vulkan became more and more obvious from mid-1995.43 Using European 
Union funds originally allocated for the East German shipyards to deal 
with liquidity problems caused the entire company to fail in the end.44 The 
European Commission then initiated proceedings for the misappropria-
tion of funds. But extravagant behaviour and resistance to advice on the 
part of the Bremer Vulkan board during the expansion phase and later are 
mentioned as the main causes of failure in the literature.45 After the Land 
Bremen was compensated for the remaining ships still under construction, 
the mayor announced the closure of Bremer Vulkan on 11 December 1996.46
Produced ships and technological developments
From the mid-1950s there was greater demand for bulk carriers worldwide. 
Bremer Vulkan was involved in the development of these types of vessels, 
and the demand brought about the decision to build two slipways and a 
bigger fabrication hall for ships of 45,000 tonnes. Additionally, the shipyard 
had to build a tailrace pool in order for bigger ships to be launched into the 
River Weser.
The f irst “miracle” of West German shipbuilding production was con-
nected to the stronger demand for oil and led to a greater need for big 
tankers in the industry generally and in Bremer Vulkan in particular. After 
the OPEC price hikes of 1973-74, oil consumption diminished, and the tanker 
market collapsed dramatically in the second half of 1974.
The third wave of innovation in the German shipbuilding was the 
container ship. It is well known that the initial development of this type 
of ship began in the United States.47 However, there is no indication about 
technological influences in West German shipbuilding companies generally, 
43 Ibid., 335.
44 Official Journal of the European Community, No. C120/4 State Aid – Germany, 18 April 
1997, eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:1997:120:FULL:EN:PDF (accessed 
5 March 2014).
45 Bremische Bürgschaft, Drucksache, 343.
46 Thiel, Die Geschichte des Bremer Vulkan, 210.
47 See, for example, Broeze, The Globalization of the Oceans, and Levinson, The Box. 
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and the chroniclers of Bremer Vulkan did not mention the trigger that led 
to the building of container ships from the end of the 1960s. Following 
the narrative of success, the West German shipbuilding industry won a 
great deal of the world market for container ships because of their relative 
short delivery times and high quality of production. Containerisation was 
interpreted as a “transport revolution” because of the rapidly changing 
character of intermodal sea and land transport in containers.48
At the end of the 1960s, Bremer Vulkan also began to build in series 
production the so-called German multi-purpose cargo ship German Liberty, 
132 m long and 15,000 dwt. Furthermore, the company built a new dry dock 
for the production of larger ships in 1973. It was 332 m long and 59 m wide. 
A technological development at this time was block building, which gave 
the opportunity to construct ships in larger steel blocks before they were as-
sembled at the dock. In addition, Bremer Vulkan developed a factory-based 
shipbuilding technology to shorten the distances between the fabrication 
halls and the building docks.49 While f inishing the f irst container ships 
with this new system, it transpired that future orders in bulk were unlikely; 
given that similar ships were being built more cheaply elsewhere using 
the same technology. Consequently, by the late 1980s, production dropped 
and Bremer Vulkan switched to ship repair and conversion and invested in 
building smaller specialised ships, but without its former success.
Role of the government and subsidies
State aid always played an important role in the West German shipbuilding 
industry.50 The f irst political impact of subsidies began in 1950 with federal 
funding of about DM 31 mn for the coastal Länder. Bremen was awarded 
around DM 12 mn to build new trawlers to get the industry started after 
48 Broeze, The Globalization of the Oceans; Levinson, The Box; Kiesel, Bremer Vulkan, 78.
49 Kiesel, Bremer Vulkan, 96.
50 Götz Albert conducted a very detailed analysis of the different shipbuilding programmes 
of the West German government after 1950; see Albert, Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und Krise der 
deutschen Schiffbauindustrie. However, according to Heißner’s descriptions from 1933, political 
influence in the shipbuilding market was already an issue in 1908. In that year, 1908, when reces-
sion was having an impact on the shipbuilding industry, government thought about intervening 
to minimise the number of ships by scrapping old vessels; see Heißner, Strukturwandlungen 
und Konjunkturschwankungen im Schiffbau, 5. Furthermore, discussions about subsidies always 
had a political meaning; see Rulfs, Welthandelsregeln für den Schiffbau. Rulfs discusses the 
long-running international disputes over subsidies.
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the ending of Allied restrictions.51 After the f irst upswing of the 1950s, 
a collapse followed, which needed a subsidy that aimed to avoid undue 
distortions of competition created by subsidies abroad. The government 
decided to develop the Shipyard Aid Programme (Werfthilfeprogramm) 
that would be reissued either on an annual basis or after a specif ic time 
period. The f irst one began in 1961. The scheme was by way of a riposte to 
shipbuilding industry in Japan, and the f irst loans were export credits for 
ships. Subsequently, the entire Shipyard Aid Programme reached a total of 
DM 5.078 mn until 1990. With the f ifth Shipyard Aid Programme between 
1966 and 1969 in addition to export credits, for the f irst time loans were 
granted for yards to balance the difference between capital-market interest 
rates and interest rates for export credits. These differences were paid out of 
the federal budget.52 The loans came from Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau. 
Within the framework of this Shipyard Aid Programme the recipients varied 
over time. First, they subsidised only exports into non-European Economic 
Commission countries. However, from 1971, the programme also applied 
to EEC countries, and in 1973 they supported orders from West German 
shipowners. From 1977, credits for exports to developing countries followed.
The Shipowner Aid (Reederhilfe) subsidy programme to support shipown-
ers investing in inland orders ran between 1962 and 1987. A government 
report on the shipbuilding industry acknowledged that there was a gap in 
German investment compared to international competitors, and insisted 
on large-ship construction and on growing market share. Therefore, they 
prepared an Investment Aid (Investitionshilfen) programme from 1969 to 
1974 to encourage sectional construction, serial production, and the use 
of new materials. The federal government and the coastal Länder shared 
the subsidies equally. In addition, the shipyards had to provide investment 
equivalent to that they were receiving.53
In implementing this plan, more than 10,000 employees were made 
redundant in the following years. The IG Metall agreed to the policy despite 
the loss of jobs. In common with the Federation of the German Shipbuild-
ing Industry (VDS), they believed in guarantees of a major investment 
programme by the federal government. The rationale of government sub-
sidies was to overcome the crisis by adjusting the structure of the industry 
to deal with the new situation. But, as described above, the emphasis on 
building bigger ships was not as successful as promised. Given this, the 
51 Thiel, Die Geschichte des Bremer Vulkan, 66.
52 Albert, Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und Krise der deutschen Schiffbauindustrie, 205.
53 Ibid., 208.
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federal government decided again to shift emphasis in 1979, and supported 
the industry with a direct Aid for Orders (Auftragshilfen) programme for 
building ocean-going ships of higher technical value. These were direct 
construction subsidies to the shipyards, comprising up to 20 per cent of 
the contract price – f inanced 75 per cent by the federal government and 25 
per cent by the Länder. This decision was made f irst and foremost because 
of trade union pressure for investments in new production areas to create 
new job opportunities.54
The federal government decided in 1981 to withdraw the subsidy after 
incurring costs of DM 640 mn, and in light of the failed recovery reduced the 
Shipyard Aid Programme. Nevertheless, the Länder tried to continue, but 
did not have the f inancial means to maintain the subsidies as before.55 After 
the closure of several shipyards in the 1980s, Restructuring Aid was granted 
to encourage rationalisation processes and factory closures. Additionally, 
there were individual Case Assistances aiming to avert insolvencies or 
support mergers and restructuring. In particular, this assistance had the 
objective of maintaining employment in structurally weak regions, and 
preserving some yards in case the shipbuilding sector were to be revived.56
In addition to this federal government aid, several programmes were 
provided by the Länder, mainly to avoid bankruptcies or to support mergers 
and restructuring, as was the case with Bremer Vulkan. For example, the Pro-
curement Aid (Beschaffungssubventionen) of the Federal Defence Ministry 
helped Bremer Vulkan to f inish production of loss-making frigates in 1977.57
Employment
Employment in the West German shipbuilding industry increased until 1958 
to a maximum of 113,000 employees, but declined in the following years.58 
Because of new developments in technology and rationalisation processes 
in the early 1960s, the working conditions of the shipyards changed and 
the process became more automated, with an increasing use of plant and 





58 Albert used this trend to explain his thesis about the peak of the West German shipbuilding 
industry in the late 1950s. He considered the decline of employment after 1958 the f irst indication 
of a structural crisis. See ibid., 104.
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carrier production resulted in increasing production volume, employment 
stagnated, and the two were thereby decoupled from each other. By 1990, 
employment had been reduced by 55 per cent compared to 1975, and by 70 
per cent compared to its historical peak in 1958.59
The development of employment at Bremer Vulkan corresponded to West 
German progression in general. In 1964 about 4,600 employees worked at 
the shipyard. During this year the workforce consisted of 3,900 industrial 
workers (gewerbliche Mitarbeiter), and about 700 salaried employees (Anges-
tellte). Of the total workforce, 140 were foreign employees (Gastarbeiter). Ten 
years later, employment at Bremer Vulkan reached its peak with about 5,700 
employees. In 1974, the shipyard employed 4,700 industrial workers and 
about 1,000 salaried employees. The number of foreign employees rose to 
more than 1,400 . Again ten years later, in 1984, after the diff icult economic 
changes and the restructuring programmes, more than 2,300 employees had 
lost their jobs. This affected about 42 per cent of the industrial workers and 
30 per cent of salaried employees, while 67 per cent of all foreign employees 
left the company.60
Labour conditions and wages
General problems of the shipbuilding industry include the need for a dif-
ferent labour process during ship construction as opposed to f itting out the 
vessel, and the irregular nature of ship orders.61 Due to these circumstances 
it was diff icult to employ workers regularly. In the 1950s, the workers had 
been hired on very-short-term contracts based on order volumes. The general 
lack of workers as the wider regional economy grew, as well as pressure from 
the trade unions, influenced decisions to offer longer contracts in the 1960s 
and 1970s. The management tried to balance fluctuations in production 
through internal procedures, particularly in times of crisis. Additionally, 
59 Ibid., 104-105.
60 The numbers were presented at the beginning of every meeting between the board and 
the works council of the Bremer Vulkan; see Minutes of the meetings between Board Bremer 
Vulkan and works council, 1962-87, StAB 7,2121-646-648. The shipyard archive is located in the 
Staatsarchiv Bremen (StAB); 95 linear metres went to the archive shortly after the closure of 
Bremer Vulkan in 1997. The material can be found under the heading “works council” in the 
board’s records. They only document the off icial representation of the meetings between the 
works council and the management. There are no transcripts of council meetings or discussions 
within the workforce.
61 Friedmann, “Arbeitsplatzabbau ohne Opfer?”,75.
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the German trade unions and works councils established, through collective 
bargaining, layoff protections or layoffs only in the framework of dismissal 
by choice or early retirement. During crisis periods, an initial policy of 
short-time work was enforced to secure the permanent workforce. These 
strategies changed with the beginning of the decline in the mid-1970s. The 
f irst break in production was balanced by short-time work, overtime, and 
extra shifts, but was later replaced by the interchange of workforce between 
companies or temporary employment (Leiharbeit).62
Thus, temporary employment was an issue from the 1970s. The inter-
change of workforce between the shipyards had a very long tradition in the 
German shipbuilding industry. It was a flexible instrument for compensat-
ing for the lack of employees. But the new forms of temporary employment 
were different. Such service contracts (Werkverträge) should guarantee the 
independent production of one entire production part. But in reality the 
“borrowed” workers were integrated into the whole production process of 
the shipyard. Sub-contracting f irms established a monopoly position in the 
market by hiring all the available workers.63 Moreover, the yards encouraged 
these trends because of the increased flexibility that resulted. One effect 
of these strategies was the reduction of the core workforce in favour of 
a “standby workforce” and a separation of the two groups. This kind of 
development also happened at the Bremer Vulkan shipyard. Short-time and 
overtime work were always an issue during down- and upturns, but when 
the economic situation did not recover from the 1980s, the management 
decided to reduce the number of core workers while hiring temporary 
workers from contractor companies.
The influence of wage costs is often described as an important criterion 
for the competition of shipbuilding industries worldwide. It is not only 
the wage level that influences the situation of the industry, but also the 
productivity of the company, identif ied by the development of unit labour 
costs.64 While unit labour costs rose from the 1960s to the 1990s in West 
Germany, productivity did not develop in the same direction. Accordingly, 
rising labour costs and no corresponding increase in productivity led to 
the German shipbuilding industry losing its price competitiveness on the 
international market.65 The wages at Bremer Vulkan experienced a constant 
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than doubled and was DM 9.86. Ten years later, the piecework wage had 
reached DM 16.22 per hour.66 During the same period the registered tonnage 
of the newly built ships increased from 85,000 grt in 1964 to 249,000 grt in 
1973. Some ten years, in 1984, later production reached a mere 66,000 grt.67
These f igures led some authors to argue that the blame for industrial 
decline should be put on the trade unions, which failed to comprehend the 
specific situation of the international shipbuilding market while bargaining 
on wages.68 This view tends to absolve management of responsibility for 
decline. In the literature on the British shipbuilding industry, specialist 
economic and business historians point to fundamental management and 
ownership failures, and state ignorance and inaction, as the major reasons 
for the decline of the industry.69
West German trade unions and works councils
German trade unions and works councils played a special role in the bar-
gaining for wage increases in the shipbuilding industry, and also fought 
for employment protection and against dismissals. Comparing different 
periods, it is obvious how successful West German trade unions were during 
the prosperous phase. Much of the extant literature has presented the “boom 
phase” of the German trade unions as a “miracle”.70 The West German trade 
unions had reached, after an initial post-war phase, a successful consolida-
tion of union membership within the “economic miracle” that ran well into 
the 1960s.71 The trade unions continued to expand steadily until the f irst 
recession of 1966-67. The phase from the late 1960s to the early 1980s is often 
interpreted as the “golden years” in many ways. From the perspective of 
most trade unionists the political trend shifted favourably, not solely but 
66 The numbers were presented in the beginning of every meeting between the Board and the 
works council of the Bremer Vulkan; see, Minutes of the meetings between the Bremer Vulkan 
board and works council, 1962-87, StAB 7,2121-646-648.
67 See Minutes of the meetings between the Bremer Vulkan board and works council, 1962-87, 
StAB 7,2121-646-648.
68 Albert, Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und Krise der deutschen Schiffbauindustrie, 128.
69 See, for example, Johnman and Murphy, British Shipbuilding and the State Since 1918, and 
on an inter-f irm basis, Johnman and Murphy, Scott Lithgow.
70 For comparative reasons it would be interesting to know if this combination of economic 
conjuncture, welfare statism, and trade union power is a historical exception.
71 For a general overview of West German trade unions, see Silvia, “German Trade Unionism in 
the Postwar Years”. For trade unions in Germany during the 1970s, see, for example, Schroeder, 
“Gewerkschaften als soziale Bewegung”.
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primarily because of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), which held power 
from 1967 to 1982. The SPD spearheaded the passage of legislation expanding 
co-determination rights in 1967 to 1978 (Konzertierte Aktion) and expanded 
the West German welfare state in several respects. From the crisis of the 
mid-1970s trade unions did not “f ight the bosses but rather [pressured] 
governments into taking responsibility for the crisis and its handling”.72
What has to be mentioned in the German case is the specif icity of the 
German dual system of industrial relations, which goes back to the Works 
Council Act of 1952. It is not the trade union that is responsible for the 
representation of the factory workers, but the works council, as a union 
independent body whose sphere of action is limited to the company context. 
It has no right to strike on the factory level, but has co-determination rights, 
such as combating accidents and health hazards and managing the pension 
funds and the housing and welfare facilities of the company. In the case of 
non-tariff regulation the works council also bargains on working hours and 
holidays. It is allowed to complete company agreements (Betriebsvereinba-
rungen) and can verify hiring and f iring, as well as initiate an procedure 
opposing the dismissal of a worker.73
From the mid-1960s, an internal union debate on the reform of the Works 
Constitution Act developed. With growing labour unrest in the factories, 
the limitations of the institutional system became apparent. The point here 
was the weak participation rights of the works councils that emerged in the 
economic recession of 1966-67. The idea was to form smaller working groups 
within the workforce, whose members should act as mediators between 
the works council and the workers. The German Trade Union Federation 
did not support this proposal. However, it resulted in a new discussion 
with the social-liberal coalition under Willy Brandt in 1969. Despite op-
position from conservatives and employers’ organisations, the new Works 
Constitution Act came into force in January 1972. Positive achievements 
included the extension of co-determination and participation rights of 
the works councils and the representation of young trainees. Furthermore, 
the position of trade unions in the Works Constitution Act was codif ied. 
However, co-determination on economic issues and the co-operation of 
the works council with trade unions was not realised.74 These negotiations 
were accompanied by an increasing number of wildcat strikes in numerous 
companies from the late 1960s to the beginning of the 1970s with regard 
72 Stråth, The Politics of De-Industrialisation, 12.
73 Milert and Tschirbs, Von den Arbeiterausschüssen zum Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, 49.
74 Ibid., 81.
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to global transformations and protests.75 They also occurred at Bremer 
Vulkan. The unrest was a reaction to complex transformation processes 
and was prompted by external influences as well as tensions inside the 
trade union movement.
Labour protests
When the German shipbuilding industry reached fourth place in the ship-
building market worldwide during the 1950s and expanding the industry was 
seen as a “national task”, both in rebuilding the merchant fleet and through 
exports gaining much-needed foreign currency, the German metalworkers’ 
union, IG Metall, negotiated an increase in the hourly wage from DM 1.36 
to DM 1.44 for the Bremen Länder shipyards in 1951. This was followed by a 
further increase to DM 1.49 in 1952.76 On this “road to success” IG Metall held a 
strike in 1953. Their achievements were mainly the participation of two union 
members on supervisory boards, legally codif ied in the Works Constitution 
Act, and improvements in the accommodation situation for workers.
During the next upswing in the German shipbuilding industry at the 
end of the 1960s, the works council of Bremer Vulkan organised several 
wildcat strikes concerning pay. The relationship between the works council 
and management had been deteriorating during this period. As part of the 
workers’ mobilisation in West Germany, the workforces of Bremer Vulkan 
began to make their own claims, separate from IG Metall’s bargaining. They 
started to refuse overtime work in order to increase non-tariff allowances in 
1968. The board was outraged and demanded talks with the works council. 
After wildcat strikes in July 1968 Director Schiff stated in a meeting with 
the works council that he would expect respect for democratic rules and 
discussions with each other; only if they could not reach agreement could 
the works council take other measures. He emphasised that taking other 
measures should not become a habit and that he was sure that the trade 
unions would not support such behaviour.77
The (mostly successful) new forms of protest continued during subsequent 
years. The management finally accepted some of the demands after pressure 
75 There is a growing number of studies dealing with the attitudes of the workers towards 
the global moment of 1968; see van der Velden et al. (eds), Strikes Around the World; Horn and 
Gehrke (eds), 1968 und die Arbeiter; Birke, Wilde Streiks im Wirtschaftswunder.
76 Thiel, Die Geschichte des Bremer Vulkan, 25.
77 See Minute of the meeting between Board Bremer Vulkan and works council, 3 July 1968, 
No. 4/68, Vol. 1, 1962-80, StAB 7,2121-646.
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from the works council or refusals of the workforce to work. In 1971, 1,000 
employees withdrew their work for two hours and marched in a demonstra-
tion through the Vegesack district.78 In 1973, with a week-long wildcat strike 
the Bremer Vulkan workforce demanded a wage increase of about DM 70 
per month, and a thirteenth month’s salary.79 The board regretted the form 
of these new protests and sharply criticised the attitude of some people who 
they suspected had political ambitions. In the 1973 annual meeting, Director 
Schneider expressed his opinion in a speech to the works council:
Export means international competition. If this fact is disregarded and 
the excessive wage demands continue, the cost will be borne by the 
employees. Maximum demands, beyond what is sustainable, are useful 
only to those who have set themselves a target of changing the system. 
But whether a system change will be to the benef it of the workforce, 
everyone can make his own judgement by looking at the conditions in the 
Eastern bloc countries. Those who speak with those who have relocated 
from the Eastern bloc countries to the Federal Republic can get a clear 
picture of how the socialist system changed the lifestyle of the individual. 
Our main concern is defending the current economic system, which has 
brought better living standards to German workers.80
At this meeting, the works council chairman Bettelhäuser countered:
The wage agreement of 8.5 per cent last year was a moderate wage 
increase, but still has not achieved the stabilisation of prices. The strike 
could have been avoided, in retrospect, if the suggestions of the works 
council had been taken up in the months before the strike. The workforce 
were not interested in a strike, but in successful co-operation.81
In the end, they agreed upon a DM 50 increase and the differentiation of 
wage groups, which resulted in better wage rates for most employees.82 After 
this success, one last upsurge of the workers emerged with a strike in the 
Unterweser region in 1974, in which IG Metall achieved a wage increase of 
13 per cent, collective wage maintenance, and special protection against 
78 Thiel, Die Geschichte des Bremer Vulkan, 117.
79 Ibid., 125.
80 See Minute of the annual meeting, 17 December 1973, Vol. 1, 1962-80, StAB 7,2121-646.
81 See Minute of the annual meeting, 17 December 1973, Vol. 1, 1962-80, StAB 7,2121-646.
82 Forschergruppe “Metallerstreik 74”, Streik und Arbeiterbewußtsein, 76.
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dismissal for older employees.83 However, not all interpreted this as a suc-
cessful result. Some union workplace representatives (Vertrauensleute)84 
condemned the executive committee of IG Metall during an assembly at 
Bremer Vulkan. The trade union affiliation rate at Bremer Vulkan was about 
95 per cent at that time. Twenty-f ive members of the works council along 
with twenty-nine shop stewards belonged to IG Metall. The number of 
union workplace representatives at the company was about 210, and they 
met monthly during working hours for two hours.85 The core of the criticism 
was that the results of negotiation after three weeks of striking were far 
from earlier aims. At this assembly they agreed that the board of IG Metall 
should have prolonged the strike. At the very end the workers at Bremer 
Vulkan proposed that the district managers of IG Metall in Hamburg and 
Bremen, Otto vom Steeg and Arno Weinkauf, be expelled from the union. 
This turmoil within Bremer Vulkan can be seen as an example of the mis-
trust between factory workforces and the trade union. The clashes between 
rank-and-file workers and union delegates were a big issue during the 1970s. 
In the Bremen case, the proposal to expel failed and the initiators were later 
locked out from IG Metall because of their membership of political groups.86
At the beginning of the 1980s, in view of the poor economic condition 
of Bremer Vulkan, another form of protest emerged to f ight against mass 
dismissal and the merger discussions with AG Weser. This again put to 
the test to the strained relationship between management and the works 
council. The works council advocated a social plan in the diff icult situation, 
which would prevent collective redundancies and regulate staff reductions 
through early retirement, compensation, and short-time work.87 Among the 
workers, there was a high level of acceptance, which is likely why the works 
council responded positively to management offers. The f irst to make use 
of these deals were foreign and older workers.
Because of the immense diff iculties with the construction of naval frig-
ates and the cruise liner Europe mentioned above, the shipyard went into 
83 Heseler, “Vom Tankerboom zum Werftenverbund”, 214.
84 A union representative or shop steward (Vertrauensmann/frau) is an employee of a company 
who represents the interests of the employees but who is also a voluntary trade union off icial. As 
a result, the union representative is a signif icant link between the union and the works council 
of the company.
85 Forschergruppe “Metallerstreik 74”, Streik und Arbeiterbewußtsein, 75.
86 Ibid., 30.
87 Fron 1978 company agreements about short-time work were concluded almost every 
month; see Company Agreements between management and works council, Vol. 2, 1971-80, 
StAB 7,2121-639.
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crisis in 1982. At this time, several leadership positions changed hands in 
Bremer Vulkan, and the restructuring of the shipyard was planned.88 On 
21 September 1982, in letters to the workforce the management announced 
proposals to dismiss 500 employees.89 On the same day the works council 
sent information to the employees and called for a joint struggle against “the 
destruction of all of our jobs. Bremen-Nord should not become the poor-
house of Germany!”90 Over the following days, the works council reacted 
with wildcat strikes at the shipyard. They protested not only against these 
drastic measures, but also because they had not been informed in advance 
about the dismissal plans – a procedure that was required by the Works 
Constitution Act.91 The management argued that the board would have 
informed the works council on the same day, and the employees were ad-
dressed in general. The letters said nothing about decisions on individuals.92
The Bremische Bürgerschaft observed the procedure at Bremer Vulkan 
and supported the charges of the works council while condemning the 
violation of the Works Constitution Act. Despite the wide-ranging expres-
sion of support, the board of Bremer Vulkan did not withdraw its decision 
and initiated the dismissals of 500 employees. The works council started to 
negotiate with the board and suggested proven measures  such as short-time 
work and retirement of older employees. The council fought against the 
use of overtime and especially temporary employment, which has been 
88 The decisions were made on the advice of management consultants. The management 
consulting f irm Knienbaum and Treuarbeit and the company Knight Wegenstein together found 
the necessary savings of DM 25 mn, which was to be achieved by reducing the number of excess 
personnel. See Draft of the Supervisory Board meeting on 22 September 1982, in Records of the 
collective redundancies of 500 employees in 1982, StAB 7,2121-661.
89 It is not clear if the management wrote the letter to the entire staff or if only the employees 
affected by dismissal received the information.
90 See “The Works Council informs”, No. 14/82, StAB 7,2121-661.
91 See Minute of the meeting of the works council, 27 September 1982, StAB 7,2121-647. The 
Dismissal Protection Act says dismissals are justif ied only by the employee’s attitude or urgent 
requirements of the company. However, they remain unjustif ied if social aspects are not taken 
into consideration. Social selection (Sozialauswahl) is determined by workplace characteristics 
and social criteria, such as age, seniority, and familial responsibilities. The works council has 
to be involved in dismissal matters; see Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, § 1; Toews, Die Entwicklung 
des Kündigungsschutzes, 94.
92 It is not entirely clear whether the board was not informed about the process of collective 
redundancies, or whether they ignored the rules. In 1976 the works council had recommended 
the advanced education of managers concerning labour law and the Works Constitution Act; 
see Minute of the meeting of the works council, 6 December 1976, StAB 7,2121-646. In 1980, the 
manager, Dr Kuhn, conf irmed that if dismissals were necessary the works council would be 
informed in time as prescribed in the Works Constitution Act; see Minute of the meeting of the 
works council, 8 February 1980, StAB 7,2121-647.
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established for some time at the yard.93 Two days after the f irst letter by 
the management, on 23 September 1982, the works council demanded an 
end to temporary employment at the shipyard in a letter:
The works council has little sympathy for employing temporary workers 
here while you terminate 500 Bremer-Vulkan colleagues. The council 
asks you to dismiss these temporary workers and to replace them with 
Bremer Vulkan employees.94
One month later, the issue of overtime work was still highly controversial. In 
an internal message to the board on 22 October 1982 the works council wrote:
We would like to draw your attention [to the fact] that the works council 
knows that you put workers to overtime work in the past week. In this 
regard the works council is going to initiate proceedings against the head 
of department according to §23 of the Works Constitution Act. We point out 
that they have violated the decision of the Labour Court in this matter. The 
works council is not willing to accept violations during such difficult times.95
During the negotiations about the dismissals in September 1982, the 
management countered that mass dismissals would be unavoidable in 
the current situation. However, they accepted that some of the workers 
within the company would be transferred between sections to reduce the 
number of redundancies.96 What they did not admit to the works council, 
but what became apparent in the board’s internal discussions, was the issue 
of overtime work and temporary employment. They argued for specif ic 
capacity requirements that were dependent on overtime work and external 
workforce.97 In order to calm the situation, the management accepted the 
request of the works council for restrictions on overtime and on external 
workers, but only for a period of time, as the f igures on overtime and the 
hours worked by temporary workers exemplify. The number of overtime 
hours fell from about 321,000 in 1982 to 127,000 in 1983, although they in-
creased in the subsequent years (189,000 in 1984 and 372,000 in 1985). The 
same happened to the hours worked by temporary workers from contractor 
93 At the time of negotiations, approximately twenty-six foreign companies were still at the 
shipyard; see Report, 1 October 1982, StAB 7,2121-661.
94 See Internal Information, 23 September 1982, StAB 7,2121-661.
95 From the minutes of the Board Meeting, Bremer Vulkan, 1 November 1982, StAB 7,2121-563.
96 See Minutes of the Board Meeting, Bremer Vulkan, 4 October 1982, StAB 7,2121-563.
97 See Minutes of the Board Meeting, Bremer Vulkan, 1 November 1982, StAB 7,2121-563.
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companies. Even in 1981 temporary workers worked 790,000 hours. This 
f igure declined drastically in 1982 to 5,200, and in 1983 the company an-
nounced there would be no temporary work at the shipyard. But in 1985 
the hours rose to 188,000, and reached 233,000 in 1986.98
Since the works council did not approve the management’s decision on 
the announced terminations during the negotiations in 1982, the so-called 
Arbitration Board (Einigungsstelle) was called on 14 October and led in the 
end to the dismissals of 290 employees.99 Once again, the council had to 
claim its rights and demanded a redundancy programme as well as a list of 
all employees to review their social selection beforehand. Only thereafter 
would proposals for re-education and early retirement recommended by 
the works council be taken into consideration.100
While mass dismissal could not be avoided, the merger was prevented. 
However, this harmed the employees of AG Weser. As already described, 
negotiations about the eff iciency of the shipbuilding industry in the 
Bremen region had begun in the early 1980s. Seeking a lasting solution 
to the crisis, the Bremer Land government under the guidance of Lord 
Mayor Koschnik urged the yards to f ind a cross-company way forward in 
1982. At the beginning of 1983, the management of Bremer Vulkan and AG 
Weser, the two major shipyards in the region, responded with plans about 
combining some activities but did not support the merger as a solution. 
Additionally, IG Metall and the works councils of both shipyards conveyed 
their worries about job losses. The works councils of AG Weser and Bremer 
Vulkan – traditionally antagonistic to each other – rejected any idea of a 
merger. While IG Metall could not make up its mind to strike, the works 
councils did protest. Koschnik tried to escape from this situation via a 
letter to the two works councils. He argued that he was not to blame for 
the crisis in shipbuilding:
To foster the illusion that appeals to the Senate and the federal govern-
ment are the only real way to get out of the shipbuilding crisis must be 
deceitful for those hit, and avoids the real causes and responsibilities. To 
compress complicated contexts into simple demands on the state does 
not correspond to our social and economic reality.101
98 From the Records of the meeting of the works council, StAB 7,2121-646-648.
99 Thiel, Die Geschichte des Bremer Vulkan, 165.
100 See Minutes of the Board Meeting, Bremer Vulkan, 1 November 1982, StAB 7,2121-563.
101 Letter from Lord Mayor Hans Koschnik to the works councils of AG Weser and Bremer 
Vulkan, 14 July 1982, quoted in Stråth, The Politics of De-Industrialisation, 36.
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IG Metall rejected this with a paper offering a strategy for diversification and 
alternatives in the regional industry. But the federal government in Bonn 
intensif ied pressure and threatened a substantial reduction in workforce, 
of about 9,000 employees, in the framework of a general restructuring of the 
whole German shipbuilding industry. During the process of convergence, 
two decisive steps forced the decision into a particular direction. During the 
negotiation Henke, the chairman of the Bremer Vulkan board, demanded 
the closure of AG Weser. In addition, Bremer Vulkan’s most important 
shareholder, Thyssen-Bornemisza, decided to withdraw from its recent 
promise about taking a f inancial share of the merger costs, and sold its 
remaining share for a symbolic DM 1 to the Bremer Senate. With this action, 
all alternatives were precluded.102 AG Weser, with 2,200 employees, was to 
be closed. There were some protests by the workers, but they had no impact 
on the decision. The second major shipyard had to be closed in 1983.103
Conclusion
As this case study of Bremer Vulkan exemplif ies, the West German ship-
building industry developed from a giant to a dwarf, from a major player in 
the global shipbuilding market to a niche industry. This observation runs 
like a red line through the German shipbuilding literature. If one looks 
at the changes and challenges that came with the crisis, such a focus is 
more than understandable. This account can, however, illuminate other 
narratives that may be of interest to more diverse stories.
Following this attempt, f irst of all, historicisation would be necessary 
for analysing the research f ield, looking for master narratives and gaps in 
research. The books and articles published about the shipbuilding indus-
try are relatively broad and heterogeneous, but technical and economic 
research papers dominate: there is no large and comprehensive historical 
work describing longer processes or making a diachronic comparison, as 
would make sense for the crises of 1975 and 2008. Discussing crises in the 
shipbuilding industry is not a new phenomenon, however: in 1933, Herbert 
Heißner wrote about economic fluctuations in the shipbuilding industry, 
which would be probably called a crisis today.104 In addition, social-historical 
work and labour history on workers and trade unions in the shipbuilding 
102 Heseler, “Vom Tankerboom zum Werftenverbund”, 222.
103 Little is known about the situation during the 1980s and 1990s; further research is needed.
104 Heißner, Strukturwandlungen und Konjunkterschwankungen in Schiffbau.
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sector could resume the results of sociological studies of the 1980s. Historical 
research might historicise the studies and could enrich them with sources 
that give new insights.
The second conspicuous aspect is the focus on national processes in 
the description of developments in the shipbuilding industry. As the basis 
of the analyses, nation-states are discussed in isolation, and rarely in 
relation to others. Comparative or inter-cultural transfer approaches that 
transcend national borders are rarely applied and, if they are, they are 
designed to strengthen the argument for national case studies.105 This often 
goes hand in hand with spatial dichotomies, between the “West” and the 
“East”. It divides the world into spatial stereotypes, which are characterised 
either by the loss or the rise of the industry. These observations could be 
relativised by long-term perspectives and differentiated by comparisons to 
avoid oversimplistic and homogeneous interpretations. Furthermore, the 
inter-cultural transfer approach could be used to broaden the narratives 
to include entangled and interlinked connections. For example, it is often 
mentioned that South Korean entrepreneurs looked to West European 
engineers to develop their own industry.106 But there is little information 
about how the knowledge came to West German shipyards, and how the 
decisions for further development of certain types of vessels were made. 
In his Short History of German Shipbuilding, Fritz Giese mentioned that 
numerous German shipbuilders travelled to the “leading shipbuilding 
country”, Britain, to gain knowledge on iron shipbuilding in the nineteenth 
century.107 However, there is little information about knowledge transfer in 
the twentieth century. An example for comparison is the idea of “clusters” 
mentioned above. Daniel Todd examined the theory of economic zones for 
the shipbuilding industry,108 and it has been discussed in the British and 
South Korean context.109 For the German shipbuilding industry, Todd’s as-
sumption is not yet under investigation.110 But it would be of further interest 
105 See, for example, Detlef Rother, “Strukturwandel im Weltschiffbau”.
106 The establishment of the Hyundai shipyard and associated engineering works at Ulsan in 
the early 1970s was undertaken with foreign expertise. The British f irm A & P Appledore and 
the Scottish shipyard Scott Lithgow furnished layout plans, ship plans, technical advice, and 
training. See Johnman and Murphy, Scott Lithgow; for the origins of South Korea’s shipbuilding 
industry, see Todd, Industrial Dislocation, 183-198.
107 Giese, Kleine Geschichte des deutschen Schiffbaus, 25.
108 Todd, “Going East”.
109 Hassink and Shin, “South Korea’s Shipbuilding Industry”.
110 However, the historical documentation showed that co-operation of regional companies 
was not a natural concomitant from the beginning. In 1926, shipyards fought tooth and nail 
against co-operative strategies. Heißner recognised that the reasons for this resistance were 
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how this concept worked in other contexts. Bremen, for example, was a 
region of countless interlinked yards, and it is of great interest how these 
economic zones and the relationships between the shipyards developed, 
and if they show similarities or differences with other regional clusters.
Finally, almost nothing is known about regional, national, and inter-
national associations of shipyard workers and their relationships. In an 
interview, the former works council chairman of Bremer Vulkan, Fritz 
Bettelhäuser,111 makes clear that shipyard workers showed much solidar-
ity during strikes and supported fellow workers when shipyard closures 
were announced. Bremer Vulkan workers also supported workers in other 
countries, such as during the Solidarity movement at the Gdańsk shipyard. 
They ranged from material assistance to political solidarity and established 
in some cases a long-standing partnership. There were also exchange visits 
with non-European shipyard workers, for example with Japan, where they 
shared ideas about the development of production and wages. But if and how 
they developed a kind of common idea about the global shipbuilding market 
or any international strategy is not known. The same applies to the exchange 
of trade union delegates at the international level. IG Metall organised 
several national shipbuilding conferences to which union delegates from 
abroad were invited. When in 1971 the European Metalworkers’ Federation 
was established they founded a shipbuilding group, which sought to respond 
to the West European shipbuilding crisis. The Shipbuilding Department 
of the International Metalworkers’ Federation was engaged in the same 
issues.112 It is of great interest how these trade union leaders responded to 
the new processes of globalisation in the shipbuilding industry. It requires 
more precise research to f ind out whether they discussed ways other than 
simple national solutions and to what extent an exchange of trade unionists 
at European and international level seemed promising to them. In following 
these approaches, narrow perspectives would be transcended and broader 
views of the shipbuilding industry and its workers would be opened up.
based on the traditional behaviour of the former shipbuilders; see Heißner, Strukturwandlungen 
und Konjunkterschwankungen in Schiffbau, 26.
111 Interview with Fritz Bettelhäuser, 1 March 2013.
112 The archives of the EMF and IMF are located in the Archives of Social Democracy in 
Bonn. While the archive collection of the EMF has been developed and systematised in recent 
years, that of the IMF still lies ahead. In my dissertation I am concerned with the development 
of shipbuilding issues in the IMF and the European initiatives as well as those questions of 
exchange and linkages between international trade union representatives.
4 From boom to bust
Kockums, Malmö (Sweden), 1950-1986
Tobias Karlsson
Introduction
Kockums in Malmö, Sweden, was one of the major ship producers globally 
in the 1950s and 1960s. The shipyard experienced a f inal boom in the early 
1970s but could not be saved from nationalisation and restructuring in the 
aftermath of the OPEC oil crisis of 1973-74. In 1986, production of ships for 
civilian use ceased at Kockums, ending a tradition of more than a century. 
This chapter describes and analyses how production, workers, and relations 
of production developed at Kockums during the period 1950 to 1986.1
Kockums’ national, regional, and international importance makes it a 
relevant case in a global history of shipbuilding workers. A further reason for 
Kockums’ inclusion is that the shipyard can be seen an illustrative example 
of the Swedish (or Nordic) model of industrial relations, characterised by 
co-operation and features of industrial democracy.2 Inter alia, this was 
manifested in an ambitious sociological inquiry, which took place in the 
late 1960s: the so-called Kockums report.3 The report provides unique 
insights into how changing production relations, related to the application 
of principles of scientif ic management to shipbuilding, were perceived by 
ordinary workers. The Kockums report received international recognition 
and made the shipyard known as “one of the most modern and progressive 
shipyards in the world”.4 Indeed, foreign delegations representing f irms and 
trade unions visited Malmö and were impressed by the relaxed atmosphere 
between managers and trade unionists. However, the Kockums report was 
1 I would like to thank Jonas Ljungberg, Lars Berggren, and John-Erik Olsson for sharing their 
knowledge of Kockums and the shipbuilding industry. This chapter has also benef ited from the 
comments and suggestions of participants at Arbetarhistorikermötet in Landskrona 2013 and 
at project meetings in Amsterdam and Bergen in 2013 and Lisbon in 2014. The usual disclaimer 
applies. Finally, I would like to acknowledge f inancial support from the research foundation 
Jan Wallanders och Tom Hedelius Stiftelse.
2 Lundh, Spelets regler; Heiret, “Three Norwegian Varieties of a Nordic Model”.
3 Ohlström, Kockumsrapporten. Similar investigations were carried out in other Swedish 
shipyards at about the same time, but without direct union involvement. 
4 Svensson, Från ackord till månadslön, 309. 
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not just an outcome of good relations among parties. It was initiated by 
alarming rates of absenteeism and labour turnover, and revealed serious 
discontent among the workers.
The Swedish shipbuilding industry
Until the First World War, the Swedish shipbuilding industry was strongly 
oriented towards the domestic market and was far from the technologi-
cal frontier.5 However, during the interwar period big Swedish shipyards 
became competitive in producing motor-driven ships, which in turn paved 
the way for their participation in the expansion of shipping for oil transport 
after the Second World War.6 In 1950, the Swedish shipbuilding industry 
produced about 10 per cent of total tonnage worldwide, and was around 
the same size as its Japanese counterpart.7 By 1960, the total number of 
shipbuilding workers had more than doubled from 15,000 in 1930 to 32,500. 
In 1960 the Swedish shipbuilding industry’s share of the total number of 
workers in the manufacturing sector was about 3.5 per cent. In contrast 
to some other countries, the Swedish shipbuilding industry had not been 
integrated with suppliers of raw materials, energy, or various manufactured 
parts.8 Instead, the Swedish shipyards relied on a wide network of external 
suppliers, initially foreign. However, from the Second World War onwards, 
suppliers were increasingly found within the country. Indeed, at the begin-
ning of the 1970s, Swedish shipyards made two-thirds of their purchases 
domestically.
While shipbuilding and repairing in many countries have served domes-
tic markets, Swedish shipyards had since the interwar period been highly 
export-oriented, with Norwegian shipping companies as their most impor-
tant customers.9 In the 1960s, 74 per cent of newly produced Swedish ships 
5 Olsson, Från pansarbåtsvarv till tankfartygsvarv.
6 Olsson, “Big Business in Sweden”, 315. Overall, the Swedish shipbuilding industry has been 
the object of much research. Svenska Varv funded an important project that resulted in a number 
of monographs in the 1980s: Bohlin, Svensk varvsindustri 1920-1975; Kuuse, Varven och underlev-
erantörerna; Olsson, Från ackord pansarbåtsvarv till tankfartygsvarv; Stråth, Varvsarbetare i 
två varvsstäder; Svensson, Från ackord till månadslön. Former shipbuilding workers have also 
produced useful documentation on work and employment conditions. See for example Nilsson 
(ed.), Vårt Kockums, and Salomonsson (ed.), “Kockumsknogaren”. 
7 Ljungberg, Tillväxt och stagnation i varvsindustrin I, 32.
8 Kuuse, Varven och underleverantörerna.
9 Ljungberg, Tillväxt och stagnation i varvsindustrin I, 31.
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were exported.10 If we accept crude measures, such as tons produced per 
worker, Sweden outperformed Japan and other competitors in the 1950s and 
1960s.11 However, compared to the old shipbuilding nations, the productivity 
f igures of the Swedish shipyards may have been somewhat exaggerated. 
Whereas Sweden, like Japan, mainly built big and rather unsophisticated 
vessels,12 shipyards in Britain and Germany produced more tailor-made 
ships, whose interiors and equipment were particularly labour-intensive.
According to Thommy Svensson, the key to Swedish success in ship-
building after 1945 was labour policies characterised by the common drive 
to increase productivity of employers and unions.13 The Swedish Metal 
Workers’ Union (SMWU) accepted managerial prerogatives over the use of 
labour, as long as its members received better pay in return. The metalwork-
ers did not resist the move from riveting to welding or the introduction of 
block-building techniques of production. Performance-based pay was not 
something that was forced upon the workers; it was something that they 
demanded. Around 1960, about 90 per cent of the work done by Swedish 
shipbuilding and repair workers was paid by the piece, which was probably 
the highest proportion in the world. In the 1960s, further attempts were 
made to apply scientific management to shipbuilding, with the introduction 
of the motion-time measurement (MTM) system and more pronounced divi-
sion of labour – horizontally and vertically. Towards the end of the decade, 
when the average serial length of production became shorter, the costs of 
rationalisation – for example, in the form of excess personnel turnover and 
absenteeism – became increasingly obvious.
Contemporaneously, Swedish shipyards began to experience tougher 
competition, but the situation appeared to improve in the early 1970s when 
the industry experienced a boom; the atmosphere has been described as 
“euphoric”.14 Big investments in dry docks and cranes were made in Goth-
enburg, Malmö, and Uddevalla. It appears that politicians were caught up 
in the pre-OPEC climate of positive prognoses for the future. Instead of 
restraining capacity, the Swedish government did the opposite and decided 
to support the expansion of shipbuilding.
10 Ibid., 32.
11 Svensson, Från ackord till månadslön, 291-297.
12 In the period 1970-75, 97.5 per cent of the newly produced ships in Sweden were bulk and 
tank ships: Ljungberg, Tillväxt och stagnation i varvsindustrin I. See also Hamilton, “Public 
Subsidies to Industry”.
13 Svensson, “Changing Industrial Paradigms”, 357-359.
14 Ljungberg, Tillväxt och stagnation i varvsindustrin I, 71.
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However, the boom turned out to be short-lived. In 1974, a deep crisis at 
the Eriksberg shipyard, related to currency speculation, was revealed, which 
led to nationalisation in the following year.15 In 1975, the total number of 
shipbuilding workers in Sweden was at the same level as in 1960. Thereafter, 
there followed a period of downsizing, nationalisation, and plant closures. 
By 1990, the total number of shipbuilding workers was below 10,000 and 
corresponded to less than 1 per cent of blue-collar employment in the 
manufacturing sector. The big shipowners, who had been close allies of 
the shipyards, turned to producers in other countries. The problems for 
the Swedish shipyards were not caused merely by a fall in demand. The oil 
crisis also forced previous customers to cancel payments, which further 
aggravated the situation for the shipyards since ships typically were sold 
on pay-off terms.
The Swedish government responded to the international crisis of the late 
1970s by raising subsidies and introducing various rescue schemes directed 
towards specif ic f irms.16 Shipyards received subsidies to produce ships 
speculatively, under the condition that they reduced their workforces.17 
A state-owned enterprise, Svenska Varv, was founded in 1977 in order to 
facilitate restructuring and plant closures. The nationalisation of the Swed-
ish shipbuilding industry and the subsequent restructuring and reductions 
in the labour force were generally accepted by the trade unions.18 There were 
local protests, but the main response of the Metal Workers’ Union was to 
demand replacement jobs for redundant workers.
Throughout most of the twentieth century, employment in the Swedish 
shipbuilding industry was concentrated in four shipyards: Eriksberg and 
Götaverken in Gothenburg, Uddevallavarvet in Uddevalla, and Kockums 
in Malmö. In the late 1960s, these shipyards accounted for more than 90 
per cent of tonnage produced in Sweden. These f irms were also major 
international actors and contributed to the development of technology 
to build ships in blocks. The Uddevalla shipyard had become insolvent 
in 1958; it became partly state-owned in 1963 and entirely so in 1971. Its 
production was f inally closed down in 1986. Eriksberg was nationalised in 
1975, became part of Svenska Varv three years later, and was closed down in 
1978. Götaverken was nationalised in 1977; attempts were made to diversify 
production but were not successful in the long run. Götaverken delivered 
15 Ljungberg, Tillväxt och stagnation i varvsindustrin II, 71-74.
16 Carlsson, “Industrial Subsidies in Sweden”, 11; Hamilton, “Public Subsidies to Industry”.
17 Ljungberg, Tillväxt och stagnation i varvsindustrin II, 72-73.
18 Ibid., 79.
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its last ship in 1989 but has survived with a reduced workforce as a shipyard 
focused on ship repairing.
In addition to the big Swedish shipyards, there have been, and continue to 
be, significant naval production and repairing in Karlskrona, which from 1961 
was run as a state-owned enterprise. Moreover, there were a number of small 
and medium-sized shipyards in locations such as Gothenburg (Lindhol-
mens), Landskrona (Öresundsvarvet), Stockholm (Finnboda), Helsingborg, 
and Oskarshamn. The medium-sized shipyards blossomed in the 1940s and 
1950s but found it diff icult to restructure production to larger ships in the 
1960s. Shipyards in Helsingborg and Oskarshamn were closed in 1966 and 
1967, respectively, and Lindholmen was taken over by Eriksberg in 1971.
Kockums Mekaniska Verkstad
Kockums Mekaniska Verstad was established in 1840, and began to build 
ships in the 1870s. Kockums was, until its introduction to the Stockholm 
stock exchange in 1972, a family-owned f irm with strong local ties. For 
a great part of the twentieth century Kockums was the largest privately 
owned workplace in the Malmö region.19 With a total workforce of 5,700 
persons in the mid-1970s (Figure 4.1), the shipyard employed almost one-
f ifth of all industrial workers in Malmö. In addition, the company had 
about 1,000 sub-contractors in the region, of which the most important 
ones together employed 9,000 people.
Kockums originally had a fairly diverse production, including railway 
wagons and a variety of metal goods. Eventually shipbuilding became an 
important part of the company’s business, encompassing both merchant and 
naval ships, including submarines. In the f irst half of the twentieth century 
Kockums successfully participated in the Scandinavian shipbuilding expan-
sion. Diesel engines and tank ships were the key features of the expansion. 
Kockums was also a pioneer in welding, and its f irst ocean-going ship with 
a wholly welded hull was launched just before the Second World War.20
The post-1945 years were characterised by continued expansion and 
diversif ication as the company sought to decrease its sensitivity to swings 
in the business cycle and open up new markets.21 In 1968, it was concluded that 
19 Berggren, “The Effects of the Shipyard Crisis in Malmö”, 199. 
20 Svensson, Från ackord till månadslön.
21 For example, Kockums aquired a mechanical engineering company (Landsverk) in the 
neighbouring town Landskrona in 1948 and became part-owner of the Lisnave shipyard in 
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the diversif ication strategy had failed, and that it had made Kockums even 
more sensitive to swings. In the following two years the annual dividend to 
shareholders was cancelled for the f irst time in decades, and there was also 
a change of managing director. The new post-holder, Nils-Hugo Hallenborg, 
regarded “poor morale” among the workers to be the most serious problem 
for the company. The rate of personnel turnover at Kockums was far too 
high, at around 50 per cent. Hallenborg initiated two investigations: one 
concerning the shipbuilding section and another on the rest of the company’s 
sections. Interestingly, he asked the Swedish Confederation of Labour (LO) to 
undertake the former investigation and American consultants to do the latter.
The performance of Kockums, particularly the shipbuilding section, 
was substantially improved in the early 1970s. Moreover, productivity 
development was stronger than that of the Gothenburg shipyards,22 the 
stock of orders grew, prof its were higher than ever, and Kockums’ share 
price skyrocketed.23 In 1973, Kockums was the biggest shipyard outside 
Portugal (together with Götaverken and Eriksberg) in 1962. See Arlebäck, Från ägarmakt till 
företagsledarmakt, 192-197; Ohlsson, “I kranens tidevarv”, 103-105. 
22 Bohlin, Svensk varvsindustri 1920-1975, 202-204.
23 Ohlsson, “I kranens tidevarv”, 108-111.
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Japan, and management self-conf idence was at its peak. The managing 
director proudly declared to a newspaper, “All new shipyards that are built 
in Japan are now using Kockums as their model.”24 Moreover, he did not see 
any upper limits to how big ships could be built and painted vivid pictures 
of giant ships for transportation of coal and virtual islands for production 
of nuclear energy.
However, when the OPEC oil crisis hit, the demand for ships was dramati-
cally reduced. In 1974, Kockums did not receive a single order, and in the 
following year two orders were cancelled. The enthusiastic atmosphere of the 
previous years did not end immediately, but gradually managers and workers 
realised that adjustments were necessary. Personnel reductions began to be 
discussed openly, and in 1976 the company was divided into separate units: 
from now on shipbuilding was conducted within Kockums Varv.
Since the 1960s, the inhabitants of Malmö had been suffering job losses 
as a consequence of the diff iculties experienced by the textile industry.25 
When Kockums began to face problems in the latter half of the 1970s, local 
politicians and citizens rallied to defend the jobs of the Kockums workers. 
In 1979, the shipyard was taken over by the state through Svenska Varv, and 
in 1986 production of merchant ships ceased. Production of submarines 
continued, however, but the physical shipbuilding was moved to a special-
ised naval yard at Karlskrona. The yard’s huge shipbuilding crane, once the 
world’s biggest, was sold for USD $1 to the Hyundai shipyard in South Korea 
in 2002. Today, a screwed skyscraper, the Turning Torso, situated close to 
the old shipyard, marks the new skyline of Malmö. The shipyard area has 
been taken over by new companies, a university college, and fashionable 
apartment blocks.
Production
During the Second World War, Kockums was a huge supplier of military 
equipment in general and ships for the naval forces in particular.26 Produc-
tion of large cargo ships for civilian use expanded rapidly in the decades 
after the war.27 Consequently, huge ships for transportation of bulk goods or 
24 Quotation from Ohlsson, “I kranens tidevarv”, 110 (author’s translation).
25 Ibid., 136.
26 Nilsson, Kockums marina fartyg.
27 Kockums did repair jobs, but in the period of investigation it was mainly a shipyard for new 
production.
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liquids dominated production. Of the 244 ships built at Kockums between 
1950 and 1977, 190 were either bulk or tank ships. As seen in Figure 4.2, 
tanker production was particularly important before the oil crisis. Between 
1970 and 1976, all ships produced were in fact tankers. After the oil crisis, 
production became more diversif ied; including vessels for transporting 
liquif ied natural gas, and roll-on-roll-off ships, some of them intended for 
passengers. The last ships for civilian use were luxury cruisers.
Over three decades the size of ships built by Kockums grew substantially. 
In 1949, Kockums built ships with a carrying capacity up to 16,510 dwt.28 
In the following decade, the biggest ships built at Kockums were of over 
41,000 dwt. In the 1960s, this f igure had grown f ivefold, to 212,000 dwt. In 
the 1970s, Kockums typically produced ships of about 350,000 dwt each.
The increasing capacity to build big ships was made possible by invest-
ments in various physical facilities. Considerable investments were under-
taken in the latter part of the 1960s, when a new dock, cranes, and assembly 
hall were built. Even bigger investments followed in the early 1970s, with 
the intention to speed up production, and which facilitated lifting of heavy 
28 Figures on the carrying capacity of Kockums ships were obtained from Varvshistoriska 
föreningen i Malmö. 
Figure 4.2  Tankers, cargo ships and bulk carriers as a percentage of ships 


















































Source: own calculations based on data compiled by Varvshistoriska föreningen i Malmö
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objects.29 Among other things, a saddle crane with a track 175 m wide and 
710 m long was put into place. Its lifting capacity was estimated at up to 
1,500 tons. As a result of the various investments in plant and equipment, 
Kockums’ lead time for big ships could be reduced to forty days.30
Workforce
Most of Kockums’ workers under the period of review had open-ended em-
ployment contracts and were organised in the SMWU. Temporary employ-
ment contracts were used in times of need, but directly employed temporary 
workers did not constitute a signif icant part of the workforce at any point. 
However, temporary workers employed indirectly by sub-contractors ap-
peared in greater numbers from the mid-1960s onwards. With high levels of 
personnel turnover, recruitment of skilled labour was a more or less constant 
problem in the decades following the Second World War. Apart from turning 
to the public employment service and sub-contractors, Kockums also made 
conscious efforts to attract workers from abroad as well as women.
The Metal Workers’ Union
The SMWU was based on the principle of industrial unionism and was 
made up of locals that in turn were divided into workplace “clubs” and 
occupational sections. The Kockums club was for a long time the most 
important unit of the SMWU local in Malmö. The club leadership was 
characterised by continuity; the period 1918-86 saw only f ive chairmen.31
Over time, the union activities at Kockums became increasingly profes-
sionalised and eff icient. Before the 1970s, the club chairman was basically 
the only person who could work full-time on union issues.32 With new 
legislation in 1974, the rights of union off icials were strengthened. Union 
off icials were protected from harassment, had the right to paid leave and to 
return to their previous job after a period of union duties, and enjoyed wage 
guarantees. This changed the preconditions for union activities drastically. 
Before the 1970s, members turned to the club board at an open meeting if 
they experienced problems with piecerates or similar. The board decided 
29 Arlebäck, Från ägarmakt till företagsledarmakt, 197; Ohlsson, “I kranens tidevarv”, 109.
30 Arlebäck, Från ägarmakt till företagsledarmakt, 197.
31 Stråth, Varvsarbetare i två varvsstäder; Salomonsson, “Kockumsknogaren”, 185.
32 Salomonsson, “Kockumsknogaren”, 189.
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what action to take and replied to the member at next meeting, a month 
later. However, due to a growing number of salaried union off icials, small 
matters of discontent could be solved much more quickly and without being 
voiced at a member meeting.33
The activities of the SMWU club at Kockums also increased in scope. 
Before the 1940s, the union was mainly involved with three issues: wages, 
occupational health and safety, and working hours. In the aftermath of the 
general agreement concluded in 1938,34 the labour market parties agreed 
to increase union involvement in issues concerning production, personnel 
policies, and social issues.35
The 1970s also saw a substantial expansion of the international activities of 
the SMWU.36 For example, the union was heavily involved in exchange of in-
formation and co-ordination with its sister organisations in the other Nordic 
countries.37 The international activities of the SMWU were mainly organised 
centrally. Still, the union club at Kockums was affected by these contacts 
as it often hosted delegations from other countries. Initially, these visitors 
typically came from neighbouring countries, such as Denmark or Germany, 
but over the years delegations from more distant countries appeared, for 
example Japan (1964, 1969), Canada (1972), and “Latin America” (1971). The 
international interest in Kockums seems to have increased considerably 
in the early 1970s (after the Kockums report). In the early 1980s the union 
club at Kockums began to take more of its own initiatives in international 
issues, for example by establishing contacts with Solidarność in Poland.38
Indirectly hired workers
Since Kockums and the other big Swedish shipyards were capital-intensive, 
interruptions in the production process were expensive. Thus companies 
were prepared to engage labour from staffing companies, even though it was 
more expensive than employing labour directly.39 In the interwar period, 
33 Ibid., 187.
34 The so-called Saltsjöbaden Agreement (SAF) between the LO and the Swedish Employers’ 
Confederation.
35 Stråth, Varvsarbetare i två varvsstäder, 327.
36 Thörnqvist, “Metall och världen”, 951ff.
37 Ibid., 939-940, 952-953, 1001-1002, 1005.
38 Ibid., 987; Arbetarrörelsens arkiv i Skåne, Malmö (hereafter AAS), Metall avd. 4, Kockums 
verkstadsklubb, Års- och revisionsberättelser.
39 Bohlin, Svensk varvsindustri 1920-1975, 297-301; Gråbacke, “Internationalisering och teknisk 
omvandling”, 163-166.
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Swedish shipyards had already brought in sub-contracted labour to perform 
specif ic tasks, such as painting and electrical installation work.40 What 
changed in the post-war period was that sub-contracted labour performed 
ordinary jobs as welders or sheet-metal workers. Thus, a situation emerged 
in which there were two groups of workers who did similar jobs but had 
different terms of employment. Legally, however, the sub-contracted f irms 
operated in a grey zone. According to prevailing legislation, private profit-
making employment agencies were not allowed. Yet, in practice it proved 
diff icult to apply the legislation, and the use of temporary work agencies 
was a matter of disagreement between employers and unions.41
At Kockums, the use of sub-contracted workers on a larger scale seems to 
have begun in 1963 and expanded in the latter part of the decade.42 In 1967, 
there were 1,500 temporary workers at Kockums,43 which corresponded to 
more than 40 per cent of the average number of blue-collar workers that 
were directly employed in the same year. Many of the temporary workers 
had foreign origins; a particularly large group had come from Finland. 
The Kockums report revealed widespread distrust among the workers 
interviewed, not only of the management but also of temporary workers. 
Many quotations suggested that temporary workers were assigned the 
“good” jobs, earned more, and took less responsibility for handling of tools 
and materials.44
The use of sub-contracted labour at Kockums almost disappeared after 
the publication of the Kockums report,45 but reappeared again towards the 
mid-1970s. Interestingly, this practice was argued against not only by the 
unions, but also by the Swedish Engineering Employers’ Association, who 
thought that hiring labour through sub-contractors aggravated problems 
with wage drift.46 Not until the late 1970s did Kockums and the union club 
reach an agreement on the proper use of sub-contractors.47
40 Bohlin, Svensk varvsindustri 1920-1975, 297; Eckhart, “Djurgårdsgänget”, 82-89.
41 Bohlin, Svensk varvsindustri 1920-1975, 305-306. The issue of staff ing companies was also 
discussed at the Nordic level: Thörnqvist, “Metall och världen”, 941.
42 Malmö stadsarkiv (hereafter MS), Kockums mekaniska verkstads arkiv, Övriga personal-
handlingar rörande arbetare, F16 BB: 11.
43 Lundin, Malmö industristaden, 26.
44 With regard to earnings, it should be noted that the main difference between ordinary and 
indirectly hired workers was that the latter had tax-free subsistence allowances on top of the 
wage.
45 MS, Kockums mekaniska verkstads arkiv, Övriga personalhandlingar rörande arbetare, 
F16 BB: 11.
46 Gråbacke, “Internationalisering och teknisk omvandling”, 165.
47 AAS, Metall avd. 4, Kockums verkstadsklubb, Års- och revisionsberättelser.
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Labour import
After the Second World War, Kockums made intense efforts to recruit 
foreign labour. In 1947, there were f ifteen different nationalities represented 
in Kockums workforce, of which the biggest group was from Denmark. 
In spite of initial union resistance, immigrants were recruited in great 
numbers in the following decades. In 1969, immigrants constituted 31 per 
cent of the workforce.48 The most important countries of origin at the time 
were Yugoslavia, Portugal, and Finland. Most immigrants were relatively 
unskilled and received basic training at Kockums. Although the company 
provided some instruction in foreign languages as well as interpreters, their 
introduction at Kockums must have been an overwhelming and not entirely 
positive experience for many immigrants. According to the Kockums report, 
mistrust of the interpreters led many immigrants to quit. The interpreters 
were thought to be loyal f irstly to the company and to disadvantage their 
clients (the immigrants) in disputes over piecerates.
Kockums offered training in the Swedish language at an early stage, but 
this was poorly adapted to working hours. Following the Kockums report, 
the company began to focus recruitment on a limited number of languages 
and undertook some measures to improve integration.49 The passing of new 
legislation on language training gave immigrants opportunities to learn 
Swedish during working hours. It also appears that the union club’s attitude 
towards immigration changed over time: from having a main ambition to 
restrict the numbers of immigrants to improving their integration.50
Women at the shipyard
While the composition of the workforce changed drastically with regard 
to country of origin, Kockums remained essentially a male domain. In the 
early 1960s, however, the management reviewed jobs in production and 
found that 225 positions would be suitable for women.51 A programme to 
recruit and train women in welding and other trades was initiated, but with 
meagre results. In 1968 there were only twenty-five women on the shop floor 
and by the mid-1980s women only constituted 1.3 per cent of the workforce.52 
48 Salomonsson, “Kockumsknogaren”, 150.
49 Nilsson, Vårt Kockums, 201-204.
50 Salomonsson, “Kockumsknogaren”, 153.
51 Gråbacke, “Internationalisering och teknisk omvandling”, 167-169.
52 Lundin, Malmö industristaden, 23.
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Similar attempts were made by the shipyards in Gothenburg, where the 
competition for labour was even more intense than in Malmö.53 In the early 
1970s, about 100 women were hired at Eriksberg. At Götaverken, women 
formed separate work teams. Most women at Götaverken were either young 
(or childless) or in their forties. At the modern Arendal shipyard there were 
special changing rooms for women. Managers there had a positive view on 
women as workers. According to the personnel manager at Götaverken, 
for example, women were “careful and ambitious”.54 Yet, even though the 
labour-force participation of Swedish women increased substantially from 
the 1960s onwards, few women entered the shipbuilding industry. There, the 
share of women increased, but from a very low level, and it never exceeded 
4 per cent.
Wages and working hours
In the decades after the Second World War, male shipbuilding workers were 
among the most well-paid groups of blue-collar workers in the Swedish 
labour market, including metalworkers.55 Indeed, the gap between ship-
building workers and other metalworkers increased until the mid-1970s, 
when shipbuilding workers on average earned between 10 and 12 per cent 
more.56 After the mid-1970s, working in the shipbuilding industry became 
somewhat less rewarding. Between 1976 and 1981, the average hourly earn-
ings decreased by 10 per cent, a change that, inter alia, related to the shift in 
wages from piecerates to monthly wages.57 Yet, in the mid-1980s, shipbuild-
ing workers were better off than most metal- and manufacturing workers.
The nominal earnings of Kockums workers increased at about the same 
pace as for workers in the mechanical engineering industry as a whole. 
This implied a signif icant improvement of the material standard of living. 
While prices rose fourfold between 1950 and 1976, earnings rose ninefold 
in the same period. The improved living standard was reflected in many 
53 Trosell, “Kvinna på varvet”. See also Persson Bertheaud, Sandberg, and Bosdotter (eds), 
Kvinna på varvet, for documentation of women’s experiences in the Gothenburg shipyards.
54 Quotation from Gråbacke , “Internationalisering och teknisk omvandling”, 169.
55 Women in the shipbuilding industry were relatively well paid compared to other groups of 
female manufacturing workers. However, the male-female gap in earnings was as big, or even 
bigger, in shipbuilding than in the labour market as a whole: Gråbacke, “Internationalisering 
och teknisk omvandling”, 69-71. 
56 Wage additions for overtime, shift work, work on holidays, vacation, and other benef its 
included: Statistiska centralbyrån, Wages. Part 2: Wage-Earners in the Private Sector.
57 Gråbacke, “Internationalisering och teknisk omvandling”, 69.
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ways. Whereas a typical metalworker in the interwar period had lived in a 
one-room apartment, the same metalworker had a three-room apartment 
in the late 1960s.58 At that time, most metalworkers owned cars, which were 
used during the summer holidays.
The raised living standard was also translated into more leisure. Work-
ing hours in the Swedish labour market had since 1920 been subject to 
legislation that prescribed a maximum of 48 hours per week. This level 
remained until the 1960s, when the normal working week was reduced 
through legislation and agreements to the level of 40 hours in 1970.59 Paid 
holiday was likewise prolonged step by step, from two weeks in 1938 to f ive 
weeks in 1977.
Occupational identity and lifestyle
To characterise the occupational identity and lifestyle of workers at Koc-
kums is diff icult. While there are plenty of anecdotes, there has been no 
systematic research into the issue. As in other shipyards,60 the Kockums 
workers made much use of nicknames and jargon.61 This suggests the exist-
ence of a relatively stable core of workers, in spite of high levels of turnover.62 
The increased use of sub-contracting f irms in the late 1960s seems to have 
given rise to two parallel cultures at Kockums: where the ordinary workers 
regarded the outsiders, who often were unmarried Finns, with suspicion 
and a certain envy.63
Like the cultures of other occupational groups over time, one may assume 
that the shipbuilders’ culture had been constantly evolving. A study of cul-
tural and class boundaries in Landskrona, which was even more dominated 
by shipbuilding than Malmö, suggests that shifting economic circumstances 
shaped the attitudes and behaviour of different generations of workers.64 It 
is likely that similar processes were at work at Kockums. While those who 
entered the trade in the interwar period were stamped by the experience 
of crises and unemployment, those who became shipbuilding workers in 
58 Magnusson, “Metallarbetarnas levnadsförhållanden”, 138.
59 Isidorsson, Striden om tiden, 61-66; Thörnqvist, “Metall och världen”, 953.
60 Andersson and Sjölin, Ackordsliv, 56-58; Salomonsson and Wikdahl, Varvet som var, 28.
61 Svärd, Blåställ.
62 John-Erik Olsson, employed at Kockums in 1947 and chairman of the union local 1968-87, 
estimates that about half of the workforce or more was stable, even during the period of high 
personnel turnover: interview, 9 October 2013.
63 Ohlström, Kockumsrapporten, 68-70; Lundin, Industristaden Malmö.
64 Wikdahl, Varvets tid.
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the post-war period enjoyed rapid improvements in their standard of living. 
They became less interested in security and put more emphasis on freedom. 
They moved out of traditional working-class neighbourhoods to the suburbs, 
which had more mixed populations. The boundaries between blue- and 
white-collar workers became less pronounced. Another study of Landsk-
rona showed that occupational boundaries among the blue-collar workers 
were also reduced.65 When the shipyard became more of a factory than a 
workshop, the contacts of workers from different occupations increased, 
which served to strengthen their common identity of shipbuilding workers.
Relationships of production
Organisation of production
Until the mid-1930s, riveting was the main method of metal joining for 
building steel ships. At that time, Kockums built ships of around 10,000 tons, 
which were assembled at slipways. Several ships were built simultaneously. 
Most jobs were performed outdoors, with only specific portions constructed 
in workshops. The transition to welding took place in the mid-1930s and 
was generally accepted by the workers, as long as it did not result in wage 
reductions.66 Welding reduced the noise level at the shipyards, but its smoke 
introduced new problems in the working environment.67
Welding paved the way for the next big change – the building of ships in 
blocks – an important step in the transition from craft-based production 
to a system of work organisation that was more in line with the logic of 
industrial production generally.68 Investments in larger production facilities 
also meant that much bigger ships could be built. Ships of 200,000 tons or 
more were basically constructed one at a time. Various parts of the ships 
could be built in parallel and then assembled. Previously, for example, the 
installation of the ship’s pipes could be done only when the actual hull was 
f inished. With block building, the pipes could be installed in each block 
before the hull was assembled. Block building, introduced at Kockums 
in the early 1960s, was associated with profound changes in the working 
65 Salomonsson and Wikdahl, Varvet som var, 38-44.
66 Svensson, Från ackord till månadslön, 343.
67 Berggren and Olsson, “Arbetsmiljö, hälsa och arbetarskydd”, 76. For the British case, see 
Murphy, “The Health of Electric Arc Welders”.
68 Ljungberg, Tillväxt och stagnation i varvsindustrin I, 37.
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environment, both good and not so good. On the one hand, more jobs could 
be done under cover, and the workers at Kockums became increasingly 
protected from the harsh weather conditions of southern Sweden, which 
had been a source of great discontent. On the other hand, the intensification 
of work led to an increased number of accidents, which tripled from the late 
1960s to the mid-1970s.69 In this regard the situation in shipbuilding was 
worse than in the Swedish metal industry overall.70
Rationalisation of shipbuilding at Kockums was not associated with 
increased horizontal division of labour and deskilling. According to Bo 
Ohlström, hardly “any worker performed a job that can be characterised as 
monotonous in the same way as at an assembly line”.71 Compared to other 
manufacturing industries, shipbuilding still retained a high share of skilled 
workers, and the developments at Kockums often meant that the content of 
jobs became more varied. After ships had begun to be built block by block, 
a sheet-metal worker would, for example, perform a wider variety of tasks 
than before. Some parts of the ship, such as the bow and stern, also required 
particular manual skills to produce well into the 1980s.72
The upgrading of jobs at Kockums was also reflected in how new workers 
were trained.73 When shipbuilding was done by riveting, training had been 
based on the simple principle “watch and learn”. Young workers assisted 
senior workers with simple tasks while at the same time observing how 
more complex tasks were performed. As the new recruits became older, they 
were promoted to positions involving more complex tasks until they were 
f inally considered ready to do skilled jobs. With the transition to welding, 
training became more formalised. Kockums initiated a systematic training 
programme, and in 1957 the company set up its own vocational school.74
However, it appears that the introduction of block building did give rise to 
co-ordination problems and led to increased vertical division of labour and 
stricter management control of work.75 Previously, the production process 
had been highly flexible: if one job could not be done at one point in time, 
it was relatively easy to transfer labour to do other jobs. From the late 1960s 
onwards, the timing of various jobs became crucial. Since blocks were 
assembled in a particular order, a delay in one block could cause stoppages 
69 Berggren, “Från arbetarskydd till arbetsmiljö”, 642.
70 Berggren and Olsson, “Arbetsmiljö, hälsa och arbetarskydd”, 79.
71 Ohlström, Kockumsrapporten, 14.
72 Ljungberg, Tillväxt och stagnation i varvsindustrin I, 37.
73 Ohlström, Kockumsrapporten, 15.
74 Yokoyama and Nilsson, “Company-Based Vocational Education and Training”.
75 Ohlström, Kockumsrapporten, 21.
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in the whole production chain. Such stoppages were frequent; internal 
company reports suggested that some workers were eff iciently employed 
for only 15-30 per cent of the working day.
In order to improve production flows, management hired more techni-
cians, put more effort in to gather information on time use, and tightened 
supervision of workers, which included the introduction of piecerates based 
on the MTM system.
Few strikes but frequent disputes
During the interwar period, the relationships between the union club and 
management became characterised by co-operation rather than conflict.76 
This relationship was further developed as Nils Holmström, previously a 
legal adviser at the SAF and one of the architects of the general agreement 
of 1938, joined the company’s management in 1940. Among other things, 
Holmström initiated a new order for negotiations in which the union club 
was represented by a committee. Overall, the union club was considered to 
have had a fairly strong position and was respected by the management.77 
In the period 1931 to 1975, there were only three strikes at Kockums.78
Even though strikes were unusual at Kockums in the period of investiga-
tion, small disputes concerning piecerates were frequent. Until the early 
1950s, Kockums applied straight piecerates, with a guaranteed minimum 
level per hour. Time-and-motion studies had originally been introduced in 
the 1930s at the shipyard, but were met with protests.79 Foremen continued 
to exert great influence over piecerates well into the 1950s which led to 
minor conflicts. The workers’ earnings were decided not only by the actual 
piecerate, but also by job allocation and by the other team members. For 
newcomers, who lacked detailed knowledge of the workplace (where to f ind 
materials, tools, and supervisors) it was hard to achieve high earnings. In 
the late 1950s, the company began to hold courses and conferences in how 
to apply and interpret wage agreements for its supervisory staff. According 
76 Stråth, Varvsarbetare i två varvsstäder, 209.
77 This also applied to Götaverken, Öresundsvarvet, and Uddevalla, but less so to Eriksberg. 
See Svensson, Från ackord till månadslön, 318.
78 The most notable conflict occurred in 1945 when the Kockums workers participated in a 
nationwide strike inititated by the SMWU, which at the time was dominated by communists. Com-
munists controlled the local at Kockums between 1944 and 1947 but lost much of their influence 
thereafter. In Gothenburg, communists retained influence well into the 1960s, which, according 
to Stråth, contributed to more conflicts: Stråth, Varvsarbetare i två varvsstäder, 240, 291.
79 Svensson, Från ackord till månadslön, 253-257.
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to union statements, management attempts to increase control over wage 
setting did not result in fewer disputes; instead the contrary was true, since 
the arbitrariness of many foremen was replaced by far-reaching formalism.80
In the 1960s, the management at Kockums imposed a more elaborate sys-
tem of piecerates – the PTS system – where each operation was divided into 
smaller actions that were allotted standard times.81 The workers received 
detailed descriptions of how each operation was to be undertaken. The 
basic intention with the new system was to attain a remuneration system 
that rested on scientif ic foundations. Yet, introducing an advanced form 
of scientif ic management to shipbuilding, where the production process 
was characterised by frequent interruptions and an almost constant need 
to adjust methods and materials, proved diff icult. As was shown in the 
Kockums report, the PTS system became a source of serious discontent.82 
Whereas some workers appreciated that the room for foremen’s discretion 
had been reduced, most workers emphasised the lack of f lexibility, higher 
work load, and increased income insecurity associated with the new system.
Considering the widespread worker discontent, the union withdrew its 
previous support for piecerates and instead strived to increase the f ixed 
component of earnings. This was gradually achieved in the 1970s, and in 
1976 the union reached an agreement by which monthly wages replaced 
piecerates.
The introduction of monthly wages was not uncomplicated, as it involved 
a valuation of each job. One participant in the union’s internal negotiations 
complained: “It was hard as hell. We f inally succeeded, but – gosh! – that 
I would not repeat more times. People were standing on tables, shouting 
and roaring at each other!”83 As observed by Svensson, the management 
was positive towards the transition to monthly wages.84 As production 
had become less homogeneous, straight piecerates were diff icult to 
establish, even with sophisticated time-and-motion studies. Initially, 
the management also regarded monthly wages as positively associated 
with productivity. However, after a few years the discussion about how 
to strengthen workers’ incentives to improve performance reappeared, 
even among union members, and bonuses were reintroduced on top of the 
f ixed-wage component.
80 Salomonsson, “Kockumsknogaren”, 144ff.
81 PTS stands for predetermined time standards and was a variant of the more widely spread 
MTM system: Ohlström, Kockumsrapporten, 23.
82 Salomonsson, “Kockumsknogaren”, 147-148.
83 Quotation in Salomonsson, “Kockumsknogaren”, 170.
84 Svensson, Från ackord till månadslön.
FRoM BooM to BuSt 161
Managing redundancies
Workers at Kockums in the 1950s and 1960s enjoyed a high degree of em-
ployment protection.85 The high rates of personnel turnover meant that 
temporary redundancies could be dealt with by natural attrition.86 Even 
when the crisis of shipbuilding became apparent in the latter part of the 
1970s, management was very hesitant to undertake layoffs.
In the early years of the 1970s, Kockums was in a better f inancial situation 
than the Gothenburg shipyards.87 Kockums’ management had avoided risky 
speculations in foreign currency in the late 1960s and had not agreed to 
produce ships for prices that fell short of actual costs, which, for example, 
Götaverken had done. Kockums’ decline and f inal closure were therefore 
delayed, and can best be described as smooth and gradual.88
Facing threats of reductions in the workforce, management and union 
leaders mobilised support from local and regional politicians, bureaucrats 
(including the county governor), and the general public. A demonstration 
involving 10,000 participants was held in Malmö city centre. The joint 
management-union initiative may be seen as a ref lection of a spirit of 
mutual understanding that had been a characteristic feature of the Swedish 
labour market in general and of the industrial relations at Kockums in 
particular.89 However, in this phase workers’ doubts that the private owners 
could take the shipyard through the bust increased, and in December 1977 
the union took the position that Kockums should be nationalised. This was 
thought to be the best way to secure the survival of the shipyard, although 
there were those who feared a loss of influence if Kockums became a part 
of a bigger business group.90
In 1978, 900 employees were given notice, which corresponded to about 
17 per cent of the total workforce in the previous year. The management 
declared that further reductions – affecting 2,000 employees – might be-
come necessary, but that not even such a measure would solve what had 
85 This stands in some contrast to accounts of earlier periods, when insecurity seems to have 
been an essential aspect of the lives of shipbuilding workers. See for example Berggren, Ång-
visslans och brickornas värld, 70-71, and Svensson, Från ackord till månadslön, 41-44.
86 Interview with John-Erik Olsson, 9 September 2013. Transfers of workers between positions 
also occurred, which was a source of discontent as changing jobs often was associated with 
income losses: AAS, Metall avd. 4, Kockums verkstadsklubb, Års- och revisionsberättelser.
87 Stråth, The Politics of De-Industrialisation, 107-108.
88 Yet, redundancy management was in many ways similar in Gothenburg and Malmö. See 
Gascoigne and Whiteside, “Work and Welfare”.
89 Stråth, The Politics of De-Industrialisation, 109-110.
90 Ibid., 108.
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become an acute liquidity crisis. The union’s response was partly accom-
modating. It recognised the need to reduce the workforce, but rejected the 
suggested means of doing so. Instead of layoffs, the union demanded that 
the redundancies should be solved by natural wastage and voluntary action, 
as had been done previously.91 It appears that union resistance to downsiz-
ing was somewhat half-hearted due to national employment-protection 
legislation, which had been put in place a few years earlier. According to 
this legislation, layoffs should be governed by length of service and age, if 
employers and union representatives did not reach another agreement. The 
implication was that, as phrased by Bo Stråth, the threat of unemployment 
was individualised. Union representatives and senior members of the union 
were not among those who were f irst in line to be laid off. In spite of this, 
the protests were successful in the sense that the downsizing process was 
delayed and layoffs were avoided. The union f inally also got support for its 
demand for nationalisation.
Nationalisation
In the summer of 1979, Kockums Varv became a part of the state-owned 
business group Svenska Varv. Nationalisation could not, however, end the 
downward spiral of Kockums. Gradual reductions of the workforce contin-
ued, and the interaction between management and union representatives 
did not change dramatically as a consequence of state ownership.92 A central 
management aim was to continue downsizing and to retain only the most 
productive workers in that process. Negotiations held in December 1980 are 
illustrative in this regard. The management argued that if it was allowed 
to establish the order of selection for layoffs, then the total magnitude of 
the cuts could be reduced. This move was a dilemma for the union: should 
it let the employer pick and choose and save jobs in return, or defend the 
prevailing seniority norm? The solution was the introduction of a new 
department for retraining within the company, to which less-productive 
workers could be transferred without any notice. A preliminary selection 
was established in negotiations between management and union; thereafter 
the union representatives held talks with affected individuals. Thus, the 
union collaborated with the employers in order to uphold work discipline 
and improve productivity at a time when morale was low.
91 Ibid., 109.
92 Ibid., 110-111.
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Somewhat later, in the autumn of 1981, the union also agreed to abandon 
the seniority principle prescribed by the law in favour of an early-retirement 
scheme.93 This was in accordance with previous practice as well as with 
the management’s eff iciency considerations.94 Yet, the downward spiral 
went on. In 1985 only 2,850 employees remained, and the shipyard had not 
received a single order in two years.
Again, a local campaign rallied under the slogan “Don’t touch Kockums” 
(author’s translation). A variety of methods were applied to voice the de-
mands, including demonstrations, petitions, and lobbying. However, the 
protests could not save the shipyard, and in 1986 Svenska Varv decided to 
shut down production of ships for civilian use in Malmö. This was, at the 
time, one of the biggest plant closures ever seen in Sweden. To compensate 
for the massive job losses, the state instead subsidised car production in 
parts of the old shipbuilding premises. Many former Kockums workers were 
also temporarily employed on renovating train carriages for Statens Järn-
vägar (the state-owned railway company). Indeed, most of the redundant 
shipyard workers were able to escape unemployment.95 Yet, the effects of 
the closing of the shipyard on the local labour market were long-lasting. 
The non-production of civilian ships at Kockums left a vacuum and made 
it diff icult for young people to enter the labour market. For many years, 
Malmö struggled with an outdated industrial structure, with no common 
vision for the future.
Concluding remarks
The frame story of Kockums in the period 1950 to 1986 is about rise and fall. 
Kockums successfully participated in the tanker revolution of the 1950s and 
1960s but was unsuccessful in adjusting production to new realities in the 
1970s and eventually had to abandon the building of ships for civilian use. 
As a case study, Kockums f its into the popular image of the Swedish model 
of industrial relations. Management-union co-operation was an established 
feature of Kockums and developed further in the period of investigation. 
Co-operation continued even during the decline phase. However, beneath 
the surface, major changes took place at the shipyard in which the workers 
actively took part. Changes affected the composition of the workforce as well 
93 See Gascoigne and Whiteside, “Work and Welfare”, 238.
94 Stråth, The Politics of De-Industrialisation, 111.
95 Berggren, “The Effects of the Shipbuilding Crisis in Malmö”, 201.
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as the basic relations of production. Workers of foreign origin, sometimes 
hired indirectly, became commonplace at Kockums. The union began to 
promote the integration of immigrants and restrict the practice of hiring 
labour from sub-contractors. Beginning in the early 1960s, block building 
in combination with a more advanced system of piecerates were important 
aspects in management attempts to move away from craft-based produc-
tion. Although not resulting in outright strikes, increased vertical division 
of labour and co-ordination failures were not passively accommodated by 
the workers. Discontent was widespread, and many took advantage of the 
situation in the labour market, which made it possible to leave Kockums and 
f ind jobs in other shipyards or industries. High levels of personnel turnover 
induced the management to take action. Like other Swedish shipyards 
and industries, Kockums eventually replaced performance-based pay with 
monthly pay. This temporary victory over scientif ic management took place 
towards the end of the Swedish shipbuilding industry’s era of greatness. 
For the workers, the struggle for fair pay was replaced by a struggle for the 
future existence of the industry.
5 The Norwegian shipbuilding industry 
after 1945
Production systems, rationalisation, and labour relations, 
with special reference to Bergens Mekaniske Verksteder and 
Aker Stord
Hans-Jakob Ågotnes and Jan Heiret
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to give an overview of the development of the 
Norwegian shipbuilding industry after 1945, and to discuss the changing 
conditions of the labour force and labour relations in the industry, both 
nationwide and internally in the workplaces. We posit three main questions: 
what industrial relations were established in the shipbuilding industry, 
what social relations in the workplace did they correspond to, and how 
did they develop during the differing phases of the post-war epoch? Such 
an overview must inevitably involve a construction at the analytical level 
of the relations between the different contexts determining the path of 
development of the industry. Our point of departure is that, to understand 
the conditions of the labour force and the character of workers’ organisa-
tions, we must on the one hand understand how the economic potential 
of shipbuilding f irms is dependent on the connections between national 
and global markets; national and international governmental regulations; 
national and transnational ownership; and company structures. On the 
other hand, we must also consider the production system in the industry 
– technology, division of labour, and work organisation – to understand 
industrial relations, both at the national level and in shipyards and company 
groups. The extant system of industrial relations, involving trade unions, 
employers’ federations, and government, in its turn, has a decisive effect 
on production.
At the base of the union organisation are the workers’ collectives at 
each individual workplace.1 The character of workers’ collectives depended 
on all the above dimensions, in addition to local circumstances, which 
varied from place to place. Nonetheless, we consider that the shipbuilding 
1 For the concept of the workers’ collective, see Lysgaard, Arbeiderkollektivet.
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workers have important traits in common, and that they have played an 
important role in the modern economic history of Norway, as well as in 
the formation of local workers’ culture and in the development of the trade 
union movement generally.
We begin by considering the situation of the Norwegian shipbuilding 
industry at the end of the Second World War, in order to analyse what proved 
to be a long cycle of expansion, which lasted until the early 1970s. We argue 
that a basic precondition for this growth phase was continuous productivity 
gains, which must be understood as a result not of mechanisation, but 
of changes in the organisation of work – we consider both investment in 
heavy mechanical plant and equipment and changes in the wage system 
as a means of organising work more eff iciently. Thereafter, we describe the 
effects of changing conditions on the industry after the 1973-1974 OPEC oil 
price hikes. On this basis, we attempt to answer the question: what were 
the situation and the role of the labour force in the build-up phase prior to 
the international oil price crisis in 1973-1974, and in the period thereafter? 
The analysis is based on research concentrating on the Bergen f irm Bergens 
Mekaniske Verksteder (BMV), and Stord Verft.2 Both Stord and BMV became 
part of Aker, the principal group in Norwegian shipbuilding, in the 1950s 
and 1960s respectively. In addition to studies at workplace level we also 
build upon studies of industrial relations at group and industry levels. 
Our procedure, then, is to take the workplace as point of departure, while 
also analysing developments at industry level, in order to get a grasp of 
industrial relations.
The state of the Norwegian shipbuilding industry in 1945
When the Second World War ended, most of the large yards in Norway 
were incapable of building the modern tonnage that shipping companies 
demanded. Not only had the war years meant a lack of investment generally 
in plant and equipment, but the low activity in the previous two decades 
had resulted in outmoded yards that were basically designed to build ship 
2 The BMV shipyard was established in 1855 at Solheimsviken, Bergen. In 1929 it merged 
with the other local yard in nearby Laksevåg, and subsequently extended its control over local 
production in the sector. The group was taken over by Aker in 1965. See Ågotnes, 100 år i kamp og 
samarbeid, 114. Stord Verft, situated south of Leirvik on the island of Stord, started its activities 
in 1945 with the construction of small ships, and became a major shipyard after it was bought 
by Aker in 1956. Aker Stord is the largest yard in Norway and has built both supertankers and 
the largest production platforms in the world. See Grove and Heiret, I stål og olje, 42ff.
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types of an earlier era.3 In 1941, the manager of Akers Mek Verksted, one of 
the largest shipyards in Norway, published an analysis of the state of the 
industry, which we utilise in this section.4 At the beginning of the war, there 
were eighteen yards in Norway that built steel ships on a regular basis, in 
addition to seven relatively important yards that mostly did ship repair 
work, but occasionally also built ships. Of these twenty-f ive yards, only 
four were technically capable of building large ships, and even those four 
had a miserable record during the interwar years.5
In the interwar years, the industry suffered under the general economic 
crisis, in part due to the macro-economic policy pursued by the Norwegian 
state. Consequently, production activity was low and unemployment high 
in the industry, as they were in the economy as a whole. Twelve yards closed 
down between 1920 and 1941, and the rest produced only a fraction of their 
tonnage capacity.6 The yards lost a large share of their domestic market, 
which was considerable for a small country whose merchant f leet was 
one of the largest in the world.7 Of the ships built for Norwegian shipping 
companies from 1900 to 1904, 57 per cent were built in Norway, while the 
corresponding percentage for 1935-1939 was 11 per cent. In absolute f igures, 
the tonnage built was less in the last period than in the f irst.8 At the same 
time, the fleet had grown, especially in the period 1924-1939, when the ton-
nage almost doubled.9 The growth was due to new ship types: motor-driven 
ships rather than steam ships, and tankers rather than traditional merchant 
ships. Almost the whole tonnage expansion in this period was in tankers 
driven by diesel machinery. And the new ships were considerably larger: 
on average between 6,000 and 7,000 grt. The Norwegian shipping industry 
had entered into new trades, especially fuel transport, and typically sailed 
between continents, rather than between European ports as earlier.10 In 
3 Although the Norwegian f leet grew in the interwar period, the Norwegian shipbuilding 
industry failed to adapt to the market. The main benef iciaries of ship orders were Sweden, 
Denmark, and Britain, despite Norway’s attempt to indirectly protect and subsidise its shipbuild-
ing industry through a State Shipping Fund in 1928. For this period, see Nordvik, “The Norwegian 
Shipbuilding Industry”, 194-197, and Jones, Shipbuilding in Britain, 76, 102-104. 
4 Aamundsen, Reisningen av den norske skibsbyggingsindustri.
5 Ibid., 18.
6 Ibid., 17.
7 As it had been since the nineteenth century; see Pollard, Peaceful Conquest, 236.
8 Aamundsen, Reisningen av den norske skibsbyggingsindustri, 7f.
9 Ibid., 10. From 2,521,674 grt in 1924 to 4,737,555 grt in 1939.
10 The market for oil transport was one of few growth areas in sea transport between the wars, 
due to changes in the international oil economy; the Norwegians were able to take advantage 
of this. See Herlitz, “Svensk varvsindustri och norsk sjöfart”, 45.
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comparison, the ships built in Norway in this period were just above 1,000 
grt on average, essentially the same as they had been thirty years earlier.11 
Norwegian yards still built traditional cargo ships with steam engines. And 
most of them combined building of new ships and repair work, of which the 
latter was more profitable.12 The building of ships was a means to retain the 
workforce and thereby remain in business. The replacement of steam with 
diesel engines in ships also called for major investment in new production 
facilities. In BMV, the poor practice in steam-engine production was f irst 
felt in connection with repair work on motor-driven ships. In the 1930s, 
BMV’s repair department started to produce replacement parts for diesel 
engines, but the existing lathes and milling machines in the machine shop 
could not work accurately enough to meet the required tolerances, and new 
machine tools had to be installed in order to achieve this production.13 After 
the war, diesel replaced steam in small ships as well, and the production 
line for manufacturing engines had to be totally renovated.14
The shipyards consequently had to modernise if they were to compete for 
contracts on the ship types that accounted for the expansion of Norwegian 
shipping. With a few exceptions the berths were too small, cranes had 
inadequate lift capacity, and production machines were old and unpro-
ductive. This was no secret for the leaders of the industry; and we can 
ask why they did not modernise their production facilities in the 1930s. 
Given the state of most shipyards in this decade, however, this would have 
required massive investment, and as one prominent manager wrote: “If 
modernisation had been profitable, they would sooner or later have found 
the necessary capital”.15 Prof itability was obviously crucial: in 1935, the 
board of the BMV turned down a scheme of modernisation on the grounds 
that such a large investment would not be profitable.16 In fact, the largest 
Norwegian shipyards almost without exception did not pay dividends to 
their shareholders in the period 1925-1939. In this period, many yards built 
ships with no profit margins, and were often subsidised by municipal au-
thorities in order to maintain production and local employment. Ship repair 
work f inanced the overhead costs in shipbuilding for most f irms. Even Aker, 
the relatively modern Oslo yard with a sub-licence from Burmeister & Wain 
11 Aamundsen, Reisningen av den norske skibsbyggingsindustri, 11ff.
12 Ibid., 25.
13 Interview, Bergen Jern og Metall, 28 January 1982.
14 There was one exception, a steamship delivered from BMV in 1947: Gilje, Skip fra vik og våg, 
112f.
15 Aamundsen, Reisningen av den norske skibsbyggingsindustri, 21f (our translation).
16 Myran and Fasting, Herfra går skibe, 200.
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of Copenhagen to build marine diesel engines, had a bad record after the 
war contracts were completed in 1924.17
During the Second World War, managers began to plan how to rebuild the 
shipyards when the war ended, anticipating a post-war situation that would 
offer new possibilities. They reasoned that the shipbuilding industries in 
other countries would be busy rebuilding their own countries’ f leets to 
make good their war losses.18 This was also the case for the Norwegian 
fleet, which had suffered serious losses. They also correctly assessed that 
monetary transfers across borders would be restricted in post-war Europe.19 
Consequently shipping companies would have to build their new ships at 
home. Representatives of the shipbuilding f irms had discussions during the 
war with the Norwegian government in exile in London on future condi-
tions for the yards, and secured support for their plans for modernisation 
on the basis of extended production capacity. After the war, markets for 
most commodities were strictly regulated in Norway, especially imported 
products, such as steel plates and profiles, which were not manufactured 
in Norway. The government controlled the use of raw materials in order to 
prioritise what it considered important. It was a necessary precondition for 
the rebuilding project that the government prioritised shipbuilding, which 
it did. In the following years, the larger yards were redesigned in order to 
build larger ships and introduce new production methods. Inspiration came 
from the US Emergency Shipbuilding Program, which utilised assembly 
techniques borrowed from other industries, and from Swedish yards, which 
Norwegian managers had studied during the war.20
Work, workforce, and industrial relations
The typical shipbuilding f irm before the war had produced almost all parts 
of the ships in-house. In addition to the yard department, where the hulls 
were built, there was a machine shop for the building of steam engines and 
other mechanical equipment, a boiler shop for production of steam boilers, 
a foundry for forging of machine parts, and several smithies and depart-
ments for woodworking, sheet metalworking etc. The workforce therefore 
17 Aamundsen, Reisningen av den norske skibsbyggingsindustri, 21f.; Solstad, Medaljens forside, 
302.
18 Kaarbø, “A/S Bergens Mekaniske Verksteder under den tyske okkupasjon 1940-45”.
19 For currency restrictions, see Petersen, Et kvartsekel i fremgang, 34ff.
20 Andersen, Fra det britiske til det amerikanske produksjonsideal.
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had a wide variety of specialised occupations, of which foundry workers, 
machinists, boilermakers, blacksmiths, platers, and riveters, together with 
their respective unskilled helpers, were the most numerous among the 
metalworking trades.21
The metalworking industry comprised several types of f irms in addition 
to shipyards, including light and heavy engineering workshops, foundries, 
etc. Local trade unions were formed on the basis of distinct occupations 
with members from diverse workplaces. At the outbreak of war in 1939 
the nine unions of metalworkers in Bergen together had around 2,500 
members.22 All these groups formed unions in the towns and were active 
in the early trade union movement. In Bergen, the shipyards were by far 
the largest workplaces for metalworkers, and the shipyard workers often 
dominated among the workforce and in the unions.23 The unionisation 
of the workforce had begun in Bergen in the 1890s. Even if the workers’ 
collectives were divided in many and diverse unions, they tended to unite 
in action when conflict with owners and management was imminent. 
From the beginning of the 1900s, the members of the different unions in 
each workplace formed a club inside the workplace to co-ordinate their 
interests. By the 1930s this organisational unit had become an important 
union asset in furthering workers’ interests. For example, during the period 
of high inflation in the mid-1930s, the club at Laksevåg organised a series 
of then-illegal actions to gain wage rises.24
Unionisation of the workforce at a national level also dates from the 
1890s.25 The Union of Iron- and Metalworkers (Norsk Jern- og Metallarbeider-
forbund, NJMF) organised workers in engineering, steel construction, and 
shipbuilding.26 The NJMF was one of the national trade union federation’s 
21 The woodworkers in the shipbuilding industry belonged to three different trades, which 
were usually in different departments: carpenters, joiners, and patternmakers. In Bergen they 
merged with the metalworkers in a joint union in 1971. See Ågotnes, 100 år i kamp og samarbeid, 
204ff.
22  Norsk Jern- og Metallarbeiderforbund. Beretning om forbundets virksomhet.
23 The members of the machine workers’ union, together with the shipbuilders’ union, ac-
counted for about half of the 2,500 organised members of the NJMF in 1940: Norsk Jern- og 
Metallarbeiderforbund. Beretning om forbundets virksomhet.
24 Grove and Grove, Verkstedklubben på Laksevåg, 25ff. 
25 For a general analysis of the industrial relations system in Norway in the period after 1945, 
see Heiret, “Three Norwegian Varieties of a Nordic Model”.
26 Not all groups belonged to the NJMF. Until the LO adopted the industrial form of organisa-
tion in 1923, the woodworkers had their own union at the national level, and there were even 
more national unions organising shipbuilding workers, including the foundry workers, which 
did not join the NJMF until 1960. Locally, merging sometimes occurred later; see Myran and 
Fasting, Herfra går skibe, 200.
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(LO’s) major member organisations and soon took a leading role within the 
national federation. The NJMF organised not only skilled workers in differ-
ent trades, such as blacksmiths, lathe turners, engine f itters, boilermakers, 
platers, and so on, but also the unskilled helpers in the metalworking in-
dustry. But the organisation was dominated by the relatively highly skilled, 
and followed a trade union strategy based on the bargaining strength of 
the skilled members. In 1907, a nationwide agreement was signed with 
the employers’ organisation on wages and working conditions. The main 
principle of the agreement was one of minimum wages: no one should be 
paid less than a minimum wage per hour (which was different for skilled and 
unskilled work). But the normal practice was to pay wages on an individual 
basis, and the agreement presupposed that actual wages would be higher 
than the minimum wage, both then and in the future, as employers would 
tend to pay more to get people with the qualif ications they needed. The 
union urged members to press for higher wages by individually demand-
ing higher payment. In the years up to 1920 it became a code of honour 
among the self-conscious skilled ironworkers to demand wage rises and, 
if their foreman refused, then they were morally obliged to quit and f ind 
work elsewhere. In periods of production growth, competing f irms would 
welcome skilled workers and willingly pay them more, and there is plenty of 
evidence that employers’ organisations had trouble avoiding “wage spirals” 
because internal discipline was too weak to hinder the member f irms from 
bidding up the price of skilled labour in this period.27
The normal wage system also included piecework. In shipbuilding, squad 
leaders would agree with management on a f ixed price for a part of the 
hull, and the team members would then be able to earn more than the 
hourly wage, with 50 per cent more being the norm. If an agreement was 
not reached on the price, the work was to be carried out on the basis of the 
hourly wage. Lacking the extra f inancial inducement of piecework usually 
meant that the squad worked slower; thus both parties had an interest in 
reaching an agreement. Squads included at least one skilled worker, who 
acted as leader, and as the team’s negotiator. He could command the helpers, 
and the eventual surplus from the job was divided proportionally to the 
team members’ individual hourly wage.
This whole system of regulating work and remuneration was built on 
relations that pre-dated unionisation and tariff agreements, and comprised 
relations not only between management and workers, but also between 
workers of different skill levels, where differences in respect and authority 
27 Ågotnes, “Skipsbygging, jernarbeidarar og fagleg kamp”, 124.
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played a central part. The agreement of 1907 (Verkstedoverenskomsten) 
– which codif ied the industrial relations for the industry and which has 
since been revised on the basis of the same principles – accepted the basic 
conditions in production, but established rules that should secure a share of 
the produced values for the workers. The NJMF wanted to use the existing 
strength of its members both in the workplace and in the labour market 
generally to achieve this. The scope for its strategy was (in addition to 
securing its own position in the workplace) restricted to get better living 
conditions for its members (not only wages, but also working hours, holiday 
entitlement, and social security). Although the outlook of the entire trade 
union movement was clearly socialist, there was no plan to overthrow the 
social order in NJMF policy. The social revolution was a task left to the 
political wing of the labour movement, the social democratic party. Even so, 
the building of the agreement on working conditions, which added a level 
of relations (between organisations at national level) to those arising out 
of production and the labour market, meant increased worker influence on 
the development of the industry. At the level of the work process, workers 
had considerable power through the skills that management depended on 
in order to achieve the needed level of productivity. Through their union 
organisation, they partly controlled the supply of labour power28 and, 
through the organisation’s position as a negotiating party at industry level, 
they could influence the rules that regulated the division between capital 
and labour of the value produced.
The web of relations among the differentiated workforce and between 
the different levels of the union organisation, and the practices connected 
with work and organisations which had crystallised over more than f ifty 
years up to the war, left the workforce of the shipbuilding industry with 
certain attitudes, skills, and other resources for action that formed one 
of the conditions for the development of the industry in the post-war 
period.29
28 The percentage of metalworkers who were organised of course varied. It increased in the 
period up to 1920, then dropped sharply in the early 1920s, and increased again during the 1930s. 
In 1938 the metalworkers’ union Norsk Jern- og Metallarbeiderforbund calculated that 95 per cent 
of metalworkers were members of the organisation: Olstad, Jern og Metall 100 år. Bind I. 1891-1940, 
520. After the war, the percentage was still high – 87 per cent is mentioned for 1968: Halvorsen, 
Jern og Metall 100 år. Bind II. 1940-1991, 413. For membership f igures in the metalworkers’ union, 
see Bjørnhaug et al. (eds), I rettferdighetens navn. LO 100 år, tables, 352-361.
29 For an analysis of the background of the formation of attitudes in the workplace, see Ven-
neslan, Arbeid og erfaring.
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Reconstruction and expanding production, 1945-1960s
The local shipbuilding company in Bergen may serve as an illustration 
of a typical development of the production system. The Bergen f irm, 
Bergens Mekaniske Verksteder (BMV), was established in 1929 when the 
two competing local shipyards, both dating from the nineteenth century, 
merged to form a new company. Both production sites continued their 
operations, intending to specialise in shipbuilding in Solheimsviken and 
in ship repair in Laksevåg. The planning of a new yard in Solheimsviken 
started in the mid-1930s, but little was accomplished before the German 
occupation (1940-1945), making its realisation impossible. In the meantime, 
piecemeal news of production methods in Sweden and the USA meant that 
the prospect for future production was constantly changing. In Sweden, 
shipyards in Gothenburg had built large ships by means of new techniques 
starting before the war. In the period 1935-1940 they replaced riveting of the 
hull with welding. In the late 1940s and the 1950s, block building profoundly 
transformed the production process. The yards built ships block by block 
before assembling them on the building berth.30 Before this period, from 
the 1920s, the successful Swedish industry had fulf illed a large share of 
Norwegian shipowners’ contracts.31 News of the exceptional productiv-
ity gains in wartime production in the USA also influenced decisions in 
Bergen. But f inal plans for renewal were slow to materialise. The plans 
were continuously revised, and became ever more ambitious during the 
war; until it was decided by BMV to refurbish its shipbuilding department 
(for hull construction) in order to produce large ships by means of the new 
methods. The preliminary aim was 10,000 tons; thereafter the capacity was 
to be expanded to 20,000 tons. By 1950 most of these plans were completed. 
The f irst ship approximating 8,000 tons was delivered in 1952, the f irst near 
20,000 tons in 1958.32 The yard area initially had three building berths and 
a dry dock; but these structures were removed to make space for two larger 
berths. A berth crane capable of lifting 20 tons and two tower cranes of 
10 tons’ lift capacity served the berths. A new block-fabrication hall was 
erected, equipped with the latest welding plant and equipment and gantry 
30 Svensson, Från ackord till månadslön, 245, 250. See also Olsson, “Big Business in Sweden”.
31 Kuuse, Varven och underleverantörerna, 18, and Svensson, Från ackord till månadslön. The 
Norwegian market was the largest buyer of ships from the British shipbuilding industry in this 
period; see Johnman and Murphy, “The Norwegian Market for British Shipbuilding”, 57.
32 Gilje, Skip fra vik og våg, 113. In 1963, the f irst ship of approximately 30,000 tons was built, 
followed by one of 37,300 in 1966. The last ship built in Solheimsviken, delivered in 1983, was 
the biggest, 39,270 dwt: ibid.
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cranes of 20 tons’ capacity. During the reconstruction of the shipyard, four 
ships were built in 1947-1948, with block building being used extensively. As 
the ships grew rapidly in size, so did the blocks, with maximum dimensions 
determined by the capacity of the lifting and transporting equipment. In 
1954-1955 one of the two new berths was extended and would later have 
capacity for 35,000-ton ships, and two new berth cranes of 45 tons’ lift 
capacity and a new 60-ton gantry crane for the block-fabrication hall were 
ordered.33 As technicians and workers gained experience with the new 
production methods, and learnt to build ever larger blocks independently 
of each other, more and more of the construction work was accomplished 
inside the block-fabrication hall, where the blocks were assembled.
A similar development towards a new organisation of production took 
place in engine and auxiliary building. Before the war, steam engines and 
other machinery were built in the same sequential way as the hull. The parts 
were made to f it together with the others in each individual engine. The 
year 1945 represented a shift from steam to diesel in propulsion power in 
the general cargo fleet. Only three Norwegian yards built diesel engines for 
the large tankers. Others had to buy from sub-licensees, in the case of BMV, 
notably the Swiss Sulzer marine diesel. The pre-war situation, when most 
parts of the ship were produced inside the yard, was eroding. However, BMV 
began to produce smaller diesel engines mainly for auxiliary machinery 
but also occasionally for propulsion. BMV’s new diesel engines were built in 
series and based on interchangeable parts – therefore expanding production 
with a premium on productivity gains, and very different from the pre-war 
production of steam engines. The motor factory emerged inside the yard 
area in Solheimsviken.34
The new production processes involved a profound transformation not 
only of the building process, but also of the relations between construction 
and other areas of production. A precondition for assembling large parts in 
the block-fabrication hall before putting them in place at the building berth 
was the increasing concentration of control over the process in the drawing 
off ice. This was a long-term development in Norwegian yards. What was 
called “pre-marking” ( forhåndsmerking) of the constituent parts, which had 
begun around 1900, was intensified and perfected during the 1950s and early 
1960s, when technicians at the drawing off ice became able theoretically 
to compute the exact form of each steel plate. Then, equipment could be 
33 Høstaker, “Føretak i endring”, 55f. and appendix 2; Myran and Fasting, Herfra går skibe, 
222ff.
34 Myran and Fasting, Herfra går skibe, 232ff.
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developed which could automatically cut the parts in exact form. From 1960, 
the plates at BMV were cut by a machine instructed by drawings or (later) 
numerical data developed in the drawing office before any handling of the 
actual building material started. (The system was marketed internationally 
as Autokon.)35 That welding supplanted riveting of course facilitated this 
process: it was no longer necessary to punch holes in exact positions in the hull 
plates. However, the plates had to conform to smaller tolerances than before.
The development of more accurate marking and profiling of steel plates 
in conjunction with welding represented a profound transformation of 
the shipbuilding process. It affected the vertical division of labour inside 
the f irm. When the exact form of each part could be decided and f ixed 
in relatively detailed drawings, the plate-worker’s role in production was 
eroded. Some of “the work of the mind” was separated from “the work of 
the hand”. With more control concentrated in the construction off ice, it 
became possible for the technicians to systematically develop production 
methods: a necessary precondition both for the mechanisation of the plate 
cutting and the increasing sophistication of block building. On the whole, 
the engineers’ role in the shipbuilding process was expanding.
The division of labour among the different occupations “on the shop 
floor” also changed. Several groups disappeared altogether, most notably 
the riveters. The two major occupational groups in the shipyard were now 
platers and welders. As a new skilled group, welders had to be trained, 
and training occurred in the workplace. Platers also had to adapt to new 
conditions, but still had a key role in production. At this stage, their trade 
qualif ications were necessary to solve unexpected problems and to secure 
the progress of production. The relations among workers produced by 
everyday interactions in the workplace also produced a workers’ collective 
in which some workers were recognised as the most capable, but which 
could also integrate newcomers and pass along the necessary skills. The 
everyday socialisation processes would also mediate established attitudes 
as to how a worker should behave, in relation to work, to colleagues, to 
piecework, and to trade union questions. The collective formed in this 
way represented a source of strength, and it preserved traditions in ways 
of thinking and acting.
This work organisation made systematic efforts to rationalise work 
easier than before. From a management point of view, production became 
35 The principles of the Autokon system and its application in shipyard lofting, and numerically 
controlled cutting of steel-plate fabrication, are presented in Mehlum and Sørensen, “Example 
of an Existing System in the Ship-Building Industry”.
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more flexible and, therefore, easier to plan in advance, and offered a real 
possibility for productivity gains. When building series of similar ships, 
experience could result in more rational solutions (“the sister ship effect”). 
With the advent of new technology, management gained more control over 
the construction work, and could plan rational ways to organise the produc-
tion process. Norwegian tonnage constructed (grt) almost trebled from 1960 
to 1975. The workforce also grew in that period, but at a much more modest 
pace, an increase of approximately 50 per cent. In 1972, off icial statistics 
showed that the Norwegian shipbuilding industry employed 30,352 people, 
just over 8 per cent of total employment in manufacturing industry. In 1960, 
the share had been just over 6 per cent – 20,010 people.36
Shipbuilding was also a relatively labour-intensive industry. The propor-
tion of the capital needed to build a ship that was variable (wages plus cost 
of materials) was relatively high compared to the proportion that was f ixed, 
in production facilities and overhead costs. According to off icial statistics, 
the value of raw materials in Norwegian shipbuilding was more or less equal 
to the value of wages in the 1940s.37 Thereafter, the ratio changed in favour 
of materials, so that in 1969 it was 2.4 times the wages paid. Even if one 
cannot infer anything about physical changes from value f igures, it is clear 
that more steel passed through the yards. This corresponded to the business 
strategy of the f irms: the principal means to keep up prof itability was 
building more productively and producing more output per working hour. 
This was also the rationale behind the investments in heavy equipment such 
as gantry and other heavy-duty cranes to enhance flow-line production and 
therefore make possible a more effective use of labour power than hitherto. 
The overarching strategy was all about the organisation of work. The invest-
ments in production facilities did not aim primarily at mechanisation over 
36  Perspektivanalyse for skipsbyggingsindustrien fra et utvalg nedsatt av Industridepartementet 
i oktober 1972 del II-IV (NOU 1974:51), 361, and Statistical Yearbook 1962.
37 The analysis of the statistical material involves some diff icult questions. Statistics Norway’s 
f igures include more than 100 production units at the end of the 1960s. At the same time, the 
government report on the state of the shipbuilding industry (1973) enumerates sixty-one units, 
each with more than f ifty people employed (workers plus technicians): Perspektivanalyse for 
skipsbyggingsindustrien fra et utvalg nedsatt av Industridepartementet i oktober 1972 del I (NOU 
1973:58). This latter source shows 16 large yards, each with more than 500 employed; taken 
together they represent 72 per cent of the total. It is these that account for the building of big 
ships. When using off icial statistics, which comprise so many small units, we are perhaps unable 
to measure tendencies in the principal yards accurately. In addition, there is the problem with 
breaks in time series. But they give f igures for wages paid to workers and technicians, for the 
value of raw materials, and for value added, and may indicate some tendencies for the industry 
as a whole.
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labour power, as parts of the work process remained dependent on the 
manual skills of the workers. But in the process, a larger part of labour was 
taken over by technicians in the construction department, and the ratio 
between technicians and workers gradually rose. While the ratio between 
the two groups in 1941 was 10 per cent, it had risen to 23 per cent in 1968. 
Since technicians’ salaries were higher, the ratio of wages paid to the two 
groups was also higher, 15 per cent in 1941 and 34 per cent in 1968.38
Seen from the employers’ perspective, wages represent a cost whether 
they are paid to technicians or to workers; however, technicians were not 
included in the workers’ collective in the yards, but were rather considered 
as part of management. From the workers’ point of view, the trade unions’ 
principal task was to make their members’ income as high as possible. 
After 1945, Norwegian trade unions demanded what they deemed to be 
a fair share of productivity gains. The economic regulation of industrial 
production was built upon a “social contract” to share the gains, with the 
result that the ratio between wages and profits for long periods remained 
more or less the same. If we look at the ratio of total wage cost to value added 
in the shipbuilding industry, it is more or less constant between 1945 and 
1969 – fluctuating between 60 per cent and 70 per cent for most years.39
Productivity gains remained diff icult to achieve in practice, however. 
Crucial to their realisation was management’s relations to the workers’ col-
lective, which could influence production both through working practices 
and through the different levels of their trade union organisation. Two 
worker groups held key roles in this transformation process. The platers, 
who formed the steel prof iles and plates for hull construction, undertook 
the marking, burning, bending, and assembly of the plates and sections 
to blocks. The most highly skilled platers formed a core group inside the 
workforce; they represented a marked continuity from the pre-war period, 
and brought the culture of their strong working-class identif ication from 
that period into the new situation. Another important group – ship weld-
ers – had largely replaced riveters in the immediate post-1945 decades. 
At f irst only the surface plates were welded together, but this was soon 
extended to most of the basic structures of the hull; even if riveting did not 
disappear completely before the end of the 1960s, it was mostly confined 
to ship repair. The yards had to train welders themselves, but it was a more 
limited skill than plating. BMV began systematic education of welders 
during the Second World War. Members of the existing workforce learnt 
38 Statistisk Årbok, various years.
39 Ibid.
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the new skills, and many new workers trained as welders. In the expan-
sion phase recruitment of new workers was considerable. The workforce 
in shipbuilding almost doubled from the beginning of the 1940s to 1969, 
according to off icial statistics.40
Reorganisation of shipbuilding capital, 1960s: group formation
Traditionally, Norwegian shipyards were local single-unit companies, often 
owned by local shipping interests. They were embedded in local economic 
and political relations: orders and financing often came from local interests, 
and the municipality could contribute to secure orders for the local yard. 
In the 1960s, this constellation of interests changed.
As ships grew bigger, especially tankers, many yards met the barrier of 
too small a production area. As we have seen, during the 1950s, ships built 
at BMV grew from less than 3,000 dwt to over 24,000 dwt.41 In the 1960s, a 
common type on the building list was 29,000 dwt, and the firm was reaching 
a size limit. Plans from the interwar years to move out of the city centre 
were never realised. Similar plans had Akers Mekaniske Verksted situated 
in Oslo’s inner harbour.
Aker was prominent among Norwegian shipyards. It had made diesel 
engines since 1914; it had built some advanced ships before the war, and 
in the 1950s had modernised its facilities along the same lines as the other 
important f irms. In 1956 Aker had a ship of 15,000 dwt on the building 
berth, a size comparable to several other f irms at the time.42 But thereafter 
its growth took off. In 1956, Aker acquired Tangen Verft, outside Kragerø, as 
an extension to its hull-building capacity. Hulls built at Tangen were to be 
f itted out by Aker in Oslo. The same year Aker bought another f irm, Stord 
Verft, a small shipyard which had been an early adopter of the new building 
methods, but whose production was small.43 The Aker management had 
something quite different in mind with this purchase: they had planned for 
40 From 12,334 in 1941 to 24,484 in 1969. Both workers and technicians are included: Statistisk 
Årbok.
41 Gilje, Skip fra vik og våg, 110-113.
42 BMV, Rosenberg Mekaniske Verksted, and Fredrikstad Mekaniske Verksted built ships of 
this size. See the building lists at http://www.skipet.no/skipsbygging/stalskipsverft (accessed 
6 May 2014).
43 Mjelva, “Stord Verft 1945-75”, 149ff. According to Mjelva, Stord was the f irst yard in Norway 
to introduce equipment for optical marking of steel plates in 1952 (p. 151). At Aker in Oslo this 
happened in 1955 (Solstad, Medaljens forside, 302f.).
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production of oil tankers on a much larger scale and had signed contracts 
to build 35,000 tonners. Soon the construction of a building dock started 
at Stord; when f inished in 1958 it was big enough to build supertankers of 
200,000 dwt. Stord became an integrated part of the Aker Group that was 
now created; we will hereafter refer to it as Aker Stord.
From then on, the size of the ships increased rapidly. In 1966, a turbine 
tanker of 90,000 dwt left Stord; the next year the size surpassed 100,000 
dwt. Aker now also controlled BMV. Tangen and occasionally BMV built 
blocks that were towed to Stord to be f itted into the huge hulls. By the early 
1970s, these tankers were typically around 200,000 dwt, but the size was 
still growing. The last contracts, signed at the end of 1973, were for ships of 
almost 500,000 tons. They were never built – in 1974 most of the building 
programme was cancelled in the wake of the OPEC price hike. The last 
tanker to be built was 280,000 dwt.44 The long post-war shipbuilding cycle 
was over. But now the oil-extraction activity in the North Sea became an 
important new market (see below).
The Aker Group was a new type of shipbuilding company in Norway. The 
Oslo yard was itself owned by a shipping company, but with the formation of 
the group management’s industrial strategy became independent of place, 
and relations to shipping interests were also widened to the nationwide 
level. The establishment of Aker as a company group represented the 
start of a process by which group organisation became common in the 
shipbuilding industry. Aker controlled a signif icant part of employment 
and production in shipbuilding – 28 per cent of total employment in the 
fourteen most important yards in Norway in 1972. Five other yard groups 
were formed in the 1960s, and together with Aker they controlled 44 per 
cent of employment.45
The second important shipbuilding group was formed by the industrial 
conglomerate Kvaerner when the company acquired Moss Rosenberg and 
later Fredrikstads Mekaniske Verksted, both among the largest shipyards in 
Norway. Moss Rosenberg specialised in tankers for carrying liquid natural 
gas, and therefore in part operated in a market sector that Aker did not 
participate in. Other groups had their own specialities. Having more than 
one production unit gave the group structure more flexibility in production, 
44 Aker bought the majority share in BMV in 1965 (Gilje, Skip fra Vik og Våg, 67). For the history 
of Aker’s building of supertankers, see Solstad, Medaljens forside, 320-376. In addition to Grove 
and Heiret, I stål og olje, the history of the Stord yard is also analysed in Mjelva, “Stord Verft 
1945-75”, Mjelva, Tre storverft i norsk industris finaste stund, and Trond Haga, “‘Stordabuen går 
offshore’”, AHS Serie A 1993-4.
45 Perspektivanalyse for skipsbyggingsindustrien (NOU 1973:58), 19. 
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and made it possible to cut building times, which was favourable to shipping 
companies, and also meant a reduced need for working capital.
Wage system and work organisation: the workers’ collective
The traditional way to organise work “on the shop floor” in the 1950s was, 
as earlier, by allotting specif ied tasks to squads as collective piecework. 
Early in the 1950s, the management of Aker took the initiative to abandon 
the piecework system. Piecework meant that, when work had to be divided 
in jobs and allotted to squads, the squads were not interested in doing 
anything not def ined as their responsibility. The system did not encourage 
workers to keep overall production in mind; squads tended to prioritise 
what was best for the team. In the 1950s, in some shipyards piecework was 
seen as a barrier to productivity gains. According to the manager at Stord 
Verft, all of them had problems with the piecework system.46 Managements 
had begun to consider alternative wage systems, as a way to introduce new 
forms of work organisation. They were aware of American Taylorist and 
Fordist management theories, but did not f ind the solution to their problems 
with the piecework system there: “Instead of solely stressing technological 
development, leadership, control and scientif ic measures, the question of 
productivity was now made dependent on a common understanding of 
interest between the owners, management, the employees and the local 
union. In line with this, wage growth became linked to an expected increase 
in productivity.”47 Accordingly, a new wage system was negotiated and 
implemented by Aker by the end of the 1950s, which consisted of f ixed 
wages, and eventually monthly salary combined with a productivity agree-
ment. The latter stated that, if productivity could be shown to have risen, 
negotiations (once a year) should result in a wage rise to all workers. Special 
shop stewards were also formally involved in co-operation to stimulate 
productivity (“productivity shop stewards”).48
In the next decade, the system of fixed wages and productivity agreements 
gradually spread to other companies in the industry. At BMV, the new system 
was finally implemented in 1968-1969.49 Later, work councils were constructed 
at company and group level, and trade union representatives in the group 
46 Statement from 1957: Grove and Heiret, I stål og olje, 87.
47 Heiret, “International Management Strategies”, 110.
48 Sørli, I samme båt?, and Grove and Heiret, I stål og olje, 90f.
49 Sørli, I samme båt?, 161.
tHe noRWegian SHipBuilding induStRy aFteR 1945 181
acquired the right to meet the top management. This representative system 
also promoted co-ordination of claims among the local unions in the group. In 
this way, the relations between managements and the union organisations in 
the company groups emerged as a new form of nationwide co-operative rela-
tions, alongside the extant relationship between national union and employers’ 
federations. Over the years, co-operation based on trust between workers’ and 
employers’ representatives allowed higher profitability to develop.50
During the long expansion phase, the organisation of work and the con-
tent of work itself had changed considerably. However, the workers’ collec-
tive at the BMV yard was still characterised by a high level of qualif ications 
and dexterity, which were still necessary to build ships.51 The anthropologist 
Hanne Müller has described the process of being integrated into this col-
lective in Solheimsviken at the beginning of the 1980s. To become a BMV 
worker, you had to acquire a habitus completely different from your private 
life. Wearing the work outf it, boiler suit, helmet, gloves, and protective 
shoes fostered identity. Over time, workers would learn how to carry out 
the different work operations and how to handle the many different tools in 
the most effective ways through instructions from more experienced work-
ers. But workers also learned – and adopted – the established normative 
system at the workplace through everyday communication, which included 
learning the internal vocabulary, but also coarse joking at the expense of 
the newcomer. Conversations during coffee breaks were often verbal jousts 
tending to establish a hierarchy giving each individual his position in rela-
tion to his workmates. The rough tone of the collective interaction tended 
to polish new workers to f it into the collective, to give them self-assurance 
resulting from a feeling of mastering the physical and social surroundings. 
This way of learning to know the workplace, of f inding your way around 
and becoming competent for the work by taking advice from – and being 
subjugated by – the more experienced workers, was meant to internalise the 
value system of the collective.52 The same integrational mechanisms, work-
ing through the everyday intercourse at the workplace – where coarse joking 
challenged people’s personalities – existed at Laksevåg.53 Undoubtedly, 
this contributed to the preservation of traditions of trade union thinking.
50 Heiret, “International Management Strategies”, 113f.; Heiret, “Three Norwegian Varieties of 
a Nordic Model”, 52ff.
51 See also García, “Astilleros, trabajo, cultura, e identidad”, 14, who makes the same assessment.
52 Alveng and Müller, Verftet i Solheimsviken. Of course, not all new workers will have ex-
perienced this socialisation as positive; many must have abandoned the workplace without 
becoming integrated into the collective.
53 Grove, Heiret, and Ågotnes, “Konsernbedriften som transnasjonal møteplass”.
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These types of relations were not unique to the shipbuilding industry; 
the point is to illustrate how attitudes were collectivised at the shop-floor 
level.54 The informal daily interaction among workers provided the context 
for the forging of attitudes to trade union policy that were expressed through 
the union organisation in the workplace, the club.
The OPEC oil price hikes starting in late 1973 created a crisis for 
Norwegian tanker shipping companies, and cancellations of building 
contracts soon followed for the shipyards. This year therefore represents 
the most important turning point in the business history of Norwegian 
shipbuilding companies. However, the crisis did not immediately affect 
union activity in most yards, even if f irms such as the Aker Group had 
their orderbooks emptied. A transition to production for offshore oil 
extraction in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea was already under-
way in some companies, and extraordinary government subventions 
also contributed to keep the f irms running (see below). In the minds of 
shipbuilding workers, the burning question at that time was a different 
one: union members were preoccupied with the development in real 
wages during the rapid price rises starting around 1970. Indeed, the 1970s 
and 1980s saw an upsurge of union activity, in which workers’ collectives 
at the shipyards played a leading role. We will argue that, in order to 
understand the dynamic of the mobilisation cycle that followed, we must 
take into account the normative complex known as the “class compro-
mise” regulating the overall relations between the parties of the labour 
market. It has been depicted as a social contract, established before the 
war, and institutionally anchored in the Main Agreement (Hovedavtalen) 
between the Employers’ Federation and the Trade Union Federation, LO. 
The tacit basis for the social contract included the presupposition that 
workers should have their share of the gains of production, but also that 
the basis for securing that share was co-operative relations with real union 
inf luence over bargaining results, and even over internal organisation 
of the workplace.55 The ideal was to further their interests through the 
bargaining system, if possible without resorting to open industrial action. 
An industrial relations system built on co-operation with employers and 
the state was seen as normal and desirable, and as effective in giving 
workers their fair share of economic growth. In this period, the normative 
conception was probably well established in the LO membership, and 
especially in the metal industry. Questions of fair wages were enmeshed 
54 Garcia, “Astilleros, trabajo, cultura, e identidad”, makes a similar analysis.
55 Heiret, “International Management Strategies”.
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in a web of expectations, including opinions on bargaining procedures 
and attitudes towards industrial co-operation.
It can be argued that this normative foundation of co-operative rela-
tions, and not a crisis consciousness, determined union behaviour in the 
decade after 1973. In this period the metalworkers went through a prolonged 
mobilisation in defence of claims that involved both material and political 
issues, and which had important effects on industrial relations and on the 
government’s income policy at the national level.
The transition to a wage system with f ixed salaries strengthened the 
unions’ general attitude towards employers. What changed with the new 
wage system was that the struggle over local wages now took place as 
part of bargaining on behalf of the whole workforce in the yard, instead 
of multiple instances of setting piecework rates. As a consequence, for the 
union members, the local arena for wage increases gained in importance 
relative to central bargaining.
Seen from the point of view of the other co-operating partners, the 
benef its included the controlled development of the general wage level, 
of central importance to employers. During the 1960s, central bargaining 
was tightly co-ordinated from the top, with more or less the same wage 
regulations for all parts of the LO’s membership. The government aimed 
at securing moderate development in wage levels.
In a situation with rapidly rising prices from 1970, the club at BMV Lak-
sevåg started a series of protests against stagnating real wages, culminating 
in metalworkers marching to the city centre in 1973 and again in 1974. The 
demonstrations voiced the opinion that public spending had become too 
high, and claimed a higher share of the value produced for workers.56 Now 
government intervened in new ways in the central bargaining processes in 
order to secure agreements with moderate wage rises, for example, by giving 
tax reductions and other forms of compensation. But locally wages still 
tended to rise and, for groups such as the metalworkers, the most important 
source of higher wages was local collective bargaining in accordance with 
productivity agreements. In 1978, the employers’ federation demanded an 
upper limit for local “wage drift”. This new principle would hinder local bar-
gaining, and the claim was met with widespread protests and a breakdown 
in the central bargaining process. To gain control over costs, the govern-
ment then declared a one and a half year “income stop”, which prevented 
wages rises and suspended all existing agreements. Then, in the spring of 
1980, the trade union federation agreed to a proposition that restricted the 
56 Ågotnes, 100 år i kamp og samarbeid, 212ff.
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right to local bargaining in exchange for a guaranteed minimum income, 
benefiting low-income sections of the membership. A narrow majority of 
the LO’s members accepted the agreement, even if more than 70 per cent 
of the members of the NJMF voted against. The metalworkers perceived 
this as a breach of the principles underlying co-operation. Several years 
of active organising from the collectives in the shipyards followed. They 
organised demonstrations and regional shop steward conferences where 
they co-ordinated their claims. Eventually, they managed to abolish the 
restrictions on local bargaining in the central agreement of 1982. During the 
following years, the struggle went on, principally over the minimum wage 
guarantee, which the employers now wanted to abolish. But the dynamic of 
the struggle now tended to unite the LO members. The central bargaining 
process in 1986 ended with a lock-out which the employers lost, and the 
balance of forces was stabilised at the organisational level.57
The events of these heated years show, in our opinion, that the conditions 
in the shipbuilding workplaces, the practices the workers had developed to 
cope with them, and their understanding of their place in society tended to 
give them a prominent role in the social struggle when they felt their vital 
interests were threatened. But it cannot be interpreted as a path away from 
the strategy of co-operation. On the contrary, their overarching perspective 
during the conflict period was to restore the rules of the game. The right 
to local bargaining was defended as a moral right of basic importance. The 
outcome also shows a certain balance of forces, both between unions and 
employers and between different parts of the trade union federation. The 
attempt to change the rules and thereby weaken the position of those parts 
of the industrial workforce who had local bargaining rights failed. One 
precondition for this, we will maintain, is the deeply rooted moral complex 
called the “class compromise”.
Crisis, market change, and restructuring
The long-term effects of the crisis in the shipbuilding market after 1973 
were to change the structure of the industry.58 Aker’s previous success in 
this market did not mean that the group was competitive on price. Japanese 
shipyards built supertankers at much lower prices. But they were not willing 
to build for Aker’s customers, because that would be highly risky. These 
57 Bjørnhaug et al., “Solidaritetens grenser”, 92ff.
58  For this period, see Tenold, Tankers in Trouble.
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shipping f irms operated in an on-the-spot market for oil freights, and made 
high profits as long as demand was high. But as soon as the marked slumped 
they were immediately out of business. That was what happened with the 
crisis in 1973-1974.59 The Norwegian government at f irst met the situation 
with counter-cyclical measures, giving financial support to the shipbuilding 
industry. The local trade unions played an important role in the negotiations 
with state authorities to secure the support; a fact that demonstrates the in-
fluence that followed from the established co-operative relations.60 Towards 
the end of the decade, however, this Keynesian solution was abandoned, 
and a new principle established: the state would not in future favour any 
given branches of production. Rationalisation and market realities should 
be allowed to do their work in diminishing production capacity.61
It could be argued that the state interventions gave the industry the 
necessary time to establish itself in other markets. Contemporaneously, 
another economic development of momentous importance had taken place. 
The beginning of oil and gas extraction in the Norwegian sector of the North 
Sea demanded products and services that represented a new market for 
shipbuilding f irms. The Norwegian government secured a substantial part 
of the new market for domestic companies, by a policy of “Norwegianisa-
tion”, demanding that multi-national operators in the Norwegian sector of 
the North Sea allowed transfers of technological competence to Norwegian 
f irms. Ultimately, the Norwegian state built and grew its own operating 
company (Statoil). State policy gave domestic producers an advantage in 
the market for offshore products. By the time the oil companies were no 
longer obliged to use Norwegian goods and services and Norwegian yards 
could not be shielded against foreign competition after the establishment of 
the European Economic Area in 1994, the industry had already established 
a f irm position in the oil sector.62
The volume of activity in this new sector also represented a new problem 
for the economy as a whole. Demand was booming and, because of much 
higher profit margins in the oil industry, government feared a “spill-over” 
59 Solstad, Medaljens forside, 360ff.; Mjelva, Tre storverft i norsk industris finaste stund, 220.
60  Heiret, “International Management Strategies”. 
61 Strukturproblemer og vekstmuligheter i norsk industri (NOU1979: 35), 83. There were several 
support schemes for the shipbuilding industry from the 1950s, notably state guarantees for the 
f inancing of building loans, which resulted in state f inancing of losses to both Aker and other 
f irms. It is reasonable to say that this support ended in 1980. See Mjelva, Tre storverft i norsk 
industris finaste stund, 211.
62 For the changes in Norwegian policy towards the oil sector, see Sejersted, The Age of Social 
Democracy, 344ff.; Ryggvik, “Norsk oljepolitikk mellom det internasjonale og det nasjonale”.
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effect by which the cost level in the new sector would be transferred to 
the rest of the economy. There was much discussion over how much oil 
production should be allowed to grow without destroying the competitive 
strength of other sectors. In spite of this, the pace of extraction was, in later 
years, allowed to rocket. The rising costs in the oil and gas sectors probably 
had an influence on shipbuilding as did high unit costs for labour, materials, 
and inflation generally, Norwegian shipowners ordering from abroad, and 
intensif ied international competition from East Asian producers.
Many Norwegian shipyards ceased production in the 1980s and early 
1990s as a result of changing market conditions, and others had to reduce 
their workforce. There was a marked reduction in the workforce in the 
important Oslof jord region, until then one of the strongholds of the metal-
workers’ union.63 What happened to the workers has not been investigated. 
It is probable that many are accounted for by early retirement schemes; 
others must have found work in the industry elsewhere. On the other hand, 
on the west coast, the production capacity was maintained at more or less 
the same levels from 1975 to 2000, with a 20 per cent reduction during the 
following five years.64 The difference can be explained in part by production 
for the new North Sea market. Oil platforms in steel and steel decks for 
concrete platforms represented big orders. The surviving production sites 
originally constructed for building supertankers (Aker Stord, and Rosenberg 
in Stavanger) were well suited for the new products. Aker’s H3 platforms 
represented a substantial production volume before the crisis hit tanker 
production.65 The company built a new yard in 1970 specialising in build-
ing these platforms in Verdal in Trøndelag, an important new production 
unit in the group in addition to Stord, which specialised in steel decks. At 
BMV, modules for oil platforms were built, and a series of H3 platforms 
were f itted out.66 The same construction and manufacturing methods and 
63 The most important yard aside from Aker’s yard in Oslo (discontinued in 1982) was Fredrik-
stad Mek. Verksted in Fredrikstad, where the workforce was greatly reduced in 1988 and which 
closed in 1993, and Kaldnes Mek. Verksted in Tønsberg, where most activity stopped around 
1985. The smaller Moss Værft yard closed in 1987, and Tangen Verft stopped hull production in 
2003.
64 Bore and Skoglund, Fra håndkraft til høyteknologi, 90-91. In the Oslof jord region, employ-
ment in shipbuilding was reduced from around 22,000 in 1975 to fewer than 5,000 in 2005. The 
western region (Vestlandet) had around 25,000 employees in 1975, a f igure that was unchanged in 
2000, but with a reduction to approximately 20,000 in 2005. Almost all were engaged in building 
and repair of ships in 1975, but only 7,500 of the 20,000 in the western region in 2005: ibid., 88.
65 Solstad, Medaljens forside, 359f.
66 Gilje, Skip fra Vik og Våg, 69.
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equipment used in shipbuilding functioned well in production for the oil 
and gas sectors.
Another dimension of developments in shipbuilding after the 1970s is the 
transition from the building of large ships to that of small ships. In addition 
to structures for oil and gas extraction, small, technology-intensive ships 
have been an important product for the yards in the later period. Later, 
ships for special purposes, such as supply ships serving offshore platforms, 
seismic research vessels for mapping oil and gas reserves at the sea floor, and 
advanced f ishing vessels have been built at Laksevåg among other yards. In 
many cases, medium-sized shipyard groups that had previous experience 
with this kind of production were able to take advantage of this market. 
They were not directly hit by the tanker crisis of the 1970s and 1980s, and 
this probably accounted for some of the takeovers of production sites.
However, even if the capacity was preserved in this region, restructur-
ing still took place that signif icantly affected industrial relations in the 
workplaces. The dominant shipbuilding group, Aker, sold its older city-based 
production units. The Oslo unit was closed down in 1982. The last tanker 
built in Solheimsviken in Bergen, of 39,000 dwt, was delivered in 1983, and 
the same year BMV was sold to local investors, who thereafter sold to the 
Ulstein Group, a smaller but successful shipbuilding f irm located on the 
north-west coast. The Solheimsviken department was then taken over by 
the workers and employees. Solheimsviken AS produced modules for the 
offshore market until it had to close down in 1990, most of the time managed 
by a former shop steward. In 1990 the repair department at Laksevåg was 
sold out of Ulstein and merged with another local yard. Later, a series of 
owners successively controlled different parts of the Bergen units. The 
foundry and the diesel engine factory remained in the Ulstein Group until 
it was acquired by the British-based Rolls Royce conglomerate in 1999.67
The changes in group structure did not stop there. In the Aker Group, Aker 
Stord and Aker Verdal were now the principal sites for the group’s produc-
tion, which concentrated on offshore installations, even if hull building at 
Tangen Verft continued (until 2003). Then in 2002, after the Kvaerner Group 
got into serious economic diff iculties, these two principal groups merged, 
and the shipbuilding activities were eventually organised into Aker Yards. 
This Aker-owned group was formed in 2004 with a merger with the French 
conglomerate, Alstom, with yards at St Nazaire and Lorient. But in 2007 Aker 
sold out of Aker Yards, and the South Korean-controlled STX Europe took 
over. Aker now organised its activities in the offshore installations market 
67 Hammerborg et al., Jernvilje, 223ff.
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into Aker Solutions. Aker Solutions as a whole is a multi-national group 
with several market areas and with production units in many countries. Its 
principal production facilities in Norway – Stord and Verdal – in addition to 
Aker Egersund, produced platforms and modules for North Sea installations. 
From 2011 these units were reorganised in a new subsidiary, now under the 
old name Kvaerner ASA. The news of September 2014 that management were 
contemplating selling the company, possibly to Chinese interests, underlines 
the short horizon for ownership in the industry.68
The situation after 2000 has also given room for new group formations 
and new ownership constellations. Eventually, after several bankruptcies, 
the rump of BMV was in 2002 restructured under a new company, Bergen 
Yards Holding, which concentrated activities on ship repair and small, 
technology-intensive vessels at Laksevåg. By 2007, the f irm had expanded 
enormously by acquiring nineteen yards and other f irms, among them 
Rosenberg Verft, Fosen Mekaniske Verksteder, and Landskronavarvet of 
Sweden, and in May 2007 changed its name to the Bergen Group; its strategy 
was to supply high-tech products in shipbuilding and in offshore work. 
In 2010 the group employed more than 2,000 people.69 This spectacular 
build-up was reversed after a few years, however, and economic losses in 
2012 forced the group to sell the successful Rosenberg yard. The Australian 
company Worley Parsons took over the yard, which continues its ordinary 
activities in the offshore market. Then in 2014 Bergen Group’s shipbuilding 
division, with its remaining two yards at Fosen and Laksevåg, was reorgan-
ised as a new company, NorYards AS, and sold to the Luxembourg-based 
company Calexco Sarl. As a part of this process, the Bergen Group entered 
into an agreement to sell two of the remaining shipbuilding projects to the 
shipyard group, Kleven, located in Sunnmøre, Norway.70 The Bergen Group’s 
CEO, Asle Solheim, indicated that this sale was a result of the strategic 
choices made in the summer of 2013 when the board took the decision to 
reduce its exposure in the shipbuilding industry and to eventually exit 
from newbuilding activity. The sales have released capital to establish a 
68 Kvaerner had already established business connections in China, through a joint venture 
company with the state-controlled China Offshore Oil Engineering: Klassekampen, 12 September 
2014.
69 Grove, Heiret, and Ågotnes, “Konsernbedriften som transnasjonal møteplass”, 55.
70 See http//www.bergen-group.no (accessed 22 March 2014). The Bergen Group’s sale to Kleven 
comprises contracts on construction of two offshore construction vessels. The contracts were 
signed between Bergen Group Fosen and Volstad Maritime AS in the f irst half of 2012. Both hulls 
were under construction at Daewoo shipyard in Romania, to arrive in Norway in the second 
and fourth quarters of 2014 respectively for outf itting and completion.
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specialised site for offshore products at Hanøytangen, north of Bergen. 
Calexco, which is owned by Kostantijn Zjevago of Ukraine, will continue 
shipbuilding in NorYards AS consisting of NorYards BMV and NorYards 
Fosen. These two Norwegian shipyards will – together with NorYards Design 
& Engineering and NorYards Zaliv (Zaliv Shipyard, Ukraine) – as a strategic 
partner, form the NorYards Group.71
In only a few years, the workforce in the Norwegian production units in 
the Bergen Group was reduced from almost 1,700 to fewer than 300.72 This 
may been seen as a symptom of the shifting fortunes of the f irms managing 
the production in the sector. The activities in the units that are bought and 
sold are often more or less continued, however, possibly with a repositioning 
in the markets. A major source of the diff iculties for the Bergen Group 
was losses in shipbuilding projects. Norwegian yards building ships have 
during the past decades had the hulls built abroad, the Bergen Group yards 
in Poland and Romania, but without long-term links with the foreign yards 
they found it diff icult to control costs. The restructuring in NorYards is 
based on the idea of building new stable relations with a Ukrainian yard.
Clearly, this strategy has implications for the existing workforce. The 
move out of shipbuilding is recognition of the higher value-added content 
of offshore work, and likely future market, and in part recognition of 
better-capitalised shipbuilding companies elsewhere.73 All this points to 
the age-old adage in shipbuilding: liquidity is everything.
Transnationalisation of shipbuilding work
The frequent changes in ownership of production units since the 1980s 
have meant that the focus of the club activity has shifted. The question of 
wage level has become less relevant in many workplaces as the more urgent 
question of staying in business has been on the agenda. Market contraction 
is not the only explanation; capital structure is also important. There is a 
striking difference between the way shipbuilding capital is organised today 
and the situation f ifty years ago. While ownership was earlier strongly tied 
to the production sites, now the company groups buy and sell the facilities, 
and with a short time horizon. This has been a gradual process, starting with 
the establishment of the groups in the 1950s and 1960s and their buying up 
71 Ibid.; Dagens Næringsliv, 30 September 2014.
72  Dagens Næringsliv, 21 August 2014.
73 See Bergen Group ASA Interim Report, quarter 3, 2013.
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of smaller f irms, intensif ied during the contraction years in the 1980s and 
1990s, and especially with the striking globalisation of the f irms since the 
1990s, where free-floating capital operates in almost full independence of 
the material production structures.
It is also an open question whether we may speak of the same kind of 
workplaces and the same kind of work as earlier. The production of oil 
and gas structures and installations has introduced new ways of working 
and new ways of organisation. Steel work, formerly so extensive, is less 
important, while e.g. pipef itting and electrical and electronic installa-
tions are all more central to the production process. This means that new 
occupations and other qualif ications have become critical. The big orders 
are often divided in modules built in different production units. The 
engineering work is normally done in separate f irms, while production is 
organised by means of quality-control systems, which prescribe procedures 
of working and registering operations. Accuracy is critical: pipes and other 
parts must f it together, often with only small tolerances. There are also 
specif ic certif icates that workers must qualify for in order to do specif ic 
operations, for example, different welding operations.74 Welders now have 
less room for structuring their working day. Another question is to what 
extent workers move between production units and work elsewhere, e.g., 
in platforms offshore. All in all, this form of organisation has undoubtedly 
altered the relations between workers and between individual workers and 
the workers’ collective.
The mechanism of integration of individual workers into the collective 
at the workplace has probably changed considerably in most production 
units. The socialisation of young welders in Solheimsviken changed with 
the transition to offshore production, with its meticulous prescriptions of 
methods. Training was now wholly separated from the production process, 
and skills and norms were not transferred from the older to the younger 
in the same manner. Because skilled welders (that is, welders with the top 
certif icates, especially in pipe welding) were highly in demand, many were 
sent on travelling jobs, sometimes for weeks. Their social world was not 
confined to the home yard, and their identity as skilled workers were no 
longer tied to the workers’ collective.75 Individual careers now depended 
on circumstances other than the respect one could win from mates at the 
workplace. The conditions for passing on norms and attitudes forged by the 
experiences of the local workforce had changed.
74 Sirnes, Fra skipsbygging til fabrikkering av oljeinnstallasjonar, 54ff.
75 Alveng and Müller, Verftet i Solheimsviken, 54ff.
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But there is also continuity. The institutional framework for co-operation 
is intact, both at production unit and group level, and workers still have 
influence on management, especially in groups such as Aker, principally 
producing for the offshore sector. In the part of the industry still building 
ships the position of the union interests is more questionable. For example, 
the Laksevåg yard, now NorYards BMV, had up to 650 workers employed in 
spring 2014, but in autumn had no new orders; part of the workforce was 
laid off (retaining employment but unpaid for a period of time), and some 
were even f ired.76
Up to 2014, the Bergen Group built small technology-intensive ships, in 
combination with repair work. The company brings together people with 
skills on many levels. In ship repair work, which services the coastal f leet, 
traditional know-how and acquaintance with plant and machinery of many 
types are important. Some of the old production equipment also made this 
firm the only one in the region able to perform certain tasks. Simultaneously, 
they have mastered the cutting-edge technology of advanced products.77
The local workforce also represents traditions for industrial relations. 
Engineering or steel-plate workers approaching the age of retirement 
represent experience, which also includes norms on how relations in the 
workplace should be. There is a culture for tackling conflicts, and the union 
institutions are still there. However, the burning issues are now different, 
and the conditions of unionised work have changed profoundly. The union, 
at production-unit level, is far removed from its old position of power. It is 
an open question whether the yard workplaces are still the basis for the 
self-assured and influential workers’ collectives of previous decades.
The instability of production and ownership since the 1980s has 
meant that the task of avoiding shutdown has taken top priority for 
trade unions. In Bergen, especially during the 1990s, much club activity 
was concentrated on keeping the f irms in business.78 The local union 
worked to secure owners with the will to keep up production. This seems 
to follow from the way capital was functioning: it was more f lexible than 
hitherto, moving more easily from industrial production to (in the Bergen 
example) property development. In this process, local unions used their 
strategic position that followed from the three-part co-operative model to 
inf luence management decisions. In the case of Laksevåg, the club acted 
as strategic partner and was involved in negotiations with government, 
76  Bergens Tidende, 19 November 2014.
77 Venneslan, Farsethås, and Mortensen Vik, Geo Celtic.
78 Grove and Grove, Verkstedklubben på Laksevåg.
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with customers, and with different investor interests to secure viable 
solutions for the f irm.79
The most important issue in the earlier phases, wage rises, has become 
diff icult to tackle because of the more precarious position of production 
units, but also because of the way workers are now recruited. Today we 
can speak of a true transnationalisation of both production relations and 
industrial relations. Products may be built partly in other countries, such 
as hulls built for the Bergen Group, and the workforce is composed of a core 
of skilled workers with long experience in the local workplaces, younger 
recruits with local training, and hired groups from outside, either specialists 
(e.g., in electrical and/or data equipment) or groups from other countries 
(e.g., welders or painters from Poland and Ukraine). The different groups 
have their own specif ic experiences and therefore their own ways of think-
ing and doing things. They have different employment contracts and may 
or may not have a relationship with the local union.80 To lead a workforce 
like this in a unifying direction is indeed a challenge.
79 Ibid.
80 Venneslan, Farsethås, and Vik, Geo Celtic; Grove, Heiret, and Ågotnes, “Konsernbedriften 
som transnasjonal møteplass”.
6 From war reparations to luxury cruise 
liners
Production changes and labour relations at the Turku 
shipyard (Finland) between 1950 and 2010
Kari Teräs
Introduction
This chapter analyses how production reforms and labour relations of 
the shipbuilding industry in Turku were interrelated in the shipyard of 
Crichton-Vulcan in the post-1945 period. In addition, shipyard work and 
its wider local and national effects, as well as their connections to the 
global development of shipbuilding, are examined. One of the objectives 
of this chapter is to reflect on the factors that have affected the nature 
and speed of production reforms that have taken place in the shipbuilding 
industry in Turku. To accomplish this, it is necessary to consider the actions 
of company management, trade unions, and shipyard employees in a wider 
social context. The extended operational environment of the shipyard was 
affected by both domestic and international markets, as well as by national 
industrial relations.
Strong traditions
In order to understand the period after the Second World War, it is necessary 
to briefly consider the traditions of shipbuilding in Turku. Shipbuilding as 
a supply-side industry is particularly sensitive to economic f luctuation, 
and thus prone to slumps in demand; however, continuity of work has had 
a signif icant influence on the industry and employment in the f ield during 
the period under study. This is due in part to the conscious preservation 
of traditions, and in part to the phenomenon known as path dependence: 
shipbuilding is, in many ways, a sluggish f ield, and earlier technological 
decisions have influenced its development in numerous ways.
The f irst notable factor is the signif icant role that foreign know-how 
played in the development of Turku’s shipyards since the eighteenth century. 
From 1737 onwards, an Scotsman, Robert Fithie, created a basis for industrial 
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shipbuilding in Turku;1 and in 1842 the f irst foundry and metal workshop 
was established. After the Crimean War (October 1853-February 1856) it 
was acquired by another Scot, William Crichton, who built a new shipyard 
for his foundry near the mouth of the River Aura. He formed a joint stock 
company, Wm. Crichton & Co.,Ab, and merged with some smaller shipyards. 
Orders from the Russian navy f illed the majority of the yard’s orderbook. 
The warships built for the Russian navy in Turku were usually part of a 
larger order that would be prepared simultaneously at multiple shipyards, 
normally according to drawings that the Russian admiralty had acquired 
from leading British shipyards. Consequently, very little of the actual design 
work was conducted in Turku. In 1874, another shipyard, Åbo mekaniska 
verkstads Ab, was founded in Turku, later merged with another f irm, and 
changed its name to Oy Vulcan Ab in 1899. In 1913, Wm. Crichton & Co. Ab 
was declared bankrupt, and a new company Ab Crichton was established 
in its place.2
At the beginning of the First World War Finland remained an autono-
mous grand duchy within the Russian Empire, but this status was placed 
under great strain during the February and October 1917 Russian Revolu-
tions.3 These events prompted the Finnish Declaration of Independence 
adopted by the Finnish Parliament on 6 December 1917, which was followed 
by a short civil war from January to May 1918 when the revolutionary 
“Reds” were defeated by the conservative “Whites” with support from 
Germany. After a failed attempt to establish a monarchy, Finland became 
a republic.4
In the early years of Finnish independence in the 1920s and the 1930s, 
the submarine and warship projects carried out were mainly based on 
German expertise.5Another important feature concerned the labour rela-
tions of shipbuilding. The shipyard was the largest and most signif icant 
employer in Turku, and the large munitions and warship orders during 
the First World War only increased its importance, raising the shipyard 
1 Robert Fithie (1705-1772) served an apprenticeship at  Djurgården shipyard in Stockholm 
from 1722 to 1726. He was granted citizenship in Turku in November 1741, and was off icially 
granted a permit to begin to construct his own shipyard and rope-making works on the west 
side of the River Aura in Turku on 13 July 1747. However, he had begun to build ships earlier, and 
from 1746 he built ships on a regular basis. 
2 Von Knorring, Aurajoen veistämöt ja telakat, 75-80.
3 From the twelfth until the early nineteenth century, Finland was part of Sweden, a legacy 
reflected in the prevalence of the Swedish language and its off icial status.
4 See Lavery, The History of Finland. 
5 Teräs, “Turkulaiset telakat”.
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workers to a special status, both nationally and locally. After the March 1917 
revolution in Russia, shipyard workers grew more radical as their means of 
livelihood weakened with the decrease and eventual end of shipbuilding 
orders. For the f irst time, the metalworkers in Turku occupied the front 
line of the local labour movement, and simultaneously joined the wider 
international movement of metalworkers in numerous countries acting 
against the rationalisation of production, and tightened governmental 
regulation on labour relations. During the First World War, the joint influ-
ence of cataclysmic political and production-related changes consolidated 
a “militant mentality” among the shipyard workers in Turku. This reflected 
their local and national signif icance, and their crucial role in production. 
This mentality led them to the head the struggle for notable reforms in 
labour relations, including the implementation of the 8-hour working day 
in 1917, paving the way for similar reforms in other f ields of employment 
in Turku and nationally.6
In 1924, shipbuilding in Turku was concentrated in one large f irm, when 
Oy Vulcan Ab merged with Ab Crichton to form Crichton-Vulcan Oy.7
Labour relations and conditions of employment
In Finland, terms of employment were mainly decided locally within 
each place of employment until the end of the Second World War, as, in 
contrast to other Nordic countries, industrial employers refused to sign 
collective agreements with the trade unions. The shipyard in Turku was 
a substantial local and nationally important employer, and thus, under 
the circumstances, the changes to its labour relations were reflected in 
the entire nation. Moreover, the shipyard workers in Turku were highly 
organised and also had the will to affect industrial relations nationally. 
Even relatively small disagreements within the shipyard’s labour relations 
had the tendency to become political, and turn into issues that concerned 
the industrial relations of the entire country, requiring national politicians 
to take a stand. In 1927, a strike for collective pay increases lasting more 
than six months took place at the Turku shipyard, eventually leading to a 
nationwide lock-out. The workers’ stand attracted national and interna-
tional solidarity, and the strike’s eventual settlement meant an end to the 
6 Teräs, Paikallisten työmarkkinasuhteiden kausi, 232-243; Teräs, “Turkulaisten metal-
lityöläisten henki”.
7 Von Knorring, Aurajoen veistämöt ja telakat, 88-89, 97.
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lock-out policy imposed by the metal industry employers’ union. In the 
end, the strike begun at the Turku shipyard and its settlement resulted in 
collective pay rises for all the employees who were locked out by employers. 
The questions of principle that were the main trigger for the industrial 
activities of 1927 resurfaced in the late 1930s, causing two more large-scale 
displays of industrial action. Before the mid-1940s, a strike, or the threat 
of one, was almost the sole means of inf luencing large-scale questions 
concerning pay and the terms of employment.8
The national signif icance of labour relations at the shipyard also played 
a substantial part in strengthening the environment of distrust prevailing 
within the company. A void existed between the mainly Swedish-speaking 
management and the Finnish-speaking workers, and, contrary to what 
was accomplished in numerous Swedish shipyards, the management’s 
various labour policy strategies were not enough to close it. For a long 
time, the management of the Turku shipyard neglected the development of 
welfare programmes, and the position of Chief of Welfare was established 
at the Turku shipyard only after the Second World War. However, the 
leftist mindset of the workers caused them to take a distrustful attitude 
towards recreational activities, such as factory sports, that the company 
organised.9
The employer policies did not concern only the Turku shipyard, but 
also the large Wärtsilä Group, with which the Crichton-Vulcan shipyard 
in Turku had been merged in 1938. Wärtsilä’s managing director, Wilhelm 
Wahlfors, was the most influential person in the Finnish metal industry. 
The Wärtsilä Group aimed at observing a uniform employer policy within 
its companies, which operated in numerous locations in the country; 
however, it was in the Turku shipyard that the boundaries of the policy 
were often stretched. It had been established by experience that any 
reforms and wage drift accomplished at the Turku shipyard were likely 
to spread over the entire f ield. In the shipyard’s industrial relations, the 
local, the multi-local, and the national were connected in a complex, if 
somewhat strained manner.10 Wärtsilä’s expansion continued in 1939 when 
it purchased a neighbouring boat and engine builder, Andros, and merged 
it with Crichton-Vulcan.
8 Teräs, Verstasliikkeistä suurtaisteluihin, 132-153; Teräs, Paikallisten työmarkkinasuhteiden 
kausi, 325-344, 444-445.
9 Group interview with shipyard workers, 8 February 1989 (Museum Centre of Turku), 21-22.
10 Teräs, ”Turkulaisten metallityöläisten henki”, 68-76.
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War reparations provide work for Turku’s shipyards
After the Finnish declaration of independence in December 1917, Turku’s 
shipyards, previously operating mostly on exports to Russia, were faced 
with a thorough structural change. Thereafter, the Finnish metal industry 
came to mainly comprise domestic manufacturing, with the state as the 
most signif icant source of ship orders. The Turku shipyard company also 
operated a foundry where production could be switched to f ill gaps in 
ship orderbooks: its products included, for example, quay cranes. In order 
to be able to construct submarines and warships commissioned by the 
state, the company invested heavily in the modernisation of the shipyard 
in the late 1920s and early 1930s. New plant and machinery were acquired; 
a new shipbuilding berth, two plate halls, and a 100-tonne crane were built. 
Meanwhile, a new German shipbuilding technique was applied during 
submarine construction in co-operation with German experts.11
Another large-scale wave of modernisation at the Turku shipyard and 
foundry took place in the late 1930s after the shipyard had been subsumed 
into the large Wärtsilä Group. From the year 1932 onwards, the shipyard 
received orders, mostly involving tugboats, from the Soviet Union. However, 
an expansion in production occurred in 1936, when the shipyard’s orderbook 
was f illed with orders for larger, more modern, and more technically de-
manding vessels required by both domestic and foreign shipping companies. 
A vast investment programme was initiated to execute these construction 
projects; including the construction of a number of notable newbuildings to 
fulf il the needs of both the shipyard and the foundry. The assembly berths 
and plate halls in the shipyard were renewed, expanded, and equipped with 
sturdier cranes manufactured by the company. Large quantities of new 
machinery, commissioned from leading European manufacturers, were 
installed just before the start of the Winter War in 1939. Simultaneously with 
these extensive construction investments, the company decided to begin 
production of diesel engines in co-operation with the German company 
Krupp Germaniawerft AG in 1938.12
Another signif icant improvement to the shipyard operation was a dry 
dock, built close to the mouth of the River Aura with the assistance of the 
city of Turku, and f inished in 1937. By the decision of the government of 
Finland, the dry dock was appointed for the use of Crichton-Vulcan, which 
11 Von Knorring, Aurajoen veistämöt ja telakat, 97-104.
12 Von Knorring, Aurajoen veistämöt ja telakat , 107-113; Laakso, “Turun teollisuus manufak-
tuureista bioteknologiaan”, 24-26.
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signif icantly increased the company’s repair capacity and, in particular, 
enabled the docking of larger vessels. During the war, the dry dock served 
as a base for large amounts of ship conversion and repair work. Post-war, 
the shipyard’s repair department worked day and night on vessels that had 
been damaged in the war.13
The series of ships manufactured for the USSR and the technological 
reshaping of the shipyard in the late 1930s had played a central role in the 
Turku shipyard gaining orders for the largest vessels that were included 
in the war reparations for the Soviet Union. The reparations were so vast 
that two new shipyards had to be established in Turku to meet demand, 
even with Crichton-Vulcan operating at full capacity. At the peak of de-
mand, f iftenn Finnish shipyards were producing war reparations vessels. 
A separate body, SOTEVA (the Board of War Reparations Industry), was 
established in Finland to manage and organise the reparations industry in 
different f ields. Most of the reparation orders issued to the Turku shipyard 
did not involve technologically challenging vessels. This acknowledged 
that the shipyard had produced the same type of vessels previously, and 
thus did not require signif icant additions to its design capacity in order to 
accomplish the construction tasks. However, a central difference existed in 
that the series of vessels constructed for reparations were much longer in 
length than any previously produced series. The shipyard’s orders included 
thirty 800-horsepower tugboats, twenty-four barges of 3,000 tonnes, nine 
3,200-dwt freighters, and three 3,000-tonne motor barges.14
The shipyard required a substantial increase in its labour force, but post-
war reconstruction and reparations offered numerous work opportunities 
in different f ields and resulted in a labour shortage. In order to ease the 
shortage, SOTEVA offered professional courses to train new plateworkers, 
welders, and outfitting craftsmen. During the war, the number of employees 
at the shipyard was between 1,000 and 1,500, rising to 2,000 in 1945; by the 
time the reparations work ended in 1951, the numbers employed exceeded 
3,000.15 At this time, Turku’s 3 shipyards had more than 4,500 employees, 
which highlighted its status as Finland’s leading shipbuilding town, and 
the important role the shipyards had in the town’s economy.
13 Laakso, Turun kaupungin historia 1918-1970, 420-423; von Knorring, Aurajoen veistämöt ja 
telakat, 106-114, 120, 158-161; Teräs, “Turkulaiset telakat”, 324.
14 Harki, Sotakorvausten aika, 128-132; Haavikko, Wärtsilä 1934-1984, 76; Grönros, Laivanraken-
taja 1938-1988, 58; von Knorring, Aurajoen veistämöt ja telakat, 119; Rinne, “Globaalin kilpailun 
haasteet ja suomalaisen laivanrakennuksen perinne”, 12-13.
15 Von Knorring, Aurajoen veistämöt ja telakat, 117, 123; Teknisk årsberättelse 1951, at Suomen 
Elinkeinoelämän Keskusarkisto (ELKA).
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The serial production of reparation vessels offered the means for the ration-
alisation of production in the shipyard; however, the nature of the production 
process remained mostly unchanged. Nevertheless, each vessel built for the 
reparations served as an education and resulted in more streamlined produc-
tion, although at this stage a uniform system of flow-line assembly production 
still remained a distant idea. In the early post-war period, Finnish shipbuilding 
was still largely based on craftsmanship, experience-based knowledge, and 
the co-operation of numerous trades. The boundaries between the various 
crafts were, however, clearly demarcated, and each trade group advanced 
their respective pay issues separately: all of the central crafts had their own 
shop stewards. Under these conditions, the employees had relatively extensive 
means of controlling the production process. Original ship drawings were 
constantly updated during serial production as the workers kept adding 
incremental improvements to their ways of working. After 1945, shipyard 
workers were hierarchically organised, and decisions on production were 
made by squad leaders directly, with the foreman responsible for particular 
tasks. In tandem with the plateworkers, riveters maintained their status as 
one of the primary occupational groups of shipbuilding, as the ships built for 
reparations were largely riveted. Smooth co-operation among plateworkers 
and riveters was essential to the flow of shipbuilding.16
The shipyard was able to meet the heavy demands of the war repara-
tions schedule by distributing the work into two or three shifts; the last 
vessels were delivered to the national commissioner in late November 
1951.17 Crichton-Vulcan had to prepare for the more normal post-reparations 
climate and increasing competition, but its return to normal market condi-
tions was relatively soft, aided by the Soviet Union placing its f irst orders 
based on commercial treaties agreed in 1948; accordingly, substantial new 
orders were received in the early 1950s. Trade with the Soviet Union was 
conducted on a bilateral basis, within the framework of general agreements 
covering f ive-year periods. In the beginning, the commercial treaties signed 
with the Soviet Union mainly concerned a type of ship similar to those 
produced for reparations, but the orders gradually became more varied. 
Orders still comprised extremely long series production, f illing shipyard 
capacity and providing fuller utilisation of overheads within the shipyard.18
16 Grönros, Laivanrakentaja 1938-1988; Grönros, “Aurajoen rautakourat”; Niemelä, Ammat-
tirajoista tiimityöskentelyyn, 43-46.
17 Crichton-Vulcan Teknisk årsberättelse 1951 (ELKA).
18 Von Knorring, Aurajoen veistämöt ja telakat, 124; Laakso, “Turun teollisuus manufaktuureista 
bioteknologiaan”, 24-25.
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Simultaneously, the shipyard was involved in competition for substantial 
ship orders with both domestic and Western shipbuilders. Being active in 
two different markets had a positive effect on the shipyard’s development: 
Soviet trade stabilised the shipyard’s employment situation and allowed 
production reforms to enable the company to succeed in Western markets.19 
In the 1960s, the USSR placed orders for a relatively long series of large, well-
equipped ocean-going freighters, but from the 1970s onwards the deliveries 
primarily consisted of technically challenging special-purpose vessels, such 
as passenger ferries, icebreakers, and cable ships. During the 1970s, between 
35 and 40 per cent of the output went to the Soviet Union. However, due to 
the longevity of Finnish-Soviet general agreements, a significant proportion 
of the shipyard’s capacity would continue to be directed eastwards, even 
though the importance of Western orders was constantly growing from the 
1960s, and these orders were for more technologically demanding ships.20
The late breakthrough of welding
The focus on reparations work had delayed numerous new technical 
innovations and rationalisation, but in the early 1950s such delays could 
no longer be afforded. According to the workers’ recollections, the end 
of reparations work resulted in a tense environment at the shipyard as 
the onset of increasing competition was reflected in labour relations and 
working processes.21 The shipyard lagged signif icantly behind, for example, 
its Swedish competitors in terms of welding techniques, but it still had to 
compete partially in the same markets.22 The f irst vessel to be constructed 
almost exclusively by welding at the Turku shipyard was an oil tanker, Esso 
Finlandia, launched in 1949, but welding slowly became more common 
during the 1950s. It was acknowledged by management that many foreign 
shipyards had been building completely welded vessels since the 1940s, 
and that it was a gap that they would have to close. However, many naval 
architects and ship designers were somewhat distrustful of the endurance 
of welded structures.23
19 From the 1950s onwards, ships exported to the USSR amounted to half of the production 
capacity of Wärtsilä’s shipyards.
20 Wärtsilä Group annual reports, 1974-1976.
21 Group interview with shipyard workers, 10 February 1988, 3-5.
22 Svensson, Från ackord till månadslön, 235-251. For the British case, see Murphy, “The Health 
of Arc Welders”. 
23 Heino, “Muutamia huomionarvoisia seikkoja”, 74-78.
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Moreover, shipowners’ conservatism, insurance companies’ reluctance 
to take a chance on a new method of metal joining applicable to ships, and 
classif ication societies’ collective wariness all contributed to the delayed 
introduction of welding. However, all-welded ships were generally intro-
duced in the 1950s as the technique and its application to shipbuilding 
progressed.24 Welding was initially applied more often in limited areas. 
However, by the mid-1950s it was generally accepted that constructing an 
entire vessel by welding was appropriate, not least by savings in weight and 
hydrodynamic eff iciency, and thus riveting could be abandoned. This did 
not occur overnight and the shipyard underwent a relatively long transition 
period in the 1950s, with old and new technology working side by side. There 
were numerous obstacles hindering the wide application of welding; one of 
the most central was removed when cold bending replaced heating in frame 
construction in the 1960s, after which “welding was suddenly smoother”, 
as a former welders’ shop steward stated.25
The introduction of welding was affected by numerous factors, particu-
larly in the Finnish climate, which is characterised by great temperature 
variations. When welding was performed outdoors, winter cold and sum-
mer humidity caused signif icant problems for the quality of the welding 
seams. Furthermore, even when welding indoors in the fabrication halls, 
the problems could not be entirely avoided as initially the halls were not 
heated, and were thus prone to humidity in summer and cold in winter. Bad 
weather conditions delayed the work signif icantly: in freezing weather it 
was necessary to separately dry and heat the parts to be welded. A Soviet 
classif ication society set severe conditions and limitations for outdoor 
welding, recommending that it be ceased immediately if cessation was 
technically possible. Sweden, already ahead of Finland in welding advance-
ments, allowed outdoor welding only with an exceptional permit in the 
early 1960s.26 Riveting was not similarly susceptible to changes in weather, 
which was one of the reasons its use was prolonged, and some classif ication 
societies demanded, as late as in the mid-1950s, that ships be partially 
riveted.27
24 Group interview with shipyard workers, 8 March 1988, 1. In the late 1980s, Usko Nurmi, a 
long-term foreman at the Turku shipyard, recalled that a problem with welding was the warping 
of steel plates, which was especially bad in the deck structures of the vessels.
25 Ibid., 12. 
26 Sorje, “Kylmissä lämpötiloissa suoritettavia hitsauksia koskevia määräyksiä”, 142-144.
27 In the UK, the passenger liner Canberra was launched by the Belfast shipbuilders and 
engineers, Harland and Wolff, in 1960. Her hull had riveted frames and three riveted seams, and 
she was the last signif icant large vessel built to incorporate signif icant amounts of riveting in 
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At f irst, the possibilities offered by welding were not suff iciently 
exploited in ship design, and its use became more common mainly by 
following foreign examples and through experience of practical work. Low-
quality welding electrodes delayed progress, and no crucial steps were taken 
until 1963, when high-eff iciency electrodes gradually started replacing 
traditional ones.28 The shipyard was constantly on the lookout for new 
welding equipment: earlier, in 1958, it already possessed 441 hand welding 
units and seven fully automatic and five semi-automatic welding machines. 
In 1959, shipyard engineer Jouko Sorje had reason to state, in a magazine 
concerning the welding f ield, that the automatic machines allowed an 
increased welding speed compared to hand welding, but he also noted 
that cutting-edge welding machinery was a very expensive investment.29 
This was one of the areas where Finnish shipbuilding lagged behind the 
more developed shipbuilding countries. Automatic welding had seen its 
breakthrough in the USA on Liberty-type vessels built during the Second 
World War, and the technique was widely adopted in Sweden immediately 
after the war. In the beginning, automatic welding machines were only 
in restricted use, but they were applied more widely once the work could 
be moved into fabrication halls and the construction of ships from blocks 
started.30
It was not until welding became more commonplace that its use enabled 
the substantial reform of working processes: production-line work increased, 
work was more frequently divided into different stages, and the wages of 
different occupational groups were reassessed.31 With the drive to more 
construction in fabrication halls, time-and-motion studies became more 
common and systematic in numerous departments of the Turku shipyard, 
particularly in the mid-1950s. The work on new, large-scale prototypes for 
series of ships was planned, studied, and priced in more detail than hitherto, 
taking into consideration the increased work eff iciency brought about by 
serialised production.32 Unsurprisingly, the size and targets of series-based 
eff iciencies prompted a constant stream of discord in the labour relations 
of the shipyard.
the UK shipbuilding industry. See Moss and Hume, Shipbuilders to the World, 378-381. See also 
Johnman and Murphy, “Welding and the British Shipbuilding Industry”. 
28 Heino, “Muutamia huomionarvoisia seikkoja”, 74-78; Mäkelä, Ossin aika, 32-34; Grönros, 
Laivanrakentaja 1938-1988, 69-71.
29 Sorje, “Nykyisistä hitsausmenetelmistä”, 22-26, 36. 
30 Ekman, “Turun hitsaava teollisuus”, 51-55; Mäkelä, Ossin aika, 15-19, 31-34.
31 Mäkelä, Ossin aika, 43-50.
32 Wärtsilä Group annual reports 1951-1954; von Knorring, Aurajoen veistämöt ja telakat, 164.
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The fact that welding had become more commonplace affected the 
organisation of work in many ways: the traditional job description of 
plateworkers in particular was changed once they assumed some of the 
welding tasks, and the professional requirements for welders started to 
develop in a different direction from those of other occupational groups. 
The welders’ professional skills, as well as pay, were at f irst divided into four 
and eventually into f ive classes. It was not possible to learn welding simply 
through practical training in the same way as, for example, plateworkers 
could learn their craft, and this enabled welders’ professional qualif ications 
to be better controlled than those of other trades. The previously mentioned 
SOTEVA training courses for welders and plateworkers were short: welders 
were trained for two months, and plateworkers for only 40 hours. Sheet-iron 
workers in particular received the majority of their professional training 
through practical work, normally starting their careers as apprentices work-
ing in squads, or in pairs with skilled workers.33 Once these courses were 
no longer arranged, the shipyards in Turku started organising six-month 
welding courses, and the participants had work at the shipyards for a certain 
period of time. The workers at Crichton-Vulcan were also offered the chance 
to study in the Gothenburg vocational institute in Sweden, where local 
shipyards had run vocational schools since the 1950s, but this never became 
a popular course of education.
The Turku shipyard began organising its own courses in welding and 
platework in 1957. They included basic and advanced courses in welding 
for welders, and courses in plating, f lame cutting, and tack welding for 
plateworkers. According to information from the company’s technical 
management, by the end of the 1950s the shipyard had already provided 
training for approximately 1,200 welders.34 In 1961, the f irst course for 
automatic welding was arranged at the Turku shipyard; indeed, emergent 
information technology stimulated a constant need for new training in 
the shipyard. There was also a lack of a skilled workforce to operate new, 
digitally controlled machine tools, computers, automatic flame-cutting and 
welding machines, and other rapidly improving automatic tools acquired 
during the 1960s.35
Women were also accepted into the shipyard’s welding classes: the f irst 
females started work as trainee welders in the early 1970s. Beforehand, 
33 Group interview with shipyard workers, 8 February 1989; Teräs, “Työssäoppiminen ja 
työelämän murros”.
34 Ekman, “Turun hitsaava teollisuus”, 51-52.
35 Von Knorring, Aurajoen veistämöt ja telakat, 131-132.
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women had been working at the shipyard as cleaners, but in a step-change 
at the beginning of the 1960s they were also employed as crane operators.36 
In 1958, a head of training was employed at the Turku shipyard, and in 1965 
a two-year vocational school was established, settling into a building of 
its own in 1968. Due to labour shortages, the vocational school had to be 
extended in the mid-1970s, after which the annual graduate count of the 
school was approximately 250 students.37
The downside of the training provided for the welders was that riveters 
were no longer considered to be skilled professionals, and were demoted to 
common labourers. The number of riveters had begun to drop in the 1950s as 
welding gained popularity, and during the following decade the entire trade 
practically disappeared from shipbuilding. This signif ied a notable cultural 
turning point in shipyard work: along with the occupational group, a rich 
professional vocabulary and a signif icant part of the shipyard’s group work 
culture disappeared.38 Nonetheless, a cohort of riveters retrained as welders, 
some as sheet-iron workers, and others were moved to less important tasks; 
some changed profession altogether. As the transition period was relatively 
long, in the end relatively few workers had to be paid off. Furthermore, the 
professional skills of riveters were still needed at the shipyard foundry for 
crane construction and ship repairs.39
Ship repair activities were frequent at the Turku shipyard, and its opera-
tional preconditions were much improved when the dry dock was enlarged 
in 1960, allowing all contemporary Finnish vessels to be docked at Turku. 
Between 100 and 200 repairs were performed at the shipyard annually in 
the 1970s, a portion of which consisted of annual overhauls, and another 
portion of large-scale vessel conversions. In 1979, the Wärtsilä Group’s Kotka 
repair shipyard, specialising in smaller-scale repair work, was merged with 
the Turku shipyard; during that year, 185 repairs were performed at the 
shipyards. In 1980, ship repairs at the Wärtsilä Turku shipyard employed 
576 workers, comprising nearly one-tenth of the shipyard’s employees; 
simultaneously, 13 per cent of the shipyard’s invoicing concerned repair 
operations. A notable portion of the repair orders came from the USSR 
and the company increased its capacity for ship repairs through corporate 
acquisitions; in addition, an 8,500-tonne floating dock commissioned from 
36 Ukkonen, Metallinaiset työssä ja kotona, 22-36.
37 Wärtsilä Group annual reports 1968, 1976-1979; Grönros, Laivanrakentaja 1938-1988, 96-97.
38 Teräs, Verstasliikkeistä suurtaisteluihin, 29-33, 93-100; Teräs, Paikallisten työmarkkinas-
uhteiden kausi, 81-88.
39 Group interview with shipyard workers, 8 February 1989, 21; Grönros, Laivanrakentaja 
1938-1988, 83-84.
FRoM WaR RepaRationS to luxuRy cRuiSe lineRS 205
the USSR was in operation in 1984.40 The ship repair operations, along with 
the manufacture of diesel engines, had an important role in stabilising the 
trade cycle that would have otherwise f luctuated due to the changes in 
vessel order numbers.
Taylorism and piecerate conflicts
Taylorist ideas, which were diff icult to apply to shipbuilding owing to 
the multiplicity of tasks involved, emerged at the Turku shipyard during 
the war reparations period. The f irst time-and-motion analysts arrived 
at the shipyard only in the late 1940s, whereas in many other f ields time-
and-motion studies had had their breakthrough during the war years. 
Contemporaneously, numerous recently graduated technicians were hired 
at the Turku shipyard to work in tasks related to piecework pricing and 
planning. The pricing of the tasks studied began to move more and more 
often from the work supervisors to the piecerate settlers in the mid-1950s. 
However, the workers had little faith in the price settlers’ ability to set the 
correct prices for tasks in the challenging conditions of shipbuilding, and 
problems concerning piecework rates were a source of continuous tension 
in the shipyard’s labour relations.41
As tasks were moved indoors and their descriptions were reformulated, 
the employer would unilaterally adopt new, discounted piecework rates, 
which they justif ied with the improvements in working conditions, and 
the effects that serial work had on contract rates. The workers would not 
agree to the new terms of contract, which, they maintained, would lead to 
a consistent decrease in wages. They felt that, as rates had been set unilater-
ally from the shipyard off ice, there had been no real chances of negotiation. 
The conflict surrounding the matter demonstrated the special nature of 
shipbuilding: the time used for a piece of work could be prolonged due to 
unexpected causes, normally a lag in the chain of production, accidents, lack 
of suff icient materials, etc. Another trigger for disputes was the removal of 
bonus payments for dirty and heavy work from numerous tasks after the 
work processes had been reformulated, and conditions of work improved. 
Even when work was partially moved indoors, the working processes, and 
consequently the rates, would be altered. From the late 1950s onwards, 
40 Wärtsilä Group annual reports 1970-1980, 1984.
41 Group interview with shipyard workers, 8 February 1989, 11, 21; Haavikko, Wärtsilä 1934-1984, 
72; Mäkelä, Ossin aika, 37-38.
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technical innovations caused wages to become a cause of serious conflicts 
at the shipyard. The disagreements mostly concerned the benefits of work 
rationalisation and serial work, and their distribution between the employer 
and the employees. The employees consistently felt that all of the benefits 
of rationalisation were flowing to the employer.42
The different occupational groups took part in negotiations on discounted 
piecework rates led by their respective shop stewards, and frequently the 
employees would switch to working for time-based rates, allowed by the 
collective agreement, if the rates could not be settled locally. This was fairly 
common in the 1950s. Occasionally the disagreements would be taken to 
trade unions for negotiations. The employers did not always agree to local 
negotiations, nor would they acknowledge the status of the department shop 
stewards, some of whom were discharged during the labour conflicts of the 
late 1950s. On the shop floor, negotiating machinery remained relatively 
underdeveloped, and the atmosphere grew more hostile during the second 
half of the decade when piecerates were systematically redefined.43
During the interwar period, work-related issues resulted in strikes due 
to the weak negotiation machinery, and later strikes became an extra step 
in negotiations. If the disputes could not be settled quickly enough, the 
negotiations would normally be “hastened” with a short strike, and it was 
only after this that the serious negotiations would begin. This reflected, and 
simultaneously strengthened, the adversarial and distrustful atmosphere at 
the Turku shipyard, where the power relations of the working life surfaced 
easily. According to the workers, the three-step negotiation system was too 
slow, too rigid, and too centralised, with the management of the Wärtsilä 
Group wishing, not unusually, to keep a tight rein on the company’s pay 
policies.44 The employees used strikes to highlight the importance of their 
demands, and to show the employers that, as a group, they were serious 
about the issues. The relationship that shipyard workers had with strikes 
can be characterised by stating that strikes were no longer considered a 
break in everyday life, but rather a part of it.45
In their own estimation, many shipyard workers gave strikes emphati-
cally social meanings and did not wish to regard them as merely a means 
to an end towards increased f inancial benefits. In the early 1980s, one of 
42 Mäkelä, Ossin aika, 37-50.
43 Ibid., 21-24.
44 Kauppinen and Alasoini, Työtaistelut telakoilla, 156-168; Niemelä, “Miksi telakoilla ei enää 
lakkoilla vanhaan malliin?”, 146-147; Niemelä, Ammattirajoista tiimityöskentelyyn, 90-92.
45 Cf. Kettunen, “Strike: An Outdated Topic?”
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the shipyard’s shop stewards answered a question presented by researchers 
concerning the f inancial losses caused by strikes, by stating that too much 
attention was being paid to counting the losses; he emphasised that strikes 
gave “additional value in the eyes of the workers themselves, and even the 
opposite side would show some respect”.46 The shipyard’s communist-led 
trade union made conscious efforts to maintain a f ighting tradition, which 
it regarded as an asset among the workers when handling issues relating to 
wages and other terms of employment.
Concerning labour relations, the shift from serially produced ships 
to one-off production, and the increasing complexity of the ships built, 
made piecework pricing technically more diff icult and thus more liable to 
cause conflict. It became more diff icult to take disturbances or changes 
to production chains into account when setting contract rates; thus prices 
would often be decided afterwards, based on arbitrary interpretations and 
prone to causing disagreements. In one-off production, the drawings could 
no longer be f ixed as in serial production, where small alterations were 
common and it was possible to constantly take advantage of knowledge 
gained from previous experience.47
Strikes
According to a study conducted on the industrial action that took place 
in Finnish shipyards between 1972 and 1982, two-thirds of the strikes 
were related to pay disputes, of which a majority concerned piecerates. 
There was a clear increase in the number of strikes at the beginning of 
the 1970s, when twelve strikes took place at the Turku shipyard, but at 
their highest the numbers reached eighty-seven strikes in 1974 and ninety-
one strikes in 1980. At the Perno shipyard, the number of strikes altered 
between seventeen and eighty-nine between the years 1976 and 1982. The 
economic depression had a clear effect on the numbers of strikes: when 
the economy eventually improved during the second half of the 1970s, the 
number of strikes increased. Work stoppages at the shipyards tended to 
occur as a result of wildcat strikes and concerned only certain trades in wage 
competition with each other. At the Turku shipyard, welders, plateworkers, 
pipef itters, carpenters, and engineer f itters were at the head of the strike 
statistics. The proportion of strikes concerning the entire shipyard (all 
46 Kauppinen and Alasoini, Työtaistelut telakoilla, 52-56.
47 Niemelä, Ammattirajoista tiimityöskentelyyn, 53-54.
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occupational groups) of all strikes at the workplace was 10 per cent at the 
Wärtsilä shipyard in Turku, and 14 per cent at the Perno shipyard (from 
1976 to 1982). Measured in strike hours, their share in Turku was 53 per 
cent and 58 per cent in Perno respectively. Strikes concerning the entire 
shipyard were primarily used to influence matters outside the workplace, 
normally the collective-agreement negotiations held between the labour 
market organisations nationally. In the 1970s and at the beginning of the 
1980s, shipbuilding was the most strike-prone branch in the engineering 
sector and in the Finnish economy as a whole.48 One of the outcomes of the 
Wärtsilä Group’s special role in determining Finnish labour relations took 
place in 1985, when the legal maximum amount of strike fines was increased 
ninefold, and the law became known as “Lex Wärtsilä” among the public. 
The objective of the law was to make the threshold for strikes much higher, 
as it was viewed as considerably too low and regarded as a major problem 
especially for Wärtsilä Group’s shipyards.49
Sub-contracting
Another source of internal tension at the Turku shipyard was sub-contracting: 
a form of employment that management relied on to alleviate skill shortages, 
which became critical in the early 1970s when the shipyard started placing 
larger orders to suppliers outside the shipyard and increased the use of 
external labour.50 Through sub-contracting, the shipyard management also 
aimed at cost savings, bringing more flexibility to the production process, 
and enabling shorter production times for the ships. One of the factors af-
fecting management decisions may have been that sub-contracted workers 
would dilute the shipyard’s own departments that were liable to strikes. 
In the midst of the shipyard crisis at the end of the 1980s, sub-contracting 
became increasingly common, while the number of the shipyard’s own 
employees was cut. Sub-contractors were hired from Germany, as well as 
from other Nordic countries. It was soon discovered that promoting the use 
of sub-contracting over the shipyard’s own permanent workforce to this 
extent was, in fact, a great f inancial error, as costs of sub-contractors rose 
steadily. Moreover, it caused friction between the sub-contractors and the 
permanent employees, disturbing production. Even if the sub-contractors 
48 Kauppinen and Alasoini, Työtaistelut telakoilla, 40, 47-62.
49 Teräs, “Turkulaisten metallityöläisten henki”, 75-76.
50 Wärtsilä Group annual reports, 1973-1974.
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were able to produce ship parts more affordably than the shipyard itself, 
this was not the case for installation work. Already in the early 1970s, the 
shipyard’s trade union opposed the use of sub-contractors, in particular in 
outf itting: it was a question both of pay and of defending the traditions of 
occupational groups.51
In many West European shipyards, f ixed hourly wages had been a reality 
ever since the 1970s, as piecework had caused conflicts in labour relations 
and complicated the solving of the organisational problems in shipbuild-
ing.52 At the Turku shipyard, the aim had been to increase task flexibility 
and co-operation between separate working groups through group tasks 
and large-scale projects; however, they, too, only led to more conflicts and 
strikes. In spite of the failure of these new types of tasks and other reforms 
to lower the thresholds between different occupations, they did, for their 
part, pave the way towards hourly wages and merit pay. It became very 
diff icult to maintain a piecework system in respect of the one-off produc-
tion of ships, because the production conditions were so variable. After 
the transition period, it was easier for both the shipyard management and 
the employees to accept the idea of abandoning piecerates. At the Turku 
shipyard, this step was taken only at the end of the 1980s, when Wärtsilä 
exited the shipbuilding industry in 1989 after its bankruptcy.53
The new shipbuilding company, Masa-Yards, formed with the aid of 
shipping companies that had ships in various phases of construction at 
Wärtsilä’s shipyards in Helsinki and Turku and aid from the Finnish state, 
was consciously oriented towards management-union co-operation instead 
of antagonism. Negotiations were improved once the decision-making was 
taken directly to the shipyard level, and because the new, co-operative 
climate brought about by the international shipbuilding crisis allowed a 
fresh start. This was accomplished on the grounds of a common under-
standing of the reasons that had led to the crisis. Co-operation and mutual 
trust were maintained for some time, but, little by little, friction emerged 
between the shipbuilding company’s management and the shipyard’s trade 
unions. In the mid-1990s, the good negotiating spirit that had prevailed 
during the f irst years of the decade was somewhat diminished; however, 
the previous antagonistic situation was avoided. Nevertheless, the increase 
in large-scale turn-key sub-contracts would occasionally cause discontent 
51 Grönros, Laivanrakentaja 1938-1988, 89-90; cf. Mantere, Lippulaivan haaksirikko, 12-13, 22-24; 
von Knorring, Aurajoen veistämöt ja telakat, 142.
52 Svensson, Från ackord till månadslön, 346-368.
53 Niemelä and Leimu, “Job Redesign in Finnish Shipyards”, 499-500.
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in the shipyard’s labour relations. The yard’s trade union criticised the 
management for neglecting the shipyard’s own employees, as there were 
sub-contractors in turn-key projects, working on tasks that had been as-
signed to permanent workers who had either been laid off or were under 
the threat of being laid off.54
In the shipyard’s labour relations, strong, craft traditions and rigid 
boundaries between occupational groups complicated production-related 
reforms. According to Jukka Niemelä, over the course of a long period of 
time, work organisation at the shipyard developed into an mixture of 
Taylorism and traditional craft production, the latter remaining vibrant, 
especially in the outfitting department.55 The craft tradition was still alive at 
the beginning of the 1980s, and Taylorist methods never became as strongly 
implanted in the Finnish shipbuilding industry as they did, for instance, in 
the Swedish yards in their golden period during the 1950s and 1960s.56 In the 
1990s, Masa-Yards tried to modernise and to develop the squad tradition 
of shipbuilding. Group work was discussed and implemented under the 
heading “team work”. Through team work, management tried to enlarge 
tasks, to remove skill demarcations, and to improve communication and 
co-operation between the production departments and other departments. 
Since the change to co-operation in industrial relations took place in 1989, 
job redesign has not aroused stiff resistance at the yard where the local 
union accepted functional f lexibility. In Turku shipyard (Masa-Yards) the 
union was active in reorganisation issues which ran against long-established 
traditions of shipyard trade unionism.57
Block fabrication and ship design
At the Turku shipyard, block fabrication was introduced in the 1960s and 
adopted gradually. The f irst blocks to be fabricated were deck blocks. Blocks 
could be assembled from mostly standardised parts, which were more and 
more commonly prefabricated in factory-like conditions. The shift to block 
fabrication required large investments in cranes with a signif icantly higher 
lifting capacity. In the 1950s, the lifting capacity of the shipyard’s cranes was 
54 Niemelä, Ammattirajoista tiimityöskentelyyn, 55-60, 114-117.
55 Ibid., 49; Niemelä, “Kriisin kautta joustavaan tuotantoon”, 104-105.
56 Cf. Svensson, Från ackord till månadslön, 302-305.
57 Niemelä, Ammattirajoista tiimityöskentelyyn, 45, 48-53; Leimu, Niemelä, and Pusila, “Joh-
danto”, 18-19; Niemelä and Leimu, “Job Redesign in Finnish Shipyards”, 498-500.
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10 tonnes, but it reached 60 tonnes in the late 1960s; it was not until the early 
1970s that the old machinery was f inally replaced with 100-tonne cranes, 
manufactured at the shipyard. The size of the blocks grew proportionally 
with the increase in crane capacity.58 According to ex-employees of the 
shipyard, it was the capacity of the lifting equipment that played a crucial 
role in the development of block assembly; particularly after all of the 
technical problems previously posed by welding had been solved.59
The increase in lifting capacity meant that, from 1970 onwards, it was 
possible to systematically develop larger block assemblies and modular 
production at the Turku shipyard. It was essential that the time needed 
for outf itting, previously performed separately and only after the ship’s 
hull had been f inished, could be signif icantly cut through block outf itting 
and prefabrication. As late as the 1960s, outf itting would be started only 
after the hull had been f inished; in the 1970s, it could be performed after 
laying down the keel, when the hull of the ship was assembled of blocks on 
an assembly base. In the next phase, in the 1980s, it was already possible 
to perform a notable proportion of the outf itting directly on the blocks, 
signif icantly shortening the time needed for f inishing a ship. The ships, 
previously built in consecutive phases, could now be built more and more 
often in overlapping and simultaneous stages.60
Welding and block-fabrication techniques required not only improved 
lifting equipment, but also the renewal of the shipyard’s building stock. 
The construction work for an assembly base, targeted at large ships, had 
begun in 1949, but it was not until the mid-1950s that a conscious effort was 
made to expand and modernise the building stock of the shipyard to make 
it more adaptable to new production technology. Finally, in early 1960s, 
halls suitable for block fabrication and outf itting were f inished on both 
the east and the west sides of the shipyard.61 Cutting-edge optical f lame 
cutters, hydraulic presses, and additional tools for automatic welding 
were acquired for indoor use. These renewal projects also increased the 
competitiveness of the Turku shipyard in Western markets, even though 
the technical level of the shipyard’s equipment was lagging behind its 
competitors, including Sweden, where block fabrication had been adopted 
much earlier. The employment-increasing effect of the deliveries to the 
58 Grönros, Laivanrakentaja 1938-1988, 80.
59 Group interview with shipyard workers, 8 March 1989, 12-14.
60 Grönros, Laivanrakentaja 1938-1988, 79-81; Niemelä, Ammattirajoista tiimityöskentelyyn, 
45-46.
61 Wärtsilä Group annual report, 1960.
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USSR began to diminish in the 1960s, when the number of special-use 
vessels included in the commercial treaties signed between the countries 
began to drop. Thus, in the 1960s, the shipyard had to compete for ship 
orders from domestic shipping companies, whose orders increased in num-
ber due to state support, as well as for orders from the Nordic countries. 
In the beginning of the following decade, the proportion of the orders 
received from Scandinavian countries varied between 30 and 47 per cent 
by invoice value, while the share of domestic orders was between 10 and 
20 per cent.62
In the 1960s, block fabrication and the construction of special vessels 
demanded signif icant additions to the shipyard’s design capacity. The 
objective was to accomplish an all-inclusive design system based on 
information technology and allowing the execution and management 
of increasingly challenging projects. A separate IT department was 
established at the shipyard in 1966 when the signif icance of information 
technology in production and ship design grew notably. In same year, 
the Crichton-Vulcan yard’s name was changed to Oy Wärtsilä Ab Turun 
telakka. In 1967, the shipyard saw the birth of a separate department 
for product design and projects involving special vessels,63 and Wärtsilä 
shipyards signed a technical co-operation agreement with the Kockums 
shipyard at Malmö, and in this context a Saab computer was ordered from 
Sweden for use at the Turku shipyard. Information technology-related 
co-operation with Kockums resulted in an administrative computer in-
formation system named “Project Q”, whose objective was to considerably 
rationalise and integrate the planning and monitoring of material f lows, 
labour, and costs. The system required considerable training and educa-
tion of employees and was thought to be fully implemented at Wärtsilä 
shipyards in 1971-1972.64
In 1969, the Swedish consultancy MEC launched the f irst production 
engineering-related development project in the shipyard’s eastern assembly 
hall, and in the following year it offered its expertise for the launch of a 
new block-fabrication project. MEC launched time-and-motion studies 
in the different departments of the shipyard to change more than 80 per 
62 Wärtsilä Group annual reports 1970-1975; Grönros, Laivanrakentaja 1938-1988, 79-80; Laakso, 
“Turun teollisuus manufaktuureista bioteknologiaan”, 25.
63 Grönros, Laivanrakentaja 1938-1988, 59; von Knorring, Aurajoen veistämöt ja telakat, 133.
64 Wärtsilä Group annual report, 1967; Haavikko, Wärtsilä 1934-1984, 120-121. Kockums sold the 
same system to other competitors as well. In the 1990s, the Kockums system was said to have 
been used by about 300 shipyards worldwide: Nilsson (ed.), Kockums marina fartyg, 232-233. I 
am very grateful to Tobias Karlsson for this information.
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cent of operations to piecerates based on the MTM system; the consultancy 
promised a productivity rise of 20-30 per cent. The implementation of the 
MTM system triggered numerous disputes at the shipyard from the end 
of 1960s.65 According to the Wärtsilä annual report, there were over 600 
employees working in the “large, f irst-class” design departments of its 
shipyards in the mid-1970s. In order to succeed in the context of a global 
overcapacity for shipbuilding, the company’s shipyards channelled their 
design work towards new and more challenging types of special-purpose 
vessels. The proportion of white-collar workers at the Turku shipyard was 
around one-quarter in the mid-1970s.66
The old shipyard area, located by the mouth of the River Aura in Turku, 
grew too crowded for large, specialised vessels and provided no possibility 
for flexible, factory-like production. With the shipyard’s production capacity 
reaching its boundaries, in the late 1960s management began to develop the 
idea of founding a new “ship factory”, following the example of Götaverken 
in Gothenburg. The project was already well underway when, in 1973, its 
progress was further hastened by the oil crisis, which increased the global 
demand for LPG vessels used for carrying liquefied petroleum gas. For their 
design, too, the shipyard resorted to international co-operation: in 1972, the 
Turku shipyard had signed a licensing agreement with the Norwegian Moss 
Rosenberg Verftn AS. After the positive outcome of the negotiations held 
with the Norwegian shipowners’ group concerning an enormous order for 
seven LPG carriers, a f inal decision was made to build a new shipyard in 
Perno. The building dock commissioned in 1976 at the Perno shipyard was 
250 m long, 80 m wide, and 10 m deep, and it was equipped with 600-tonne 
gantry crane and two 50-tonne outf itting cranes; the building dock was 
later extended to 365 m in length and 15 m in depth to suit even larger 
LPG carriers and cruise liners. Notable investments were made to acquire 
eff icient controlling systems, CAD/CAM technology and more automatic 
production tools were allocated to Perno in the 1980s.67 The Turku shipyard’s 
operations were gradually moved from the River Aura shipyard to Perno, 
which mainly served as a shipyard for outf itting and repairs until the 
beginning of the 1990s.
65 Grönros, Laivanrakentaja 1938-1988, 60; Mäkelä, Ossin aika, 130-138. The MTM (Methods 
Time Measurement) system is an industry time-and-motion analysis system developed in the 
1940s.
66 Wärtsilä Group annual reports, 1974-1976.
67 Wärtsilä Group annual reports, 1974-1976, 1984.
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The economy
The drop in the global tanker market took place during the construction 
period of the Perno shipyard; however, the Wärtsilä management had 
not invested in the construction of tankers, which had been the basis of 
operation for Swedish and many other West European shipyards. Once 
the Perno shipyard was set for use, the Turku shipyard could concentrate 
on building large special-purpose vessels. The rise in oil prices caused 
by the oil crisis in the 1970s was an advantage to Finnish shipyards, as 
Finland was able to increase the number of ship deliveries to the Soviet 
Union and thus pay for the importation of Soviet oil. Compared to other 
West European countries, the entire Finnish shipyard industry was able 
to keep its order numbers and employment rate exceptionally steady until 
the mid-1980s. The markets and employment levels of Finnish shipyards 
fell nearly a decade later than those of their Western competitors, as the 
Finnish shipyard crisis did not start until the late 1980s. Then, the number 
of exports to the USSR began to decrease, and the shipyards were unable 
to f ind a substitute market for Soviet orders. Furthermore, the implosion 
of the Soviet Union in 1991 brought to an end most of the bilateral trade 
between the countries. The radical decrease in global market prices and 
the artif icially high strength of the f ixed exchange-rate Finnish mark 
during the boom years of the 1980s, when f inancial deregulation included 
the removal of bank borrowing controls and liberalisation of overseas 
borrowing and consumer debt controls, further accelerated the crisis in 
Finland and fuelled a debt mountain. Competitive devaluations had been 
a feature of the Finnish economy, and were particularly valuable to its 
large paper industry, which mainly traded in US dollars. The early 1990s 
recession in Finland was particularly damaging and by 1992 – after the 
artif icially f ixed exchange rate had been abandoned and the mark had 
f loated on foreign exchanges – it had lost 12 per cent of its value, and 
artif icially high nominal prices dropped accordingly. Many entrepreneurs 
who had borrowed money denominated in foreign currency were ruined 
as the value of the mark during the recession depreciated by almost 40 
per cent. In all of this, the price competitiveness of Finnish shipyards 
was weakened by the fact that the state refused to pay direct production 
subsidies to the shipyards.68
68 Niemelä, Ammattirajoista tiimityöskentelyyn, 31-32, 40; Mikko Uola, “Meidän isä on töissä 
telakalla”, 482-484; Niemelä, “Kriisin kautta joustavaan tuotantoon”, 104.
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Wärtsilä
Earlier, in 1986, Ab Wärtsilä Oy and the state-owned Valmet Oy decided 
to merge their shipyards to reduce overcapacity and bring detrimental 
competition between the companies to an end. The rationale of the merger 
was to close down the Valmet shipyards and to centralise shipbuilding in 
the stronger of the companies. The new shipbuilding company, known as 
Wärtsilä Marine, began operations in early 1987. Due to problems relating 
to the underpricing of contracts, its organisation of production, liquidity 
problems, labour shortages, and the combined effect of oversupply and a lack 
of demand, Wärtsilä Marine ran into f inancial trouble and eventually went 
bankrupt in 1989, leaving the future of Turku-based shipbuilding hanging 
by a thread. In the end, the industry’s centuries-old traditions were allowed 
to remain uninterrupted, as shipbuilding in Turku was continued under the 
company Masa-Yards, founded largely on financial support from the Finnish 
state. The new company continued the interrupted construction of pas-
senger ferries, and the numerous new ship orders, which filled its orderbook 
during its f irst year of operation, were enough to secure employment at 
the shipyard. However, the ownership of the hastily formed company was 
not stabilised. The company’s future and orderbook were strengthened 
in 1991 when the Norwegian conglomerate, Kvaerner, became its largest 
shareholder. That year, the shipbuilding businesses of Holming Oy of Rauma 
and Rauma-Repola were merged to form Finnyards, and in the mid-1990s 
Kvaerner purchased Masa-Yards. In 1999, Kvaerner announced it would 
give up shipbuilding operations, but the reorganisation of the Norwegian 
company resulted in the founding of the Aker Kvaerner Group, under which 
the Turku shipyard could continue its operations using its old name.69
The new century
The Turku shipyard at Perno concentrated increasingly on car and passenger 
ferries and luxury cruise liners, and at the beginning of the 2000s the share 
of shipyards at Turku and Helsinki of these markets worldwide was around 
an impressive 25 per cent.70 The Turku shipyard built ten large-scale cruise 
69 Laakso, “Turun teollisuus manufaktuureista bioteknologiaan”, 26-29; Grönros, “Lustjakter, 
passagerfartyg och lyxkryssare byggda i Åbo”, 336-341.
70 Arctech Helsinki Shipyard Oy specialises in building icebreakers and other Arctic offshore 
and special vessels. It was formed in a joint venture agreement signed in December 2010 by STX 
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liners for the American-owned Miami-based Royal Caribbean International 
between 1999 and 2010.71
In September 2004, the Aker Kvaerner Yards Group announced that it 
would merge its two shipyards in Finland, Kvaerner Masa-Yards Inc. and 
Aker Finnyards Inc., to form Aker Finnyards Oy to take effect on 1 Janu-
ary 2005.72 The name of the company was changed to Aker Yards Oy on 
7 June 2006. In October 2007 the South Korean shipbuilding and shipping 
conglomerate STX secured an almost 40 per cent stake in Aker Yards, and 
in October of the following year it gained control as STX Europe. From 
September 2009 the company was renamed STX Finland Oy, a division of 
STX Europe, with three shipyards at Helsinki (Arctech), Rauma, and Turku. 
However, the lag effects of the 2008 world f inancial crisis continued to have 
an impact on both shipping and shipbuilding and, by 2012, STX’s shipping 
arm, Pan Ocean, had f iled for bankruptcy protection in South Korea in 
June 2013. STX had sold ten of its STX Europe subsidiary shipyards, many of 
which specialised in offshore supply vessels, to Fincantieri of Trieste, which 
renamed the group Vard and listed it on the Singapore Stock Exchange. By 
December 2012, Fincantieri held the controlling stake in Vard.73 However, 
STX Europe retained its three Finnish operations and its French yard at St 
Nazaire, in which the French state held a one-third share, for cruise-ship 
building
The Turku shipyard – still under the operation of STX-Finland Oy as one 
of the company’s three shipyards – continued building large specialised 
vessels, particularly luxury cruise liners. However, the continuity of ship-
yard operations in Turku came under threat in late 2012 as the shipyard 
lost a large cruise-liner order from Royal Caribbean International to the 
St Nazaire shipyard of the STX Group.74 This did not augur well for the 
future of the yard and, on 16 September 2013, STX Finland announced 
Europe and the Russian United Shipbuilding Corporation. Arctech has a century of experience 
in building icebreakers; indeed, about 60 per cent of all icebreakers in operation today were 
built at the Helsinki shipyard, which has approximately 400 employees. See www.arctech.f i 
(accessed 6 February 2014).
71 Grönros, “Suurten merten seikkailijat”, 114-115; Rinne, “Globaalin kilpailun haasteet”, 23-25.
72 The new Aker Finnyards formed a part of the Norwegian-based Aker Yards shipbuilding 
group, which in addition to Aker Finnyards included yards in Norway, Germany, Romania, 
and Brazil. The new company employed some 4,500 personnel, of whom 1,000 were located at 
the Rauma Repola shipyard, 2,000 at the Turku shipyard, 1,250 at the Helsinki shipyard, and 
some 250 at the cabin manufacturer in Piikkiö and Paimio. The combined revenues of Kvaerner 
Masa-Yards and Aker Finnyards for 2003 was roughly €1 bn.
73 Vard comprised f ive shipyards in Norway, two in Romania, two in Brazil, and one in Vietnam.
74 Cruise Industry News, 27 December 2012.
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that the shipyard in Rauma, which had not won newbuilding orders for 
several years, would close its gates at the end of June 2014. According 
to the company, which had not made a prof it for six consecutive years, 
this was the only way to guarantee the continuation of the shipbuilding 
industry elsewhere in Finland. The closure of the shipyard would lead 
to around 600 people losing their jobs in Rauma.75 It was envisaged that, 
after the completion of the last two ships at Rauma in June 2014, the yard’s 
ownership would shift to the town of Rauma, which paid STX Europe €18.1 
mn on 22 January 2014 to create a new marine business park on the site, 
subsequently named the Rauma Seaside Industry Park. Given this scenario, 
a return to major shipbuilding at Rauma was unlikely; however, Rauma 
Marine Constructions was formed on the site to utilise some of the skills 
of ex-Rauma employees.
Beforehand, the position of STX Corporation in South Korea remained 
uncertain. At October 2013 it was reported that the state-run Korea Develop-
ment Bank, the major creditor of STX, was looking to sell STX’s remaining 
European shipyards. STX has a huge debt mountain and faces continuing 
f inancial and debt restructuring. As is so often the case in instances of 
foreign direct investment, the South Korean shipyards and manufacturing 
plants of the STX Corporation undoubtedly took precedence over their 
European counterparts in any future restructuring. In the present world 
of multi-national capital inflows and outflows, workers are increasingly 
becoming irrelevant and usually nationally impotent in terms of closures 
of shipyards.
With the Turku shipyard’s future guaranteed only to 2015, there had 
obviously been considerable behind-the-scenes attempts by the Finnish 
state to interest a buyer in the shipyard. Negotiations with the German 
shipbuilder, Meyer Werft, with yards in Papenburg and Rostock, were 
already underway by June 2014, and by August a deal was announced that 
Meyer Werft, in conjunction with the Finnish state (which would take a 
30 per cent stake), would purchase the Turku shipyard.76 Accordingly, the 
deal was confirmed by the German competition authorities in September. 
In the interim the yard, renamed Meyer Turku Shipyard Oy, received an 
order for two German TUI cruise ships worth €1 bn, giving continuity of 
employment. The deal was aided by Finnvera, a government-owned export 
credit organisation, which pledged to underwrite 50 to 80 per cent of the cost 
of building. Clearly the hope is that Meyer Turku will become a long-term 
75 Finland Times, 16 September 2013. 
76 Helsinki Times, 4 August 2014.
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player in Finnish shipbuilding, although the Finnish state announced soon 
after the purchase that it would relinquish its shares as soon as possible.77
Conclusion
The Turku shipyard has long been the flagship of the Finnish shipbuilding 
industry. As the largest shipyard in the country, it has had a signif icant 
effect on both local and national employment rates. After the Second World 
War, war reparation deliveries and, later on, bilateral trade relations with the 
Soviet Union provided the shipyard with large orders consisting of series of 
vessels. Consequently, the operation of the shipyard was rather predictable 
and stable. In fact, it was largely due to the Finnish-Soviet trade and to the 
Finnish shipyard industry’s focus on building large specialised vessels that 
the international shipbuilding industry crisis hit the Finnish shipyards 
approximately ten years later than in many other Western countries.
Labour relations at the Turku shipyard were characterised by confronta-
tions and distrust up until the beginning of the 1990s, when the Wärtsilä 
Group gave up shipbuilding. The shipyard had a long history of industrial 
conflicts, and this tradition was consciously maintained by the communist-
led local trade union. The relatively stable flow of orders also strengthened 
the employees’ position with regard to labour relations. Industrial action 
was frequently taken at the shipyard, especially after the management 
started a systematic reform of production; thereafter the numbers of strikes 
increased signif icantly, especially after the mid-1970s, when the economic 
situation began to improve. As a result of technical reforms, piecerates 
became a source of serious conflict, as the time needed to complete piece-
work often varied due to unexpected circumstances. The conflicts often 
boiled down to how the benefits gained from work rationalisation and serial 
working were distributed between the employer and employees. Strikes 
became almost like an additional negotiation phase at the Turku shipyard: 
serious negotiations to solve any contract disputes were started only after 
the negotiations had been given “a boost” with a short strike.
Production reforms were slowed down by strong craft traditions, which 
characterised the operation of the shipyard until the 1980s. The post-war 
shipbuilding industry relied heavily on workers’ craft expertise and experi-
ence, and on the co-operation of different occupational groups. There were 
rigid boundaries between different occupational groups, and each group 
77 Helsinki Times, 19 September 2014.
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promoted its own interests with regard to separate payment; all essential 
occupational groups had their own shop stewards. Under these conditions, 
the employees had relatively extensive control over the production process, 
as part of the design work was still carried out at the factory-floor level. 
Many shipyards in Western Europe adopted f ixed salary rates in the 1970s 
as contract deals were causing conflict in labour relations and hindering 
the solving of organisational issues in the shipbuilding industry. However, 
this step was taken at the Turku shipyard only at the end of the 1980s, 
when the Wärtsilä Group abandoned the shipyard industry as a result of 
bankruptcy, and the new shipbuilding company Masa-Yards consciously 
promoted co-operative labour relations. Consequently, the situation began 
to improve, which was evidenced by, for example, a decreasing number of 
strikes. However, conflicts did still occur, especially with regard to the use 
of sub-contractors at the shipyard. The continuous uncertainty with regard 
to the future of the Turku shipyard has been an important incentive for the 
employer as well as the employees to work together in order to keep the 
shipyard in operation.
Although there were many changes in the ownership of the yard, it is 
clear that the Finnish state wishes to retain a semblance of large shipbuild-
ing capacity in the country: witness its involvement with Meyer Werft in 
the Turku yard. Contemporaneously, in the medium term, it seems that 
West European ownership will be more successful than South Korean in 
keeping the Turku yard in employment.

7 The Dutch shipbuilding industry, 
1950-2012
Sjaak van der Velden
Introduction
In 2012, shipbuilding production and repair represented only 1.3 per cent of the 
total industrial volume of the Netherlands.1 Sixty years ago, Dutch shipbuild-
ing and repair’s share of total industrial volume was approximately 12 per cent; 
thus its percentage has diminished to about one-tenth of the 1952 share. In 
2012, there were 75 shipbuilding companies employing 11,850 workers active 
in the Netherlands, as against 136 in 1952, employing 48,333 workers.2 Hence, 
over the period, the number of companies has diminished markedly, and total 
employment in Dutch shipbuilding and repair has decreased by 75 per cent.
It is not only the numbers that have changed; the product has too. While 
the industry produced mainly passenger and general cargo ships in the 
1950s, nowadays it focuses on specialist offshore vessels and super-yachts.
Short history of Dutch shipbuilding during the Second World War 
and aftermath3
During the period before the Second World War metalworkers generally, and 
workers in the shipbuilding industry in particular, were among the most strike-
prone of the Dutch working class. According to the data collected by Clarke 
Kerr and Abraham Siegel, metalworkers in the Netherlands showed an average 
propensity to strike; however, my own database of strikes makes it clear that in 
the metal industry workers were more than averagely prone to take strike action.4
The years of Nazi occupation of the Netherlands were characterised by 
passive resistance on the part of the workforce, which caused production to 
1 Scheepsbouw Nederland, Jaarverslag 2012, 75.
2 CBS, Scheepsbouw- en scheepsbouwreparatiebedrijven 1952.
3 Dirkzwager, “Scheepsbouw”.
4 Kerr and Siegel, “The Interindustry Propensity to Strike”, 209-210; van der Velden, Stakingen 
in Nederland, 195. The difference between the Kerr-Siegel f indings and my own has much to do 
with the fact that the Dutch dataset of strikes and lock-outs is on a micro level, while Kerr and 
Siegel used data of a highly aggregated level. See also Hamark, “Strikingly Indifferent”. 
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be extremely low. For example, at the Rotterdamse Droogdok Maatschap-
pij (RDM) shipyard, twelve torpedo-boat destroyers were ordered by the 
Kriegsmarine of which not one was completed.5 At other shipyards work 
for the Germans was also sabotaged.6 When the Nazis realised that defeat 
was likely, they destroyed much of the infrastructure of the Amsterdam 
and Rotterdam ports, including parts of the shipyards.7
After the defeat of the Nazis, the Dutch government stressed the priority 
of reconstructing the economy. The main policy tool used was a strict policy 
on prices and wages in an attempt to limit inflation. This wage policy and the 
refusal to negotiate with radical labour unions, in tandem with shortages of 
food as the Netherlands readjusted to a peacetime economy and efforts to 
employ people who had collaborated with the Nazis, led to a wave of strikes 
in the immediate post-war period.8 Within a few years, however, this wave 
5 Van den Aardweg et al., 1900-1952. Een halve eeuw “Droogdok”, 151.
6 Van Borselen, De Kriegsmarine in Rotterdam, 203.
7 De Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, vol. 10b, 7.
8 Harmsen and Reinalda, Voor de bevrijding van de arbeid, 268-270.
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ebbed as sustained economic growth made improvement of working-class 
life possible. The post-war strike wave was, however, also strongly opposed by 
officials and politicians who feared a repetition of the labour unrest that had 
followed the First World War. They did everything in their power to stop the 
activities of the EVC (Eenheids Vakcentrale, Unity Union) and striking workers.9
By around 1950, Dutch shipbuilding had recovered from the consequences 
of the war. This recovery was largely the result of ship repairing activities, 
which were more cost-effective than new construction. Things were, however, 
to change irreversibly. Because of the Japanese occupation during the war, the 
Dutch had lost control over the former Dutch East Indies, now Indonesia. Two 
days after the surrender of Japan in August 1945, led by the nationalist leader 
Sukarno, Indonesia declared independence, and Sukarno was appointed 
president. The Dutch attempted to re-establish colonial hegemony, and the 
9 Coomans, de Jong, and Nijhof, De Eenheidsvakcentrale (EVC) 1943-1948, 494; van der Velden, 
“Geheim agent verdedigt arbeidersbelangen”. See below, p. 232.































































Source: cBS, Produktiestatistieken Industrie. Scheepsbouw- en scheepsbouwreparatiebedrijven 
1951-1986 (1959-87)
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resulting conflict ended in December 1949, when, facing increasing interna-
tional pressure, the Dutch finally recognised Indonesian independence.10
This was a serious setback for Dutch liner shipping companies which had 
previously relied on trading to and from Indonesia. As a consequence the 
Dutch shipyards that repaired and built ships for these shipping companies 
feared that their sales would also plummet.11 However, despite this threat, 
the shipbuilding industry developed positively, as Figure 7.1 shows, in terms 
of production of ships from 1951 onwards. By 1957, production of ships had 
doubled; it dropped from 1960 to 1965, and rose again to a peak in 1975-1976, 
before declining in the extended wake of the OPEC quadrupling of oil prices 
and subsequent recession in world trade, so much so that, by 1986, the total 
value of Dutch shipbuilding and repair had almost returned to the level of 1951.
Figure 7.2 makes it clear that in most years the value of the building of 
new ships and of repair were roughly the same size until the early 1970s. 
Then building became much bigger than repair as a part of total production.
Location and importance of shipyards
In 1889 only three big shipyards existed (in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and 
Vlissingen) but this number expanded when a few new companies were 
established, mainly in the Rotterdam area.12 During the twentieth century, 
the Dutch shipbuilding industry was concentrated near the port of Rot-
terdam, with minor concentrations in Amsterdam and Vlissingen and in 
the province of Groningen. In Groningen the yards built many smaller 
inland vessels while the shipyard in Vlissingen (De Schelde) mainly built 
warships for the Royal Dutch Navy. In the Amsterdam and Rotterdam areas 
the shipyards largely built passenger and general cargo ships.
The seven largest shipbuilding companies in the Netherlands were 
labelled the “seven sisters” by a parliamentary research commission that 
investigated the problems of the Dutch shipbuilding industry in 1984-1985. 
In doing so they acknowledged the importance of these seven companies 
which had a similar impact on Dutch shipbuilding as had the “seven sisters” 
on the international oil trade.13
10 Woltjer, Recent verleden, 179-207.
11 Van Zanden and Griff iths, Economische geschiedenis van Nederland, 80.
12 Brugmans, Paardenkracht en mensenmacht, 319.
13 Sampson, The Seven Sisters.
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These seven biggest companies, out of a total of around one hundred 
companies, accounted for a disproportionate amount of sales and employ-
ment as can be seen from Table 7.2.
From Figure 7.1, it is clear that shipbuilding production rose steadily to 
the end of the 1950s and peaked in the mid-1970s. From then it declined, as 
did the numbers of employees and value of sales.16 There were on average 
a little under one hundred companies with more than f ifty employees 
during those years, but the seven sisters accounted for almost 59 per cent 
of annual sales in 1958-1967.17
The 1950s
During the 1950s there was still a sense of euphoria in Dutch shipbuilding. 
Big passenger liners were built – such as the 35,000-ton SS Rotterdam, built 
by RDM in 1959 – and a new company was established, Verolme Verenigde 
Scheepswerven (Verolme United Shipyards). The latter was the work of one 
16 CBS, Produktiestatistieken Industrie. Scheepsbouw- en scheepsbouwreparatiebedrijven 1951-
1986 (1959-87).
17 I calculated the average of the given shares in Table 7.2.
Table 7.2  Shipbuilding companies with more than fifty  employees compared to 



















1958 107 1,315 53,836 985.7 75.0 29,122 54.1
1959 101 1,512 51,608
1960 100 1,608 49,975 819.9 51.0 27,199 54.4
1961 100 1,345 49,180
1962 98 1,531 49,091
1963 94 1,290 46,252 674 52.2
1964 94 1,306 44,634
1965 91 1,275 43,545 777.2 61.0 24,153 55.5
1966 91 1,515 42,600
1967 88 1,668 42,821 921.8 55.3 23,355 54.5
Source: cBS, Produktiestatistieken Industrie. Scheepsbouw- en scheepsbouwreparatiebedrijven 
1958-1967 (1959-68); tweede Kamer der Staten-generaal vergaderjaar 1984-1985, Verslag van de 
Enquêtecommissie Rijn-Schelde-Verolme (RSV), deel 1, 6-9. unfortunately figures from this source are 
incomplete and therefore do not allow the construction of an uninterrupted series.
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man, Cornelis Verolme, who stood outside the existing Rotterdam metal 
industry elite.18 Verolme refused to co-operate closely with the other compa-
nies in the Rotterdam area that were united in the employers’ organisation, 
the Metaalbond (Metal Union), which had taken a f irm stand against labour 
unions since the beginning of the twentieth century. Verolme was able to 
obtain huge profits in comparison to the other “sisters”. During the years 
1957-1967 Verolme had a net prof it that was much higher than the others 
combined. He earned 167.9 mn guilders, while the others made 101.5 mn.19 
As he was the sole owner (no other shareholders were involved), Verolme’s 
company was, despite the good results, vulnerable. It was not easy for him 
to attract outside capital to expand and renew the company.
Growth and decline
In general the 1960s was a period of economic growth in the Netherlands. 
The welfare state also grew, and workers managed to obtain higher wages 
by way of a series of wildcat strikes. Through these strikes workers tackled 
the system of wage control that had existed since 1945. When the state 
abandoned such control in 1963, wages started rising rapidly, including in 
the shipbuilding industry (Figure 7.3). In general, wages in the metalworking 
industry were lower than the average for the entire Dutch industry. For 
example, in 1966 metalworking wages per hour were 375 cents while the 
overall average was 384 cents.20 But nominal wages rose year after year 
until the mid-1970s.21
During the 1960s, labour became expensive in relation to the 1950s, 
when wages in the Netherlands were among the lowest in Europe. To cut 
costs, companies merged, employees were sacked, and capital looked for 
more prof itable opportunities by moving to countries where wages and 
labour costs in general were lower. One of the f irst industries where this 
happened was shipping. Others were clothing and shipbuilding.22 From 
1967 unemployment started to rise and, with the crisis of the 1930s in mind, 
most of those involved in the political scene became convinced that it was 
time to turn the tide. One of the important economic sectors that drew 
18 Verolme, Memoires met medewerking van Leo Ott; Dekker, Cornelis Verolme.
19 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal vergaderjaar 1984-1985, Verslag van de Enquêtecommissie 
Rijn-Schelde-Verolme (RSV), deel 1, 7.
20 CBS, Statistisch Zakboek 1972, 252.
21 CBS, Vijfennegentig jaren statistiek in tijdreeksen 1899-1994, 50.
22 Van Zanden en R.T. Griff iths, Economische geschiedenis van Nederland in de 20e eeuw, 269.
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the attention of the state was the shipbuilding industry as it had begun to 
exhibit signs of a slow and probable decline. In 1930, the Dutch shipbuilding 
industry had been the third-largest in the world (after the United Kingdom 
and Germany) but those days were over. From 1956 Japan, and later, Sweden 
outstripped the Netherlands; by the end of the 1960s the Dutch occupied a 
lowly fourteenth place in the world shipbuilding league table.23
Pressed by parliament, the Dutch government established a research 
commission in 1965 to investigate the problems. This Commissie Keyzer 
(Keyzer Commission), named after its chairman, intended to devise a 
common policy for the state and the industry to follow with regard to 
shipbuilding.24 Contemporaneously, the European Economic Community 
23 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal vergaderjaar 1984-1985, Verslag van de Enquêtecommissie 
Rijn-Schelde-Verolme (RSV), deel 1, 4.
24  Rapport van de Commissie Nederlandse scheepsbouw 1965.


































Source: cBS, Produktiestatistieken Industrie. Scheepsbouw- en scheepsbouwreparatiebedrijven 
1951-1986 (1952-87)
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proposed a policy that allowed its member states to place orders with their 
own industry without actually giving subsidies to the companies involved.25
When the Commissie Keyzer published its f indings in 1966, it came to 
three conclusions. Dutch shipbuilding had suffered from the fact that it 
received no state support in the form of subsidies, while other countries 
did; the industry was unable to attract young workers; and it was too con-
servative in its working methods. It leant too heavily on craftsmanship 
instead of trying to industrialise shipbuilding.26 In short, Dutch shipyards 
had not kept pace with advances elsewhere in production methods and 
were insuff iciently specialised.
The recommendations of the commission implied co-operation and 
mergers of the seven major existing companies in order to foster specialisa-
tion in products and to modernise shipbuilding through standardised serial 
production. Another important recommendation was the introduction 
of a state subsidy to enable shipyards to match those subsidies given to 
shipowners elsewhere. Following the conclusions of the Commissie Keyzer, 
the Dutch government decided in 1967 to support the industry if companies 
actively engaged in innovation and a restructuring of the sector. A good 
example of the way this worked is the support that Verolme received in 1968. 
He obtained a state guarantee for the building of a new dock as a reward 
for taking over the unprofitable NDSM shipyard in Amsterdam. Two years 
earlier, a few of the seven sisters had already decided to co-operate more 
closely in order to be able to build larger ships. The building of tankers 
(66,000 tons or more) had become urgent after the closing of the Suez Canal 
in 1956, and this trend was strengthened as a result of the Six-Day War 
between Israel and Egypt in 1967.
In 1966, RDM (including its subsidiary Piet Smit) and De Schelde merged 
to form Rijn-Schelde Machinefabrieken en Scheepswerven NV (RSMS) or 
Rijn-Schelde. Other shipyards including Wilton-Fijenoord joined in 1968, but 
this was not the end of the merging process. Despite the state support for 
Verolme, the construction of supertankers at the former NDSM shipyard and 
at the new Verolme shipyard in Rotterdam was not prof itable. Continuing 
losses tempted Verolme to ask for more support, which was granted only 
on the condition that Verolme and Rijn-Schelde merged. In January 1971, 
the two companies merged into Rijn-Schelde-Verolme Machinefabrieken 
en Scheepswerven NV (RSV). Within a few years six of the seven sisters of 
25 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal vergaderjaar 1984-1985, Verslag van de Enquêtecommissie 
Rijn-Schelde-Verolme (RSV), deel 1, 14.
26  Rapport van de Commissie Nederlandse scheepsbouw 1965.
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Dutch shipbuilding had merged into one single company, together with a 
few engine-manufacturing factories. Only Van der Giessen-de Noord had 
stayed out of this merger (see Appendix 4).
The RSV concern was now in a stronger position regarding the Dutch state. 
It employed many thousands of workers, and with each restructuring the 
state had also stipulated that a merger should not jeopardise employment. 
Internally, the concern was no more than a combination of several companies 
that did not really work together; hence the potential advantages of econo-
mies of scale and scope of RSV were limited. The economic crisis of 1973-74 
also worked in favour of RSV, not just because for a short period it stimulated 
the building of new supertankers,27 but also because the government was 
convinced that it should follow an anti-cyclical policy. The maintenance of 
jobs was considered very important by the governing Social Democrat Party, 
and RSV was therefore well supported, not only with orders for the Royal 
Netherlands Navy, but also with f inancial support. Later governments, in 
which there was no social democratic representation, continued this policy. 
In 1977, the state even agreed that it would cover 75 per cent of the calculated 
company losses.28 Between 1967 and 1983 the Dutch state thus f inancially 
supported RSV with 2,700 mn guilders, which was roughly 5 per cent of total 
sales of the entire Dutch shipbuilding industry for the period.29
Financial support from the state was conditional on RSV restructuring 
several times during the second part of the 1970s. Each time employment de-
creased and the company became a little more stable, but it was ultimately 
in vain. When the company asked for new support in 1983, after having 
received aid in 1982, the government f inally decided to cut its losses.30 RSV 
entered bankruptcy and the remaining 5,000 workers of the company  – of 
which the component parts had employed around 30,000 men during the 
mid-1970s – lost their jobs.
The extended demise of RSV changed the entire landscape of Dutch 
shipbuilding. Some parts of RSV were actually closed; other parts were 
saved. De Schelde became the property of the state and the province of 
Zeeland.31 In Amsterdam there is no shipbuilding left apart from a few ship 
repair yards, and the big companies in and around Rotterdam were also 
closed and some parts sold to other companies. The once huge Verolme 
27 In 1974, Verolme delivered the biggest ship ever built in the Netherlands: Lepton, an oil 
tanker of 318,000 dwt.
28 Van Zanden, Economische geschiedenis, 83.
29 Ibid., 84.
30 Graf, Een ongelijke strijd.
31 Quite, Koninklijke Mij. “De Schelde”.
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shipyard is now part of the Singapore-based specialist ship repairers, Keppel 
Corporation. In Vlissingen the shipyard of De Schelde still exists despite 
being sold by the state and the province in 2000. It is now part of the Dutch 
Damen Shipyards Group building for the navy while other parts of the 
group build yachts and inland vessels. Dutch shipbuilding nowadays is 
much reduced from its heyday, but what remains has specialised in niche 
markets and is relatively healthy.
A highly unionised and strike-prone workforce
The social democratic metalworkers’ union (Algemeene Nederlandsche 
Metaalbewerkers Bond, ANMB) was the biggest Dutch trade union in the 
years between the two world wars. Union membership in the metal industry 
generally was also among the highest in the entire economy. Due to the 
lack of available data the extent of trade union membership in the Dutch 
shipbuilding industry is impossible to calculate. However, the overall union 
penetration of the Dutch metal industry in the 1930s was roughly 41 per 
cent, although in the Amsterdam and Rotterdam regions numbers were 
higher (47 and 48.8 per cent respectively).32 There were also a number of 
unions besides the ANMB that represented metalworkers. The ANMB was 
by far the largest, comprising almost 60 per cent of total union member-
ship; in addition the Roman Catholic Union accounted for 22.6 per cent 
of total membership, the Protestant Union for 12 per cent, and two small 
revolutionary unions less than 3 per cent.33
The combined metal unions negotiated collective agreements with the 
companies which for their part wanted such agreements in order to prevent 
competition on the labour market. Most employers also wanted a general 
wage standard to prevent competitors attracting workers by offering higher 
wages. This scenario would end with higher wages for the whole industry – not 
exactly an endpoint that would please employers – hence they were prepared 
to sign collective agreements.34 After the German occupation this system 
returned within the policy of strict wage regulation initiated by the state. 
There was, however, a problem with a newly established radical labour union, 
32 Own calculations from CBS, Overzicht van den omvang der vakbeweging in Nederland op 
1 januari 1932; digitised census 1930, www.volkstelling.nl/nl/volkstelling/jaartellingdeelview/
BRT193007/index.html.
33 CBS, Overzicht van den omvang der vakbeweging in Nederland op 1 januari 1932.
34 Binneveld, De stakingen in de Rotterdamse metaalindustrie in 1965, 35.
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EVC. Many workers joined this new organisation, which was clearly a result of 
the war resistance. EVC wanted to do away with the pre-war division within 
the union movement, which encouraged workers to join a union of their own 
“pillar” instead of joining the one union that aimed to organise the entire 
working class. Because of its apparent radicalism shown during a number of 
big strikes, especially in the port of Rotterdam, both employers and the state 
refused to accept EVC at the negotiation tables. It took until 1950 before the 
role of this union was finished, and the old relations had been restored. EVC 
still existed; however, most union members rejoined the pre-war unions.35
There was, however, one big change. Within the leaderships of the three 
major pre-war unions there was a changed state of mind. This attitude can 
possibly be best illustrated by citing the chairman of the Rotterdam branch 
of the ANMB who in 1954 wrote:
social struggle in the past could not be carried out other than by the 
sharpest weapon of class struggle; the strike must be regarded historically 
only as a social evil, as a tragic episode in the development of mankind 
to a higher stage.36
This comment highlighted a tendency in the off icial labour movement 
to participate in the new social and economic policy of post-war govern-
ments, stimulated by the welcoming of the unions into a number of new 
organs of management, the tripartite system which came into being in the 
years 1945-1950 and was still intact in 2014. Part of this management was 
regular consultation between employers’ organisations, labour unions, 
and the state. In such consultations, collective agreements were settled 
for entire industries like metals or construction. The unions, which were 
originally organised along professional lines, were now also structured 
along industrial lines.37
Under this new tripartite approach, labour unions became a well-respect-
ed part of management, and they therefore almost never issued a strike call 
during the 1950s. However, this did not prevent workers from staging wildcat 
strikes during that period. This new attitude of the union movement had a 
35 Van der Velden, Werknemers georganiseerd, 131, 180.
36 “Dat de sociale strijd in het verleden niet anders dan door het scherpste wapen van de 
klassenstrijd: de staking, kon worden gevoerd, moet – historisch gezien – slechts als een 
maatschappelijk kwaad, als een brok tragiek in de ontwikkeling van de mensheid naar een 
hoger plan worden gezien”: Wacht, Heet voor de vuren, 242.
37 For a good overview of the early history of the Dutch tripartite system of labour relations, 
see Windmuller, Labor Relations in the Netherlands.
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counterpart in what is termed the social policy of many employers. Since 
the 1870s there had been developments, especially within the industry, 
towards affording better education and housing for the workers. This move-
ment started in reaction to the threat of the emerging labour movement 
combined with the social attitude of certain individual employers.38 This 
combination of interests was strengthened by certain specif ic factors. The 
Rotterdam metal employers had problems with recruiting skilled labour. 
It was therefore in their own interest to attract workers by providing ac-
commodation. A good example of this is the living quarters built by RDM 
in Rotterdam Heyplaat.39 This quarter was built in 1914 according to the 
principles of garden villages, like other quarters built in the Netherlands, 
such as the quarter De Schelde erected for its workers in Vlissingen. What 
the companies attempted to foster was a form of community feeling among 
the workforce by affording all kind of facilities including libraries, musical 
societies, and sports clubs.40
38 Nijhof, «Villages ouvriers: de l’idéalisme au pragmatisme?», 16. 
39 Van den Aardweg et al., 1900-1952. Een halve eeuw “Droogdok”, 65, 211-225. 
40 Ibid., 221. Other industrialists known as social entrepreneurs were already active at the end 
of the nineteenth century; see Kleij, Sociaal Ondernemerschap.












































































Source: http://socialhistory.org/en/stakingen; 2008-13 data are from author’s own database
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Figure 7.4 illustrates the number of strikes in the shipbuilding industry 
from 1950 to 2013. It shows that the trend of strike frequency is diminish-
ing. After a fairly high number of strikes during the 1950s, the 1960s saw 
fewer. The 1970s started with an upsurge while during the early 1980s strike 
frequency returned to the level of the 1950s. This was understandable at 
a time when workers in shipbuilding felt a constant threat of sackings 
because the state wanted to stop f inancial support to the industry and 
especially RSV. To get a better picture of strike activity I present in Figure 
7.5 two other strike indicators: the number of strikers and the number of 
strike-days.
Looking at Figures 7.4 and 7.5 together makes it clear that the 1970s and 
1980s were periods of a higher strike activity. The total numbers of strikers 
and days lost to strikes in the two decades to 1970 were lower but, although 
the number of strikes was higher, they had less impact in terms of days lost 
than the strikes in the early 1970s.
After the initial strike wave just after the war, the 1950s saw few and 
small strike events. The labour conflicts that occurred were in most cases 
unoff icial wildcat strikes by union members because the union leader-
ships were primarily engaged in deliberating in the tripartite system and 
this, necessarily, took time, leaving local matters unresolved. Despite the 
growth of the Dutch welfare state, many workers were unsatisf ied by recent 
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Source: http://socialhistory.org/en/stakingen
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developments. In 1957, Dutch wages were among the lowest in Europe and 
workers naturally wanted higher wages for comparable work. From 1959, 
a strike wave developed in order to end the strict wage policy in order to 
raise wages. The metal industry, including ship building, also played a role 
in this movement.41 The following strike stories are taken from the website 
http://socialhistory.org/en/stakingen. Only literal quotes receive a footnote 
from the original source.
Overview of strike movements
In 1960, the 4,000 workers of the NDSM in Amsterdam struck for the 
payment of travel expenses and a 45-hour working week. They were not 
supported by the unions but nevertheless reached a settlement after two 
days. Travel expenses would be met in the future. This was one of the 
nine strikes that took place in shipbuilding in 1960. Most were on a small 
scale, but from 24 November a nationwide strike by 24,000 workers from 
35 companies started in the metal industry, including shipbuilding. This 
strike movement started without the approval of the unions, although the 
strikers supported the unions during their negotiations for a new collec-
tive agreement. Most shipbuilding workers participated for a short period 
or a number of periods. The 800 workers of the Amsterdamse Droogdok 
Maatschappij (ADM) for example, joined for two and a half days, and their 
counterparts of RDM struck for a few hours. The 5,000 workers of Wilton-
Fijenoord (WF) resumed work after a few hours, although two days later, 
550 of them struck again; on 8 December, 3,000 WF workers joined the strike 
again. They demonstrated through the streets of Schiedam (a small city 
close to Rotterdam) to express their anger about the government’s refusal 
to grant a wage rise of 3 per cent.
Strikes like this were the reason for a discussion within the union move-
ment about the lost connection between the leadership and the rank and 
file. It was acknowledged by social researchers invited by the Metalworkers’ 
Union to study this discrepancy between management and members that 
a union with unsatisf ied members, who, at times, threatened to terminate 
membership, might be a threat to the credibility of the unions in the eyes 
of employers and the state.42
41 Van der Velden, Werknemers in actie, ch. 7.
42 Harmsen, Perry, and van Gelder, Mensenwerk, 190-195. 
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Five years later an event took place known as the Rotterdam metal strike 
of 1965.43 The strikers took over a wage demand the unions had already 
issued a few months before. The Rotterdam department of the employers’ 
organisation Metaalbond still practised the same policy they had up to and 
beyond the Second World War. They would not negotiate during the strike 
and refused to pay for strike-days (a demand often made during strikes). 
The newcomer Verolme, on his own, hardened the employers’ attitude by 
declaring in the midst of the conflict that, although business was going 
well, he would decrease the workers’ share of the distribution of prof its. 
This incited a general strike at the Verolme yard and radicalised the other 
shipbuilding workers in the Rotterdam area. Despite his provoking the 
strike, the f irst to break the ranks was Verolme, but the other employers 
followed suit quickly. After all, business was recovering after the decline of 
the early 1960s (see Figure 7.1). When Verolme gave in to the demands, the 
workers of Wilton-Fijenoord took this as their inspiration to walk out. Under 
the leadership of an action committee, the shipyard was occupied during 
the Zwarte Nacht van Wilton-Fijenoord (Wilton-Fijenoord night).44 Manage-
ment of Wilton-Fijenoord soon submitted, as did the other companies. At 
one point, more than 10,000 workers of 13 companies were on strike in the 
Rotterdam metal industry. They all gained the wage rise they desired.
The 1965 Rotterdam metal strike was decisive for years to come. The 
unity within the Metaalbond was broken by the strike, and, according to the 
sociologist J.M.W. Binneveld, who has studied the strike thoroughly, future 
strikes in shipbuilding were enabled by the 1965 events.45 A few small strikes 
occurred between 1965 and the big outburst of worker discontent in 1970. In 
one simultaneous but disconnected movement the dockers and metalworkers 
of the Rotterdam area came out without union support at the end of August 
1970. On the docks almost 20,000 workers in Rotterdam and Amsterdam 
struck for more than 2 weeks from 28 August. The metalworkers preceded 
the dockers by three days when the workers of Wilton-Fijenoord walked out.
Both employers and the leaderships of labour unions showed that 
they had been slow to understand the rationale of strikes since 1965. The 
August 1970 strike took them by surprise and, despite several attempts at 
negotiation, the strike continued. One of the union executives declared in 
a national newspaper: “We don’t support the strike because we feel tied 
43 This strike is described and analyzed in Binneveld, De stakingen in de Rotterdamse metaal-
industrie in 1965. 
44 Henriks et al., De zwarte nacht van Wilton-Fijenoord.
45 Binneveld, De stakingen in de Rotterdamse metaalindustrie in 1965, 62.
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to the collective agreement.”46 On a national level there were also negotia-
tions within the extant tripartite system. Because almost everyone in these 
institutions felt that there was a growing discontent among Dutch workers, 
they agreed that all workers should receive a one-off extra payment of 400 
guilders in 1970. This agreement caused the metalworkers to resume work, 
while the dockers continued the strike for a further week.
The discussion within the union movement about the lack of connec-
tion between leadership and the members, which had begun around 1960, 
revived. The leadership realised that the voice of the members had to be 
heard if the union executives wanted to prevent being taken by surprise 
in the future. Over the next few years, a higher proportion of strikes than 
during the preceding decades occurred, and now most strikes were initiated 
and led by the unions. It seemed the waves of wildcat strikes that had swept 
the Netherlands during the 1950s and 1960s had come to an end.
However, in 1972 there was a very large wildcat strike in shipbuilding. 
On 4 February the workers of RDM began the strike, and they were fol-
lowed by many colleagues at short notice. One day later, 30,000 workers in 
Amsterdam and Rotterdam were on strike in protest against a court order 
that forbade the metal unions to issue a strike call. The fact that the lawyer 
for the employers stated in court that the workers’ meetings summoned by 
the unions reminded him of the meetings of the Nazi party in Nuremberg47 
aroused a lot of anger among the workers. This strike also expanded to a 
shipyard in Zaandam and De Schelde in Vlissingen.
It took twenty-one days before the strikers – who continued their struggle 
without any f inancial compensation – realised that they would not receive 
the rise the unions had asked for. Although this strike was unoff icial, it was 
recognised that union cadres took the lead in many instances.48 In 1973, 
things were different. Because of the threat of an economic crisis, there was 
no more room for offensive strikes and the unions had seemingly learned 
their lessons from 1970 and 1972. They realised they should take the lead in 
the future. The entire union movement then launched a series of nation- and 
industrywide strikes against the threat that rises in prices would no longer 
be compensated for by the employers. The unions even demanded that this 
compensation would be paid in an absolute amount, instead of a percentage 
46 “Wij staan echter niet achter de staking want wij achten ons gebonden door de CAO”: Nieuwe 
Rotterdamse Courant, 29 August 1970.
47 Kommunistiese Eenheidsbeweging Nederland (ml), Metaalstaking 1972, 17.
48 Smolders, “Chronologie van de belangrijkste gebeurtenissen voor en tijdens de 
metaalstaking”.
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of wages. Thus wage differences would be levelled, and at the same time the 
total wage rise would be moderated.49 A total of more than 80,000 workers 
(6,000 in shipbuilding) went on strike in this defensive action, totalling more 
than 600,000 strike-days (110,000 in shipbuilding). During the 1973 Easter 
weekend, the unions suddenly reached an agreement with the employers. 
Not all strikers were happy with this, and it took a lot of persuasive power by 
the union leaders to talk the workers of ADM, NDSM, and Verschure back to 
work. At the Rotterdam shipyards a reporter noted: “We were mad enough 
to slave away and now we must back off.”50 After f ifty days of a variety of 
actions, the strike was settled.
The next year that saw a big industrial strike was 1977, again for the 
maintenance of price-rise compensation. This strike lasted 25 days, and 
more than 34,000 workers participated under the leadership of the un-
ions. After 270,000 strike-days were lost, the strikers, including the 5,000 
shipbuilders, resumed work. The biggest single strike during this action 
occurred at the Wilton-Fijenoord shipyard where 3,000 workers stopped 
working for 3 days. During the mid-1970s there was a shift from an of-
fensive to a defensive attitude by labour. As Dutch shipbuilding suffered 
intense foreign competition and plummeting sales from 1976, its workers 
lost confidence, and not many joined the last offensive strike movement of 
that year. Even during later national strikes against a reduction in wages in 
1980 and 1982, most shipbuilding workers continued to work. In 1980 only 
the workers of the independent shipyard Van der Giessen-De Noord struck. 
However, during the 1982 strike against the diminution of the Sick Leave Act 
initiated by the social democratic minister of social affairs and employment, 
more shipbuilding workers followed the strike call by the union movement. 
They thus protested against the lowering of sick-leave payments by 10 per 
cent. More than 100,000 workers participated in this strike but they lost, 
although many employers were forced to compensate their employees for 
the consequences of the new law in favour of their employees. At almost all 
the big shipyards the workers joined the strike, despite the difficult situation 
in shipbuilding. The workers of Wilton-Fijenoord even ignored the fact that 
a judge forbade them to go on strike. Their wildcat strike was supported by 
2,500 workers and ended only after ten days. This was the last big strike in 
Dutch shipbuilding before the bankruptcy of RSV.
In the meantime a few strikes had occurred in order to prevent this bank-
ruptcy and push the state for more f inancial support. It began in 1977 during 
49 Breij, Een kwestie van principe, 9.
50 ”We waren gek genoeg om voor sloof te spelen, en nu kunnen we oprotten”: ibid., 144.
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a one-day strike by the workers of the Schiedam Gusto shipyard. They went 
to The Hague to present the government with a petition containing 1,400 
signatures asking for more state support for shipbuilding. In 1979 more work-
ers’ actions took place urging that the endangered industry be protected. On 
4 January of that year workers of De Schelde interrupted work for one hour to 
demand preservation of the yard. In April, strikers at Verolme demanded that 
the state should negotiate soon about financial support instead of postponing 
the f inal decision, and talks were promised. Despite the April strike, state 
support was not f inalised. The union therefore issued a strike call in June, 
which was backed by 2,700 workers. The strike ended after three days, but 
other actions continued. In June, the workers of IHC Verschure in Amsterdam 
received a notif ication that the restructuring of the company threatened 
the jobs of 780 of the 3,400 workers. They were not willing to accept this 
possibility. After a month, the unions advised the workers to stop all kinds of 
action (on one occasion workers prevented the managing director entering 
the yard) as management had threatened to stop paying wages. The company 
decreased the number of workers during the following years. In February 
1982 the workers of IHC Verschure occupied the shipyard to prevent a further 
decrease in the number of employees to just one hundred.
There were more labour actions to stop or redirect the restructuring 
of the shipbuilding industry but, as we have seen, they were all in vain. 
The industry has suffered hard times and even as late as 2004 there was a 
demonstration in The Hague for state support attended by 4,000 workers. 
Shipbuilding was restructured and the workers had to accept this. Although 
they had fought the consequences of the restructuring process the number 
of workers plummeted, as did their strike activity. Meanwhile, what remains 
of a once-great industry seems to be relatively healthy again, although it 
is much smaller than before. In 2013, workers in the shipbuilding industry 
together with their colleagues from the metal industry dared to strike for 
higher wages again. And they were successful.51
Concluding remarks
Dutch shipbuilding is still vibrant in many niche shipbuilding markets, 
but it is no longer one of the biggest shipbuilding industries in the world 
as it was in the 1930s, when it was the third-largest. In 2012 it was the 
51 See http://w w w.fnvbondgenoten.nl/mijnbranche/branches/metalektro/nieuws/ 
655996- grootmetaal_werkgevers_komen_211013/. 
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fourth-largest – but not on a global scale: only in Europe. Indeed, all Euro-
pean countries together, including Turkey, only made up about 5 per cent 
of world production.52 The big shipyards no longer function as they did: 
some survive either as repair companies or the yards have been taken over 
for other purposes.53 The Dutch shipbuilding industry has at least retained 
one of its long-standing specialisms, the building of dredgers. Today, the 
construction of super-yachts and specialist offshore vessels is prevalent in 
the Netherlands, which shows that Dutch shipbuilding has found a new 
niche market to operate in. For example, IHC Holland Merwede is focused 
on the continuous development of its design and construction activities 
for the specialised shipbuilding sector, in particular the dredging and 
offshore industries. IHC Holland Merwede is the world market leader in the 
construction of specialist dredging equipment and complex custom-built 
offshore vessels.54
After a short period in the 1960s and 1970s when shipbuilding work-
ers were able to gain higher wages by large and offensive strikes, the tide 
turned to defensive actions. Shipbuilding as an industry moved to low-wage 
countries, and the Dutch government’s support policy was not able to stop 
this. The only thing that it accomplished was to delay the advent of high 
unemployment in Dutch shipbuilding. Ultimately many thousands of work-
ers lost their jobs, and the social environment of many of those workers 
also crumbled.
52 Scheepsbouw Nederland, Jaarverslag 2012, 71-73.
53 Ter Brugge, Moeyes, and Spits (eds), Scheepsbouw in perspectief.
54 See www.ihcmerwede.com/.
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Appendix 7.1  Completed ships in the Netherlands, 1950-1986
Sea-going Inland vessels Tow-boats and tugboats
Number 1,000 GRT Number 1,000 tons Number 1,000 kW
1950 87 195 47 22 35 12
1951 115 256 65 29 28 11
1952 132 235 38 11 51 9
1953 116 287 19 5 52 13
1954 119 342 50 18 64 14
1955 124 396 70 24 51 11
1956 136 399 96 44 56 14
1957 172 537 84 38 59 19
1958 146 500 91 55 36 13
1959 106 564 95 67 32 13
1960 116 599 112 56 45 27
1961 115 466 144 122 31 13
1962 111 544 165 147 66 20
1963  77 423 173 137 40 28
1964  62 226 188 155 57 22
1965  86 111 115 70 58 17
1966  90 292 99 76 57 23
1967  88 263 54 36 46 9
1968  62 228 45 68 62 26
1969  76 452 56 56 49 23
1970  74 603 83 88 70 29
1971 79 565 83 124 85 45
1972 79 750 94 143 92 37
1973 60 792 78 127 88 41
1974 64 895 53 75 113 52
1975 86 991 50 59 96 76
1976 82 594 25 21 110 96
1977 70 204 15 11 65 55
1978 53 320 20 12 55 64
1979 52 172 53 71 29 16
1980 22 92 88 137 71 62
1981 25 102 69 106 80 66
1982 46 162 44 81 85 95
1983 38 139 9 8 69 90
1984 30 109 30 52 28 30
1985 45 109 29 36 33 36
1986 28 95 25 48 24 24
note: 1950-62 companies ≥ 25 employees, 1963-86 all companies ≥ 10 employees 
Source: cBS, produktiestatistieken industrie. Scheepsbouw- en scheepsbouwreparatiebedrijven 
1986, 37
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Appendix 7.2  Number of companies and number of employees in shipbuilding 
and ship repair, 1951-1986 





































note: all companies ≥ 10 employees 
Source: cBS, produktiestatistieken industrie. Scheepsbouw- en scheepsbouwreparatiebedrijven 
1986, 37
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Appendix 7.3  Strikes in the Dutch shipbuilding industry, 1950-2013
  Total number of strikers Strike-days Number of strikes
1950 1,009 17,933 5
1951 5,745 6,470 5
1952 230 29 1
1953 6,396 5,125 4
1954 2,201 12,253 8
1955 2,568 17,409 9
1956 5,502 2,629 6
1957 367 1,613 5
1958 286 429 1
1959 380 333 1
1960 17,866 14,468 9
1961 410 878 2
1962 120 800 2
1963 400 795 3
1964 1,929 2,003 3
1965 15,195 30,285 3
1966 458 816 2
1967 1,111 1,022 2
1968 2,000 6,000 1
1969 1,620 1,214 4
1970 30,470 128,510 5
1971 1,672 1,215 4
1972 30,820 400,153 4
1973 6,246 110,411 1
1974 1,000 288 2
1975 . . 1
1976 435 83 4
1977 6,100 17,725 6
1978 1,000 125 4
1979 7,880 9,472 9
1980 1,800 21,071 2
1981 4,243 698 6
1982 8,678 19,250 3
1983 2,060 260 3
1984 2,500 . 1
1985 1,770 . 3
1986 97 30 1
1987 . . 0
1988 . . 0
1989 90 0 1
1990 . . 1
1991 . . 1
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  Total number of strikers Strike-days Number of strikes
1992 300 37 1
1993 500 312 1
1994 300 300 1
1995 . . 0
1996 . . 1
1997 . . 0
1998 . . 0
1999 . . 0
2000 . . 0
2001 . . 0
2002 . . 0
2003 70 18 1
2004 . . 1
2005 . . 0
2006 . . 0
2007 . . 0
2008 . . 0
2009 . . 0
2010 . . 0
2011 . . 0
2012 . . 0
2013 . . 1
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Southern and Eastern Europe

8 Always on the verge of sinking
Labour and production in the Sestri Ponente shipyard, 
Genoa (Italy), 1950-2014
Giulia Strippoli, Davide Tabor, and Luciano Villani1
Introduction: is the identity of Sestri Ponente at a crossroads?
In this chapter we examine the history of the Sestri Ponente shipyard in 
relation to three themes: employment and labour composition; production 
trends and changes in the organisation of work; and workplace struggles 
that took place during the Republican period to guarantee the role of the 
workers in the company, and to avoid the closure of a highly productive 
shipyard. The importance of the local context in which the shipyard stands 
seems to go beyond the issue of employment, embracing the physiognomy 
of a territory in its broadest sense, embedded in cultural and communal 
identity processes over a long period. This identity has flourished through-
out the past two centuries and has been forged around the knowledge 
and special skills learned and passed down through generations by the 
Sestri Ponente shipyard workers. Although many of its constituent elements 
remained intact, Sestri Ponente eventually declined as a result of economic, 
production, and social changes.
Sestri Ponente
Sestri Ponente is an industrial suburb of Genoa in north-west Italy and 
is situated on the Ligurian Sea to the west of the city.2 It grew to become 
1 Giulia Strippoli wrote two sections of this chapter (on workers’ identity and workers’ strug-
gles), Davide Tabor wrote two sections (on the quantitative prof ile and on health and safety), 
and Luciano Villani wrote two sections (on Sestri Ponente and on the business and technical 
prof ile), with the rest being a combined effort of the three authors.
2 The Port of Genoa is an important outlet to the sea for northern Italy’s most industrialised 
area. It covers a total surface area of about 7 mn m2 and extends uninterrupted for 20 km along 
a coastal strip protected by breakwaters, starting from the Old Port basin, in the city’s historic 
centre, to the far western end, in the area of Voltri. It has 47 km of maritime works, including 
30 km of operative quays. The Sestri Ponente shipyard covers an area of approximately 248,000 
m2, of which 81,000 m2 are covered. It has three docks of 285 m,255 m, and 250 m in length and 
three cranes including one with a capacity of 200 tons. 
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a working town in the early decades of the nineteenth century with a 
particular “vocation” of otherness, expressed in the form of a jealously 
guarded administrative autonomy, which was lost during the fascist period 
as it was subsumed into a wider urban area.3 However, in the current eco-
nomic climate, it seems that Sestri is unwilling to accept a future without 
maritime activities, despite the threat of a future without shipbuilding. 
During periods of diff iculty of the yard, the company, employees, and trade 
unions have proudly proclaimed their long tradition of work, each according 
to its role in the history of Sestri Ponente’s “forge of ships”.4 Founded by 
Ansaldo (an Italian engineering company est. 1853) in the latter years of the 
nineteenth century, Sestri Ponente was eventually taken over by the state 
conglomerate Finmeccanica in 1948, which then divested the shipyard to 
Italcantieri of Trieste in 1966. Italcantieri was established in 1959 as a state 
f inancial holding company for the Italian shipbuilding industry under 
the supervision of the Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (Institute 
for Industrial Reconstruction, IRI),5 and in 1984 became a state-owned 
operating company under Fincantieri, at which point it merged eight Italian 
shipyards controlled by it, including Sestri Ponente.6
Workers’ identity
Hull-launching ceremonies, often witnessed by the entire community, pro-
jected an image of perfect co-operation between the company and workers. At 
this moment, the workers recognised the result of their labour and their special 
skills and creative abilities, according to a specific culture of the enterprise, 
the “ansaldina”, which created a strong relationship between the workers and 
Ansaldo. This culture stimulated a particular valorisation of the essential traits 
of the workers’ mental universe and skilled training, but remained sensitive 
3 See Rugaf iori, “Da città a quartiere operaio”.
4 The title of a 2012 book: Caterino, Fucina di navi. 
5 IRI was an Italian public holding company established in 1933 by the fascist regime to 
rescue, restructure, and f inance banks and private companies that had gone bankrupt during 
the Great Depression. After 1945, IRI played a pivotal role in the marked growth of the Italian 
economy of the 1950s and 1960s. It was dissolved in 2000.
6 The company, founded in 1959 as a f inance company, the Cantieri Navali – Fincantieri Ltd 
Company, was transformed into an operating company in 1984, following the merger of eight 
companies controlled by it, in the f ield of shipbuilding, ship repair, and production of mechanical 
components and diesel engines. For Fincantieri, see Carminati, Il settore delle costruzioni navali 
tra globalità e nazionalità, 159-200, and Galisi, Dai salvataggi alla competizione globale.
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to the sirens of the productivist ideology.7 This specific culture also involved 
other aspects of the social and professional identity of workers and employees. 
Working at Ansaldo – which was strongly rooted territorially – meant gaining 
a position in Sestri society and guaranteed access to a range of benefits (from 
grants to welfare activities for employees’ families organised by the company, 
from recreational clubs to internal solidarity funds) that helped to cement the 
bond with the company.8 These features and the “ansaldina” culture would 
continue even when the shipyard was no longer part of Ansaldo.
“In Genoa”, as Duccio Bigazzi has written, “it was enough to say, ‘I work 
at Ansaldo’ to f ind all doors opened.”9 This summarises a perception of 
common purpose that rested on internalising a certain corporate loyalty – 
constitutive of workers’ pride – able to coexist with the spirit of the values 
of their social class. The transition to the public sector in 1966 triggered by 
Italcantieri’s takeover led to the strengthening of the welfare mindset, which 
had important implications, due to the assurance of work and the redistribu-
tion of resources to the whole community, and contributing in other ways 
to mitigate the harshness of the capital-labour conflict. At some points, 
especially with the creation of Intersind (the trade union for workers at state 
holding enterprises) at the end of the 1950s, the trade unions and Ansaldo 
came together in applying for grants and contracts from government. And, 
in more recent times, when the unions disapproved of the decisions of public 
managers less willing to participate in dialogue, they invoked the better 
team spirit they had enjoyed with the previous managers.10
Between the reality of the yard and the rest of society of Sestri Ponente 
existed a natural exchange of interests. It was a relationship developed 
within traditional family and social structures, as the transmission of work-
ing knowledge occurred mainly through the generational inclusion or in 
specif ic group dynamics, and was then articulated in a more extended way. 
7 Molinari, Lettere al padrone, 19, contains a description of typical characters of workers: “The 
Ansaldo worker […] is politically antagonistic but he has an ideology that exalts the value of 
labour; he f ights inside the factory but is respectful of order and discipline. He can also oppose 
and despise the ‘owner’ or those who represent the ‘owner’, but he is proud of his work and the 
place where he works.”
8 For the relationship between corporate culture and professional hierarchies at Ansaldo, 
see Gibelli, “Tecnici e operai”.
9 Bigazzi, “Culture ed etica del lavoro”, 198.
10 This is the case of the metalworkers’ union FIOM, which, in criticising the decisions of 
Giuseppe Bono, Fincantieri’s CEO since 2002, recalled the previous CEO Pierfrancesco Guargua-
glini, who immediately after taking off ice declared: “the workers do not have to ask anything, 
the problem is ours”. See Coordinamenti nazionale FIOM-CGIL del gruppo Fincantieri, Il caso 
Fincantieri.
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On this, the processes of mobility had an influence: besides the stable and 
mostly unionised workforce, some workers spent only a few weeks or months 
in the yard; others worked with assiduity at Sestri Ponente, even if they 
were employed by sub-contracting companies. There was also considerable 
mobility of workers, and an objective community of interest expressed in 
the good performance of shipbuilding orders, elements that explain the 
support provided by the citizenship to the mobilisations against the closure 
of the plant in recent times. For some people, support originated from a 
long-lasting professional relationship with the yard, but for others this rela-
tionship appeared mediated by different relationships with other companies 
and with the wider community: the yard retained, however, a heritage they 
wanted to defend, because it was deemed an irreplaceable major part of the 
local economy. The region’s identif ication with the shipbuilding industry is 
therefore the result of long historical experience with multiple trajectories, 
condensed into a symbiotic relationship that has made the image of Sestri 
Ponente almost indistinguishable from its shipyard’s activities.
A quantitative profile of the work in Sestri Ponente
The f irst element we would like to highlight concerns the gender composi-
tion of the labour force: the majority of shipyard workers were men, with 
some females employed in cleaning and canteen work. This is a constant, 
which changed only partially during the period of the Second World War 
and in the past two decades, when there has been a limited increase in 
female employment in the shipyard. Employment statistics over the decades 
under consideration outline a clear trend, although it is one peppered with 
some variations. The reduction in the number of workers is constant and 
relevant. The data show a radical contraction of the labour force, which 
began in the mid-1950s and has continued ever since. In 1956 there were 
5,235 employees; in 1965, 3,383; in 1970, 3,764; in 1980, 2,530; and in 1996, 
1,020. By the year 2000, the numbers had fallen to 770 employees; although 
in 2004 this had slightly increased to 1,050, by 2010, only 770 employees 
remained, almost seven times fewer than in 1956.11 This sharp decline had 
11 Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale, Archivio generale e pratiche societarie (hereafter 
AIRI), FC, b. R1558, Brevi note sulla cantieristica italiana degli ultimi venti anni. Genova 25 agosto 
1977; b. R1693, Piano quadriennale 1980, Relazione; b. R1564, Bilancio consolidato 1998. Esercizio 
1998; b. R1566, Preconsuntivo 2000. Budget 2001; documents provided by Sandro Scarrone (inter-
view 22 November 2012). It is better to consider the data as trends, because they are obtained 
from different sources.
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several causes; including marked technological change, the organisation 
of the production cycle, and changes in the market for ships.
The recurrent crises in the sector have not simply reduced the number 
of workers: they have represented an unusual condition of employment. 
The role of social safety in Italy in the public sector has been translated, 
when necessary, into the absorption of the workforce dismissed from small 
companies in crisis into larger public industrial establishments, as hap-
pened in Sestri in relation to the troubled history of a local ship repair f irm, 
OARN.12 More generally, the result of labour disputes has undoubtedly had 
an influence on those entering the workforce: an example was the negotia-
tion, completed in the mid-1970s, which led to the absorption of those who 
worked for outside contractors into the shipyard in Sestri.13 Finally, the 
recruitment processes have been affected by domestic migration. Between 
the 1950s and 1970s, when the population of Genoa grew by approximately 
150,000 inhabitants – mainly due to migration from southern Italy, where 
recruitment was extensive. The f irst recruitment drive was directed at 
towns in the South, where posters were displayed. The second was indirectly 
linked to the classic cycle of urban integration: after a period of work in 
small companies, often engaged in related industries of the sector, workers 
moved to work at Sestri. Similar models operated in more recent years, with 
migration from abroad becoming more prominent: for example, Croatian 
welders arriving in Genoa in the 1990s.14
Up to the 1960s workers at Sestri were mainly Genoese or Ligurian. 
This changed in the next decade as a result of the arrival of workers from 
different regions. Thereafter, many people from different localities and 
nationalities worked in the yard, with inevitable problems related to their 
integration and to language barriers. The district of Sestri, however, is still 
involved in immigration to some extent: according to municipal statistics 
(2010), 6 per cent of local inhabitants were foreigners, a percentage lower 
than the urban average of 8.3 per cent.15
12 The absorption occurred in 1992. There was  a documentary and an exhibition on OARN, 
OARN: una storia di uomini e navi (by Luigi Pastorino, a former worker), which premiered at 
Genoa in 2012.
13 AIRI, fondo Italcantieri (hereafter ITC), b. R1688, Piano quadriennale 1975, Relazione 
(5 December 1975), 81.
14 Interviews with Diego Delzotto, Giulio Troccoli, and Bruno Manganaro (21 November 2012); 
interviews with Camillo Costanzo and Vincenzo Alicinio (22 November 2012).
15 Comune di Genova, Direzione statistica, Stranieri a Genova al 31 dicembre 2010, 10 (http://
statistica.comune.genova.it/pubblicazioni/storico/stranieri_2010.pdf, accessed 22 September 
2013).
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The data on employment in Table 8.1 highlight that between 1959 and 
1975 86 per cent of employees were workers, with peaks of 90 per cent.16 
The proportion of workers to clerks can be considered constant, with the 
exception of the early 1970s, when a favourable economic and commercial 
situation and the stimulus of the trade union battles allowed the hiring of 
hundreds of workers. Table 8.2 refers to the technical composition of the 
workforce and reveals the clear dominance of those with higher qualif ica-
tions. In 1972, this percentage was 90 per cent of the labour force working 
in the yard. This peak owed much to collective negotiations arising from 
16 Statistics about workforce are discontinuous in available sources. In case of Table 8.1 there 
are no f igures for 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, or 1981: despite the fact that the statistical series is 
incomplete, it nonetheless provides an overview of trends.




















Source: istituto per la Ricostruzione industriale, archivio generale e pratiche societarie (hereafter 
aiRi), itc, b. R1688, Piano quadriennale 1975. Relazione (trieste, 5 december 1975); b. R1689, Società 
Italcantieri. Note sul bilancio al 31 dicembre 1968; Società Italcantieri. Note sul bilancio al 31 dicembre 
1969; Italcantieri. Bilancio al 31 dicembre 1971; Italcantieri. Bilancio al 31 dicembre 1972; Italcantieri. 
Bilancio al 31 dicembre 1973; Italcantieri. Bilancio al 31 dicembre 1974; b. R1693, Piano quadriennale 
1980. Relazione (trieste, 8 october 1980); b. R1697, Piano quadriennale 1982. Relazione (trieste, 16 
September 16, 1982); centro ligure di Storia Sociale (hereafter clSS), camera del lavoro di genova 
(hereafter cdlg), Succursali cdl di genova-Sestri (hereafter Sestri), b. 4, FioM-cgil, Inchiesta sulla 
struttura del salario nelle aziende metalmeccaniche Italcantieri Sestri P. (February 1968).
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actual or threatened trade union action. It should also be highlighted that 
it was diff icult for the company to f ind not only skilled workers, but also 
unskilled ones. During the 1970s there were extensive efforts to plan ap-
propriate courses of pre-placement for workers, especially for the “younger 
generation”, organised with the help of the local ANCIFAP,17 while IFAP from 
Rome – a branch of the IRI  – was involved in the training and retraining 
of clerks and managers.18
At the end of the 1960s, the average age of workers and clerks was rather 
high, about 45 and 47 years old.19 The data seem to be confirmed by the 
testimonies collected today, which give the impression of  strong job stabil-
ity: many employees, once they entered the yard, grew old doing the same 
job until retirement. The work in the yard crowned a long period of working 
life: the f irst part was spent in the apprenticeships in small enterprises; 
17 The National Association IRI Training Centres and Training was formed in Genoa in 1936 
and developed especially in cities where the group’s companies were situated.
18 IRI, numerazione rossa, AIRI, ITC, b. R1687, Piano quadriennale 1972-75, f. 1 (Trieste, 10 No-
vember 1971), 85. IFAP stands for Institute for Training and Professional Qualif ications.
19 AIRI, ITC, b. R1689, Società Italcantieri. Note sul bilancio al 31 dicembre 1968.









1959 21.2 41.0 35.5 2.3
1960 22.2 42.7 32.8 2.2
1961 22.9 43.2 31.4 2.5
1962 22.6 43.3 31.5 2.6
1963 22.7 45.6 29.2 2.5
1964 22.0 46.7 29.2 2.1
1965 22.2 47.8 28.0 2.0
1966 21.9 48.4 28.1 1.6
1967 22.1 46.9 29.7 1.3
1971 23.2 42.6 33.2 1.1
1972 25.5 46.6 26.8 1.1
1973 25.3 50.6 22.9 1.2
1974 29.8 49.4 19.8 1.0
1975 36.4 51.7 11.7 0.2
note: Workers in italy were divided by national collective agreement into the four categories 
above based on the nature of the work and its specialisation. totals may not equal 100 because of 
rounding. 
Source: clSS, cdlg, Sestri, b. 4
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employees then began to work for the public company. Employment at 
Sestri was a relevant “leap forward” in people’s lives, for better wages and 
working conditions, including safety. Retention of the skilled workforce 
along with the recruitment of adult workers increased the average age of 
the workforce.
The seniority of the workforce, in particular among the working class, 
was addressed by a report on the budget in 1980: it highlighted that the 
percentage of young people was “drastically decreased”.20 A long-running 
trend has become acute in the years following the global crisis in 1973. 
During that crisis, the process of expulsion of labour from the yard penalised 
younger age groups. For example, the number of workers under 25 years old 
decreased from 25.5 per cent in 1974, to 8.7 per cent in 1980 (Tables 8.3 and 
8.4). The expulsion of the lower age groups should therefore be linked to the 
lack of orders after the OPEC crises of 1973-1974, and it is the f irst indication 
of a signif icant change in the composition of the Sestri workforce, mainly 
related to seniority in service.
High rates of labour mobility are easily distinguishable as long as we 
include in the analysis the relationship between internal and external 
sub-contract and temporary workers. In the yard, in addition to the em-
ployees counted in off icial statistics, hundreds of people worked, some 
permanently, on behalf of small and medium-sized sub-contractors for 
20 AIRI, ITC, b. R1693, Piano quadriennale 1980. Relazione (Trieste, 8 October 1980).
Table 8.3  Workers in Sestri under 25 and 29 years old, 1974 and 1980 (percentages)
Workers under 25 Workers under 29
31 december 1974 31 august 1980 31 december 1974 31 august 1980
12.9 0.5 25.5 8.7
Source: aiRi, itc, b. R1693, Relazione (trieste, october 8, 1980), 87
Table 8.4  Workers at Sestri by age in 1974, 1977 and 1980 (percentages)
0-20 21-24 25-28 29-32 33-36 37-40 41-44 44-48 49-52 53-56 57-60
1974 1.2 11.7 12.6 9.1 9.3 8.7 10.8 10.4 11.5 8.4 6.4
1977 0.1 5.4 12.7 12.5 11.1 10.9 10.7 11.6 11.8 9.6 3.5
1980 0.0 0.5 8.2 13.3 13.0 12.6 12.8 13.1 12.8 9.3 4.3
note: totals may not equal 100 because of rounding. 
Source: aiRi, itc, b. R1693, Relazione (trieste, october 8, 1980), 87
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certain services and processes. Statistics show the extent of this kind of 
work in the yard: some surveys conducted by the CGIL (Italian General 
Federation of Labour) in 1971 showed that of 3,200 workers employed in the 
yard about 860 were actually sub-contract workers.21 The shipyard resorted 
to external companies when orders and production cycles required it, 
on an intermittent basis. Because of the labour agreement of September 
1975, which opposed the hiring of outside workers, the use of this kind of 
contracts decreased drastically. As late as 1981, the company complained 
about long delays in the execution of the work, attributing this to union 
obstructionism, procurement problems, and overtime.22 In recent years, 
however, the amount of sub-contracted work has increased dramatically, 
unbalancing the relationship with internal employees. On the one hand, it 
was the consequence of the increasing outsourcing of services in the public 
sector, not just in industry; on the other hand, it was the result of the change 
of the core business of Sestri Ponente to cruise-ship construction, for which 
the fitting-out operations – where the sub-contract work predominates – ac-
count for more than 70 per cent of the value of a ship. According to another 
union estimate, in November 2012, there were some 2,000 sub-contract 
workers, of which about 700 worked on a regular basis.23 This number is 
comparable to the internal employees, of which there were 777 in 2010. 
Another much earlier form of mobility of labour was the phenomenon of 
workers transferred, in moments of particular need, from other yards of 
21 Centro Ligure di Storia Sociale (hereafter CLSS), Camera del Lavoro di Genova (hereafter 
CdLG), Succursali CdL di Genova-Sestri (hereafter Sestri), b. 4, Italcantieri di Sestri. Situazione 
ditte di appalto (1 May 1971).
22 AIRI, ITC, b. R1693, Piano quadriennale 1981. Relazione (Trieste, 20 October 1981), 4-6.
23 CLSS, CdLG, Sestri, b. 4; interviews with Diego Delzotto, Giulio Troccoli, and Bruno Man-
ganaro (21 November 2012).







Source: clSS, cdlg, Sestri, b. 4, FioM-cgil, Inchiesta sulla struttura del salario nelle aziende 
metalmeccaniche. Italcantieri Sestri P. (February 1968)
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Italcantieri; this phenomenon is not observable for the whole period, but 
is nevertheless present.24
With regard to salary, although the changes in the labour agreement 
do not facilitate the reconstruction of a complete wage series, we can 
still summarise some macro-trends of negotiation. The difference in pay 
between men and women was observable until at least 1963:25 men, as in 
the rest of the Italian industrial sector, earned higher wages than women 
did. Up to 1960, labourers, the category of male shipyard worker that 
was the least well paid, received a minimum wage higher than women 
(Table 8.5).
Until the 1970s, the salary structure was broadly divided into two parts: 
one f ixed at the minimum wage; and payment by results, represented by 
piecework. As the data in Table 8.6 show, in Sestri during the 1960s piece 
rates accounted for one-third of workers’ wages. In addition, from 1961 
there was also a production bonus, not counted here. The structure of the 
piece rate or piecework was overhauled at the end of the 1970s, as we will 
see later in this chapter.
Health and safety
A dramatic aspect of work at Sestri Ponente – certainly felt by the workers 
– was the dangers inherent to the job. During the 1950s, there were frequent 
articles addressing the issue in the off icial newspaper of the company, 
L’Ansaldino.26 Both the company and trade union archives testify to the 
importance assigned to the problem. Of course, there were many other 
measures to be taken to limit the number of accidents that occurred in the 
shipyard, in the workshops, and in the basins of the yard. The incidence of 
injuries depended of course on typical working conditions of shipbuilding 
production, which took place in precarious places, forcing welders to work 
in narrow tunnels or people to work in solitude and in cramped conditions, 
at least in some phases of the construction cycle, and certainly more in the 
past than in recent times. A better idea of  what it meant to work in Sestri 
in terms of safety can be inferred from the data and statistics contained 
24 AIRI, ITC, b. R1686, Nota sul programma aziendale a fine 1969: Sestri “has been able to 
take advantage of the performance of substantial rates of workforce moved temporarily from 
Monfalcone”, 3. There was worker mobility between yards in the next period too.
25 From that year onwards, the union documentation tended to refer to two different wages.
26 For example, L’Ansaldino: 1 September 1954; 1 June 1955; 15 February, 1 April, 1 October 1956.
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in the off icial reports. Table 8.7 describes the situation rather effectively 
for about a decade.
A union survey in 1968 subdivided risks according to the stage of the 
production cycle.27 Just two examples from this survey are worthy of 
special attention. In the basin, according to a FIOM (metalworkers’ union) 
document:
The construction of the bow and stern lockers, along with the pace and 
the delivery dates, makes this a hellish environment. In a few square feet 
of space the workers assembling the hull, masons, welders, and electri-
cians worked one above the other, elbow to elbow.
Secondly, about assembly on board:
[it] is certainly the phase when the indices of harmfulness are the highest. 
All or almost all of the negative environmental factors (as they relates to 
shipbuilding) are added together. Temperature: too hot or cold. Humidity. 
Very poor air circulation. Low lighting. Dangerous scaffolding. Noise. 
Vibration. Radiation.
There were also risks arising from the presence of asbestos dust and marinite, 
welding fumes, and vapours of many other dangerous products. Given 
the inherently dangerous working environment, many union campaigns 
focused on the issues of health and safety at work.
27 CLSS, CdLG, Sestri, b. 3, Appunti sull’ambiente di lavoro (20 February 1968).
Table 8.7  Accidents per million hours worked, 1968-1979
1968 1971 1973 1977 1979
number of compensated 
injuries 95 148 129 133 138
number of accidents 
 requiring medical treatment 1,422 1,730 1,730 1,290 1,360
number of production hours 
lost per accident 13.1 18 15.5 18.8 18.9
Source: aiRi, itc, b. R1689, Note sul bilancio al 31.12.69, p. 8; ivi, Bilancio al 31.12.71;  Bilancio al 
31.12.1974; aiRi, itc, b. R1693, Relazione (trieste, 8 october 1980), 89
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Evolution of business and technical-production profile
The phase of post-1945 reconstruction and the needs posed by the conver-
sion to the civilian market presaged the beginning of a diff icult period 
fraught with uncertainties for the shipyard in Sestri Ponente. The shipyard 
had structural limitations inherent to its location in an urban environment, 
and was crossed by the railway line from Genoa to Ventimiglia. A profound 
reorganisation, moreover, was urgently imposed after the war for the entire 
Ansaldo group.28 From that moment the yard was the centre of several reno-
vation projects – some of which were realised, although others remained on 
paper – in order to try to reduce the constraints dictated by topography. In 
conjunction with the introduction of more modern techniques and with the 
improvement of the facilities and organisational systems, the aim was to 
make Sestri more productive and efficient in comparison to its international 
competition. In market terms, the yard had to deal with a new situation 
and it was necessary to change to respond to the emergence of a different 
composition of the demand for ships: the yard – which also launched cargo 
ships – had specialised in warships and passenger liners (passenger liners 
were built even later despite the growth in air travel). With Italy defeated 
in the Second World War there were fewer warship orders from the state, 
and the market growth sectors were in the liquid and dry bulk sectors as 
the world economy recovered and then grew in the post-war climate.29
Up until this period, Ansaldo’s Sestri Ponente yard had been able to 
maintain a leading position in Italian shipbuilding – mainly thanks to 
its expertise acquired in building fast trans-Atlantic liners. The company 
had consolidated its position during the 1930s with the addition of new 
berths and 21 per cent of the national average annual production of hulls 
(32,000 tons per year under full employment).30 A considerable handicap 
was, however, already detectable at the time of the launch of the famous 
trans-Atlantic passenger liner Rex in 1931.31 In the immediate post-war 
28 On the history of Ansaldo, see Castronovo (ed.), Storia dell’Ansaldo, and Doria, Ansaldo. The 
renovation was completed in 1948 on the basis of the plan for grouping together similar sections 
of production prepared by Finmeccanica (the holding company of IRI, formed to reorder the 
entire mechanical sector also including shipbuilding), and this led to the concentration into 
the Ansaldo Group of other yards, as Odero Terni Orlando (Livorno and Muggiano-La Spezia).
29 See Fioratti (ed.), Ansaldo navi, 17.
30 See Manetti, “La cantieristica e le costruzioni navali”, 116.
31 See the document by the f irst Technical Committee created in 1934 within IRI to examine 
problems of the publicly owned part of the shipbuilding industry in Italy: Fragiacomo, L’industria 
come continuazione della politica, 100.
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period, the company tried to resolve this crucial problem by taking the f irst 
steps to rationalise its production. Between 1948 and 1952, some workshops 
and facilities required for staging were built at Sestri, and some docks and 
piers were served by special lifting equipment. But it was not enough in 
comparison to the better Swedish, German, or Japanese companies, where, 
following wartime American practice, considerable progress had been 
achieved in the prefabrication and assembly of hulls. Nonetheless, from 
1954 to 1957, Italian shipbuilding was able to survive thanks to subsidies 
amounting to 27 per cent of the cost of cargo vessels and 21 per cent for 
passenger liners built in Italy arising from the Tambroni Act (named for the 
minister of the merchant marine) of the spring of 1954. This act replaced 
and co-ordinated earlier measures, and was designed to expand the Italian 
merchant marine and bring the output of Italian shipyards near capacity 
levels.32 This level of subsidy masked the fundamental lack of competitive-
ness of Italian shipbuilding in the international context,33 but nevertheless 
had important repercussions on production. Italy’s share of world output 
rose from 3 to 5.7 per cent, but the subsequent downturn in international 
freight rates from 1958 onwards demonstrated the fragility of the Italian 
position: 25 per cent of the orders held by Italian shipyards were cancelled.34 
The cost gap with other countries was substantial and diff icult to resolve 
because of the def iciencies of the technical and production systems of 
Italian yards.
At Sestri, facilities were totally outdated: the different parts of the hull 
were transported by a system of cable cars, each of which had a capacity 
under 4 tons; assembly took place in the open, on an inclined plane where 
the ship was launched. In 1959 a project of modernisation began: the aim was 
to raise Sestri to a f irst-rate industrial level within the European shipbuild-
ing industry. In fact, in 1967, when this programme was almost f inished, 
the yard had been fundamentally changed. Cableways and inclined slopes 
had been replaced by the building of three basins, each served by 60-tons 
capacity cranes. New covered welding and steel-fabrication halls were built, 
and optical marking of steel plates began. The steel-plate storage area was 
expanded by annexing 12,000 m2 f irst occupied by the Ansaldo Fossati. A 
dual ramp, which opened to traff ic in 1960, put in direct communication 
32 Law no. 522, 17 July 1954.
33 In 1938, the level of subsidies available to Italian shipbuilders was 40 per cent; see Parkinson, 
The Economics of Shipbuilding in the United Kingdom, 195.
34 AIRI, FC, b. R1524, f. Note e relazioni dell’IRI, Situazione e problemi dell’industria cantieristica 
(24 July 1958).
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central areas of the yard: the welding workshops and the basins, respectively 
located upstream and downstream of the railway.35 Overall, it was an invest-
ment of 15.5 bn lire.36
But the expectation that this modernisation would mean that Sestri 
could match its foreign competitors’ levels of productivity and ship prices 
was unfounded. In fact, IRI’s own leaders did not believe in the modernisa-
tion programme. Before the modernisation plan was launched, the prefect 
of Genoa and the Ministry of State Holdings contacted IRI, lamenting 
the reasons that hindered its approval, because it would be diff icult “to 
maintain the current employment at the end of the orders”.37 The concerns 
for the political and social consequences of a potential closure of Sestri 
won against purely economic logic. It must be said, however, that the city 
of Genoa had already witnessed a considerable downsizing of its industrial 
infrastructure, much of which took place under public control and resulted 
in the reduction of about 50 per cent of workers in a decade.38 The restructur-
ing of Sestri (with other initiatives such as the expansion of the steel mills of 
Cornigliano) became a measure of compensation, and IRI could not escape 
from this mechanism.39
Without modernisation, the fate of Sestri would probably have been 
sealed, as Giuseppe Petrilli, the president of IRI, wrote in a letter to Minister 
for State Holdings Giorgio Bo: on one hand, he applied new funds in order 
to achieve the laws approved by parliament to support the sector at the 
beginning of the 1960s.40 On the other hand, he urged the authorities to 
install new measures to replace the ones that were expiring and, in response 
to the clarif ication requested by the EEC – which was opposed to state 
subsidies – to send a government memorandum in which they reiterated 
the reasons for continuing aid.41
35 The modernisation work on the site is described in Esercizi, Ansaldo, from 1960 to 1966, 
AIRI, fondo Ansaldo (hereafter Ansaldo), b. R1158.23, Assemblee e bilanci 1961-1970.
36 AIRI, FC, b. R1526, f. Relazioni e appunti IRI-Fincantieri, Investimenti nei cantieri (12 October 
1966).
37 AIRI, FC, b. R1526, f. Corrispondenza, Genova – Riordinamento aziende IRI, lettera del 
ministero delle PP.SS. all’IRI (26 November 1958).
38 AIRI, FC, b. R1526, Rapporto sulla politica cantieristica italiana nel quadro del Trattato di 
Roma, February 1961, 7-8.
39 AIRI, FC, b. R1526, f. Relazioni e appunti IRI-Fincantieri, Società cantieristiche del gruppo 
IRI. Problemi e provvedimenti (13 December 1960), 6-10.
40 In particular, Law no. 301 31 March 1961 supplemented the Tambroni Act, which assigned 
contributions to ships built in shipyards for Italian and foreign national military: laws no. 1 and 
2 of 9 January 1962, concerning ship f inancing and contributions for scrapped vessels.
41 AIRI, FC, b. R1526, f. Corrispondenza, letter, 4 October 1963.
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Meanwhile, the Italian public shipbuilding sector was separated from 
Finmeccanica and vested in Fincantieri, a new f inancial company created 
in 1959.42 The global crisis in the shipping sector began in 1957-1958 with 
a substantial fall in freight rates, and recession followed for most of the 
following decade with very serious consequences for Italian shipyards. 
Accordingly, suspensions and dismissals were a real risk for Sestri, where 
underutilisation of the yard’s capacity increased the risk of redundancies 
caused by the restructuring period.43 It was expected that 2,100 workers were 
at risk of losing their jobs in 1964.44 Letters to ministers in Rome were sent by 
the mayor of Genoa, Vittorio Pertusio, and by the president of the province, 
Francesco Cattenei, hoping to avoid reductions in the Sestri workforce.45 
However, what was needed was not more time for solutions at the level of 
individual production unit, but an examination of the overall situation 
in Italy in terms of excessive fragmentation of the operating units, the 
heterogeneity of productive enterprises, outdated plant and machinery, 
low productivity, and ineff icient management. A committee chaired by 
Giuseppe Caron was created as part of the Interministerial Committee for 
Economic Planning (CIPE) with the task of providing guidelines for the 
restructuring of the Italian shipbuilding industry. The industry had lost 
ground to other European competitors and to Japan. The overall situation 
in Europe prompted a change in the hitherto hostile attitude of the EEC on 
the continuation of state subsidies, and in April 1965 the EEC promulgated 
a draft directive allowing the granting of state subsidies to shipbuilding, 
with a limit of 10 per cent of the value of the ship.46
The proposals by Caron’s commission incorporated the reorganisation 
plan presented by Italcantieri and approved by IRI. It established on one 
hand the combination into one operating company all the yards considered 
useful for a possible recovery and, on the other, the conversion of smaller 
shipyards to ship repairing, and in some cases closure. In addition, the 
commission subordinated these interventions “to the questions of a social 
42 On the creation of Fincantieri, see Carminati, Il settore delle costruzioni navali tra globalità 
e nazionalità, 159-200; Galisi, Dai salvataggi alla competizione globale.
43 At that moment, the few orders in the works were part of a special programme developed 
by Finmare – the f inancial company of the IRI group that controlled the major Italian shipping 
company – in order to prevent the orderbooks being empty.
44 AIRI, FC, b. R1524, f. Esuberanza di personale, Esuberanze personale aziende cantieristiche 
“Fincantieri” previste alla fine del 1964.
45 AIRI, Ansaldo, b. R1157.22, f. Riordinamento del cantiere navale di Genova-Sestri, letter by 
Petrusio to Minister Bo (3 October 1963); letter from Cattenei to Petrilli, 24 October 1963.
46 Doria, Ansaldo, 293-294.
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and economic nature, related to the general conditions of the local area”.47 
It thus reaff irmed that protection of employment was a principle to be 
defended, as well as, if necessary, establishing new activities for workers 
as compensation measures. At the same time, some passages contained 
in the committee’s report brought to light a degree of scepticism about 
the real possibility that the Italian shipbuilding industry could rise to the 
level of the world’s largest producers. For example, the report stated that 
the rationalisation would in any case be insuff icient “to soothe the pain of 
this particular sector of the domestic industry, because [the pain] is rooted 
in the social and political situation of Italian reality”.48 The government ap-
proved the Caron Plan and a few days later, on 22 October 1966, Italcantieri 
was born; its general shipbuilding division encompassed the shipyards of 
Castellammare, Monfalcone, and Sestri Ponente.49
All shipyards under Italcantieri had a production specialisation. The 
choice of IRI to establish the headquarters of the General Directory in Genoa 
contained in the 1965 Caron Plan sparked the beginning of a serious dispute 
with Trieste, already apprehensive because of the expected downsizing 
of its San Marco shipyard. The strong pressure exerted by public opinion 
and by the institutions in Trieste, supported by a f ierce press campaign 
orchestrated by local newspapers, prevailed over the claims of Genoa, and 
the IRI chose Trieste as the headquarters and design centre of Italcantieri. 
The move was emblematic of the politics of compromise, susceptible to 
local interests, which inevitably intertruded in the politics of the system 
of state-controlled companies.50 The centralisation of ship design in Trieste 
meant that the technical department of Sestri remained active only for 
liquid natural gas carriers, which at that time marked the workload of the 
Genoese yard as did other “sophisticated” ships, such as containerships. 
However, LNG carriers built in Sestri in the second half of the 1960s had 
notable technical problems, attributable in part to the delay of the company 
Chicago Bridge in the machining of the cryogenic parts of these vessels.51
47 AIRI, ITC, b. R1696, Relazione della commissione interministeriale di studio per i cantieri 
navali (Rome, 1966), 135.
48 Ibid., 77-78.
49 AIRI, Ansaldo, b. R1158.23, Assemblee e bilanci 1961-1970, Relazione del CdA all’assemblea 
degli azionisti dell’Ansaldo tenutasi il 28 dicembre 1966. The Sestri shipyard passed off icially to 
Italcantieri on 1 February 1967. See ibid., Plan 1967, 8.
50 AIRI, FC, b. R1526, f. Relazioni e appunti IRI-Fincantieri, relazione Cantieri navali – Ristrut-
turazione (Rome, 7 October 1966).
51 AIRI, ITC, b. R1686, Programma quadriennale 1969-72. Note riassuntive (Rome, November 
1968), 8. 
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Given the problems encountered on LNG carriers from the 1970s the 
workload was focused on two types of ships: bulk-oil carriers and container 
ships.52 It was, however, a transitional phase, in which in fact Italcantieri 
planned to reorganise its plant and equipment in order to reduce its 
construction lines and so that each factory would specialise in monotype 
production. In 1972, with two production lines instead of three, repeat 
orders accounted for 93 per cent of Sestri’s workload.53 However, the oil 
crisis of 1973-1974 sparked a drastic decline in the freight market, especially 
for oil tankers, calling into question Italcantieri’s strategy of monotype 
production, which particularly affected the Monfalcone shipyard, which 
exclusively produced very large oil tankers. Not surprisingly, the com-
ments about the four-year plan in 1973 warned about the completion of a 
monotype conversion of Sestri shipyard.54 The plan of 1975 emphasised the 
importance of achieving “technological, organisational, and engineering 
effective improvements”.55 Subsequently, these improvements, particularly 
in fabrication and welding of sub-assemblies, when completed, increased 
production and ultimately kept costs down.
In August 1974, Italcantieri presented a programme of modernisation of 
its Sestri shipyard to IRI. The plan called for the creation of a new block-
construction manufacturing plant. The anticipated area set aside was over 
100,000 m2,  made up of 34,000 m2 of land occupied by old plant, the acquisi-
tion of 21,000 m2 of state-owned land, and the reclamation of 47,000 m2 of 
land covered by water.56 Overall, when completed, it was estimated that an 
increase would result in production capacity from 50,000/60,000 to 90,000 
tons per year. Without this investment, worth 20 bn lire, Sestri would have 
been unable to compete with the best of the competition.57 In supporting 
the project Italcantieri used traditional arguments that emphasised the 
expectations of workers “particularly worthy for the professional maturity 
and operational commitment that characterise them”, who had waited “for 
too long a time for major investments in Sestri”.58 However, the post-OPEC 
crisis in the mercantile market imposed a signif icant downsizing on the 
investment programmes and therefore on the prospects for the shipyard’s 
52 AIRI, ITC, b. R1687, Piano per il quadriennio 1971-74, f. 1 (Trieste, 23 November 1970), 32.
53 AIRI, ITC, b. R1695, Esercizio 1972, 6.
54 AIRI, ITC, b. R1687, Osservazioni sul piano Italcantieri a fine 1973, 7.
55 AIRI, ITC, b. R1688, Piano quadriennale 1975. Relazione (Trieste, 5 December,1975), 29.
56 AIRI, ITC, b. R1697, inserto “g”, Sistemazione degli impianti di scafo del cantiere di Sestri 
(31 July 1974), 4.
57 Ibid., 9.
58 AIRI, ITC, b. R1688, Piano quadriennale 1974. Relazione (Trieste, 9 December 1974), 10.
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modernisation. In June 1978, the possibility of beginning reclamation of land 
from the sea had not yet become possible (there remained the issue of dif-
f icult negotiations with local authorities for the acquisition of the areas to be 
reclaimed). However, the four-year plan drawn up in November of that year 
postponed to the following year any decision in relation to this and to 1982 
the probable beginning of the investment in plant.59 Among the objectives 
of the four-year plan in 1982 again appeared the elimination of “bottlenecks 
in the production flow resulting from the presence of the railway overpass”, 
but the layout of the shipyard remains largely unchanged to this day.
The changes that did occur were in terms of work organisation. By an 
agreement of October 1975, the company and unions agreed to abolish the 
system of piecework by 31 December 1978. Instead, a new organisational 
system was developed, known as “islands”, which would have to overcome 
the piecework component of production while ensuring the overall control 
of production and yields, focused on the use of the workers according to 
the principle of “expanded craft”. The island is a basic unit of production in 
which workers perform various operations complementary to each other, 
designated by a programme (cedola di lavoro). This method creates joint 
responsibility and implies that workers perform tasks other than those strict 
specif ications of their craft.60 The island system, launched in 1977 in Sestri, 
aimed to eliminate waiting times and optimise work performance, subject 
to a process of collective control of time and carried out by “new” workers, 
who were flexible and versatile. For these reasons, there was considerable 
working-class resistance to the adoption of the new organisational system 
developed in Sestri; this resistance was deemed to be more f ierce than in 
other establishments.61 Meanwhile, the fall in global demand assumed the 
proportions of a real collapse. Many shipyards in Europe closed, and even 
Japanese yards cut labour and acquired contracts at a loss.62 There was a sharp 
59 AIRI, ITC, b. R1691, Piano quadriennale 1978. Relazione (Trieste, 10 November 1978), 60.
60 The method and experimental path adopted in establishments Italcantieri are illustrated 
in a document in AIRI, ITC, b. R1696, Il caso Italcantieri, December 1978, 121ff. On the island 
system, see Merotto, Sacchetto, and Zanin, Fincantieri fabbrica globale e territorio, 37ff.
61 AIRI, ITC, b. R1693, Piano quadriennale 1977. Relazione (Trieste, 8 October 1980), 54: “The 
organisation of ‘island’ work has been extended to almost all productive sections of Castellam-
mare shipyards, while unions and workload have prevented the launch in some departments at 
shipyard of Sestri. The analysis of the f irst results confirms both the maintenance of productivity 
and reduction in accounts aids and services, although the basic principles of the new organisa-
tion, such as enlargement of the trade and joint responsibility, have not yet been satisfactorily 
applied.” 
62 See Rapporto sull’industria cantieristica giapponese, October 1979, inside Piano quadriennale 
1979, AIRI, ITC, b. R1693.
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deterioration in economic performance of Sestri, from a profit of 4.4 bn lire 
in 1976 to a deficit of 13.9 bn lire in 1978, caused by a decrease in production 
volumes and lower remuneration for orders. According to business calcula-
tions, the market prices covered just 55 per cent of the cost of the ship.63
Despite the freeze on hiring, extended until 1984, and the attempt to settle 
the production in monotype, the shipyard, facing gaps in work, could not 
escape layoffs, launched in April 1980. From that year, among the solutions 
proposed by Italcantieri to revive the fortunes of the national shipbuilding 
industry (the reactivation of ship f inancing, the modernisation of national 
armament, alternative market prospects in the f ield of offshore and floating 
production plant) began to appear the possibility of “deactivation” of the 
Sestri Ponente shipyard.64 Otherwise, governmental charges of 350 bn lire a 
year to stay in the market and compensate for gaps in production were pre-
dicted. Italcantieri discussed the matter until 1984: that year Fincantieri, the 
f inancial holding company with headquarters in Trieste, became the new 
operating company (with a divisional structure of merchant shipbuilding, 
naval shipbuilding, ship repair, and marine engine building after merging 
eight subsidiaries) and issued yet another restructuring plan. The plan 
provided for a reduction in production capacity and the “drastic reduction 
of the shipyard in Sestri”65 already provided for by the document drawn up 
by the Technical Advisory Committee for the shipbuilding industry and 
welcomed by the so-called Carta Plan, named after the minister for the 
merchant navy. However, the protocol approved at the Presidency of the 
Council of Ministers on 27 November 1984 committed the government to 
keep the shipyard open; it was to develop “integrated specialised produc-
tions – in addition to maintaining a naval [merchant] production function”.66 
However, Fincantieri failed to register profits: losses in 1985 totalled 89 bn 
lire; in 1986, 59 bn lire; and in 1987, 89 bn lire, the last prompting another 
reconstruction plan with the provisional aim to break even by 1990. This was 
substantially assisted, in addition to EEC subsidies, by a government package 
63 AIRI, ITC, b. R1696, La situazione e le prospettive della cantieristica a partecipazione statale 
(Rome, 28 May 1980), 16.
64 Ibid., 14.
65 AIRI, ITC, b. R1695, Verbale dell’assemblea ordinaria degli azionisti della società Italcantieri 
(2 May 1984). Fincatieri delegated merchant-ship construction to f ive yards, Ancona, Castel-
lammare di Stabia, Sestri Ponente, Livorno, and Venezia Marghera. Naval warship-building was 
devolved to Muggiano and Riva Tregoso, with the Monfalcone yard building merchant and naval 
vessels. Ship-repair work was delegated to six yards at Trieste, Venice, Genoa OARN, Palermo, 
Naples, and Taranto.
66 The Provincial Council of Genoa approved article 6 of the Protocollo di orientamenti e 
decisioni del governo sull’economia marittima. AIRI, FC, b. R1555. Corrispondenza col M/ro PP.SS.
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of aid to Italian shipowners, who would be eligible for interest subsidies on 
domestically ordered tonnage. Indeed, up to half of the price of a ship would 
be covered by one subsidy or other. As Daniel Todd has noted, the scheme 
was successful: the Fincantieri orderbook, which stood at a meagre 85,000 
dwt in 1985, rose to 807,000 dwt one year later and undoubtedly saved the 
Sestri Ponente yard from closure. In addition, the Italian state shipping 
company Finmare allocated sums for a fleet-renewal programme from 1987. 
Accordingly, Finmare companies accounted for 54 per cent of Fincantieri’s 
merchant ship newbuilding capacity at the beginning of 1989.67
The 1990s were characterised by a profound change that swept through 
the state holdings, a process that ended with the abolition of the relevant 
ministry in 1993 and the liquidation of IRI, which took place in 2000. 
The company reoriented its mercantile production to large cruise ships, 
intended for a fast-growing international niche market.
In October 1993 the Sestri shipyard was separated from Fincantieri and 
transferred to the newly formed company Sestri Cantieri Navali Spa (owned 
almost entirely by Fincantieri itself), with the purpose of enabling co-
operative projects in the area of marine systems.68 Nearly a decade later, in 
September 2002, the shipyard returned to Fincantieri.69 In the interim, the 
Sestri plant had transferred its activities to the high value-added cruise-ship 
market. Cruise-ship construction had in fact increased the backlog of orders 
at Sestri, and it was now joined in the production of “floating hotels” by the 
Monfalcone and Marghera establishments, to the point that Fincantieri 
approved new investment to improve these facilities for cruise ships.70
This situation lasted until the 2008 world f inancial crisis, which resulted 
in a precipitous drop in orders that has once again engulfed the sector and 
called into question the future of the Sestri Ponente shipyard.
Workers’ struggles at the Sestri Ponente shipyard
Sixty years separate the workers’ struggles that took place in Sestri during 
the reconstruction phase from those to which now pertain. A considerable 
amount of time passed – along with major turning points – in which many 
67 Todd, Industrial Dislocation, 83.
68 AIRI, FC, b. R1571, Verbale del comitato esecutivo Fincantieri (20 November 1992).
69 AIRI, FC, b. R1584, Verbale di assemblea straordinaria della società Sestri Cantieri Navali 
S.p.A. (4 September 2002).
70 The planned expenditure amounted to more than €35 mn; see AIRI, FC, b. R1582, Verbale 
del CdA di Fincantieri (4 April 2002).
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of the aspects that affect the life of the shipyard have changed. Yet, yester-
day as today, there is a common denominator in the workers’ movement: 
avoiding mass layoffs and obtaining guarantees to continue employment. 
During the period of post-war reconstruction, the labour movement showed 
great resilience. In spite of the defeats suffered by the left and a decidedly 
unfavourable power relationship, the labour movement continued to act 
secretly in anticipation of change triggered by the resistance to and the 
defeat of Nazism and fascism. Political and trade union structures had 
taken root, and the area around the shipyard was distinguished by “a chain 
of uninterrupted neighbourhoods with a composition exclusively popular 
[…] a panorama singularly compact and homogeneous from the point of 
view of class”, to quote the words of Antonio Gibelli.71 The situation after 
the Second World War was, therefore, in many ways not comparable to that 
of today: in the f irst case myths – and rhetoric – of a productive working 
class remained prevalent. This emphasis on productivity reflected aspira-
tions to control the entire production process and ambitions to achieve 
self-management, an alternative to taking direction from the company.72 
In the second case, job survival becomes the motivating factor. In addition 
to the claims made on the national level (remuneration, working hours, 
holidays), the most forceful requests at the local level were about the work 
environment and trade union rights, but also led to the idea that wage 
levels should be independent of productivity.73 Below we will analyse the 
circumstances of the three moments of struggle, in the early 1950s, the late 
1960s, and post-2000.
The 1950s represented a turning point for the labour movement in Genoa. 
The restructuring plans of the mechanical engineering and the steel indus-
tries instigated thousands of layoffs and redundancies. The alarms caused 
by redundancies and the withdrawal of managers from factories in liquida-
tion led workers to engage in all-out strikes and sensational initiatives. As 
was the case at the St George factory, the workers of the Sestri Ponente 
shipyard decided to self-manage production. It was the time of the “72 days 
of occupied Ansaldo”, from 28 September to 9 December 1950. During this 
period workers worked on a vessel commissioned by the owner Lauro, an 
oil tanker, Will, of 18,000 grt, eventually launched on 29 January 1951. The 
action was not confined to Sestri Ponente but was supported by all Ansaldo 
71 Gibelli, “I ‘grandi costruttori’”, xxiv.
72 On this cycle of workers’ struggles in Genoa, see interventions that appear under the title 
“Gli operai di Genova (1950-1970)” in the journal Classe, 19 (1981), 65-126.
73 AIRI, ITC, b. R1690, Bilancio Italcantieri 1968 (May 1969), 17.
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workers. The Ansaldo conglomerate employed 20,000 workers, of which only 
250 chose not to join the strike; the majority of these were managers, while 
the rest of the workers were united in their opposition to the 4,417 layoffs, 
which precipitated the occupation. The union FIOM-CGIL had a leading 
role in the occupation of the shipyard, and in general the strike was highly 
organised, mainly thanks to the work of the “internal commissions” and 
“management councils”.74
In addition to the trade unions, another important actor emerged: the 
Roman Catholic Church, which had always played a prominent role in 
the events of the shipyard. Even the communist PCI (Partito Comunista 
Italiano), then the largest communist party in the Western world, also 
accepted the presence of the church, which combined with political 
campaigns that the party was leading at the national level, in support of 
the plan of work started by the CGIL and, more importantly, of the peace 
movement. The PCI tended to emphasise the importance of moral values in 
particular, such as solidarity among the workers of Ansaldo and the fact that 
they were working while not receiving a salary. For example, in an article 
published in Rinascita, the weekly theoretical journal of the party, Luigi 
Longo listed the associations and institutions that had expressed solidarity 
with the workers of the shipyard and then appealed to the constitution 
and national solidarity for “a positive mobilisation and struggle of ever 
new layers of workers and population”.75 In the struggles of the 1950s there 
emerged the following main components: strong organisation, a leading role 
for the trade union CGIL, broad participation of workers – not just of the 
shipyard, but also of all Ansaldo’s factorie –, and an atmosphere glorifying 
the willingness to peace. There was also a great work ethic and vigorous 
reference to Soviet productivity models. Gibelli described the universe of 
workers of Ansaldo as:
Inside the mythology of the factory, of labour and its products, lived 
the mythology of the new man to be built, a future to be realised […] In 
this way the work ethic is welded to a political ideal with strong moral 
content, which ideally joined, in an unbroken thread of continuity and 
consistency, setting the ship in the shipyard, alongside the resistance 
against dismissal and the f ight against repression, the struggle for peace 
and for the defense of the USSR from the aggression of imperialism. A 
vision of what constituted the safest bearer, the most consistent and 
74 Botta, “Gli anni cinquanta a Genova”, 86.
75 Longo, “Le lotte per il lavoro e il pane degli italiani”, 504-508.
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unwavering defender, was the communist militant in the factory, the 
professionalised worker, master of the craft, an example and model for 
his comrades both on a moral and political as on that of the work.76
At the end of the 1960s, there was another signif icant round of strikes in the 
shipyard – now part of Italcantieri – in very different circumstances from 
the ones just described. The more macroscopic effects of the post-1950 eco-
nomic boom were fading, and the Italian situation was beginning to arouse 
anxieties. The student revolt of 1968 and the “Hot Autumn” of 1969 initiated 
a social and political conflict in a country emerging transformed by the 
“economic miracle” and not just with increased well-being: the development 
had also produced severe distortions and irreconcilable contradictions. The 
management described the situation of the shipyard in terms of contrast, in 
an analysis in which there were conflicting elements. On the “weak points”, 
the company wrote:
Union unwilling to co-operate, disrespectful of the pacts signed (they im-
mediately strike without performing proper procedures of negotiation), 
which uses irregular forms of struggle (interittent strikes).
As for the “strengths”:
Staff and managers basically healthy (better than the union that exploits 
them) satisfactorily responding to moral incentives (self-esteem, profes-
sional pride), the actions of training, to different incentives, and therefore 
likely, even for the rejuvenation that is going to begin, improved returns 
in the new organisation.77
In the strike at the end of the decade, in fact, the union did not have a 
prominent role, at least in principle. It was a mobilisation born within the 
shipyard, but the workers involved were not Italcantieri employees, but 
Chicago Bridge’s, an American company specialising in LNG carriers. Work-
ers numbered between 1,000 and 1,300 people, and the pay was good, but 
the working conditions were deemed to be very bad. The authoritarianism 
of management increased the discontent among the workers concerning 
dismissals and dangerous work, the latter apparently worsened with the use 
76 Gibelli, “I ‘grandi costruttori’”, xlix.
77 AIRI, ITC, b. R1686, Piano per il quadriennio 1968-71. Parte generale sintesi e linee impostative 
del piano, 6-8.
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of a new welding process that involved the use of aluminium. In October 
1968 workers began an all-out strike that would last for ten consecutive 
days. In the memory of the witnesses:
That f ight was really legendary […] [workers] upset industrial relations 
policies, invented new methods of struggle and new forms of organisation, 
and especially created new relations between workers and society.78
From there was born a rapport between the Chicago Bridge workers and 
the collective of local university medical students, which occurred mainly 
on the issues of health and safety. This group, in fact, developed a test 
to be submitted to the workers on working conditions and health in the 
workplace, creating f ierce unity between students and workers. American 
executives immediately tried to dismiss the struggle, f iring workers who 
distributed leaflets and questionnaires. The PSIUP79 of Genoa, which in a 
January 1969 flyer emphasised that from a “defensive” position the move-
ment had changed to an “offensive and articulate” line. They also recognised 
the character of the struggle as being different from those of the past.80 Of 
particular importance was a leaflet signed by “A group of workers at the 
Chicago Bridge and the neighbourhood group of the student movement” 
dated September/October 1968, in which they explained the danger of the 
work during the preparatory phase of construction. The authors described 
the noise level and the development of metal powders, as well as the risk 
of diseases that fall into the group that were not covered by the public 
health service. They denounced the excessive heat in the welding phase, 
responsible, they said, for a reduction in attention and a decline in energy 
levels, and the presence of ultraviolet rays, responsible for the formation 
of cancers and eye irritation that could cause eye diseases.81 It was a rather 
spontaneous conflict, with the union reduced to a role that was still rela-
tively safeguarded by the link established between workers and students, 
in line with the atmosphere in the most important factories in Italy. The 
content of the struggle was also new, focusing on workers’ health, safety, 
and working conditions. Despite the negotiations initiated by the union in 
78 Archivio dei movimenti a Genova e in Liguria, Biblioteca Civica Berio, “Autobiografia del 
68 a Genova e in Liguria. Le occupazioni universitarie, la Chicago Bridge” (VTS_O1_1) mm. 15,44 
(Genoa, 2010).
79 The Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity was created in 1964. See Agosti, Il partito provvisorio.
80 Archivio dei movimenti a Genova e in Liguria, Biblioteca Civica Berio, Fondo Bruno Piotti, 
faldone IV, Chicago Bridge: una lotta che non deve rimanere isolata.
81 Ibid., Compagni della Chicago Bridge.
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early November 1968 and the acceptance of all workers’ demands on wages, 
working conditions, and prospects, sixteen workers were summoned in June 
1969 by a court order to appear for questioning; they had been investigated 
for months without their knowledge. They had to respond to allegations 
of domestic violence, unauthorised marches, and injuries. The multiplier 
effect of the workers’ struggle did not wait: in Sestri there began a series 
of strikes organised by working areas, which then moved to all suppliers, 
with serious damage to the timing of the flow of materials and for the image 
of the company, which described a catastrophic situation in the four-year 
plan 1970-1973:
Everything is against us: the actions of the union (official and “rebellious”) 
which, while aiming to punish the “master” or protest against the state, 
seriously detract from business eff iciency […] The political “carpe diem” 
sanctions in fact only the obligation to strike, and strikes that are often 
illegal and destructive for the company. Crimes are in fact unpunished 
[…] leaders, without whom large masses of workers would not be capable 
of fruitful work, have a growing sense of painful powerlessness. It is a 
deadly virus for the future of the company.82
The year 1969 was unique, with a total amount of 1.5 mn strike-hours in all 
sites of Italcantieri. As early as 1970, the strike-hours were reduced to 0.3 
mn, which grew to 0.67 mn in the following year. However, severe outbreaks 
of discontent returned often in the course of the decade: for example, 
during contract negotiations, on the question of classif ication of workers 
on piecework rates, and so forth. In the mid-1970s, almost 20 per cent of 
hours lost were due to absenteeism.83 The workers’ struggles of the 1970s 
largely attained their objectives, economic and contractual, upsetting the 
traditional balance of power in the shipyard. However, to defend the work-
place, the workers themselves initiated the largest labour mobilisation in 
recent memory. On 8 September 1983, Italcantieri announced that the Sestri 
Ponente shipyard would be closed. They gave two reasons for the closure: 
the site was considered obsolete and production too expensive compared to 
other sites in the group. Moreover, the city of Genoa was estimated to be ca-
pable of absorbing the industrial workers of the shipyard. The prediction of 
the yard’s closure dated to a few years before. The Italcantieri programme for 
the years 1981-1984, drawn up at the end of 1980, provided for the reduction 
82 AIRI, ITC, b. R1686, Piano per il quadriennio 1970-73, f ile 1 (Trieste, 15 January 1970), 1.
83 AIRI, ITC, b. R1688, Piano quadriennale 1975. Relazione (Trieste, 5 December 1975), 90 (table).
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of shipyards’ production capacity. The target, set in 1979, was to lower the 
production capacity from 250,000 to 200,000 cgt.84 For this reason, it was 
necessary to close a medium-sized yard, identified as Sestri, whose workload 
would be exhausted at the end of 1982. Italcantieri considered the closure 
of Sestri a strategic necessity. There thus arose the problem of f inding a 
place for the workers. In this regard, the solution advocated was to transfer 
the workers to other companies of Italcantieri. One thing seemed certain: 
Sestri would cease to manufacture ships. Although the yard was kept open 
(which had been considered improbable by many), it would be conducting 
another activity, “to be found, however, outside the shipbuilding industry”.85 
The path to the end, moreover, had been established: it provided a gradual 
shift in numbers of layoffs, from 430 employees in the third quarter of 1981 
to the remaining 2,365 in the following year, until 31 December 1982, when 
the shipyard would close. The layoff programme combined with mobility 
of labour and retraining would allow the gradual accommodation of all 
staff “either by transfer to other local companies, or by resorting to proper 
incentives for early retirement”.86
Despite this plan, the shipyard remained open, but on 8 September 1983 
Italcantieri communicated its desire def initely to close it. The reaction of 
the workers was bitter, and they began a series of protests that enjoyed the 
broad support of the citizenship and the involvement of institutions and 
the Roman Catholic Church, especially in the person of the cardinal of 
Genoa, Giuseppe Siri. In this case, the protest of the shipbuilding workers 
extended to workers in the harbour, the private arsenals, and all companies 
thrown into crisis by the dismantling of the system of state holdings. On 
1 October 1984, hearing the news that Fincantieri had cancelled, without 
notice and without explanation, the meeting with representatives of trade 
unions planned for the next day in Rome, there was a huge demonstra-
tion and occupation of the railway station. The demands of the protesters 
were threefold: the restoration of 80 bn lire in funding for the shipbuilding 
industry that had been cut, the immediate resumption of negotiations with 
Fincantieri, and the guarantee of a share of orders for Sestri. The closure 
of Sestri Ponente was eventually averted thanks to the collective actions 
of the workers and the contribution of all the citizens of Genoa: the local 
and national press, the Roman Catholic Church, and national politicians 
fearful of increasing levels of social unrest. Workers and trade unionists 
84 AIRI, FC, b. R1546, Nota sul programma del gruppo Fincantieri 1981-1984, 18.
85 Ibid., 19.
86 Ibid., 22.
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did not limit themselves to organising meetings: they went out onto the 
streets every night to discuss the situation with citizens. Cardinal Siri was 
very influential in the Vatican and especially in urging priests to denounce 
the idea of  closing the shipyard during his homilies. Solidarity was also 
expressed by Sampdoria, the football team of Genoa: the players’ visit to 
the shipyard was reciprocated at a football match, from the entrance of the 
workers on the pitch: an episode which long remained in the memory of 
many people. There were demonstrations for a year and at the end of 1983 
Italcantieri, in drawing up the programme for the years 1984-1989, stated 
that “to mitigate the severe tensions” generated by the dispute, they were 
considering the possibility of preserving some of the workers’ jobs, by using 
them in different processes, similar to ship-construction techniques.87
Earlier, on 4 August 1983, the IRI had approved the reorganisation plan 
presented by Italcantieri. It provided, in addition to the closure of the 
shipyard, a reduction in capacity through radical rearrangements in each 
establishment “up to the level of the minimum operating under the best 
possible conditions of eff iciency and productivity”, and the merger of all the 
group’s companies into one.88 The pressures of many people, including local 
politicians, did change company policies: in November 1984, the government 
removed the right to close shipyards from the Protocol on Maritime Activi-
ties. In 1985, under Fincantieri, funds were allocated for the renovation of 
Sestri and investment allowed an improvement in production. The arrival 
of two new cranes made  it possible to build larger ships. At the end of the 
1980s, in order to make the most of its capacity, the shipyard began to build 
so-called marine systems, such as the submersible platforms Scarabeo 5 and 
the Spirit of Columbus, commissioned respectively by SACEM and SANA. 
The diversif ication of the shipyard’s production was not enough to reassure 
all of the workers, because the arrival of the work was not immediate, and 
many workers were forced to undertake work far away from Sestri. This 
situation created a sense of injustice and even revenge against members 
of the other sites, as evidenced by Pippo Carrubba in one of his memoirs:
The Sestri Ponente shipyard will not close; it will make floating platforms 
(offshore) to extract oil from the sea and to convince us they had put a 
sheet in the basin. They spent months and months, but the same plate 
was always there and the majority of us [worked] away in Italy mak-
ing huge sacrif ices. Meanwhile, both Monfalcone and other shipyards 
87 AIRI, FC, b. R1549, Programma a fine 1983, 6.
88 AIRI, FC, b. R1549, Osservazioni al piano Fincantieri a fine 1983.
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inaugurated giant platforms without having struck for an hour. We – who 
had conquered that specialisation with hard struggles – we saw that 
others were doing our job.89
Meanwhile Fincantieri reorganised by divesting its division of ship repair 
yards, OARN of Genoa, Castellammare, Palermo, and Taranto. The divest-
ment began with the closure of the yard in Taranto: in 1992, 390 OARN 
workers were transferred to the Sestri Ponente shipyard, which was able 
to absorb the excess through early retirement. In addition, the problem of 
asbestos and its related cancers led to a proportion of the workforce leaving 
Sestri. The enactment of Law 197 pushed the company, fearful of not being 
able to cope with the workload, to take on younger workers.
Meanwhile, within Fincantieri, Sestri, in tandem with the yards at 
Monfalcone and Marghera, concentrated on cruise-ship construction. 
Beforehand, in 1992, with the aim of privatising state assets the Italian gov-
ernment had published a White Paper on State Ownership, which defined 
the shipbuilding industry as a sector now “mature” and to be divested. This 
occurred in conjunction with the fruition of the new strategy of Fincantieri, 
which focused on cruise ships and had lifted the performance of the whole 
group, including Sestri. The yard f irst began the construction of mini cruise 
ships and ferries; then, with the orders of Costa Crociere, the shipyard 
positioned itself as a leader in cruise-ship construction. The predictions 
of continued prosperity after the millennium, moreover, were very opti-
mistic. Cruise-ship construction was highly concentrated: there were only 
seven builders worldwide of vessels of more than 60,000 cgt. Therefore, as 
Fincantieri management noted, it was “a favourable competitive situation” 
which also highlighted the “excellent performance of ships built”.90 The 
long-term plan of Fincantieri 2001-2004 provides interesting data on the 
cruise-ship market, in the hands of a small number of owners, often active in 
the entire sector of the tourism industry, including ships, hotels, and tourist 
agencies. However, the need for a cautious attitude was linked to the rise of 
oil prices and a slowdown in the US economy, factors that were causing a 
drop in the profitability of cruise-ship operators. Meanwhile, Fincantieri’s 
CEO, Pierfrancesco Guarguaglini, was replaced by Giuseppe Bono, who 
launched a plan to privatise the company. The mobilisation of trade union 
antagonism to this plan lasted from the autumn of 2005 to the end of 2007, 
and eventually led to its withdrawal and the abandonment of privatisation 
89 Carrubba, Lettere dalla fabbrica, 85.
90 AIRI, FC, b. R1569, Piano Poliennale 2001-2004.
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of shipbuilding by the centre-left government of Romano Prodi. Production 
at Sestri continued, but in September 2010 Fincantieri presented a draft plan 
that provided for a reduction of 2,500 jobs and the closure or semi-closure 
of three sites at Sestri Ponente, Riva Trigoso, and Castellammare di Stabia. 
As in the 1980s, though in lesser forms, the protest against this plan had 
spread from Sestri to the rest of Genoa. Its distinguishing features were the 
types of action, with the blocking of the motorway and the airport, citizens’ 
marches, and the solidarity of the local population. There were also protests 
in the yards “saved” by the plan, such as Palermo. In Sestri at that time, the 
workers were building two cruise ships and an Indian military ship. A f irst 
strike, of two hours’ duration, resulted in the temporary occupation of the 
site and in a short march. In May 2011, a strike involved the three threatened 
shipyards in Sestri Ponente, Riva Trigoso, and Castellammare di Stabia. 
The restructuring plan presented by CEO Bono confirmed the cutting of 
2,550 jobs, the closure of Sestri and Castellammare, and the reduction 
of the workload of the shipyard in Riva Trigoso, leading to its closure. A 
series of agreements between the company and unions – 21 December 
2011, 15 February 2012, and 5 April 2013 – reached a temporary solution: the 
shipyard in Sestri was saved (as were Castelammare and Riva Trigoso), and 
the company reduced redundancies at Sestri from 330 to 180.91
The turnaround in Fincantieri’s fortunes was largely achieved with the 
aid of various subsidies and by reducing labour costs reached through 
simplif ication of the production process by computerisation of design 
and planning and the introduction of f lexible work organisation on the 
so-called Fincantieri model. This was based exclusively on the use of direct 
employees in the construction of the hull and on on-site outsourcing for 
ship assembly operations by sub-contractors. The Fincantieri model led to 
the coexistence, in the same shipyard, of working conditions that were very 
different but interdependent, resulting in an overall worsening of working 
conditions for the entire labour force. In the sub-contracting system, there is 
marked racial division in the workplace; the prevalence of undeclared work 
to avoid taxation; lack of unionisation and lax health and safety standards; 
an extension of working hours up to 10-12 hours per day; and lowering wage 
levels through piecework and “global” pay.92
91 Press releases issued by the unions related to negotiations were circulated and commented on 
by many media outlets. See for example http://www.informare.it/news/gennews/2013/20130567-
lavoratori-FincantieriSestriPonente-hanno-detto-si-accordo-sindacale.asp (accessed 10 May 2014). 
92 On the abuse of sub-contract workers and on wage reductions obtained using “global 
pay” in Italian shipyards and particularly at Sestri, see Rassegna sindacale, 22 June 2004; Il 
Fatto Quotidiano, 17 March 2012; the journalistic inquiry by the television programme “Report” 
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The future of Sestri Ponente?
Since the advent of Fincantieri’s move towards cruise-ship construc-
tion, competition in this sector has intensif ied with companies such as 
Mitsubishi of Japan and Meyer Werft of Papenburg, Germany, achieving 
large market shares. Fincantieri responded in part by diversifying into 
off-shore construction while continuing to build warships and cruise ships 
and undertaking ship repair and conversion. In January 2013, Fincantieri, 
with its head off ice in Trieste, had almost 20,000 employees worldwide 
(8,400 in Italy) and twenty-one shipyards on three continents. That month, 
Fincantieri completed its acquisition of the f inancially troubled Korean-
owned STX OSV – a company listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange and 
now renamed VARD. As a result, Fincantieri doubled its size and is now the 
f ifth-largest shipbuilder in the world, after four South Korean shipbuilding 
companies.93
The present position at Sestri remains ever vulnerable to competitive 
pressures. Its direct workforce has been drastically reduced with a greater 
than ever reliance on sub-contract labour now being the norm. At present 
the yard is in the process of completing an order of 13 July 2013 by Royal 
Seven Seas Cruises of a 54,000-grt cruise ship to be named Seven Seas 
Explorer, due for delivery in the summer of 2016.
on Fuori bordo (1  April 2012) by G. Boursier (http://www.report.rai.it/dl/Report/puntata/
ContentItem-ee826574-458d-4616-b1a2165f0804e857.html, accessed 5 May 2014); interviews 
with Diego Delzotto, Giulio Troccoli and Bruno Manganaro (21 November 2012); and with 
Camillo Costanzo and Vincenzo Alicinio (22 November 2012). Global pay is a legal expedient 
utilised by sub-contractors to avoid paying social and pension contributions. Payment, in fact, 
is determined on the basis of individual bargaining in which workers are obliged to monetise 
all their social rights: payment of social security and insurance contributions for the hours of 
work not covered by the contract, severance pay, the thirteenth month’s salary, overtime. It is 
lower than a wage calculated on the basis of a collective agreement.
93 Fincantieri’s merchant-ship division comprises yards at Monfalcone, Marghera, Sestri 
Ponente, Ancona, and Castellammare. Its warship capacity is located at Riva Trigoso (Genoa), 
Muggiano (La Spezia), and Marinette Marine, Bay Shipbuilding, and ACE Marine, the last three 
located in Wisconsin, USA. Ship repair and conversion are undertaken at Palermo, Trieste, and 
La Spezia, and offshore work at Trieste, Sestri Ponente, Palermo, and Ancona. VARD comprises 
two yards in Brazil, Niteroi and Promar; f ive yards in Norway at Aukra, Langsten, Brattvaag, 
Brevik, and Soviknes; two yards in Romania at Braila and Tulcea; and one yard in Vietnam 
at Vung Tao. The sale by STX in January 2013 did not include its St Nazaire shipyard, which is 
partly owned by the French government. Fincantieri publicises the current organisation of 
the company as: “Working together as one large, f lexible shipyard” (http://www.f incantieri.it/
cms_display/pagina_sedi.aspx, accessed 12 May 2014).

9 Work, workers, and labour conflicts in 
the shipyard Bazán /Navantia-Ferrol, 
Galicia (Spain), 1950-2014
José Gómez Alén
The shipyard between autarky and economic development in the 
1960s
The role of the state and the renewal of shipbuilding
After 1939, the Franco dictatorship’s economic policy was one of autarky 
(self-suff iciency); the vast majority of companies with foreign capital were 
therefore taken under state control. This was the case with the Spanish 
Society of Shipbuilding (SECN), founded in 1908 with 60 per cent Span-
ish capital and the rest held by the British shipbuilding f irms, Vickers, 
Armstrong-Whitworth, and John Brown.1 Prior to the outbreak of the 
Spanish Civil War, SECN, known widely as “La Naval”, comprised Ferrol 
and Cartagena shipyards and the artillery workshops at La Carraca in 
Cádiz. It subsequently acquired the shipyard of Matagorda (Puerto Real, 
Cádiz, 1914), built the shipyard of Sestao (1915-1916), and bought Astilleros 
del Nervión in Bilbao (1920) and other centres of armament such as Reinosa 
in Santander and San Carlos in Cádiz. In 1936 the navy took up arms 
against the Republic and seized the yards at Ferrol and Cádiz. Almost 
all warships built at the Ferrol yard were designed based on Royal Navy 
vessels.2
Throughout the 1940s, the Franco dictatorship attempted to restore the 
productive sectors destroyed during the Spanish Civil War; and the reform 
and modernisation of shipbuilding were among its industrial priorities.3 
Although the legal basis for its creation was passed into law in 1942, the 
1 Jordi Mollas-Gallart notes that a British consortium of Vickers, Armstrong-Whitworth, John 
Brown, and Sir John Jackson and Company (civil engineers) held a 40 per cent stake in SECN. 
See Mollas-Gallart, Military Production and Innovation in Spain, 43-44.
2 See Ramírez Gabarrús, La construcción naval militar española, 89-91, and Romero González 
and Houpt, “La Sociedad Española de Construcción Naval”.
3 For an overview of Spain’s domestic and foreign policy during the Second World War, see 
Bowen, Spain During World War II.
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formation on 11 July 1947 of the Empresa Nacional Bazán (ENB) was the high 
point in the process of nationalisation and concentration of Spain’s warship-
building industry under the overall control of the Instituto Nacional de 
Industria (INI), with shipyards at Cadiz, Cartagena, and Ferrol. Under the 
1951 Law for the Protection of Naval Construction, the company’s main 
customer was the Spanish Admiralty. However, the persistence of structural 
problems in the post-war economy, a lack of accessibility to international 
markets due to political isolation, a scarcity of energy resources and raw 
materials, and the delay in the implementation of f inancial measures 
hindered the renewal of the sector during the 1950s.4
The realities of Cold War politics increasingly meant that US policy-
makers saw the strategic importance of the Iberian peninsula. In September 
1950 the United States had agreed a package of aid to Spain amounting 
to USD $62.5 mn and supported a United Nations resolution lifting an 
international boycott on Franco’s regime. In 1951, the United States resumed 
full diplomatic relations with Spain. The signing of the Pact of Madrid on 
26 September 1953 marked the end of Spanish neutrality. The pact consisted 
of three separate, but interdependent, agreements between Spain and the 
United States making provisions for mutual defence, for military aid to 
Spain, and for the construction of US bases there for a renewable ten-year 
period, although the bases remained under Spanish sovereignty.5
The Preamble to the Pact of Madrid stated:
Faced with the danger that threatens the western world, the Governments 
of the United States and Spain, desiring to contribute to the maintenance 
of international peace and security through foresighted measures which 
will increase their capability, and that of the other nations which dedicate 
their efforts to the same high purposes, to participate effectively in agree-
ments for self defense.6
Under this agreement the USA was granted the right to expand, build, and 
use military airf ields and army and navy bases in Spain and to build secret 
installations. The agreement also provided for the importation of American 
military equipment. The Americans also provided f inancial support, raw 
4 For an overview of the Spanish economy, see Prados de la Escosura, The Progress of the 
Spanish Economy.
5 For a succinct account, see, for example, Calvo-Gonzalez, “American Military Interests and 
Economic Conf idence in Spain under the Franco Dictatorship”.
6 US-Spain Treaties in force, Department of State, Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement 
between the United States and Spain, 26 September 1953.
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materials, oil, and technology for the military sector, which then began a 
slow process of modernisation.
The pact was a triumph for the Franco dictatorship, bringing Spain in 
from the cold of international opprobrium. Franco stated in his 1 October 
1953 message to the Cortes:
If the Spanish nation, serving its own interests and those of Western 
defense, has to cooperate closely with the United States, it has done 
so maintaining its own ideology intact and within its incorruptible 
sovereignty, thus inaugurating a policy of stable friendship between 
our two countries.7
Unsurprisingly, as the First Secretary of the American Embassy in Madrid 
later noted:
the reaction of the traditional, but not latent, political opposition to the 
Franco government – the Anarchists, Socialists, and Republicans – has 
been, insofar as the Embassy has been able to determine, predominantly 
adverse, since the US Agreements represent for them, in the f irst instance, 
the strengthening of a regime to which they are unalterably opposed.8
By the mid-1950s the United Nations had approved Spain’s membership, 
and by the end of the 1950s new laws to support the sector, together with 
low wage costs, led to the growth of the shipbuilding industry in the next 
decade.9
The new economic policy also demanded the transformation of labour 
relations. The Law on Collective Agreements (1958) opened the way to col-
lective bargaining between workers and companies. It allowed the creation 
of incentives to increase productivity and put an end to wage rigidity, which 
until then had been unilaterally imposed by the Ministry of Labour. All the 
factors of change, combined with the state’s f inancial and legislative efforts, 
made possible the modernisation of shipyards. At Bazán, facilities and 
machinery were enlarged and improved. A new huge slipway, 260 m long and 
110 m wide, where several ships could be assembled at the same time, was 
7 Foreign Relations of the United States of America 1952-1954, vol. VI, Pt 2, doc no. 920, 1st 
Secretary of US Embassy in Spain to the Department of State, 16 June 1954.
8 Ibid.
9 Ley de Protección y Renovación de la Marina Mercante (1956); Plan de Estabilización (1959); 
Plan de Renovación de la Flota Pesquera (1961); I Plan de Desarrollo (1963); Decreto de Acción 
Concertada (1967).
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built, and the new cranes installed had more carrying capacity and could 
move crosswise. New machinery workshops, smelting and metal-fabrication 
shops, and a large dock for armament afloat were built. Working conditions 
also improved with new toilets and dining rooms and new premises for 
a School of Apprentices.10 At that point Bazán was the foremost Galician 
company, and the group it belonged to was the largest in Spain.
The growth of construction activity gradually increased, as did the labour 
force, rising from 5,249 workers in 1947 to 5,840 in 1960 and to just over 6,000 
in 1966.11 The increase in the workforce was in part met by rural migrants 
in search of the job stability offered by the shipyard. Another portion of 
the workforce came from the company itself, which gave priority to the 
children of workers f irst entering the Work School; at 14 years old they were 
transferred to the School of Apprentices where they were trained for four 
years prior to joining different sections with the professional qualif ications 
obtained in the theoretical and practical exams performed.12
In terms of production, the shipyard kept its traditional lines: construc-
tion of new vessels, ship repairing, and manufacture of turbines and engines. 
Although in the decade following the Civil War the shipyard focused on 
military construction, from the mid-1950s onwards it would incorporate 
newbuilding of oil tankers.13
Until the mid-1960s the shipyard continued to work along traditional 
lines despite some technical and organisational changes. The vessels 
designed in the drawing off ice still followed traditional plans, the only 
novelty being that small parts were made in precast blocks. Bazán was the 
one shipyard in Spain which, having been run by British engineers and 
technicians during the f irst third of the twentieth century, would start to 
apply some of the innovations already being developed in other countries. 
In fact, the shipyard had a certain tradition of technological innovation: 
it was the f irst Spanish shipyard to use prefabricated welded parts and 
autogenous welding (a process that does not require a f iller metal), before 
going on to use electric arc welding.14
10 Ramírez Gabarrús, La construcción naval militar española, 162.
11 Carmona Badia, “La economía gallega en el periodo franquista”, 285.
12 Reglamento Nacional para el Trabajo en la Industria Siderometalúrgica de 1938 and 1946, 
and Reglamento de Régimen Interior de la Sociedad Española de la Construcción Naval, Factoría 
de Ferrol, 1939.
13 Blanco Núñez, La construcción naval en Ferrol, 129-130.
14 Houpt and Ortiz-Villajos, Astilleros españoles, 478. For welding in British shipbuilding, see 
Murphy, “The Health of Electric Arc Welders”, and Johnman and Murphy, “Welding and the 
British Shipbuilding Industry”. 
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Despite various diff iculties and the ups and downs in production, the 
number of ships built in this period illustrates the capacity of Bazán. Between 
1950 and 1966, thirty-nine ships were delivered: twenty torpedo destroyers 
and landing craft and nineteen other vessels including tankers, freighters, and 
bulk carriers. The percentage of Spanish output produced in the shipyards 
in Ferrol (Bazán and ASTANO) more than doubled during the mid-1960s, 
rising from 20 per cent of the Spanish total in 1964 to 43 per cent in 1967.15
Autarkic rigidity and the earliest forms of industrial protest
During the 1950s the framework of labour relations remained inflexible, 
similar to the politics of the f irst stage of Franco’s dictatorship. Once free-
dom of association was suppressed, the state created the OSE (the State 
Union) inspired by the Fuero del Trabajo (Labour Law), and the principles 
of unity, totality, and hierarchy. Workers were compulsorily included in the 
only trade union permitted in Franco’s Spain, along with entrepreneurs. The 
leaders of the union belonged to the Falange, the government party, and 
labour relations were controlled by the state. The Law of Contracts (1944) 
and the Regulations Act (1942) established a ranking of labour relations in 
which employers and employees were forced to accept the wages guidelines 
decided by the Ministry of Labour, while working conditions were estab-
lished through regulations corresponding to each sector and company. 
The union defended the interests of companies and exercised rigid social 
control over the workers, whose claims were represented by the OSE and 
ultimately resolved by Labour Courts, Magistraturas de Trabajo. Collective 
claims were banned, and the possibility of labour disputes disappeared 
from factories and shipyards.16
The workers could, however, elect their own trade union delegates, who 
formed the representation bodies in large companies; the Committee of 
Safety and Hygiene and the works councils were both conceived as “entities 
of social harmony […] called to achieve coexistence in the heart of the 
company, increase in production, and development of our economy”.17 In 
practice these bodies did not begin operating until the end of the 1950s, 
and in Bazán not before 1960. The works councils incorporated shop-floor 
representatives who had to be politically trusted by the off icial trade union, 
15 Galicia. Su realidad socio-económica, 87.
16 Fuero del Trabajo (1939), Ley de Unidad Sindical (1940), and Ley de Constitución de Sindicatos 
(1940).
17 Pérez Leñero, Jurados de Empresa, 430.
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delegates of other departments, and the company management that actually 
controlled it. Subjected to the orientation of the State Union hierarchy and 
the interests of the companies, they intended to overcome class struggle, 
guaranteeing social peace in factories and in other workplaces.
The shipyard in Ferrol was no exception. Working conditions followed 
the guidelines of the state, and company management imposed their own 
interests on a workforce lacking legal instruments for collective action. 
The wages were generally very low and, although workers could supple-
ment them with labour premiums (overtime work, piecework, etc.) and 
bonuses for children and other dependants, they failed to improve their 
precarious living conditions.18 Work organisation was determined by the 
Regulation of Internal Regime, in force at the time. It organised the shipyard 
in departments and sections; regulated working conditions; f ixed profes-
sional categories, performance standards, the working day, all wage levels, 
and the hiring of labour; and controlled the relationship between workers 
and the company.19 During the 1950s, the workforce endured extremely 
hard conditions in all respects: long working hours, eight hours a day, six 
days a week; serious def iciencies in workshops due to poor wall and roof 
insulation and no heating, no extractor fans, and no proper ventilation, 
which caused high levels of toxicity and frequent respiratory diseases. In 
addition, scaffolding was in poor condition, as was access to ships, there 
were no protective helmets, the shipyard was badly lit, and scant attention 
was paid to security measures.20
Plant, equipment, and tools were on the whole outdated. The deficiencies 
were highly visible in the workshops of welders and foundry and metal 
fabrication, where they still used cloth gloves, old masks, and poor welding 
goggles, which led to diseases and above all a large number of eye injuries, as 
evidenced by 3,070 cases in 1948 and 2,950 in 1961.21 However, some accidents 
were caused by neglect as the workers often refused to take preventive 
measures, although they were disciplined if found out.22
18 Records of the Distribution Committee of Family Bonuses, E.N. Bazán, 1947 to 1956, Archivo 
Comité de Empresa NAVANTIA (Archive of the Company Committee of Navantia, Ferrol; 
hereafter ACENF).
19 Reglamento de Régimen Interior de la Sociedad Española de la Construcción Naval, Factoría 
de Ferrol, 1939.
20 Records of the Committee of Safety and Hygiene, E.N. Bazán, 1950-1960, in ACENF.
21 Annual report of the Committee of Safety and Hygiene, 1966, in ACENF.
22 Records of the Distribution Committee of Family Bonuses, 1947-1960, and Records of the 
Committee of Safety and Hygiene, 1948-1960, illustrate the salary problems and working condi-
tions in all workshops and sections of the shipyard, in ACENF.
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Despite poor working conditions and low wages, forms of protest did not 
surface easily. Some workers still had fresh memories of the fear and repres-
sion that many of them and their families had endured as a result of the Civil 
War, or of the strike of 1946, even closer.23 However, while they lacked the 
freedom to put into effect any kind of labour protest, they tried to overcome 
difficulties to regain a sense of class and an incipient organisation that would 
enable them to express their dissatisfaction. Not all the old Republicans had 
been wiped out. Those that remained would help to recover the working-
class culture and spread it among the young. The communist militants made 
efforts to reorganise clandestinely during the 1950s, following a new strategy 
that turned the factories into the arena for socio-political confrontation 
against the dictatorship. To do this they needed stable organisations inside 
factories and all the instruments of mobilisation Franco’s legality would 
allow workers.24 In this, Bazán had an additional diff iculty because it was 
primarily a military shipyard, and collective labour disputes and strikes were 
not only banned, but also considered crimes of sedition. Therefore strikers 
could be court-martialled, with no redress to civil law.
However, although their efforts at reorganisation during much of the 
1950s failed, the workers would f ind ways of displaying their discontent and 
generating forms of conflict and industrial protest. Wage complaints were 
soon received by the organs of social representation, the Commission for the 
Family Bonuses and the Committee for Security and Hygiene. Individual 
claims quickly acquired a collective signif icance and a class sense that 
workers began to recognise. The content was varied, and it was repeated 
year after year and meeting after meeting. On the one hand, they made wage 
claims, seeking above all the recognition of family bonuses, premiums for 
endangerment such as for toxicity or for dirty work, promotion, and recogni-
tion of occupational categories. On the other hand, there appeared claims 
concerning working conditions: medical services, changing rooms, tools 
and equipment, and the provision of leather boots and asbestos gloves for 
foundry workshops.25 Above all, they were concerned with safety problems 
related to electricity lines, scaffolding, safety belts, handrails, etc., and 
demanded preventive measures against the labour risks involved.26
23 See Maíz, Resistencia, guerrilla e represión.
24 Testimony of Julio Aneiros, 1991, and Francisco González Vidal, 1992, personal archive.
25 Records of the Committee of Safety and Hygiene, June 1953, in ACENF. The fact that the 
provision of abestos gloves and sheets, material that the company had already introduced in 
the previous decade, was one of the recurring claims indicates both the high risk levels the shop 
f loor lived with and their ignorance.
26 Ibid., 1950 to 1960.
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The management either rejected claims or gave excuses that delayed 
any response, which was hardly ever favourable to the workers, although 
productivity was greater in better working conditions as a comparative 
study concluded: “in the workshops without heating the coldest days only 
yield ¾ parts net of the daily hours and the number of sick workers in the 
workshops where heating was installed fell from 7.5 per cent to 1.5 per cent”.27 
The intensif ication of individual protests and the negative attitude of the 
company exacerbated the discontent felt by the workforce.28
During this stage, other signs of labour unrest were detected in atti-
tudes of def iance towards head engineers and foremen. Such resistance 
to authority and refusal to accept the rules (which meant sanctions) were 
accompanied by conscious oversights with working tools (which increased 
losses), by small thefts of material and tools, by slow-paced work, and above 
all by the incessant wandering of workers across the yard.29 These shows 
of strength and vindication were the basis on which some Communist 
Party militants would f inally create a clandestine organisation inside the 
shipyard, which would soon play a central role in all the labour disputes of 
the following decades.30
The new framework of labour relations and collective labour troubles
As Franco’s Spain began to liberalise its outlook on the economy at least 
partially, the Law of Collective Agreements of 1958 put an end to autarkic 
rigidity, and a new framework of labour relations began to materialise: it 
would have immediate consequences for the working class. For the f irst 
time the rank and f ile could negotiate wages and working conditions with 
management. The union elections for works councils as well as the new 
focus of their functions turned them into useful tools for the interests of 
workers because they gave their representatives the chance to take part 
in the preparation of, internal debate on, and negotiation of collective 
agreements.
The f irst elections in Bazán were held in 1960, and the results left no 
doubt that something was moving, surreptitiously, in the shipyard. The 
small communist core, which had achieved signif icant social support in 
27 Ibid., November 1948 to October 1950.
28 Records of the Committee for Family Bonuses, July 1947. Similar ones appeared until 1955.
29 Interview with Julio Aneiros and Francisco González Vidal. 
30 See González Vidal, Paco Balón; Gómez Alén, As Comisións Obreiras de Galicia e a conflic-
tividade laboral durante o franquismo; and Santidrián, Historia do PCE en Galicia.
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some workshops, prepared the election call with a demanding programme 
following their general guidelines in the f ight against the consequences of 
the 1959 Stabilisation Plan, which had been promoted by the government 
as a starting point to increase productivity.31 The plan entailed measures 
that affected working time, and the f irst changes in work organisation put 
mounting pressure on the workers, through surveillance and control in the 
various tasks and the restriction of breaks and dead time, with coercive and 
punitive measures. The hardening of working conditions and the increase in 
work-related accidents as a result of increased pressure on the labour force 
were the immediate cause of the rise in labour disputes, which adopted new 
forms of social mobilisation.
It was soon perceived that the balance of power between centralised 
management and the workforce was changing. The workers began to 
organise outside the State Union headquarters. From all sections of the 
shipyard a tide of demands emerged: the workers’ representatives, already 
in permanent conflict with the management, demanded wage bonuses 
for hazardous work; more time to attend medical appointments; dining 
rooms; houses for workers; a suggestion box; and union time to meet with 
the workforce in order to listen to their claims.32
The confrontation would experience a major turn with the emergence 
of the f irst collective conflicts in the early 1960s. The f irst originated in the 
wage discrimination suffered by workers in Bazán in comparison to others 
in the metals sector.33 The next one began when management presented a 
plan restructuring the working day that meant a change in remuneration 
per hours worked, and which was openly detrimental to workers. After the 
proposal was rejected at the works council, stoppages and interruptions 
of production followed. The members of the works council met with the 
minister of labour who finally imposed a solution favourable to the workers, 
as management was forced to maintain the existing overtime system with 
the same pay per hours worked.34
At the beginning of 1962 the workers requested a collective agreement. 
The written petition “Un clamor de justicia” (An Outcry for Justice) forced 
the formation of a commission to begin the negotiation.35 Again strain and 
31 Records of the Company Works Council (hereafter RCWC), 7 December 1960, in ACENF. 
Julio Aneiros, Ramón Arbe, and Manuel Anido received massive electoral support among the 
workers and the technicians.
32 Ibid., 1960-1963, in ACENF.
33 Ibid., February 1962, in ACENF.
34 Ibid., December 1961, in ACENF
35 Ibid., February 1962, in ACENF.
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unrest seized the shipyard. Eventually the workers’ representatives rejected 
the agreement, and the company put into operation the Rules of Compulsory 
Compliance, which presented the same salary conditions.36
During the following years, the shipyard suffered from lack of orders and 
from new employment regulations, which sparked new collective protests 
aggravated by the signing of the first collective agreement that incorporated 
the Gombert system for work organisation. These major changes generated 
numerous protests.37
As a result of all the conflicts and of the constant pressure on manage-
ment, working conditions gradually improved and work accidents decreased 
signif icantly38 from 1960. The struggles had pointed to the possibility of 
defeating the company and escaping the control of the State Union by using 
new forms of organisation, and combining the use of legal instruments such 
as union delegates, shop stewards, and collective bargaining with illegal 
methods, such as slow-paced work, stoppages, and strikes, to force them 
to negotiate. Collective disputes allowed workers to learn the new rules in 
collective bargaining and helped to enlarge their mobilisation repertoire: 
rejection of the authority of heads and foremen, threats of resignation from 
shop-floor delegates, written petitions, slow work, interruption of produc-
tion, and strikes.39
From an organisational point of view, the emergence of workers’ com-
missions in the framework of the labour disputes of those years was to be of 
the greatest importance for the workforce. Formed by workers of different 
ideological tendencies, those f irst commissions, which sprang up to chan-
nel specif ic complaints, consolidated in Bazán thanks to the instigation 
of communist militants who had managed to extend their organisation 
throughout the shipyard.40
36 Interview with Julio Aneiros, 1991, personal archive; and RCWC, October 1962.
37 The Gombert system is a model of work organisation that determines the salary for each 
worker according to professional category and amount of useful work in each period; the time 
for each work stage is measured in work units. See Gómez Alén, “La organización del trabajo y 
los conflictos laborales en Galicia”, 51-56.
38 Accidents resulting in sick leave fell from 872 in 1960, to 637 in 1962, and to 438 in 1963. 
Those without sick leave fell from 12,800 in 1960 to 6,661 in 1964: Records of the Committee of 
Safety and Hygiene, E.N. Bazán, 1960-1966, in ACENF.
39 Lago, La construcción del movimiento sindical en sistemas políticos autoritarios, 173, and 
Gómez Alén, As Comisións Obreiras de Galicia e a conflictividade laboral durante o franquismo, 
46-50.
40 For the origin and expansion of Comisiones Obreras, see Ruiz (dir.), Historia de Comi-
siones Obreras (1958-1988). For Bazán, see Gómez Alén, As Comisións Obreiras de Galicia e a 
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At the end of 1966, before the renewed election of the works council, 
the f irst open battle against the State Union was fought. The Communist 
Party, the main supporter of Comisiones Obreras (Workers’ Union), once 
again chose its well-known strategy of participation in the elections to take 
over the control of the works councils.41 They prepared a wide programme 
approved in a general meeting and asked for a minimum daily salary of 250 
pesetas, a working week of 44 hours, and changes in the implementation 
of the Gombert system owing to its negative effects on working conditions 
and to the increase in the number of accidents. There were also claims of 
a political nature, such as freedom of association and the right to go on 
strike.42 A single candidacy, in which communist leaders joined with HOAC 
(Brotherhood of Workers of Catholic Action) workers was prepared to defend 
that programme. The results gave victory to Comisiones Obreras,43 which 
anticipated the start of a new stage in industrial action.
Bazán: a shipyard between productive growth and the crisis in 
the shipbuilding industry, 1967-1977
Productive growth and the state
The closure of the Suez Canal from 1967 occasioned a huge demand for large oil 
tankers to reap economies of scale in seaborne crude oil transportation. This 
demand increased expectations in Spain, especially in those shipyards prepared 
for the construction of ships of more than 200,000 dwt. Anticipating greater de-
mand, the state promoted some liberalising measures for the sector to facilitate 
export. A system of official credit was opened with tax advantages, facilities 
of amortisation, and low interest rates. The Empresa Nacional Bazán was one 
of the fifteen establishments participating in a new programme, which aimed 
to increase productivity by up to 50 per cent and to preserve employment.44
The f inancial support of the state, an increase in productivity because 
of the high amount of work, and low wages kept production costs low, 
conflictividade laboral durante o franquismo, and Lago, La construcción del movimiento sindical 
en sistemas políticos autoritarios, 46-50.
41 “La batalla de las elecciones sindicales”.
42 Gómez Alén and Santidrián Arias, Historia de Comisións Obreiras de Galicia nos seus 
documentos, 58-66.
43 RCWC, 19 October 1966, in ACENF.
44 Sequeiros, El desarrollo económico de Galicia, vol. II, 62, and Capmany et al., La industria 
en la economía de Galicia, 209.
292 JoSé góMez alén 
favouring the competitiveness of Spanish shipyards in international 
markets. In 1975, Spain reached 2.5 per cent of total world shipbuilding 
production, and in the following year moved up to third place in output 
behind Japan and Sweden.45 Nevertheless, the f irst symptoms of a deepen-
ing crisis began to appear in that year. The economic effects of the energy 
crisis of 1973-1974, aggravated by the continued closure of the Suez Canal, 
accounted for increasing amounts of laid-up tanker tonnage. However, 
the lag effect of completing tonnage under construction kept employment 
steady in some shipyards, but the overall tanker orderbook suffered a 
considerable drop. Market conditions particularly affected the ASTANO 
shipyard in the adjoining town of Fene, which in 1973 had delivered the 
largest tanker in the world, but by 1976 had no new ships on its backlog.46 
In the following years the situation worsened, although in 1978 Spanish 
shipyards still built 998,763 tons of shipping. World production dropped 
from 33 mn tons in 1976 to 19 mn tons in 1977 and to 11.8 mn tons in 1980.47
Technological modernisation and changes in the construction process
In 1964, the Spanish government decided to purchase one cruiser and f ive 
British Leander-class frigates, but the British government, under pressure 
from Harold Wilson’s Labour Party, refused to sign an agreement that would 
benefit Franco.48 The Spanish government then sought co-operation with 
the United States, which put an end to the long dependence on French 
and British designs. The ambitious initial plan, which would require the 
introduction of signif icant technical changes, was considerably reduced, 
but Bazán was given the order for modernisation of two destroyers, and 
importantly the construction of f ive guided missile-launching frigates, 
which were subsequently Baleares class, with US design and supervision. 
In addition, Bazán undertook the conversion of the former US light aircraft 
carrier, USS Cabot, loaned to Spain in 1967 and sold to the country in 1972. 
Initially to be converted to a helicopter-only carrier renamed Dédalo, it 
was transformed into a STOVL (short take-off and vertical landing) aircraft 
carrier and became the f irst aircraft carrier of the Spanish navy.49
45 Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, cited in Capmany et al., La industria en la economía de Galicia, 
195.
46 Yañez, “A incidencia da reconversión naval en España”, 92.
47 Tamames, Estructura Económica de España, vol. I, 523.
48 Ramírez Gabarrús, La construcción naval militar española, 191-192.
49 Ibid., 192-195.
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The government invested 500 mn pesetas to enlarge and adapt the 
shipyard facilities to the new needs: a large workshop for the prefabrica-
tion of aluminium blocks, enlargement of the plumbing workshop, etc. 
Several pipe-bending machines and more new plant and machinery were 
purchased. A new dry dock was designed for the repairs section with capac-
ity to accommodate the largest tankers of the time; when it opened in 1973 
it was the largest in Spain.50
With renovated and technically prepared facilities the pace of produc-
tion increased considerably. While the Ministry of the Navy remained the 
main client, new customers appeared, demanding all types of merchant 
ships: OBOs, bulk carriers, and especially tankers which were delivered 
to Argentina, Greece, Norway, Peru, Panama, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. 
During this phase Bazán-Ferrol delivered-tonnage data increased from 
154,000 cgt in 1967 to 205,973 cgt in 1976 and 205,903 in 1977; the end of the 
year would bring a backlog of 10 ships which made a total of 271,634 cgt.51 
The technical ability of the repair unit reached its peak with the tanker 
Marquina, a technical landmark in careening.
The activity of the different sections had positive effects on employment, 
which grew slowly to reach 6,749 direct workers in 1975. The workforce was 
to take a technological leap in shipbuilding because of the technical features 
required for the construction of the f ive missile-guided frigates. First, they 
would begin to develop the building-by-block system, and secondly the 
increased technical and constructive features demanded that workers were 
technically trained for each phase of the process, which in addition would 
be restricted by the specif ications imposed by the project itself and by 
the American technicians who directly controlled it. Accordingly, staff 
had to take courses either in Spain or abroad.52 The ship’s hull was to be 
partially built of blocks prefabricated in pre-outf itting workshops. It was 
then assembled on the slipway where the outf itting tasks were carried out. 
The new construction process also required changes in work organisation 
and co-ordination, in design and hull assembling, and in the times outlined 
for each task.53 The technological success, compliance with deadlines, and 
construction requirements would determine the future of Bazán, and it 
was the starting point of a new era for the shipyard.
50 Blanco Núñez, La construcción naval en Ferrol, 192 and 211.
51 Capmany et al., La industria en la economía de Galicia, 214.
52 Martínez Gabarrús, La construcción naval militar española, 193; and Blanco Núñez, La 
construcción naval en Ferrol, 135.
53 Cabanas et al., “La construcción integrada”.
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Bazán at the foreground of political struggle for democracy
Since the 1966 elections Comisiones Obreras had managed to reach all the 
workshops and sections of the shipyard. The introduction and applica-
tion of the Gombert system subjected workers to a new pattern of time 
measurement and generated wage disparities by restructuring occupational 
categories. Industrial relations deteriorated and labour unrest intensif ied, 
resulting in a relentless surge of protests and demands that the new shop 
stewards raised at works council meetings.54
The conflict coincided with a temporary reduction in backlogs, and 
management proposed the closure of the section known as Civil Works and 
consequently the dismissal of 1,162 employees and 62 apprentices. The works 
council and the shop floor opposed this, and a period of intense disputes 
began. The leaders formed a negotiation committee with the company; 
they met with the local authorities and eventually with the minister of 
labour in Madrid. Supported by the shop floor, they triggered a wide range 
of collective actions, inside the shipyard with stoppages, working to rule, 
overtime boycotts, and strikes, and in the streets with gatherings at the State 
Union headquarters and city hall. They also created a network of citizens’ 
solidarity to raise funds to aid workers and f inally, after several months of 
struggle, managed to avoid layoffs.55
These actions had signif icant costs for the leaders, who were arrested, 
prosecuted by the Tribunal of Public Order, dismissed from their union posts 
for their role in the conflicts, and temporarily sacked. On the other hand the 
repression strengthened their prestige and their leadership in the shipyard. 
They understood the need to widen the organisation of Comisiones Obreras, 
the importance of bringing the struggle into the open, in search of support 
and solidarity from the rest of the companies. The unrest reached the most 
important industrial centres in Spain, and the government responded by 
stepping up repression. In November 1967 the Spanish Supreme Court 
in Madrid pronounced Comisiones Obreras an illegal organisation and 
measures to weaken their ability to mobilise were adopted.56
In 1969 the shipyard orderbook was brimful: freighters, bulk carriers, 
tankers, and the f ive guided-missile frigates occupied the slipways and 
workshops. To increase productivity, management imposed twelve-hour 
54 Gómez Alén, “La organización del trabajo y los conflictos laborales en Galicia”.
55 Gómez Alén, As Comisións Obreiras de Galicia e a conflictividade laboral durante o fran-
quismo, 99-101. 
56 Supreme Court sentence 39/1967. See Bastida, Jueces y franquismo, 177-179.
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shifts and stepped up the work pace with the Gombert system. Under these 
conditions the workers redoubled their protests and demanded amnesty 
for their leaders and the revision of the collective agreement.57
In the heat of labour struggles, the shipyard was becoming a political 
space of reference in the f ight for democracy. In addition to the eff icient 
propaganda apparatus, the leaders of the now illegal Comisiones found 
places for clandestine meetings, further developed their range of collective 
actions, and also organised an effective solidarity network. Their influence 
had spread throughout the region, and they were a part of all cultural as-
sociations in several city quarters. They had allies that guaranteed social 
support: worker priests let them use parish premises and churches for 
their meetings and also helped with the solidarity network;58 a law f irm 
provided advice on collective bargaining and defended them before the 
Labour Courts or the TOP, Tribunal de Orden Público, a special Court of 
Law and Order.59
At the beginning of 1971 the situation forced the government to hold 
new elections for the shop stewards in the works councils, which in many 
companies were short of delegates due to dismissals and arrests. The govern-
ment was, however, concerned about communist influence in Ferrol and 
the shipyard:
We have already seen its penetration since 1966; in 1968 in the Bazán 
factory and another company in the city there have been partial stop-
pages and constant agitation of the worker masses with subversive 
propaganda.60
The workforce went a step further and demanded a collective agreement 
unique to their shipyard, and amnesty for imprisoned and dismissed worker 
representatives. The now clandestine Comisiones Obreras also prepared its 
strategy while the new leaders developed a programme trying to mobilise 
57 Gómez Alén, “La organización del trabajo y los conflictos laborales en Galicia”, 104-106, 
133-135. 
58 Gómez Alén, “El Ferrol y la Bazán”, and Lago, La construcción del movimiento sindical en 
sistemas políticos autoritarios, 148-151.
59 The TOP was created in 1963 to judge what the dictatorship considered social or political 
crimes. It was abolished in 1977. See del Águila, El TOP.
60 Ministerio de Trabajo, Criterios ante una posible situación conflictiva, 1971; Boletín Informa-
tivo de la Dirección General de Seguridad, 18 (Madrid, 1972). This document lists the names of 
communist militants in Comisiones Obreras and their activities. The civil government in the 
province considered Bazán-Ferrol an endemic problem in their Memoria Anual del Gobierno 
Civil (Madrid, 1969) in Archivo General de la Administración. Fondo Interior.
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workers to rescue those still in prison or suspended.61 The management tried 
to impede meetings and assemblies, hampered delegates in the exercise of 
their functions, and transferred shop stewards suspected of being members 
of Comisiones Obreras or changed their work shifts in order to minimise 
their influence on other workers. Economic penalties were also frequent, 
and when a worker was arrested management would sack him for staying 
away from work.62
The 1971 elections for union delegates in the works councils gave the 
victory to members of Comisiones Obreras. All the shop stewards elected 
were members of Comisiones, and as soon as they took over they denounced 
the extant agreement and demanded that the collective bargaining was 
kept solely for Bazán-Ferrol. The company rejected the proposal, and the 
ensuing conflict brought about fresh trouble when two of the delegates 
were subjected to disciplinary proceedings.63
The confrontation with the company and with the State Union was 
building up: workers’ proposals were rejected; dismissed workers were not 
readmitted; the agreements approved in assemblies were not accepted; 
the shop stewards’ movements inside the yard were restricted; and general 
assemblies were banned from union premises. Collective bargaining was 
moved to Madrid with only the representatives of the other two shipyards of 
the group attending. In response, the workforce in Bazán gave up the twelve-
hour shifts and kept supporting their representatives with new actions and 
partial strikes in the f irst days of March 1972, and almost the whole shop 
floor demonstrated on the courtyard in front of the management building. 
When the company announced that the collective agreement had been 
signed in Madrid, the protests increased, and harsh repression hit again: 
six delegates were suspended. The workforce decided to remain assembled 
until the suspensions were lifted. Finally, on 9 March, management allowed 
police to enter the shipyard, and more than 3,000 workers who were gath-
ered before the buildings were evicted with extreme violence. The conflict 
then spilled over into the city, and there were clashes and police charges in 
the streets. On 10 March the police f ired directly into a crowd of thousands 
of workers. They left behind two dead workers and forty wounded, and a 
city paralysed with shock. For ten days the shipyard remained closed while 
61 RCWC, 5 November 1970, document signed by 1,147 workers demanding the revocation of 
disciplinary proceedings for two leaders and “Llamamientos de las CCOO por la amnistía”, in 
Gómez Alén and Santidrián, Historia de Comisións Obreiras de Galicia nos seus documentos, 
129-137.
62 Gómez Alén and Santidrán, O 10 de Marzo, 35-38.
63 RCWC, November 1971, in ACENF.
WoRK, WoRKeRS, and laBouR conFlic tS in tHe SHipyaRd Bazán 297
strikes and demonstrations of solidarity swept Galicia, the rest of Spain, 
and even many European countries.64
The months following the conflict saw a temporary retreat in the activity 
of the banned Comisiones Obreras. The protests focused on demonstrations 
for democratic liberties and amnesty. The mobilisations against the trial 
of Los 23 de Ferrol, their leaders who were still in prison, were particularly 
intense.65 Their victory in the union elections of 1975 meant the beginning 
of the end of the State Union. That year Franco died and the transition to 
democracy began, but it was also a period of labour unrest. Those who 
mobilised in Bazán-Ferrol never forgot the claim for amnesty for those 
dismissed in 1972, who were slowly reinstated except for Manuel Amor, 
Rafael Pillado, and José María Riobó, the last labour leaders to be released 
from Francoist prisons. In February 1976 a demonstration of more than 
10,000 citizens welcomed them back home.66
From Bazán to Navantia: the crisis in the shipbuilding sector, 
1978-2010
Crisis and restructuring of the shipbuilding sector on the new 
international scene
From 1978 the consolidation of a democratic and constitutional framework 
would facilitate the final integration of Spain into international markets and 
onto the path towards accession to the European Economic Community in 
1986. The context was one of widespread crisis in European shipbuilding 
owing to the long-term shift of production to South-east Asia.67 This situa-
tion along with the conditions to be admitted to the European Community 
forced the Spanish state to start a long reconversion and restructuring of 
the shipbuilding sector.
The Royal Decree of Naval Reconversion of 1984, which would be devel-
oped until 1987, would have continuity in successive feasibility plans and 
64 The conflict can be followed in Gómez Alén and Santidrián, O 10 de Marzo, and the tes-
timonies of Rafael Pillado Lista (2005) and Manuel Amor Deus (2004) in Archivo Historia del 
Trabajo, Fundación 1º de Mayo, Fondo Biografías Obreras, Madrid. 
65 Twenty-three citizens of Ferrol were tried by the TOP for the events of 10 March 1972. The 
communist leaders of the Comisiones Obreras in Bazán were part of them.
66 La Voz de Galicia, February 1976; and Gómez Alén, Manuel Amor Deus.
67 On this, see Strath, The Politics of De-Industrialisation, and Todd, Industrial Dislocation. See 
also Todd, “Going East”. 
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staff adjustments until 1999. The Spanish shipbuilding sector was still trying 
to adapt to a situation that would require it to reduce its production capac-
ity, further reduce its workforce, gain competitiveness against East Asian 
producers, and overcome the gaps in expertise, technology, and equipment 
to increase productivity.68 In 2000, the Spanish government’s commitment 
to the restructuring of the public shipbuilding sector led to Bazán-Ferrol 
joining the newly created state conglomerate IZAR. IZAR was founded in 
December 2000 following the merger of Astilleros Españoles SA (AESA) and 
Empresa Nacional Bazán. Its activities were spread over eleven sites in Gali-
cia, Asturias, the Basque region, Valencia, Murcia, Andalucía, and Madrid. 
It had approximately 10,700 employees. Around half of the sales concerned 
military production. This operation, far from solving problems, aggravated 
them as it integrated loss-making shipyards, some in their terminal phase, 
with others that were more profitable but had to take a share of the losses 
of the whole sector, as was the case of Bazán-Ferrol. Spanish government 
attempts to prop up IZAR through subsidies fell afoul of the European Union 
Commission, In a decision in October 2004, the commission ruled that €556 
mn of state aid to IZAR was not compatible with EC state aid rules and had 
to be recovered.69 In response, Spain invoked Article 296 of the EC Treaty, 
which allowed it to “take such measures as it considers necessary for the 
protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with 
the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war materials”. The state 
68 Houpt and Ortiz-Villajos, Astilleros españoles; Sánchez Aguilar, La crisis de la industria 
naval ante el desarrollo económico.
69 See www.europa.eu (20 October 2004). This decision concerned capital injections of €1,477 
mn provided in 2000-2002 from the state holding company SEPI to IZAR, the owner of the public 
Spanish shipyards. The commission established that of this amount €556 mn was used to cover 
losses and to provide other forms of support to IZAR’s civil activities. The rest of the capital 
was used to cover social costs and other costs linked to past and recent military activities of 
IZAR and its predecessor Bazán. Funds for military activities are in principle not covered by 
European Union’s state aid rules. But the €556 mn in aid provided to IZAR’s civil activities was 
not in line with the rules, and the commission, therefore, concluded that this amount had to 
be recovered from IZAR. It should also be noted that in 1997 the commission and the council 
approved restructuring aid to the public Spanish shipyards amounting to €1,380 mn, on the 
condition that no further such aid could be provided. Including aid approved in 1995 the total 
restructuring aid package amounted to €1,900 mn. The restructuring period lasted from 1994 
to 1998, after which the shipyards should have become prof itable. This did not happen, and the 
shipyards continued to generate losses. In 1999 the commission decided that €111 mn provided 
in 1998 to the public Spanish shipyards could not be approved and had to be recovered. The 
Court of Justice upheld the decision. In May 2004, the commission also decided that further 
aid of €308 mn provided to IZAR’s civil shipyards in 2000 could not be authorised and had to 
be recovered.
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rescue would take place by transferring IZAR’s military shipyards to a new 
public company, Navantia, owned by the state holding company Sociedad 
Estatal de Participaciones Industriales (SEPI), which controlled 100 per 
cent of Navantia’s capital. The former Bazán-Ferrol was to be joined with 
the old ASTANO shipyard at Fene. Navantia also had yards at Cadiz, San 
Fernando-Puerto Real, and Cartagena.
Throughout this period Bazán-Ferrol did not remain unaffected. The 
company implemented a series of measures to reduce production costs as 
well as its workforce, which gradually diminished in successive viability 
plans until 1999 when the Plan for the Future gave 2,125 workers early 
retirement.70 Bazán-Ferrol concentrated its activity on warship construc-
tion. Spain’s earlier entry into NATO meant that the construction of new 
ships had to adapt to the needs and characteristics of that body’s military 
operations, def ined mainly by US geo-strategic policy.
In the 1990s warship-building activity increased gradually, and some war-
ships were built in collaboration with the Dutch Royal Schelde dockyard. 
This line of work presaged a fundamental technological leap for Bazán-Ferrol 
in developing technology-transfer programmes which increased its added 
value content and its specialisation in a high-tech production segment 
that turned it into one of the largest warship constructors in the world.71 
At the beginning of 2000, IZAR-Ferrol tendered to build f ive frigates for the 
Norwegian navy. Of the f ifteen shipyards worldwide participating, only 
three developed the project: Blohm und Voss from Germany, a Norwegian 
shipyard Consortium NORD-ESKORT, and IZAR-Ferrol, which f inally won 
the contest. The Norwegian frigates were worth €1.1 bn, and consisted of 
1 mn engineering hours and 11 mn work hours. The project for the second 
frigate involved f ive yards: IZAR-Ferrol, IZAR-Gijón, IZAR-Fene, and the 
Norwegian Bergens Mekaniske Versted and Kleven Floro; they had to deliver 
one frigate per year, starting in 2005.72 Another super-contract with the 
Royal Australian Navy would also be signed to construct several blocks 
for some AWDs (air warfare destroyers) and two LHDs (landing helicopter 
docks) at Ferrol and Fene, in collaboration with the UK-based BAe Systems, 
which would f inish the job in its Australian shipyard in Williamstown.73
70 Plan de Futuro de Bazán, 1999; early retirement for 2,125 workers older than 52 was voted 
in referendum in all the shipyards of the company. See RCWC, 1998-1999; interview with José 
Portas, secretary of the works council in 1999, and Yáñez, “A incidencia da reconversión naval 
en España”, 89-99.
71 Rodríguez, “El Futuro de la industria naval militar I-II-III, Ferrol”.
72 Cabanas et al., “La construcción integrada”.
73 Blanco, La construcción naval en Ferrol.
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Integral construction and work organisation
At this stage, the construction of increasingly complex ships called for 
new advances in the building process. Therefore the changes experienced 
in the previous period would continue in the 1980s to incorporate all the 
features of integral construction in the 1990s. This system required a 
construction strategy essential to consistently set plans to build the ship 
in sections and modules. The technical off ice def ined the manufacture 
and assembly programme of each block built in the workshop.74 When 
the block left the workshop on its way to the slipway for the assembly of 
the engine, mounting and a few other tasks remained to be completed. 
This system, which required computerised programming and tooling, 
allowed the distribution of the workload between several shipyards, as 
was the case with the Norwegian frigates, which involved f ive Spanish 
and Norwegian factories producing blocks that were f inally assembled 
in Ferrol.75
Integrated construction optimises human resources, galvanises informa-
tion flows, makes the organisation more flexible while improving the quality 
of the product, and reduces costs and construction times by distributing 
the workload evenly. The same applies to working conditions as it improves 
the way every task is performed with greater safety, thanks to the removal 
of scaffolding and other portable structures, and because it facilitates 
welding, electrical, and piping work while jobs are carried out according 
to the “just-in-time” (JIT) system. For these recent projects, the features of 
the JIT system also meant the introduction of the techniques and tools of 
Lean, the system with the f ive Ss: Sort (organisation), Straighten (neatness), 
Shine (cleanliness), Standardise (visual control), and Sustain (discipline and 
habit). Not without a certain resistance, these lines began to be followed 
during the construction of the Norwegian ships in the Ferrol factory; they 
meant a step further in the development of a more effective and profitable 
construction model.76
74 Interview with Agustín Álvarez, Engineering Manager, Navantia-Ferrol, 2012.
75 Metodología de diseño and Design capability evolution, Internal papers of Navantia-Ferrol.
76 Liker and Lamb, “Que son la construcción y reparación naval Lean?”; interviews with Rafael 
Suárez, Deputy Managering Director of Navantia-Ferrol; José Antonio Cabanas, Piping Workshop 
Chief Engineer in Navantia-Ferrol; and Begoña Rodríguez, Head of Electricity and Electronic 
Area, Navantia-Ferrol (all 2012).
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Labour disputes in a democratic framework of labour relations
The consolidation of democracy in Spain gave labour relations a distinct 
social sense while the composition of the workforce in the shipyard suffered 
some important changes and some reduction, in part caused by the restruc-
turing of the sector and in part by the changes in the productive system 
I referred to earlier. The reduction in the number of workers was more 
diff icult for workers organised in traditional guild occupations replaced 
by sub-contractors, while the number of engineers and technicians grew. 
In 2012 the staff of Navantia in the Ferrol-Fene shipyards had fallen to 2,335 
workers, 238 of them engineers.77
A fact worthy of attention is that since 1978 more women began to join 
the shipyard, not only in clerical jobs, dining rooms, or technical off ices 
where they used to work, but also in workshops and in the Engineering 
Department. It was in the early meetings of the f irst elected Company 
Committee that the delegates of Comisiones Obreras got, despite opposition 
from some sectors, the admission of two women as apprentices. Today there 
are 221 women working there, 39 of them on the slipways and workshops; 
those with a university degree include 24 technical engineers and 24 senior 
engineers. One, Begoña Rodríguez, was the f irst woman to be head engineer 
during the Norwegian frigate programme.78
Within the democratic framework of labour relations, for the f irst time 
workers could freely choose their delegates and form company committees 
without the presence of their employers. They had meeting places, union 
time to hold meetings, and editing media to present their proposals or 
their mobilisation slogans. The workers themselves opted to allow trade 
union diversity, and new union options emerged in the yard, although 
throughout this time Comisiones Obreras had the majority of representa-
tives and therefore a certain control over collective bargaining. The f inal 
decisions were taken in assemblies, which decided the forms of collective 
action at every moment; when there was no agreement with the company 
they fell back on traditional forms of pressure and on strikes that were then 
regulated by law.79
From 1978 collective bargaining became a slow process; with regular 
demonstrations and strikes and also with no agreement with management 
over wages; it coincided with the protest against the restructuring of the 
77 Data provided by the Organisation Department of Navantia-Ferrol.
78 Interview with Begoña Rodríguez, Head of Electricity and Electronic Area, Ferrol, 2012.
79 Real Decreto Ley de Relaciones de Trabajo, 1977, and Constitución de 1978.
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shipbuilding sector and employment regulation mainly affecting workers in 
sub-contracting companies. The rank and f ile supported such workers and 
defended their integration in Bazán, proposing the abolition of overtime so 
that casual workers could join the shipyard. Closures and assemblies were 
constantly held in the shipyard, and the tension reached its peak when the 
police entered the factory to evict workers. Strikes also played an important 
role in the pursuit of solutions, and numerous workshops went on partial 
strike because of labour problems caused by new work organisation.80 
However, most of the conflicts ended up in agreement, particularly with 
collective bargaining; on some occasions they even reached agreement with 
the government to accept plans for early retirement in exchange for hiring 
young people and other types of compensation.
Since 1993 the unrest in the yard had been marked by the restructuring 
of the workforce, by diff iculties involving wages and collective bargaining, 
and by changes in the construction system. During this time the workers 
retained their negotiation model and their intermittent strikes, demon-
strations, and meetings, but f inally accepted the company’s Plan for the 
Future and the proposal of early retirement that would reduce the shipyard 
workforce who were moved to the IZAR group and after 2005 to Navantia.81
The results of 2009 showed that, while the accounts of Navantia Ferrol-
Fene presented a positive balance of more than €12 mn, the rest of the 
company shipyards had million-euro losses; however, political decisions 
remain favourable to the shipyards in southern Spain and do not take into 
account the levels of prof itability and the technological innovation in 
the various shipyards. For two years now Ferrol has been demanding the 
construction of a f loating dock with space to accommodate the large ships 
being repaired. The workers see it as essential to preserve both their jobs and 
the prestige of the repair unit. It is technically and f inancially feasible, but 
political decisions seeking to redirect the workload to the shipyards in the 
south are hampering it. In recent years the situation is getting worse thanks 
to the inability of the SEPI leadership and of the government, whatever 
its political colour, to put pressure on European institutions and acquire 
workload, as other European countries whose shipyards compete with Spain 
do. Therefore, Navantia Ferrol-Fene, the Norwegian frigates completed 
and the last HLD ship about to be delivered to Australia, sees its future 
threatened by the lack of orders in the short term.
80 RCWC, 1978-1993.
81 RCWC, Bazán, IZAR, and Navantia, 1993-2010, in ACENF.
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In 2014, Navantia Ferrol-Fene was in a diff icult situation caused by the 
absence of sufficient workload to maintain the activity of the two shipyards. 
There is only enough work for those who were preparing the last blocks of 
the Australian destroyers and for the group of engineers and workers who 
were in Australia where they were contributing, in collaboration with BAe 
Systems, to the completion of the two LHDs which will be delivered by the 
British company in 2015.
The crisis of shipyards in northern Galicia threatens their survival and 
the economy of the region. In the immediate future Navantia Ferrol has one 
single contract, a floating hotel for the Mexican oil company PEMEX, which 
will be built soon and will give work only to 25 per cent of the staff. On the 
other hand the limitation to 20 per cent of its productive capacity, imposed 
in 2005 to comply with the demands of the European Commission, will be in 
force for another year. This has caused a decline in labour force in auxiliary 
companies, which have lost 2,657 workers since 2011, while the permanent 
staff have been reduced to 313 workers in Fene and 1,994 in Ferrol.82
The economy of the region suffers from the insecurity of its shipyards 
and from the effects of the layoffs in the sub-contracting companies; in 
the meantime the disorientation and improvisation of the policies of the 
governments of Galicia and Spain for the shipbuilding sector became obvi-
ous, in addition to their usual sluggishness in making decisions to ensure 
work continuity. For their part, the trade unions are trying to reignite their 
tradition of social struggle and widen their range of mobilisations; they 
meet with members of the parliaments of Galicia and Spain and use time-
honoured methods such as demonstrations and assemblies both inside the 
factory and at the town hall, stopping traff ic on motorways, etc. They meet 
with the directors of SEPI and Navantia and, with the support of the city, 
try to broaden the social projection of their claims to defend, once again, 
their jobs and the future of a shipyard with three centuries of labour history 
in its workshops.
82 Information provided by the Organisation Department of Navantia-Ferrol.

10 Against market rules
A Spanish shipyard nobody wanted (except workers)
Rubén Vega García
Introduction
From construction of the Dock to the creation of Naval Gijón
Modern industrial shipbuilding in Gijón has its origin in the late nineteenth 
century. In 1892, a dry dock was built enabling construction and repair of 
ships. Because of its dimensions (87 m long, 14 m wide and 5.2 m deep), 
it had capacity for small and medium-sized hulls. Throughout its history 
and despite the many changes of business ownership, this shipyard was 
known as El Dique (the Dock), distinguishing it from the rest of shipyards 
in the Bay of Gijón.1 The Dock is part of a larger industrial complex where, 
in addition to the construction and repair of boats, boilers, engines, and 
machinery were also manufactured.
After various vicissitudes, in the period immediately after the Spanish 
Civil War, (1941) El Dique became part of one of the oldest and most important 
of Asturian industrial business partnerships: Duro Felguera, which at that 
time had a large number of coal and iron mines, a steel factory, and work-
shops manufacturing heavy machinery, as well as a shipping fleet for the 
transportation of minerals.2 El Dique’s inclusion in the vertically integrated 
Duro Felguera conglomerate gave the shipyard stability over four decades.
Prior to the 1950s the Spanish economy had suffered from decapitalisation, 
technological backwardness, weakness of internal markets, international 
isolation, and stagnation. However, its shipbuilding industry experienced 
rapid growth from the 1950s and, above all, the 1960s; this growth linked to 
industrial expansion and aid policies operated by the state.3 This boom was 
accompanied by modernisation of production which left behind sections of 
the craft-based workforce. The previous fabrication of moulds in wood to 
guide cutting of metal plates and manual riveting of plates of the hull of ships 
were replaced by machine cutting and electric arc welding. Nevertheless, 
1 Toral Alonso, “Breve historia del Dique de Gijón”.
2 For Duro Felguera, see Ojeda, Duro Felguera.
3 For this period, see, for example, Houpt and Ortiz-Villajos, Astilleros españoles.
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workers in qualif ied trades were retrained. At the same time, the increase 
in workload in boom conditions fed a growing need for labour that was met 
by extensive recourse to sub-contracting. Auxiliary companies supplied an 
increasing proportion of the work needed by the shipyard but this did not 
have a great impact on the permanent staff of the parent company. El Dique 
had 378 full-time employees in 1962 and 316 in 1974; however, the number 
of sub-contractors working in the shipyard increased, with those workers 
on less favourable contractual terms and conditions.4
The phenomenon of outsourcing became a key part of management 
strategy during the peak years of demand in the 1960s and early 1970s. It 
helped the company reduce costs, introduce flexible employment depend-
ing on demand, and weaken unionisation. However, the abundant supply 
of jobs existing in the metallurgical industries for skilled workers and the 
youth of most contract workers sowed the seeds of persistent conflict. 
The contractual divergence among workers who shared tasks and spaces 
delineated by one or another company’s name embroidered on their work 
clothes or by the colour of their helmets created comparative grievances 
and generated a climate of discontent and a suitable ground for trade union 
activists to encourage political opposition against the Franco dictatorship. 
Reports of the so-called prestamismo laboral (“phantom” companies that 
lacked capital, facilities, and machinery, but served as intermediaries to 
supply workers to the parent company) assumed a growing importance in 
workers’ claims. This discontent unleashed two successive strikes in the 
early months of 1975, leading to a victory for the workforce, who achieved 
the incorporation of all outsourced labour as f ixed in the payroll of the 
shipyard, which doubled the number of permanent workers employed.5
This led to a profound alteration of the balance of power in relationships 
between company and workers. The latter became extraordinarily cohesive 
and strong; however, it coincided with the f irst symptoms of the crisis in 
the shipbuilding sector in the wake of the downturn in demand occasioned 
by the OPEC price hikes of 1973-1974.6 The company had lost its ability to 
regulate the volume of employment through sub-contracting and was faced 
4 Asturias Semanal, no. 317, July 1975.
5 See Vega Garcia, La Corriente Sindical de Izquierda.
6 During the economic expansion of the 1960s and the early 1970s, Spain became one of the 
world’s leaders in shipbuilding, ranking third in 1974. Its merchant shipbuilding industry was one 
of the few major industries in the country that made little use of foreign capital. Shipbuilding, 
both in Spain and among other shipbuilding nations, was, however, one of the main casualties of 
the post-1974 energy crisis; following a sharp drop in orders in the late 1970s, the shipbuilding sec-
tor was in serious diff iculty. Among Spain’s leading industries, it was one of those most affected 
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with an oversized payroll (more than 700 workers between 1976 and 1982) in 
a period of low demand. The threat of the company reducing wages or rights 
was resisted by a highly unionised, spirited, and self-confident workforce 
buoyed by the death of Franco and return to democracy.7 The Dock of Duro 
Felguera became, between 1976 and 1980, the focus of frequent, intense, and 
prolonged industrial conflicts. Union leaderships, organisational loyalties, 
and forms of collective action that had originated at the end of the dictator-
ship crystallised in the years of democratic transition. They remained almost 
immutable in the following decades through productive restructuring, 
defence of employment, and the struggle for the survival of the shipyard.8
Crisis and shipbuilding restructuring policies
For a few years, membership in a diversif ied industrial group (although 
Duro Felguera had abandoned mining and steel activity, but maintained a 
signif icant presence in the manufacture of heavy machinery and assembly) 
served to mitigate adverse market conditions. Construction for the fleet 
of Duro Felguera was an interim solution but one which could not be ex-
tended indefinitely. At the same time, in a more general framework, policy 
measures that aimed at an orderly restructuring of the sector, inaugurated 
by agreements signed in 1979, were delayed due to the weakness of the 
government, the instability of the new democratic system, and the expected 
strength of union resistance. Consequently, the restructuring of the Span-
ish shipbuilding sector was not undertaken effectively until 1983, when 
a socialist government, in tandem with trade unions (the socialist UGT, 
Union General de Trabajadores), initiated closures of facilities, reductions 
in productive capacity, and losses of a large number of jobs. This policy 
of industrial restructuring resulted in the closure of three shipyards in 
Gijón and the reduction of the volume of direct employment by more than 
one-third, from 3,384 to 2,138 people employed in shipbuilding in the two 
companies which remained open: a private company (Naval Gijón) and a 
state-owned enterprise (Juliana Constructora Gijónesa).9
by production cutbacks, closures, and reductions in personnel. The number of shipbuilding 
yards able to build steel-hulled vessels declined from forty-three in 1975 to thirty a decade later. 
7 Juan Carlos was crowned on 22 November 1975, two days after Franco’s death. In 1978, a 
Spanish constitution was approved by referendum; it established a constitutional monarchy in 
Spain, bringing the years of dictatorship to an end.
8 Vega Garcia, “La fuerza del pasado”.
9 Vega Garcia, Crisis industrial y conflicto social.
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For the private yards, restructuring measures meant the creation of a new 
company resulting from the merger of two pre-existing Gijón shipyards: 
Duro Felguera and the smaller (Marítima del Musel) to form Naval Gijón SA 
in 1985, operating on the old facilities of the Dock. The new company was 
50 per cent owned by both original companies, which in practice meant 
the segregation of the shipyard from the rest of the industrial group Duro 
Felguera. As in Spain generally, the restructuring measures implemented 
by the socialist government were the source of intense conflict, and led to 
prolonged challenges by the workers directly concerned; such measures also 
directly affected the population of the districts where the shipyards were 
located. In Gijón, barricades of burning tyres and clashes with the police 
became part of everyday life. With clockwork regularity, workers occupied 
the streets of the city every Tuesday and Thursday for almost three years, 
highlighted by black columns of smoke from the barricades and the sound 
of police sirens. Contemporaneously, the city of Gijón was paralysed up to 
four times throughout 1984 by general strikes called in protest against the 
industrial crisis and, in particular, about the situation of the shipyards.
The extraordinary capacity of workers to mobilise in the culminating 
phase of industrial restructuring was maintained long after it developed; 
however, it had to cope with signif icant union division. Internal fractures 
affected not only organisations but also workers, who were divided by the 
intense conflicts held in the years of democratic transition. In the f inal 
phase of the dictatorship, the CCOO (Comisiones Obreras, or Workers’ Com-
missions, usually led by Communists) completely dominated the leadership 
in many conflicts which occurred, but in the new democratic context other 
Table 10.1  Shipbuilding workforce in Gijón
1974 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990
Juliana Constructora  
Gijónesa
908 1,768 1,665 1,497 1,426 1,235 995 786
Astilleros del Cantabrico 
y Reira 
571 533 616 588 578
S.M. Duro-Felguera
(Dique)
316 705 715 699 635
Maritima del Musel SA 170 324 315 309 298
Industria Auxiliar Interna 1,778 197 177 169 162
Industria Auxiliar Externa 630 438 320 285 152 151 126
Naval Gijón SA 742 742 595
TOTAL Gijón 3,743 4,157 3,926 3,582 3,384 2,129 1,888 1,507
Source: censos de empresas y expedientes de Regulación de empleo, author’s calculations
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unions managed to strengthen their presence in the shipyard. The more 
reluctant to strike were found in the socialist trade union UGT. A split in the 
CCOO created a new organisation, Corriente Sindical de Izquierda (CSI). CSI 
supported protest in the streets, and boasted the most prestigious leaders. 
However, both CCOO and CSI formed an alliance representing the majority 
of the shipyard workforce and based their strategy on radical mobilisation 
and prolonged resistance.10
The critical phase of industrial restructuring in the mid-1980s, when the 
size of the payroll, conditions of employment, and the productive capacity of 
the new company (Naval Gijón) had to be determined, was subject to great 
political, trade union, and business tensions. Workers were determined to 
retain their jobs and refused to accept any cuts to the workforce which did 
not include access to early retirement or guarantees of relocation in jobs 
with similar conditions.
In the case of Naval Gijón, the aim of Duro Felguera was initially to 
maintain a workforce of 350 employees, but the pressure of demonstrations 
and strikes f inally set its size at 742. Negotiations between entrepreneurs, 
the regional government, and the UGT resulted in a plan that envisaged 
the construction of a new covered shipyard, investments amounting to 11 
bn pesetas, and 975 employees; however, this plan did not come to fruition. 
Naval Gijón began its existence in extremely adverse conditions: reliant on 
the aged facilities of the Dock, without any improvement since the crisis 
had begun; undercapitalised; no workload; and a lack of will on the part of 
managers to solve structural problems. With no contracts for the construc-
tion of new vessels, the shipyard slipped down a slope of indebtedness with 
workers being laid off and forced to seek unemployment benefits.
A company looking for an employer
Against this background and with the threat of closure, the majority of 
workers and their leaders opted to f ind solutions through political pressure 
and strikes. In this way they managed to involve the Ministry of Industry of 
the regional government in the pursuit of contracts for the construction of 
ships and agitated for the return to the shipyard of their former co-workers 
10 Franco banned the UGT after his victory in the Spanish Civil War until his death in 1975. 
The union emerged from underground during the democratic transition after Franco’s death, 
as did the CCOO. The UGT and CCOO, between them, constitute the major avenues for workers’ 
representation in today’s Spain.
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who had been declared redundant in 1985 and had not been offered alterna-
tive jobs. The demand for fulf ilment of this promise originated a new round 
of conflicts in the 1987 Christmas period and again in the spring of 1989. 
After f ive years of strife and industrial restructuring, workers continued to 
insist on the return of some of the workforce who had been made redundant 
in 1985, refusing to accept any solution which did not include this. The 
progressive downsizing initiated by the company through early retirement 
was thus offset, despite the endemic lack of activity. In 1990, Naval Gijón 
had around 600 workers, but its f inancial situation was desperate. The bulk 
of the workforce and their representatives concentrated in the following 
years on avoiding the closure of the company. The shipyard’s survival in the 
f irst half of the 1990s was aided by a series of seven of f ifteen sophisticated 
Norwegian-designed 105M factory vessels for the Russian Far East Fleet be-
ing built by Naval Gijón; the other eight were built at the Factorias Vulcano 
yard in Vigo. Naval Gijón handed over Sozidanie, the fourth in the series 
in June 1992.11 However, the continuance of shipbuilding owed more to the 
political mediation of the Asturian government than the passivity displayed 
by the directors of the company, given the stance of one of the shareholders 
(Duro Felguera) that it intended to disassociate itself from the sector.
When f inally, in December 1996, Duro Felguera got rid of its shares in 
Naval Gijón, the reaction of the workers was intense, and resulted in demon-
strations demanding the payment of previous commitments. This included 
a spectacular action that, in January 1997, occupied the attention of the 
media: an attack of Luddite proportions in which a large group of masked 
workers destroyed computers and furniture in a workshop belonging to 
Duro Felguera. This action did not prevent the workers garnering several 
thousand demonstrators only weeks later, revealing their remarkable ability 
to combine radical tactics with massive demonstrations around a common 
goal: the survival of the shipyard and jobs.
Somewhat incredibly, a shipowner, Victoriano Sayalero, purchased the 50 
per cent shareholding which had belonged to Duro Felguera at the symbolic 
price of one peseta. The new owner was seen by the workers of Naval Gijón as 
a mere f igurehead who enabled Duro Felguera to ignore their responsibili-
ties. As a result, his f irst visit to Naval Gijón facilities was also his last: held 
against his will and threatened, he decided to give his shares to the other 
owner of the shipyard, the business group of the Orejas family, owner of the 
former Marítima del Musel shipyard at the time Naval Gijón was created.
11 World Fishing, 42:4 (April 1993), 26.
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A short spring
The consolidation of management in one owner led to an active search for 
workload. Soon – and, to a great extent, as a result of the radical attitude 
of workers – the shipyard entered on a previously unexplored path: busi-
ness management focused on the indispensable investments that would 
overcome obsolescence accumulated over more than twenty years, and 
labour relations driven towards co-operation around a shared objective of 
reaching viability. To ensure this change of course a new manager of the 
shipyard, the engineer Galo Baizán, was appointed. Baizán represented a 
new style of leadership. His entry on the scene could not have been more 
expressive: he publicly acknowledged in a newspaper interview that the 
shipyard could not stay open without the co-operation of the workforce. 
In line with this analysis, relations between the company and unions 
experienced a full turnaround. Up to then, all the dialogue had rested on 
the privileged treatment that the company gave to the more moderate UGT, 
closing all channels of dialogue with the more radical CSI and restricting 
contacts with its ally, the CCOO. Even when agreements were evident as a 
result of strikes and other actions, the right to approve them was reserved 
for the UGT, and UGT aff iliates enjoyed more favourable treatment in the 
day-to-day running of the shipyard.
Suddenly, previous management-union and intra-union relationships 
were inverted and the new shipyard management opted to find understand-
ing with those who held more conflicting attitudes than those who until 
then had been privileged by moderation. This openness to dialogue with 
those workers who had relied strongly on strikes and other actions inaugu-
rated a period which could be considered as a trial of co-management. Over 
more than three years, all the important decisions related to conditions of 
work, the hiring of workers, and the sub-contracting of ancillary companies 
were the result of previous consultation and agreement with the trade 
unions, whose decisions in turn were agreed by workers’ assemblies.
When the orderbook f inally guaranteed full employment, the discourse 
that the workers had long sustained about the social returns provided by the 
shipyard translated into the decision to reduce overtime to a minimum to 
ensure that new jobs were created. In this way, newbuilds of vessels created 
230 new jobs with terms and conditions that were identical to those of 
the permanent workforce. Performing tasks within the shipyard that had 
previously been outsourced limited such outsourcing to external phases 
of the production process and, under union supervision, contractors were 
monitored and urged to respect the labour rights of their workers.
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This exceptional situation of harmony in labour relations and abundant 
workload at Naval Gijón generated both direct and indirect employment 
in the wider economy of the city and also provided the means for young 
workers to acquire trade qualif ications. Permanent workers taught courses 
in which new entrants acquired the necessary skills of shipyard work, 
ensuring social integration of newcomers in a direct way. This change of 
industrial climate was aided by public funds which sometimes skirted the 
restrictions of EEC employment regulations, and was largely attributable to 
a willingness to consolidate social peace after the political pressure exerted 
by long years of demonstrations.
The new industrial harmony allowed the introduction of technological 
modernisation which enabled construction of more complex vessels than 
hitherto. After long years of paralysis, the association between the path 
of radical struggle of workers of Naval Gijón and its survival as a company 
was accepted by managers, political spokespeople, and media, within an 
environment which denoted an ostensible improvement of the social image 
of shipyard workforce who were converted from a permanent source of 
disturbances to an engine of industrial activity.
The change for the better in the situation of the shipyard also reinforced 
the professional pride of the workforce and their self-image. In a series of 
open days in 1996, the company attempted to show the local populace new 
investment in the shipyard, the favourable climate for expansion of output, 
and the positive effect this would have on the local economy. In these 
open days, managerial staff and middle management largely remained in 
the background, giving prominence to the workers. During the four open 
days, close to 5,000 people visited the facilities, with workers acting as 
improvised guides. They showed the newly acquired mechanical, welding, 
and pipe-bending equipment in the shipyard and also presented a kind of 
exhibition of photographs and “weapons” (slingshots, ball bearings, rockets, 
balaclavas, and so forth) used in their various strikes and demonstrations. 
The implicit message was to link new investment to the workers’ struggles, 
which was not questioned by owners or managers. This message had some 
purchase as two years later, a local cultural institution decided to reward 
Naval Gijón workers for their history of struggle and organised a ceremony 
that was attended by representatives of the company.
By this stage there were broad expectations of reducing accumulated debt 
and stabilising a company hitherto at permanent risk of closing. Apart from 
the absence of labour conflicts, several factors contributed to this: invest-
ments amounting to 1.76 mn pesetas (more than €10.5 mn) were instituted 
in the 1995-1998 period, including two extensions of the dry dock to reach 
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130 m in length to enable the construction of larger ships. In addition, the 
company had a backlog of orders worth 45,000 mn pesetas (€270 mn). 
These levels of capital investment enabled the shipyard to build vessels of 
larger size and technological complexity, concentrating on factory ships, 
container carriers, and chemical tankers, and targeting foreign markets 
(mainly German and Norwegian shipowners).
The beginning of the end
This apparent overcoming of the seemingly endemic labour problems of 
Naval Gijón did not last: a bitter conflict occurred suddenly in early 2000. 
The trigger was an announcement by the company of the dismissal of ninety 
casual workers. Immediately, all activity was paralysed, and a strike began. 
For the permanent workforce, more than 200 new direct jobs that had 
been created in the years of industrial harmony were not only a source 
of pride, but also a promise of continuity of employment in the shipyard. 
The workforce saw the entry of younger colleagues as part of the necessary 
generational renewal. The links between f ixed and temporary workers 
(sometimes reinforced by ties of kinship, neighbourhood, or militancy) 
had been cultivated through a conscious strategy to actively defend the 
homogeneity of working conditions. After several years of permanence, 
casual workers had increased the influence of the most combative union, 
the CSI, and had assimilated many of the veterans’ tactics. The announce-
ment of layoffs signalled an outbreak of hostilities and led workers to occupy 
the shipyard leading to heavy f ighting with police. In the f irst and last days 
of the strike, which lasted from 10 February to 14 March, clashes extended 
from morning to night.12
Concentrations of support and a large demonstration that took place 
at the end of February, as well as mediation by members of regional and 
national governments, were not enough to reach a deal. After a month, 
the pressure produced by such a hard and prolonged conflict resulted in 
an open division between the unions, which also affected alliances and 
strategies that had been held since the years of the industrial restructur-
ing. Both the CCOO and UGT leadership were in favour of accepting an 
agreement renouncing the defence of temporary jobs, while the CSI was 
left alone in its stance of continuing the strike. An assembly of more than 
500 workers discussed both alternatives for 8 hours until a vote decided, 
12 Vega Garcia, “Cerrando el círculo”.
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by a narrow margin, to end the strike, with the explicit threat of def initive 
closure weighing upon them. The defeat suffered by workers in the conflict 
against the dismissal of casual workers marked the inexorable decline of 
the shipyard, which would continue for nine more years.
In 2003, the Orejas industrial group gave up their ownership of the ship-
yard. Their shares passed into the hands of various managers, the majority 
of shares going to the yard manager, Galo Baizán. In 2004 he left. Shares 
were transferred to a new owner, the Dike Global SL Company of Madrid. 
By then, the management of the company had been assumed by PYMAR.13 
In a critical situation, with closure of the shipyard looming, this appeared 
to be the only possibility of survival as an emergency solution. In response 
to the continuing uncertainty a new phase of radical demonstrations took 
place throughout 2004 with the double aim of pressure to obtain workload 
and to neutralise any urban plan that would allow non-industrial use for 
the shipyard site. The overcoming of this stance led to a further reduction 
in the workforce, leaving only 170 workers, and left in addition a source of 
lasting social tension stemming from the arrest and imprisonment of two 
trade unionists of CSI because of their participation in protests.
PYMAR ran Naval Gijón through appointed administrators in a period of 
mounting debts and losses while allegedly seeking a buyer for the shipyard. 
Meanwhile, debts continued to mount with an option being discussed of 
selling its ownership of the land containing the shipyard. Such a sell-off 
could reclassify the land for residential use, and generate substantial capital 
gains for new owners. Indeed, the surrounding neighbourhood experienced, 
with the closure of other shipyards and industries, an urban transformation 
in which the price of property appreciated throughout the area.14 Given this 
possible scenario, the workforce intensif ied their complaints about the lack 
13 PYMAR is a public limited company established in 1985 by small and medium-sized private 
Spanish shipyards to protect the interests of private shipbuilding in Spain and throughout 
Europe. It carries out its work in close collaboration with the state government and the autono-
mous regions. At one point PYMAR brought together as many as twenty-four private shipyards, 
which compete with each other but also hold common strategic positions. It is a governing body 
of the sector which co-ordinates and promotes the decisions adopted by mutual agreement of 
its members for the benef it of one of the longest-standing industries in Spain. With the aim of 
achieving an improvement in its shipyards’ competitiveness, it has access to key mechanisms 
which are extremely important to the shipping sector. These include the Shipbuilding Guarantee 
Fund, which is aimed at facilitating the implementation of shipbuilding projects in Spain. Among 
PYMAR’s activities are the provision of technical, legal, and f inancial/tax consultancy services 
to help shipyards bring their construction projects to fruition.
14 Alonso, “Astilleros varados”.
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of willingness to continue shipbuilding and what seemed to them to be the 
existence of a hidden purpose of closure to benefit property speculators.
The criminalisation of the two main leaders of the CSI took place against a 
background of reducing the workforce through early retirement; for the f irst 
time, such reductions were accepted as mandatory by the other two unions 
(UGT and CCOO). The forced departure from the shipyard for mere reasons 
of age and without acquiescence of some trade unionists who opposed the 
agreements, and who rejected the early retirements as a path which could 
only lead to closure, weighed increasingly on the minds of the older workers. 
On the other hand, some of the older workers felt that the plan put an end to 
the uncertainty suffered for such a long time by means of a definitive exit 
from the labour market with an acceptable level of compensation. Those who 
were members of the CSI tended to be younger workers and had a greater 
interest in the continuity of work in the shipyard. The combination of this 
generational factor with the charisma and authority exerted by some CSI 
leaders allowed this union, traditionally confined to manual workers and 
with no presence in offices, to recruit among technical staff, administration, 
and even managerial staff, whose relative youth made them appreciate the 
determination with which CSI rejected any prospect of closure.15
This process of reductions in staff and increased indebtedness, leading to 
closure, was accompanied by a wave of new demonstrations which retained 
considerable social support and captured the attention of institutions and 
the news media.
The arrest of two members of the CSI accused of public disorder as a result of 
the 2005 demonstrations became a thorny problem which resounded for years, 
highlighting political, judicial, and police contradictions. Two years later, they 
were sentenced to three years in prison, while a persistent social mobilisation 
expressed support through demonstrations, and signs of solidarity under many 
different forms. A song and two documentary films composed the sound and 
audiovisual chronicle of a campaign which gave rise to the creation in the city 
of a citizen platform against authoritarian repression. Their imprisonment in 
the summer of 2007 provoked a reaction that led, just nineteen days later, to 
releasing the men from prison and then to a partial pardon.16
15 Testimonies of Zaza González-Llanos and Alejandro Alonso, engineers at Naval Gijón, 
Archivo de Fuentes Orales para la Historia Social de Asturias (AFOHSA), serie Culturas del 
Trabajo.
16 The story of the imprisonment of these union activists has been told in two 2007 documen-
tary f ilms: Alejandro Zapico, El astillero (disculpen las molestias), and Ruth Arias, Cándido y 
Morala, ni un paso atrás.
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In 2007 the shipyard had just 101 permanent workers, although it generated 
hundreds of indirect jobs. The situation had already resulted in suffocating 
debt, resulting from failure to comply with all of the targets set in the action 
plan for the period 2004-2006, with the exception of early retirements. The 
promise of investment amounting to €9 mn, to keep the shipyard viable, 
was not realised, and the company’s approach consisted of a closure plan. 
This possibility was accepted by two trade unions (UGT and CCOO) and by 
the regional government, but was rejected by the CSI. For the f irst time, the 
minister of industry of the Asturian government spoke out openly in favour 
of closure of the shipyard, with arguments expressed in terms of profitability 
and punishing the obstinacy of some workers in defence of their jobs.
Although the end of shipbuilding activity was initially set for 2008, Naval 
Gijón lasted until the middle of 2009, with workers continuing to sustain 
actions several years later. Throughout November 2008, workers were on 
strike which, as usual, was accompanied by demonstrations in the street (fire 
barricades, traffic stoppages, and clashes) until the workforce finally accepted 
on 4 December an agreement which, for the f irst time, did not guarantee 
coverage for all workers. Only workers aged fifty-three years or older could 
access early retirement, while forty-two younger workers were promised 
relocation to the neighbouring shipyard Juliana. This proved to be no more 
than a delay, as the Juliana shipyard ceased activity only six months later.
Even when the agreement to close the shipyard had been signed, conflict 
reappeared in its last weeks of activity. Action by sixty workers for twenty-
two days, accompanied by daily demonstrations, demanded guarantees 










Source: company and union documents
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of compliance with the commitments acquired with the pensioners.17 
This matter was ultimately resolved and workers abandoned the action. 
Naval Gijón closed its gates and ceased all activity on 31 May 2009. In the 
following months, its facilities were dismantled, and cranes and gates that 
surrounded the dry dock were scrapped. The speed that administrators of 
property exhibited in this scrapping and the passive attitude shown by the 
authorities seemed to indicate a desire to erase as soon as possible the most 
visible vestiges of an uncomfortable memory starring an extraordinarily 
confrontational collective of workers. The potential redevelopment of the 
shipyard has not been thus far been confirmed. The deep economic crisis, 
one of whose main dimensions in the Spanish case is the bursting of the 
housing bubble and consequent paralysis in the building sector, has put 
on hold the future destiny of the facilities and the ground of the shipyard.
17 Another documentary f ilm reflects this last conflict: Jaime Santos and Vanesa Castano, 
Prejubilandia, una verdad incómoda (2009).

11 Labour relations in a Portuguese 
shipyard
The case of Setenave
Jorge Fontes
Introduction
In the years following the Second World War, Portugal remained an 
authoritarian regime and a colonial power. Economically, it continued 
to be a mainly rural economy and a peripheral country in the European 
context. From the 1960s, however, Portugal joined several international 
organisations such as the European Free Trade Association in 1960, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in 1961, and 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1962. This reaching out 
to supra-national bodies helped to create the conditions for the develop-
ment of Portuguese industry, in association with banks and other f inancial 
institutions through great monopolies. The gross domestic product (GDP) 
average annual growth rate was 6.9 per cent between 1960 and 1973, and 
for the f irst time in Portuguese history the secondary sector equalled the 
primary in terms of manpower.1
Seven major business groups dominated the Portuguese economy in the 
period of the Estado Novo dictatorship. At the top was the Companhia União 
Fabril (CUF) group, which included about 186 companies, from textiles 
to fertilisers, metal products to shipping, trade to property, insurance to 
f inance, supermarkets to petrochemicals, and shipbuilding to computer 
science; it was responsible for about 10 per cent of GDP and employed 
around 100,000 people. In association with foreign capital it developed the 
Portuguese shipbuilding industry, initially with the successful case of ship 
repairers Lisnave, followed by the more ambitious project of a new gigantic 
shipyard specialising in shipbuilding, Setenave.
The conditions for the formation of Setenave seemed encouraging. The 
closure of the Suez Canal in 1967 and shipowners’ subsequent preference 
for the Cape route (the canal remained closed until June 1975), the need to 
reduce costs with freights paid abroad, the success of Lisnave, the boom in 
1 Rocha, “Crescimento económico em Portugal nos anos de 1960-73”, 621.
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orders to shipyards for mega-oil tankers and Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries’ full embargo on Portugal in retaliation for the use of 
the Lajes base in the Yom Kippur War of October 1973 all accelerated the 
need for the construction of a new large shipyard, facilitated by the non-
adherence of Portugal to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) agreement of 1969 establishing the full liberalisation 
of the sector. An ambitious plan was on the march: Cabinda in Angola 
produced oil, Setenave built the ships, and the Soponata shipowner of CUF 
would transport the oil to be ref ined in Portuguese factories.2
However, a growing dissatisfaction with a colonial war fought on three 
different fronts resulted in a military coup by middle-ranking off icers on 
25 April 1974. It was a thunderous fall, with hardly any resistance, of Europe’s 
longest dictatorship in the twentieth century and the most durable of the 
classic colonial empires – opening the floodgates for the most radical social 
revolution Europe witnessed in the second half of the past century.
Setenave (Estaleiros Navais de Setúbal) was officially formed on 6 August 
1974 at Mitrena in Setúbal to cope with increased demand, both for ship 
repairing and shipbuilding. It commenced operations on 16 June 1975, with 
the arrival of the vessel Montemuro in the shipyard amid the aforementioned 
social revolution (which nationalised the shipyard) and amid the continuing 
effects of the world economic crisis of 1973-1974, which strongly affected 
the shipping industry. Consequently, the severe downturn in demand in 
orders of new ships, especially in Setenave’s projected area of expertise (oil 
supertankers), the discovery of oil in the North Sea, the downfall of the 
national merchant navy after decolonisation, and the new international 
division of labour with the productive relocation to sectors more profitable 
to the accumulation of capital, as well as Setenave’s ruinous deal with 
international shipowners in Portuguese currency (the escudo) exposed 
the early operations of the shipyard to the grim realities of international 
competition.3
In this less than propitious market situation Setenave would try to 
diversify its productive range and its market, but would always struggle 
with chronic problems of f inancial asphyxia. The constant devaluation of 
the escudo (increasing the costs of material and equipment acquisition), 
bureaucratic slowness in f inancing operations (delaying contracts and 
causing cancellations from shipowners), a f inancing signif icantly under 
2 Available at http://www.esquerda.net/dossier/o-caso-da-lisnave (accessed 14 September 
2013).
3 Grupo de Trabalho ad hoc, “A indústria naval em Portugal”, 12.
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international standards, and the lack of payment on time of wages and 
invoices together created a scenario of chronic instability.4
Successive governments, although recognising Setenave’s strategic 
importance and repeatedly promising new orders, by neglecting to put 
in place an integrated plan for the whole industry (when all the banks, 
shipping companies and the majority of the shipyards were nationalised) 
left Setenave in a diff icult economic situation.
Notwithstanding the f inancial troubles, the reduction in freight and 
external dependence, the balance in trade and transactions, and employ-
ment had positive effects on the shipbuilding industry. In 1984, shipbuilding 
represented about 3 per cent of employment in the intermediate goods 
industries and 6 per cent of industrial GDP, a sector with a “per capita” 
product superior to the industry average by about 40 to 50 per cent. The 
national value added, since there are virtually no producers of equipment 
or other materials for shipbuilding, was almost exclusively dependent on 
the greater or less volume of manpower utilised (which varies between 30 
and 50 per cent of the value of ships built in Portugal) because the materials 
of Portuguese origin represent only 10-25 per cent of that measure. In ship 
repairing (including sub-contractors) the national value added ranged from 
75 to 90 per cent. By 1987, the Portuguese shipbuilding and -repair industry 
represented about 4.3 per cent of employment and 4.8 per cent of the gross 
added value in manufacturing industry. Setenave, with its locational ad-
vantages, was second in Europe in docked tonnage and number of repaired 
ships (above 30,000 tons) and third worldwide in docked tonnage.5
The social struggles of 1982-1984, the joining of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) in 1986, and the election of a neo-liberal government in 1987 
(paving the way for private capital and denationalisation of the Portuguese 
economy) created the conditions that led in 1989 to Setenave handing over 
its facilities in Mitrena to a private company, Solisnor, a consortium between 
Lisnave, Soponata, and a Norwegian company.6 Solisnor would manage the 
Mitrena facilities for five years after which the concession was passed to Lis-
nave, which closed its own shipyard on the south bank of the Tagus and focused 
solely on Mitrena, re-orienting it to ship repair, modernising its facilities from 
1997, and adding three Panamax-size dry docks at the turn of the millennium.
4 Comissão Coordenadora das Comissões de Trabalhadores da Indústria Naval, 7º Encontro 
de Trabalhadores da Industria Naval, 16. 
5 Federação dos Sindicatos de Metalurgia, Metalomecânica e Minas de Portugal, Indústria 
naval faz falta a Portugal, 11.
6 Barber International, Wilhelmsen, and Platou.
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Setenave shipyard
Setenave was the largest Portuguese shipyard that undertook both 
shipbuilding and repair. It was a gigantic project put in motion by the 
association of the most powerful Portuguese monopolist group with foreign 
capital.
From the beginning, Setenave functioned almost like a subsidiary factory 
of Swedish shipyards, building ship hulls and block sections of oil tankers 
that were towed to Sweden in order to be completed. In this international 
division of labour, Setenave provided a cheap and flexible labour force and 
Swedish yards retained overall control including design.7
The shipyard was initially projected to build very large crude carriers 
(VLCCs) but the contraction of the world market post-OPEC forced a change 
in strategy. A decision to readapt the shipyard towards ship repair was 
crucial to the economic survival of the enterprise; it repaired not only 
VLCCs but also other types of ships and oil platforms, and even assisting 
shipyards in the former Portuguese colonies.8 According to my estimate 
more than 1,200 repairs were undertaken in the shipyard between 1975 
and 1995 (Table 11.1).
The shipyard was built in Mitrena, 40 km south of Lisbon and 12 km from 
Setúbal. The Tagus estuary has a dimension of 10 km in length with the 
narrowest point being 1.5 km wide. The average depth of the waters varies 
between 8 m and 12 m. The Tróia peninsula and the mountain range of 
Arrábida form a natural protection against winds and tides. The tempera-
ture of the waters ranges from 10 °C in the winter to 25 °C in the summer. 
Weather conditions (with little precipitation) are very good for shipbuilding 
and ship repairing, allowing longer periods of work.
Mitrena shipyard has a total area of 3,000,000 m², of which 1,000,000 
m² were reclaimed from the river, with facilities being divided between 
shipbuilding and ship repair. The area set aside for shipbuilding has an area 
of 350,000 m² in a U shape. The construction dock was 420 m in length and 
75 m in width equipped with a gantry crane of 500 tons’ lift capacity and 
cranes of 100 tons’ and 15 tons’ lift capacity. The ship repairing arm could 
repair ships up to 700,000 dwt (the world’s biggest tanker at that time was 
550,000 dwt and was docked in Lisnave). Setenave was equipped with two 
7 Federação dos Sindicatos da Metalurgia, Metalomecânica e Minas de Portugal, Indústria 
naval faz falta a Portugal, 12.
8 Informação Setenave, no. 252, 27 August 1981, “Manter e desenvolver a cooperação Setenave 
Moçambique”, 1.
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docks of 420 m x 75 m and 350 m x 55 m, three piers, one tube workshop, 
one mechanical workshop, and one hull-fabrication hall. The shipyard 
was equipped with one building platform with the capacity to build up 
to 700,000 dwt served by a huge gantry crane, and two repair dry docks 
(700,000 dwt and 300,000 dwt). Setenave had a maximum capacity to repair 
fourteen ships simultaneously, and also to build four or f ive ships provided 
that dates of delivery were staggered.9
In terms of construction Setenave built seven oil tankers (376,000 dwt, 
323,000 dwt, 316,000 dwt, 159,878 dwt, 159,719 dwt, 152,000 dwt, 88,980 dwt), 
three bulk carriers (38,300 dwt), f loating docks, hulls for reefer ships, and 
deck cargo barges, and undertook jumboisation of ships by adding prow 
and cargo tanks to oil tankers.
9 Moisés, Setenave e Lisnave, 20.
Table 11.1  Ships repaired in Setenave and Solisnor, 1975-1995






















Source: author’s calculations from government, industrial, and union publications ; conceição, 
Setenave
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Setenave: the workers
The workers had the following characteristics: they came from geographi-
cally dispersed areas, although the majority were recruited in the rural 
south, and they were young with an above-average education (National 
Employment Centre and industrial courses) but with little training (the 
more qualif ied were recruited in Lisnave and the CUF group). Other sources 
of recruitment were former soldiers in the colonial war and Portuguese 
emigrants working in European metalwork factories and shipyards. These 
recruits were a perfect prototype of the new Portuguese working class that 
arose in the 1960s amid the “rural ocean”: concentrated on both banks of 
Tagus River, recently urban, and yet with strong ties to the rural areas, 
highly concentrated, in new modern factories, young and inexperienced in 
the old traditions of the Portuguese workers’ movement, and bereft of almost 
any kind of labour rights and union and/or political legal representation.10
By 1975, shipyard workers had f inally achieved paid holidays, wage 
increases, and automatic promotions, among other labour rights. In 1977, 
night-shift working was introduced at Setenave, leading to more employ-
ment and allowing the utilisation of the shipyard 24 hours a day, 6 days a 
week.
In the late 1980s, the working week was 44 hours per week; with a day 
shift from 8.25 a.m. to 3.45 p.m. from Monday to Friday, and a night shift 
from 5.30 p.m. to 2.40 a.m. In general, workers preferred the night shift 
because it paid 25 per cent on top of the normal wage. On Saturdays they 
were paid three times the normal hourly rate of pay and would have a day 
off for every fourth Saturday worked, while on Sundays they were paid 
at twice the hourly rate of pay but obtained an immediate day off on the 
following Monday. Later on, a new shift was introduced in which work 
would take place from Tuesday to Saturday in order to reduce overtime. 
Setenave wages were in general twice the minimum wage, but not very good 
in comparison with Lisnave shipyard rates or those in similar metalworking 
establishments.11
The legal framework of industrial relations inside the shipyard was the 
Collective Vertical Contract of the Metalworkers (CCTVM), which covered all 
workers in metalworking trades. The CCTVM stipulated precisely the function 
of each worker and had a chart of minimum wages applicable to each trade. 
This professional description was, however, an obstacle to the multi-tasking 
10 Rosa et al., Sistemas de trabalho, 182.
11 Interview with Miguel Moisés (Workers’ Commission Setenave), 1 June 2009.
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and labour flexibility desired by the company management and because of 
that, and contrary to most enterprises, there never was a so-called Collec-
tive Agreement specific to the company. Nevertheless, on an annual basis 
a process of negotiation took place between the workers and management 
concerning wages and conditions of employment. These negotiations and 
associated “claims” were better for the workers than the restricted terms of 
the CCTVM. Indeed, in cases of discrepancy between the CCTVM and the 
annual agreement, the most favourable to the worker was applied.12
Labour protest in a revolutionary context
The coup of 25 April 1974 took place while Setenave was under construction. 
In an enterprise without autonomous structures of labour organisation, 
the workers eventually recruited from Lisnave and CUF shipyards were 
the most experienced, carrying the traditions of struggle against the CIE 
(Enterprise Internal Commissions) and of the emblematic strike of 1969 in 
Lisnave that resulted in hundreds of dismissals. The f irst major mobilisa-
tion of workers at Setenave occurred in May 1974, when workers gathered 
spontaneously near the building of the Training School and constituted 
an ad hoc negotiating commission. A set of demands was presented to the 
management, with an ultimatum of ten days and thereafter immediate 
start of a strike of unlimited duration, with a General Assembly of the 
Workers operating at all times. The main demands were: reduction of the 
working hours to 40 hours a week, no work on Saturday, more holidays, 
limitation of overtime, less time until retirement, limitation of extra hours, 
and abolishment of the third shift, control of the disciplinary processes and 
promotions, a substantial rise in the minimum wage, and a simplif ication 
of wage scales. Some demands fully met were: profit sharing, paid holidays, 
freezing of higher wages, compensation for workplace accidents, and the 
establishment of a set of political and labour rights within the shipyards.13
On 27 May 1974 the f irst Workers’ Commission of Setenave (CTS) was 
elected. However, a General Assembly dismissed the previous committee 
and elected another, which was strongly anti-capitalist. The second CTS 
(July 1974 to May 1975) and the third (May to December 1975) would be 
politically led by those who had been on the far left throughout the revolu-
tion. Only after the failed communist-led coup of 25 November 1975 against 
12 Ibid.
13 Pires de Lima et al., “A acção operária na Lisnave”, 853-854.
326 JoRge FonteS 
the transition to democracy would the PCP (Portuguese Communist Party) 
direct the CTS (as well as all other workers’ representative bodies); in Lisnave, 
however, the Workers’ Committee (WC) was led by the socialists in 1986.14
During the Portuguese revolution the CTS focused its claims on anti-capi-
talist and egalitarian issues, and struggled to harmonise different categories 
of workers and to reduce wage scales, to freeze higher wages, to block sub-
contractors, to abolish fixed-term and probationary contracts, and to reduce 
the privileges of senior staff. In particular, the third CTS (May to December 
1975) integrated the mobilisation of Mitrena workers in the wider context of 
the revolutionary dynamic; tried to co-ordinate with other committees of 
workers, residents, and soldiers; and attempted to establish alternative forms 
of “people power” within the framework of a new socialist society.15
Evolution of workers’ struggles
The second CTS was elected on 11 July 1974 with 849 votes. Only one pro-
gramme was presented in the elections. It established “Base Commissions” 
for each area of activity.16
The main opposition to the CTS was led by the PCP under the rubric 
“Movement for the Constitution of a New WC”. In March 1975 they gained 
a critical advantage in the Portuguese shipbuilding industry with the dis-
missal of the “Group to Reduce the Wage Scale” (linked with the far left) in 
Lisnave. Also in March, the big controversies in the shipyard were related 
to the hostility of the CTS to the visit of representatives of the Movement of 
the Armed Forces (MFA) and the proposal, approved in the Workers’ General 
Assembly, of reducing the wage scale from eleven categories to just three. 
However, the defeat of that position in Lisnave undermined the efforts of 
a similar solution in Setenave.17
The third CTS was elected in May 1975, near the peak of the revolutionary 
period. Earlier, on 11 March 1975, a failed far-right coup caused the radicalisa-
tion of all social activity. The banks and major enterprises were nationalised 
(except foreign capital) and in key factories self-management and workers’ 
control were widespread. At the same time, in the conservative and religious 
14 Fernandes, “As relações sociais de trabalho na Lisnave”, vol. I, 125.
15 Comunicado Comissão de Trabalhadores da Setenave 10.7.7, Archive Centro de Documen-
tação 25 de Abril in Coimbra.
16 Comunicado Comissão de Trabalhadores da Setenave 18.7.7, Archive Centro de Documen-
tação 25 de Abril in Coimbra.
17 Pires de Lima et al., “A acção operária na Lisnave”, 870. 
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north, counter-revolutionary forces supported far-right terrorist groups 
who began to destroy the headquarters of the Communist Party and far-left 
organisations. In the south, the industrial belts of Lisbon and Setúbal were 
controlled by workers’ commissions that began to centralise themselves in 
Soviet style with the active complicity of low-ranking soldiers who started to 
organise their own commissions in the army. In all of this political activity, 
Portugal remained on the edge of a civil war.18
The new CTS developed active intervention in the general struggles of the 
Portuguese working class, in an attempt to co-ordinate and centralise all 
workers’ commissions (WCs) to include their aim of the socialist transforma-
tion of the society. For instance, it took part in the “Committee of Struggle” 
of Setúbal in co-ordination with other enterprises, residents’ commissions, 
and soldiers’ commissions.19 In response, the company management issued 
a “Letter to the Workers of Setenave” on 6 October 1975, characterising 
the situation as a “catastrophe”: “the abandonment of the work place is 
frequent, productivity is low, dead times are huge, authority of those in 
charge is questioned, discipline has deteriorated, the enterprise is ‘invaded’ 
by political conflicts, the indifference of the workers and tensions and 
disputes grow”. The document closes with a subtle threat of dismissal of the 
directors, engineers, and managers and calls for a platform of understanding 
with the workers’ organisations because the situation was “untenable”.20
The very experienced management tried to communicate with the work-
ers over the heads of their delegates, blaming the WCs for the “disorganisa-
tion” of the shipyard and the lack of orders, accusing them of being against 
the government,21 and playing on the workers’ divisions (far left versus PCP).
In a Workers’ General Assembly on 16 October 1975 the speakers sup-
ported “the dictatorship of the proletariat”, and the assembly approved 
with acclamation “the development of the unity of the soldiers, seamen, 
farmers, and workers towards socialism and reject all measures from the 
6th Government that intend to suppress the voice of the oppressed and the 
exploited”.22 It also approved the process of election of another WC that 
would complement a Workers’ Control Programme.
18 Varela, História do povo na Revolução portuguesa.
19 Dows et al., Os Moradores à Conquista da Cidade, 201.
20 Letter to the workers of Setenave, 6 October 1975: Archive Centro de Documentação 25 de 
Abril in Coimbra.
21 The provisional governments tried to regulate and institutionalise workers’ control with 
state participation.
22 Minute of the General Assembly of Workers of 16 October 1975, Archive Centro de Docu-
mentação 25 de Abril in Coimbra.
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To what extent was “workers’ control” expressed in Setenave? They had 
very high levels of information, for instance, on wages, control without 
resistance of tasks, meetings, services, staff, production, the f inancial state 
of the company, and likely level of prof its, etc. They had the strength to 
refuse proposals from management and to impose many of their own.23 It 
was in this context that workers began to discuss an off icial programme 
of workers’ control for establishing functions of the WC. However in the 
midst of this process, the 25 November 1975 coup took place and elections 
for the Workers’ Control Programme only occurred in December. Five 
different programmes of workers’ control were presented. Programme E 
(PCP) won with 862 votes, followed by Programme B (Maoists, 260 votes), 
Programme D (Maoists with the Socialist Party, 240 votes), Programme A 
(far left, 142 votes), and Programme F (Trotskyists, 18 votes). The total votes 
cast numbered 1,914; 402 were invalid and 2,093 workers (more than half 
the workforce) did not participate.24
The winning Workers’ Control Programme “Unite-Organise-Control” 
divided the shipyard into f ive geographical sectors that elected their rep-
resentatives in the approximate proportion of one representative to every 
one hundred workers. A Workers’ Control representative could not also be 
a union delegate, and any representative to the WC could be recalled at any 
time by the Workers’ General Assembly.25
The highest-level body of the WC communicated with the WC Assembly 
via thirty-four representatives. The assembly elected the secretariat and the 
subcommittees. The organisations had the following roles:
– Secretariat (seven representatives): centralise WC activities, chair the 
Workers’ General Assembly, and represent the workers to management.
– Sub-committee for liaison with union delegates (three representatives): 
contribute to obtain a correct balance between the specif ic interests 
of the different professional groups and the collective interests of the 
workers as a whole.
– Sub-committee for the liaison with rank-and-f ile organisations (three 
representatives): liaison with others workers’ committees, soldiers, and 
resident committees.
– Education committee (three representatives): to activate programmes 
for cultural and technical development of the workers in order to 
prepare them for building a future socialist society.
23 Rosa et al., Sistemas de trabalho, 490.
24 Informação Setenave no. 57, 22 December 1975, Controlo Operário, 2.
25 SRTUIU, “Workers’ Control in Shipbuilding/Shiprepairing”, 5.
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– Information sub-committee (three representatives): to produce com-
muniqués and pamphlets.
– Sub-committee for liaison with sectors (f ive representatives, one for 
each sector): to provide links with the sectors.
– Sub-committee for the Workers’ Control Commission (with ten mem-
bers), worked on the following principles:
a To co-ordinate the activities concerning workers’ control; to analyse 
all the irregularities reported to it.
b To request from the administration any documents or management 
reports; some of these elements should be submitted regularly to 
the sub-committee, so that the workers knew the main activities 
of the shipyard at all times.
c To detect which activities may be subject to economic sabotage 
and to ask the workers to reinforce their vigilance on them.
d To obtain from management the services of specialists to help 
the sub-committee to interpret documents referred to in b). 
These specialists may also be requested to give evidence or 
information.
e To demand from the administration that all detected irregularities 
are corrected.
f To attempt the integration of Setenave into a planned economy 
by linking its objectives with those of the same and similar 
industries.
g To ensure a correct investment policy, protecting both the workers 
and the national interest.
h To demand that all the existing or prospective contracts be revealed 
to the sub-committees.
i To guide all possible activities that may contribute to the improve-
ment of the workers’ knowledge of the activities of the management 
of Setenave. The aim is that workers should view the exercise of 
workers’ control as a necessary practice heading for a new kind of 
production relations.
The document analyses the political context but does not mention the 
25 November 1975 coup,26 and positions the f ight against fascism and for a 
future socialist society as the main aims of the Portuguese working class. 
However. the term “socialism” never appears in the specific workers’ control 
26 The PCP saw the revolution as ongoing and Portugal as developing into a special kind of 
democracy, with non-capitalist sectors of the state, that is, nationalised industries.
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project or attributions. Here the priority is given to “national independence”, 
namely:
a Reconversion of the shipyard.
b To buy Portuguese goods whenever possible.
c To press for the immediate inclusion of shipbuilding materials in the 
range of products of national steelworks.
d The acquisition of national technology.
e The search for a large market, by the inclusion of countries that were 
not traditional clients.
The non-PCP vote got 44.2 per cent. The partisan fragmentation is a reflec-
tion of internal disputes. The second most popular among these groups 
were the Maoists. They wanted the CTS to be political, non-partisan, 
“class”-oriented, and revocable at any time. The main tasks were seen as 
the anti-fascist and anti-imperialist struggle, to ensure and organise the 
defence of the workplace, organise workers’ control against unemployment, 
and against fascist and imperialist sabotage. The goal was to centralise 
commissions of all shipyards and of all metal mechanical enterprises and 
to establish the total centralisation of all WCs in Portugal.
The immediate goals of workers’ control were:
a Control over all orders;
b Control over raw materials and equipment;
c Reconversion; and
d Financial situation and enterprise spending.
According to Programme D (240 votes, Maoists and Socialist Party) orders 
and contracts should be channelled to national needs and raw materials 
and equipment bought in Portugal whenever possible. All accounts ledgers 
were to be controlled by the WC. Workers’ control was to act in admissions, 
recruitment, training, security, and hygiene.
To supporters of Programme A (142 votes, far left) the workers’ organisa-
tion was to be democratic, autonomous, and not elected by lists. The political 
mobilisation should be framed in the alliance with the MFA. Its immediate 
tasks were: to exercise workers’ control over planning, commerce, f inances, 
repair, and construction and to expel saboteurs.
Finally Programme F (Trotskyists, with only 18 votes) proposed a struggle 
against unemployment and inflation. Workers were to organise pickets in 
self-defence.
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Setenave and “democratic normalisation”
Notwithstanding the defeat of the so-called military left in the coup of 
25 November 1975, a set of labour objectives was crystallised, a network 
of democratising public services was established, and the economy was 
heavily nationalised. It is in this context that the elections for the new 
CTS in January 1976 offered victory to the PCP list with 45 per cent of the 
votes cast, as against 13.5 per cent for the Maoists and 12.4 per cent for the 
Maoists and Socialists combined. Communists also held the majority of 
shop steward positions and leadership of the company’s most important 
union, the metalworkers (Table 11.2).
Most political interventions could be characterised as “national devel-
opmentalism”. Priorities became, on the one hand, the continuation of the 
nationalisation of the company within the “state enterprise sector”, the 
“non-capitalist sectors” that would serve as a barrier against the advance-
ment of the forces of reaction, and allow – through a rational articulation of 
the productive sectors – independence and national development, as well 
as the improvement of the living conditions of workers; and, on the other, 
the economic and f inancial viability of the company.
The “claims ’80” in 1980 emerged in a context where the purchasing 
power of workers’ wages had fallen to levels signif icantly below those of 
Lisnave and many other metallurgical enterprises of the district of Setúbal. 
Therefore, wage demands were at the centre of negotiations, a process that 
would end with an average percentage increase of 11.8 per cent. Also in this 
year the CTS were forced to apply a new legislative rule, which introduced 
the D’Hondt method into workplace elections, a system criticised by both 
the PCP and the Maoists.27 The elections marked the beginning of a trend 
of stability in the CTS’s composition. The PCP (“unitary list”) got the largest 
share of the vote and elected an average of seven mandated delegates; 
followed by the Socialists with around 20 per cent and two seats, and the 
Maoists ranging between 15.8 per cent and two seats in 1980, and 12 per 
cent and one seat in 1986. The PCP unitary list easily exceeded the votes of 
the other factions and, elected the secretariat of the WC, which undertook 
negotiations directly with management.
The year 1981 marked a turning point in labour relations in the shipyard. 
Claims gradually moved from being qualitative in character (workers’ 
control, co-management, etc.) to a more quantitative dimension (salary 
27 The D’Hondt method is a highest average method for allocating seats in party-list propor-
tional representation.
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increases, bonuses, etc.), and a deterioration of labour gains was seen. How-
ever, there was some stability in the company, made possible by a certain 
climate of optimism about its viability and the establishment of channels of 
communication with management; this was considered positive by the WC, 
whose members were more critical of government than of its own leadership.
Early in December 1980, the company was declared to be in diff iculties 
by the government. In January 1981 the degaussing station (one of the most 
prof itable sectors) was handed over to Lisnave (a private company), the 
chairman of the company was removed, and salary arrears began.
In this period the social context was the stormiest since the revolution. 
The International Monetary Fund intervened in Portugal in 1977 and again 
in 1983; a state constitutional revision of 1982 had eroded previous labour 
gains. In 1982, the CGTP (General Confederation of the Portuguese Workers) 
declared the f irst two general strikes in Portugal since 1934 (on 12 February 
and 11 May). A drama over the issue of wage arrears began (leading to some 
reported cases of hunger and even some suicides), and a letter from José 
Mello of Lisnave to the prime minister proposing a lock-out of thousands 
of workers in the shipbuilding industry ignited workers’ tempers.28
The “social pact”
In 1979, the shipbuilding and -repair industry provided 28,000 direct jobs, 
more than 5,000 in sub-contracting arrangements, and some 100,000 Portu-
guese depended indirectly on this activity, making the Lisbon-Setúbal region 
the largest repair centre worldwide. In 1984 it accounted for about 3 per cent 
of total employment in manufacturing and 6 per cent of industrial GDP. 
The sector had a product “per capita” superior than the industry average by 
about 40 to 50 per cent and, with the two main yards (Lisnave and Setenave) 
geared to the international market, allowed signif icant foreign exchange 
inflows.29 To complete the picture, most shipyards, shipping companies, and 
banks were nationalised, which would facilitate, at least theoretically, joint 
synergies, obviate f inancial credit bottlenecks, and create a policy of state 
subsidies that could at least compete with the OECD countries.
Setenave sought to respond to the crisis by introducing innovative meth-
ods such as jumboising (lengthening the ship), but it was the incident of 
the tanker Setebello (S-106) that would mark the subsequent period. Due to 
28 Rosa et al., Sistemas de trabalho, 519.
29  Grupo de Trabalho ad hoc, “A indústria naval em Portugal”, 8.
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delays in its delivery, the shipowner Thyssen wanted to cancel the contract. 
In January 1983, workers were expecting to receive their December salary 
and holiday allowance, despite the spectre of the shipyard’s closure, now 
reported in the media. Given this uncertain background, at the end of the 
month a historic agreement on labour relations was signed. For the f irst 
time in a public company in Portugal workers accepted a loss of rights in 
exchange for economic viability.30
The government committed itself to ensuring the continued functioning 
of the shipyard until the completion of S-106 until August 1983, and the 
workers agreed in assembly, after intense controversy, to the government 
holding back 6 per cent  of their salary as well as bonus payments until 
the ship was f inished, and they relinquished the right to strike (except 
when called out nationally). The CTS agreed these measures as “a form of 
responsible and patriotic commitment” and “as a challenge to consciously 
ensure the viability of the company.” The Setebello underwent sea trials 
in August, workers left the industry by the hundreds with programmes of 
“voluntary redundancies”, privatisation was postponed, and the company 
would survive, agonisingly, more than half a dozen years.31
The newspaper Expresso labelled this agreement a “social pact”. Indeed, 
in a context of acute economic crisis, the political actors and the media 
started to discuss with increasing intensity the need for a “social dialogue” 
able to institutionalise and regulate labour relations, which had reached 
a degree of radicalism unprecedented since the revolutionary period. In 
the shipbuilding industry Lisnave was militarily occupied in June 1983 to 
liberate the ship Doris, which had been held by workers with wage arrears, 
and a demonstration of shipyard workers in February 1984 on the 25th of 
April Bridge was violently repressed by police. In the aftermath of the Doris 
affair and the subsequent redundancies (which affected several union 
activists); in Lisnave the socialists became the majority party in the WC 
in 1986. A year later the CGTP f inally entered into “social dialogue” after 
three years of absence. In Setenave, 2,000 workers left between 1980 and 
1987, and more than 1,300 did so in 1988. That year the PCP and the Maoists 
started competing on joint lists, and the Socialists never received more than 
30 per cent of the votes.32
30 Expresso, nr 535, 14, “Pacto Social viabiliza construção do ‘S-106’”.
31 O trabalhador dos estaleiros navais, Ano I, no. 2, January 1983, “Setenave: o plano do governo 
ruiu como um castelo de cartas”, 5.
32 Comissão Coordenadora das Comissões de Trabalhadores da Indústria Naval, Grupo 
Trabalho Informação, Dossier Imprensa, January 1983, 66.
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A new era?
In 1988 under a new neo-liberal government a new management team was 
nominated with the promise of creating a “cultural revolution”. Sectors of 
the shipyard such as canteens, security, and cleaning were privatised, the 
kindergarten was closed, and 2,000 workers were threatened with dismissal; 
at the same time the project of privatisation advanced. Unsurprisingly, 
the workers demonstrated and were able to partially transform the initial 
proposal into around 700 “voluntary redundancies”.33
Under the provisions of the EEC VII Directive on Shipbuilding, subsides 
could be granted only if there were a reduction of shipbuilding capacity. 
Thereafter, Lisnave co-opted the Mitrena shipyard. It formed a consortium 
with Soponata (which was in national ownership) and Norwegian Barber 
International to form Solisnor, which gained control of Mitrena shipyard 
in 1989. The agreement made by the state with Solisnor established the 
construction of ships for the national merchant f leet. However, just two 
years later, Lisnave proposed a plan to merge the two shipyards, including 
the state’s assumption of Lisnave’s liabilities linked to the current value of 
its facilities, and the closure of new construction work.34
The plan later settled with workers’ organisations stipulated, among 
other measures, “voluntary redundancies” of 800 workers, and a programme 
of early retirements at age 55 or more until December 1996. However, the 
plan had to be approved in two Workers’ General Assemblies, in Lisnave and 
Setenave. On 15 July 1994 workers in Lisnave agreed to the plan, but it was 
rejected in Mitrena. Thereafter, the workers’ organisations had hundreds 
of meetings in Setenave and the plan was f inally approved.35
In 1996, Lisnave replaced Solisnor in charge of Mitrena shipyard and in 
the second half of 1997 put in place a restructuring plan that concentrated on 
ship repair.36 This focus was confirmed in 2000 when the Lisnave shipyard in 
Margueira was closed. That flexibility of labour was pursued was indicative 
of the company’s strategy. With the average age of employees being high, 
Lisnave instigated a youth training programme. In response to opposition 
from trade unions, Lisnave formed a new company in 2009 to hire all future 
33 Fernandes, “As relações sociais de trabalho na Lisnave”, vol. II, 52.
34 Público, Lisnave avança com carteira cheia, 86.
35 The agreement was signed 4 August 1994: O Pórtico CT Solisnor, April 95, no. 175, 2.
36 Lisnave Estaleiros Navais SA Mangement Rport and Accounts, 2013. Since the Restructuring 
Plan of 1997 to the reporting year of 2013, Lisnave has undertaken the repair and/or maintenance 
of 2,047 ships, from more than f ifty countries, resulting in sales of €1.78 bn.
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employees, Lisnave Naval Services, LDA.37 Although Lisnave experienced 
diff icult trading conditions at Mitrena after the world f inancial crisis of 
2008 and the slow recovery of global trade thereafter, at the time of writing, 
it has positive f inancial results; and employs about 300 workers on direct 
contracts and many thousands more in sub-contracting.38
Conclusion
In an authoritarian regime, a revolutionary situation, or a liberal democracy, 
and in the context of a private or nationalised enterprise, in offensive or 
defensive claims, the shipbuilding and -repair industry, and Setenave in 
particular, served as a nerve centre. Throughout, a specif ic configuration 
of the balance of power between social classes was built, test-tube solutions 
for social engineering were created, and it served as a carrier element, f lag, 
and reference point for the movement, behaviour, mood, and action of a 
signif icant section of working-class people.
Setenave was also the test bed for a new form of “post-revolutionary” 
industrial relations institutionalism. The deal to “rescue” Setenave in 1983 
was the first piece of the puzzle of social dialogue in Portugal, translated in the 
signature of the first social pacts, after serious defeats of the labour movement, 
particularly in the shipbuilding industry, which began to be dismantled in the 
context of accession to the EEC, the denationalisation of the economy, and the 
eventual transfer of the industrial and productive sectors into private hands.
We can ask if the result of the Portuguese revolution of 1974-1975 as set out 
in the 1976 Constitution was perhaps the only true “social pact” throughout 
the Portuguese twentieth century;39 and, if the subsequent retreat of labour 
achievements in the context of assistance from the IMF, the accession to 
the EEC, or the opening of banks to private capital and the dismantling of 
the “state business sector” are not the accumulation of the economic, legal, 
political. and social conditions necessary for the victory of the neo-liberal 
project in Portugal. The reality of the so-called social pacts was that they 
were an accumulation of strategic defeats of the labour movement; as such 
they established a new framework for seemingly permanently precarious 
labour relations and resulted in the almost total collapse of an industry.
37 Ibid., 26.
38 Ibid., 29, at 31 December 2013, the total direct workforce at Mitrena stood at 294 with an 
average age of 54.
39 Varela, “Ruptura e pacto social em Portugal”.

12 Work in the Portuguese shipyards of 
Lisnave
From the right to work to precariousness of employment1
Raquel Varela and Ana Rajado
Introduction
For nearly three decades, the workers from Lisnave’s Lisbon shipyards 
staged some of the most important social conflicts in Portugal. From 1967 
to 1984, Lisnave was the locus of Portugal’s highest concentration of work-
ers (at its peak it had 9,000 permanent employees), and a model in the 
relationships between private economic groups and the state. The history 
of Lisnave’s modern growth mirrors trends in the world market for ships, 
particularly the growth in size and scale of oil tankers consequent upon 
the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967, the OPEC oil crises of 1973-1974, the 
recession thereafter, and subsequent restructuring of the shipbuilding 
industry by relocation of the bulk of shipbuilding production to East Asian 
countries.2
Lisnave was a model of workers’ organisation which had a profound effect 
on Portuguese society as a whole. In 1974, in one of the major conflicts of 
the revolution, 7,000 workers marched in the streets of the capital, Lisbon, 
against the Popular Front government. It was also in these shipyards during 
the early 1980s that the f irst company agreement that helped consolidate 
the social pact in Portugal was signed. However, by the 1990s, the model 
of restructuring applied in Lisnave saw both a massive replacement of 
workers who had been on standard terms and conditions of employment 
(guaranteed working week, agreed wages and conditions, pensions, etc.) 
with those on more precarious short-term contracts, and increased use of 
sub-contractors.
1 We would like to thank theoretical physicist Renato Guedes and economist Luís Felipe 
Pires for help given in the construction of the database and its analysis.
2 For this production shift, see Todd, Industrial Dislocation, and Todd, “Going East”.
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Lisnave shipyards: the current situation
With an ideal geographical location (Atlantic Ocean, Mediterranean Sea), 
central to the trade routes between the South and North Atlantic, and favour-
able weather conditions enabling outdoor work, Lisnave currently operates in 
Mitrena, Setúbal, on a site of 1,500,000 m2. The yard has three large dry docks, 
two of which are straddled with a 500-ton gantry crane and which are capable 
of docking the largest ships afloat, and three Panamax-size dry docks. In 
addition to this, there are nine repair berths and a large marine-engineering 
facility. In mid-1997 the company implemented a restructuring plan in order to 
meet future trends in ship repair and conversion, including the construction 
of the three Panamax-size dry docks. Reconstruction and general upgrading 
of the yard were completed in late 2000 and a cost-containment policy for 
human resources was implemented with all activity focused at Mitrena.
As of December 2013 the shareholder structure of Lisnave was as follows: 
Navivessel Estudos e Projectos Navais, SA, 72.83 per cent; Thyssenkrupp 
Industrial Solutions AG, 20 per cent; Parpública, SA, 2.97 per cent; other 
shareholders, 4.20 per cent.3
Lisnave’s business was severely affected by the crisis in the international 
economy from 2009 onwards. Nevertheless, in part due to the fall in wage 
costs the company was able to mitigate the effect of depressed market condi-
tions. Changes to the labour laws of 1 August 2012 allowed for a reduction in 
compensation for overtime, now established as an extra 25 per cent during 
the f irst working hour, 37.5 per cent in the subsequent hours, and 50 per 
cent on weekends and holidays. Since 2009 the trend of net profits has been 
downward, but profits increased again in 2013.4 That year, Lisnave repaired 
107 ships, of which 106 were foreign-owned, and 103 were dry-docked, with 
the repair of tankers and bulk carriers predominating. This is equivalent to a 
total turnover of about €81 min, a slight increase over the previous year (101 
ships).5 However, it should be noted that, although the number of vessels has 
increased, there was a smaller amount of work per vessel. Still, in its market 
area (ships above 30,000 dwt), the company stands out as the f ifth-largest 
in the world and largest in Europe. Since the restructuring of the company 
in mid-1997, Lisnave has undertaken repairs and/or maintenance of 2,047 
ships from more than 50 countries, resulting in sales of €1.78 bn.6
3 Lisnave Estaleiros Navais SA Management Report and Accounts 2013, 15.
4 Ibid., Statement of Prof it and Loss, 2009-2013, 33.
5 Ibid., 30.
6 Ibid., 12.
WoRK in tHe poRtugueSe SHipyaRdS oF liSnave 341
With regard to its workforce, Lisnave’s main objective, as part of its wide 
cost-containment policy, is to replace older workers, who have more labour 
rights, with younger, more precarious workers. The company’s strategy in 
labour relations is clear: to rejuvenate its workforce by the introduction 
of more flexible working conditions and contracts to ensure its continued 
survival. However, the company’s proposed collective-bargaining agree-
ment has been repeatedly rejected by workforce representatives. Against 
this background, between 2006 and 2009 Lisnave drew up a youth training 
programme. This was in part an acknowledgement that the average age of 
its workforce was high and to bring in a new hiring regime. To this end, with 
the co-operation of its major shareholder, Navivessel, Lisnave incorporated 
a new company with objectives similar to its own, which would hire all 
future employees. The new company, Lisnaveyards - Naval Services, Ltd, 
operated from February 2009.
Lisnave has recruited most of the young people who successfully passed 
out of the first training programme organised by Lisnaveyards. Compared to 
the 2012 personnel indicators, the number of Lisnave employees fell slightly 
and, as of the end of 2013, the total number of Lisnave directly employed 
workers stood at 294, the average age increasing to 54,7 with approximately 
2,300 precarious workers. However, it should be noted that in the current 
situation and with the successive amendments to the labour laws, direct 
workers’ employment is increasingly precarious. Lisnave’s activities are 
divided into two shifts: one from 08:00 to 16:30, and another from 16:00 to 
00:00, with the majority of workers in the f irst shift.
In 2013, for the eighth consecutive year, Lisnave proceeded to return on 
the capital invested by shareholders of the company, posting a net prof it of 
€6,979,646 mn, of which €6 mn was allotted to shareholder dividend and 
the remainder to retained earnings.8
From the Rocha Shipyards to Lisnave, 1937-1974
In 1937, the CUF group (Union Production Company), the most influential 
economic group of the Estado Novo (“new state”), chaired by Alfredo da Silva, 
and protected by the Law of Industrial Conditioning,9 won the concession 
7 Ibid., 29.
8 Ibid., 40.
9 For the development of this subject see, for example, Brandão de Brito, A industrialização 
portuguesa no pós-guerra.
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for the naval shipyard of the Port Authority of Lisbon, and founded the 
Rocha Shipyards on the north bank of the Tagus River. The Law of Industrial 
Conditioning (1931) limited domestic competition in particular industrial 
sectors, and required prior authorisation by government if an entrepreneur 
intended to start a business in the conditioned areas. This measure served, 
in practice, to protect from competition a sector of the domestic bourgeoisie 
linked to the government, guaranteeing them a monopoly of certain sec-
tors of the economy. For shipping and shipbuilding, the Tagus River has 
exceptional locational advantages.10 Its shipyards and shipping lanes are 
protected by the largest estuary in Western Europe, with 300-350 km2 of 
water (depending on the tides).
When the shipyards were founded in 1937, Portugal was a dictatorship. 
During the 1930s anarchist influence in the labour movement had declined; 
communist influence had duly increased and was reorganised in 1940-1941, 
in line with the VII Congress of the Communist International.11 Antonio de 
Oliveira Salazar had come to power as prime minister (effectively dictator) 
in 1932. Since the coup d’état of 1926 against the Republican government, 
workers’ organisations had been suppressed.12 The insurrectionary general 
strike of 18 January 1934, with its epicentre in Marinha Grande, a glass-
making village in central Portugal, was crushed and brutally repressed – its 
leaders were the first prisoners in the newly opened Tarrafal’s concentration 
camp, built in the African archipelago of Cape Verde.13
The victory of the Nationalist forces in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) 
served to consolidate the authoritarian regime in Portugal. The Rocha 
Shipyards thrived up to and during the Second World War, becoming the 
main ship repair yard for the Portuguese fleet. However, in the summer of 
1943, against a background of the high price of food and rationing since the 
beginning of the war, a wave of strikes broke out in Lisbon. Some 50,000 
workers took part in closing down dozens of factories on both banks of the 
Tagus. Demonstrations of workers and their families multiplied in other 
10 Saiote and Espírito Santo, “A construção naval no Grupo CUF”, 25.
11 Sena Junior, “Frentes Populares”.
12 Originally, Salazar’s regime was based on an alliance of f inancial-colonial and agricultural 
capital. The policies of the Estado Novo were designed to reduce class struggle at home and 
opposition in the colonies. The price of agricultural goods was maintained by the state at a 
very low level, thus progressively ruining the smaller landowners. Simultaneously, trade unions 
were replaced by off icial sindicatos. The industrial bourgeoisie also had to toe the line, being 
obliged to organise on a corporative basis. There was a ban on all public meetings and strikes. 
No opposition was tolerated in what was effectively a police state.
13 Antunes, “No tempo em que os homens usavam chapéus”, 12.
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cities. According to João Madeira, state repression was brutal and wide-
spread, and many factories were taken under military control. Against this 
backdrop, from the Fundição and the Caldeiraria of the Rocha shipyards, 
1,625 workers went on strike, and 851 of them were arrested by the GNR 
(National Republican Guard).14 Repression continued throughout the war.
In 1947, the workers of CUF and Parry & Son shipyards went on strike, 
refusing to repair the ship Lourenço Marques which was to carry Portuguese 
soldiers to Angola. In April, in solidarity, the PCP (Portuguese Communist 
Party) cell directed the workers in Rocha Shipyards to refuse to repair 
the same ship. Consequently, management called in PIDE, the Salazar 
regime’s political police, which radicalised the situation, linking it with 
the Naval Construction’s workers ongoing strike on the Tagus docks, with 
the workers taking shelter in the workshops and roofs of some buildings – a 
situation that could be resolved only by the departure of the police from 
the shipyard.15
Despite these isolated challenges, Salazar remained f irmly in power and 
retained the support of the military, police, and other organs of state. In 
this he was substantially aided by the relative prosperity of the bourgeoisie 
who supported the Estado Novo, and by international support in the context 
of the Cold War. Thereafter, labour disputes in the Rocha Shipyards were 
relatively scarce for almost f ifteen years.
The industrialisation of the Portuguese economy had gradually resulted 
in a larger concentration of the Portuguese working class on both banks 
of the Tagus, in Lisbon, and in Setúbal, which ref lected changes in the 
composition of the workforce. The rural labour force had decreased from 44 
per cent in 1960, to 28 per cent by 1973, while the industrial workforce had 
increased from 29 per cent to 36 per cent in the same period.16 According to 
Eloy Clemente, the proportion of industrial production in Portuguese gross 
domestic product increased from 37 per cent in 1960 to 51 per cent in 1973. 
Moreover, the manufacturing sector tripled its added value, especially in the 
most dynamic sector, metals, and in construction.17 In 1970, three-quarters 
of the active population were employed and over two-thirds of industrial 
workers (67.4 per cent) were employed in manufacturing units with more 
than twenty people. Maria de Lourdes Santos et al. claim that there was 
an increase in the working class, between 1950 and 1970, from 768,000 to 
14 Madeira, “O arsenal e os movimentos populares e operários”.
15 Ibid.
16 Clemente, “Problemas y ritmos de la modernización económica peninsular”, 203.
17 Ibid., 203-204.
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1,020,000, all this in a framework of emigration of manpower to the richer 
countries of Western Europe (1.5 million people left Portugal between 1950 
and 1970).18 During the 1960s the proportion of women employed increased 
substantially in industry, agriculture, and services.19
The formation of Lisnave
On 11 September 1961, the Rocha Shipyard company adopted the name 
Lisnave - Estaleiros Navais de Lisboa; thereafter, it expanded on the south 
bank of the Tagus. Formed with mainly Portuguese but also with Dutch 
and Swedish capital, with Manuel de Mello (Alfredo da Silva’s grandson) 
as chairman of the Board of Directors, Lisnave had orders of a military 
nature from 1963 to 1967, within the framework of the commitments of the 
Portuguese regime as part of NATO. Nevertheless, the company’s output, 
particularly in ship repair, also gained added importance because of the 
colonial war, which had begun in 1961, against the peoples of Angola, 
Mozambique, and Guinea Bissau. However, Lisnave lacked the capacity at 
this point to build four corvettes for the Portuguese navy. These orders were 
granted to Bazán-Ferrol, in Galicia, the most important military shipyard 
in Spain.20
Thereafter, Lisnave increasingly specialised in ship repair, focusing less 
on new construction. The growth in orders and the prospects for develop-
ment of the ship repair industry led to the construction of a new Lisnave 
shipyard, this time across the river. On 23 June 1967, the president of the 
Republic, Américo Tomaz, inaugurated the new shipyards at Margueira, 
on the south bank of the river, designed for large ships. They were named 
Lisnave, Shipyards of Lisbon. The opening took place with the entry of the 
vessel Índia into dock No. 11, one of the largest in the world, with a capacity 
for vessels of 300,000 dwt. On that day, José Manuel de Mello was awarded 
the Grand Cross of Merit Industrial. Representatives of major oil companies 
and foreign shipowners attended the inauguration.21
The Suez Canal was closed that same year, necessitating the re-routing 
of crude oil tankers around the Cape of Good Hope and through to the 
Atlantic Ocean. The closure and its impact led to an exponential growth 
18 Santos, Lima, and Ferreira. O 25 de Abril e as lutas sociais nas empresas.
19 Barreto and Preto, Portugal 1960/1995: indicadores sociais, 17.
20 Alén, “El Ferrol y la Bazán”.
21 Diário de Notícias, 24 June 1967.
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in size of these vessels to reap economies of scale and to a consequent 
increase in tanker construction.22 Lisnave was ideally located to service 
this growing market segment’s need for ship repair. In response to this 
market opportunity, the company attempted to create framing mecha-
nisms and to control its workforce politically. In 1967, the company created 
an Internal Commission (CIE), through which it was envisaged workers 
should offer suggestions and contribute, in general, to the company’s 
progress. However, later testimonies and interviews collected show that 
workers were inherently suspicious of the CIE, which reproduced the 
failed scheme of vertical unions (corporate) created by the Estado Novo. 
It failed because they were unable to gather enough members from a 
sceptical workforce.23 Moreover, workers suspected that the information 
from this commission would somehow be conveyed to PIDE/DGS, the 
political police, which quickly proved to be the case when a strike in 1969 
broke out.24
In an interview, a Lisnave worker recounted that his section had de-
cided to elect a deaf-mute worker as a workers’ representative to the CIE,25 
a way of showing their contempt for this structure, which was considered 
incapable of listening to workers. On 12 and 13 November 1969, there was 
a strike in the Lisnave shipyards of Margueira (south bank) and Rocha 
(north bank), in the midst of the economic crisis and the political jolt that 
swept Europe in the social and political upheavals of 1968 and 1969, with 
important repercussions in Portugal. Indeed, 1969 was the year with the 
largest number of recorded strikes since the Second World War;26 this 
year would also be instrumental during the revolutionary period. The 
reasons for this particular strike are still controversial. From the PCP 
perspective – the only structure with a cohesive organisation, although 
it was still operating underground – the protest arose over wages which, 
despite being higher than the national average, were still below the 
European average. The PCP claimed that its activists had organised the 
strike but rejected the idea of a walkout that included political claims. The 
sources analysed by Paulo Oliveira and Paulo Fernandes show, however, 
that the strike itself had political roots, as three of its claims were the 
22 Faria, Lisnave.
23 Valente, “O Movimento Operário e Sindical”.
24 Faria, Lisnave.
25 Interview with Fernando Figueira, Lisnave Margueira worker, Jan. 2009.
26 In 1968, 15 strikes were recorded in Portugal and 100 in 1969. The sectors where strikes 
happened are metallurgy, manufacturing, and transport. For further development of this theme, 
see Patriarca, “Greves”.
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end of the colonial war, Portugal’s exit from NATO, and opening trade 
with Eastern Europe.27 The state’s response to the strike was to send in 
riot police to suppress the workers and prevent them from entering the 
shipyards; they would later be reinstated at the shipyard’s entrance, one 
by one. The leaders of the strike were dismissed. A few months later, the 
administration raised the wages of dockyard workers, but the suspicion 
27 Oliveira and Fernandes, “A Lisnave no início da década de 70”. 
Table 12.1  Number of workers at Lisnave 1967-1997 
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created by the repression in 1969 remained, and following the 25th of April 
1974 coup – which led to the fall of the dictatorship – a new opportunity 
awaited the Lisnave workers.
Earlier in 1969, the directors of Lisnave had decided to build dock No. 
13, with a capacity to receive vessels up to 1 mn dwt. On construction, 
it became the largest dry dock in the world. Lisnave had a workforce of 
4,719 in 1967 and, at its peak of production, in 1976, 9,803 workers were 
employed; 21 per cent of the world f leet of tankers above 70,000 dwt used 
Lisnave at the end of 1969. The number of employees grew, as shown in 
Table 12.1, until Lisnave became the locus of the largest concentration of 
workers in Portugal.
Mitrena shipyard
A new site opened in 1973, at Mitrena in Setúbal – Estaleiros Navais de 
Setúbal Setenave – initially geared for shipbuilding, with the state as 
the major shareholder. Other shareholders were CUF, Lisnave, Banco de 
Fomento, and the CGD bank. However, a military coup d’état carried out 
by the Armed Forces Movement (MFA) on 25 April 1974 ended the Estado 
Novo, the longest dictatorship in Europe. The new regime pushed through a 
rapid programme of decolonisation. Over the next few years, Guinea-Bissau, 
Mozambique, the Cape Verde Islands, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Angola 
all became independent.
Immediately, and in defiance of a radio appeal broadcast by the military 
asking people to stay at home, thousands of people left their homes, shout-
ing: “Death to fascism”. The prison doors of Caxias and Peniche opened 
up in order to set free all political prisoners; PIDE was dismantled, the 
headquarters of the regime’s newspaper A Época was attacked, and censor-
ship was abolished. In the aftermath of the coup, between May and June 
1974, more than 2 million workers, nearly half the working population of the 
country, participated in strikes, occupations of companies, and demonstra-
tions. Lisnave workers organised to demand better working conditions, 
above all, an increase in “sanitation” of the former regime’s supporters.28 
In an administration accused of repressing the 1969 strike, one f igure in 
particular, the deputy manager Perestrello, an engineer, was accused by 
28 “Sanitation” was a term that was born in popular slang at the beginning of the revolution, 
to describe the processes of stripping those directors linked to the Estado Novo – as well as 
entrepreneurs and employers of occupied businesses – of positions of political responsibility.
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workers of having released a list of twenty-four names of strikers in 1969 
to the political police.29
The f irst strike at Lisnave took place in May 1974. Workers demanded 
a minimum wage of 7,000 escudos with production bonuses and a 40-
hour working week with Saturdays off, vacation entitlement of 6 weeks, 
retirement at age 55, full and free medication, extra sickness benefits, and 
the right to assembly within the company and during working hours. In 
addition, a prof it-sharing scheme was mooted (the government approved 
a minimum wage of less than half of that proposed, but was unable to 
impose this on the metalworkers’ union). The workers’ demand ended with 
an allusion to the 1969 strike. Lisnave workers demanded the “immediate 
readmission of all comrades f ired during the last strike, [who would be] 
entitled to all social benefits from the moment of [their] redundancies”.30
By the summer of 1974, the company administration attempted to com-
promise on some of the workers’ demands (sick pay, thirteenth month’s pay, 
and holidays, making a counterproposal with salary increases)31 but refused 
to sack Deputy Manager Engineer Perestrello. Tension was heightened in 
Lisnave following a peak of nationwide strikes, which occurred in the f inal 
days of August 1974 and September 1974. On 7 September, a plenary meeting 
in Lisnave with 2,000 workers attending ratif ied the decision to convene a 
demonstration that led the steelworkers of Lisnave to the centre of Lisbon, 
to the Ministry of Labour in Praça de Londres. On 11 September, the govern-
ment, through the Ministry of Internal Affairs, banned the demonstration 
that same day, fearing that demonstrations and strikes would spread 
to other companies. By the morning of 12 September, a MFA delegation 
was sent out to convince the workers to postpone the demonstration to a 
Saturday. In vain, as Fátima Patriarca recalls, workers had evolved from a 
dialogue position to a position of strength where the claims were not to be 
argued: the demonstration would take place and it would be an act of force 
against the establishment. The workers gathered inside the shipyard, and 
ratif ied the demonstration on the 12th, with only twenty-f ive votes against:
At 5:20 pm we set off in demonstration and in the middle of the yard 
we encountered a Rifle Corps and three chaimites [armoured vehicles] 
blocking the way. We stopped there and started yelling: “Soldiers are sons 




WoRK in tHe poRtugueSe SHipyaRdS oF liSnave 349
of the people” […] at that time soldiers began to cry and the Commander, 
after this, ordered an open passage.32
With the passage open, a six-hour demonstration followed – one of the 
most famous in Portuguese history – including marching along the main 
avenues of Lisbon, a stop for a minute’s silence in solidarity with Chile, and 
a stop at the Ministry of Labour. The workers’ communication, distributed 
to the population, is an example of the democratic struggle transforming 
into a socialist one, as Patriarca stated: “The f ight for sanitation surpasses 
its anti-fascist character and is now also being set in anti-capitalist terms.”33 
Below are some excerpts from the communication that Lisnave workers 
distributed to the population during the demonstration:
We remind you of all the announcements from the Administration, an 
outrageous provocation to the workers’ dignity, disguised as “Justice”, “Un-
derstanding”, “Economic Chaos”, “National Economy” […] When there is 
initiative and organised struggle of the oppressed classes, reaction recoils 
[…] We are not with the Government when it promulgates anti-worker 
laws, restricting the workers’ struggle against capitalist exploitation.
We will actively f ight the Strike Law because it is a deep blow to the 
workers’ liberties.
We reject the right that employers have to drag thousands of workers into 
poverty because the lock-out is against the workers and protects capitalists.34
Lisnave workers maintained a position of strength, achieving virtually all 
claims  – placing them, in terms of wage and working conditions, above the 
national average, with the government anxious to prevent the spread of 
conflict. It is signif icant that the welfare costs of the company, in millions 
of escudos, rose from PTE $910,400 in 1973 to PTE $1,518, 700 in 1975 to 
PTE $2,109,500 in 1976,35 which represented not only an absolute increase 
in the number of employees but also an extension of the net social wage. 
During the revolution of 1974 and 1975 there was an overall increase of 
18 per cent of payroll on income from wealth in Portugal,36 and a large 
32 Patriarca, “Operários portugueses na revolução”, 722.
33 Ibid., 709.
34 “Dos operários da Lisnave à população”, Lisnave workers communiqué, 11 September 1974, 
in Santos, O 25 de Abril e as lutas sociais nas empresas, 110-112.
35 Oliveira and Fernandes, “A Lisnave no início da década de 70”, 255.
36 During the 1974-1975 revolution, there was a general wage increase due to strikes and other 
protests. See Varela, “A eugenização da força de trabalho”.
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number of workers who had previously been in a precarious situation were 
hired by the company.37
Lisnave: the 1981-1984 crises and the social pact
We proposed, as an explanatory hypothesis in another work,38 that the social 
pact born in Portugal in the revolutionary period of 1974-1975 and enshrined 
in the 1976 Constitution – which consolidated a large welfare state with the 
right to work and wages that rose above the minimum needed to maintain 
the biological reproduction of the labour force – remained in force because 
of the intense political bickering inherited from the revolution. There were 
ten governments in ten years, between 1976 and 1985, which gave rise to 
diff iculties in governing and stabilising the political situation in order to 
ensure production under the capitalist system, although there were fewer 
diff iculties than in 1974-1975.
There was, however, a major change in the midst of the economic crisis 
of 1981-1984 and, by a combination of factors the result of this crisis was not 
victory for the workers, as in 1974-1975, but defeat. A reconfiguration of the 
Portuguese workforce emerged from this crisis, and in this the shipyards 
of Lisnave played a central role.
Accordingly, a conflict developed within the company, which would last 
for years, the most critical period being from 1982 to 1986; the end result 
was the restructuring of the company from 1992 to 1996. This was a conflict 
that from the workers’ side had defensive characteristics, and they primarily 
aimed at the conservation of employment. Marinús Pires de Lima states that:
The strategies of social management of manpower in Lisnave seek to 
respond to the specific conditions of the economic crisis: about 2,700 early 
retirements, attempts to suspend employment contracts, proposals for 
more than 2,000 voluntary terminations of contract, and the collective 
dismissal of close to 600 workers.39
The hardest blow to these workers was a policy of wage arrears that the 
administration used to demoralise workers. Fernando Figueira, a Lisnave 
worker at this point, told the authors “that there were families who sent 
37 Oliveira and Fernandes, “A Lisnave no início da década de 70”, 256.
38 Varela, “Ruptura e pacto social em Portugal.”.
39 Lima, “Transformações das relações de trabalho e ação operária nas indústrias navais”, 541.
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children to their grandparents because they no longer had means to sustain 
the education and even the survival of the children”.40
Workers responded differently to the f ierce labour dispute unfolding in 
this period within Lisnave, opposing the trend driven by the UDP (Maoist) 
faction, which proposed direct action and a permanent model of discussion 
and action among workers; and a trend led by CGTP, close to the PCP, which 
advocated the control of discussion and information to conduct negotia-
tions with management. In the end, a trend led by UGT (Social Democrat) 
gradually gained ground, according to Pires de Lima, because workers saw 
greater proximity to power with this trend and, conversely, because the 
actual militancy of workers tended to decrease during this period, follow-
ing a general decline of workers’ mobilisation in the post-revolutionary 
period. Despite this, however, Lisnave workers were protagonists of radical 
struggle, including measures such as the kidnapping and detention, for 
several days, of directors and administrators in the shipyard (September 
and October of 1982), a blockade of ships, and measures that led to a police 
occupation of the site in 1983. Although kidnapping is a criminal act under 
Portuguese law, no criminal sanctions followed for those who carried it out.
Thereafter, the workers’ response to the administration’s anti-crisis 
measures tended to subside. In this context, surprisingly, given Lisnave’s 
previous history of radicalism, the UGT won a majority at the workers’ 
council in 1986. Far from having guaranteed Lisnave’s viability, however, 
the restructuring and f inally the near-disappearance of the company were 
seemingly irreversible from this date.41
The single enterprise agreement, which provided for a social peace clause, 
was signed in 1986 after negotiations with the UGT workers’ council. In 
exchange for the administration’s regulation of their wages in arrears, 
“social contracts” were also signed, in which workers undertook not to strike 
and to renounce holidays in exchange for the promise of work constructing 
a supertanker, which in the end turned out to be cancelled. There were 
700 voluntary terminations with prompt compensation by the company 
administration immediately after the agreement.
This was the f irst substantial political union defeat at Lisnave and one 
that led to the widespread casualisation of the workforce. Once stabilised, 
40 Interview with Fernando Figueira, a worker from Lisnave Margueira, January 2009.
41 UDP: União Democrática Popular (a Maoist organisation); CGTP: Confederação Geral dos 
Trabalhadores Portugueses (the main union confederation, strongly linked with the Communist 
Party); UGC: União Geral dos Trabalhadores (the second-largest union confederation, connected 
with the liberal and social democratic sectors).
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the company’s restructuring programme was then set in motion between 
1992 and 1995. It was carried out by ensuring ample rights to those who 
remained in the company, as well as 100 per cent of salary for the next ten 
years to those who agreed to leave, plus compensation – guaranteed to 
about 5,000 workers. This model – using the Workers’ Fund to undermine 
these same workers – applied to all sectors of the Portuguese working 
class from 1990 and 2013. Unions were strong enough to ensure that their 
full-time members complied with these generous terms in their entirety, 
but accepted, in exchange, the casualisation and sub-contracting of new 
workers – which, in the medium term, eroded the reforms because the 
precarious position of casualised workers meant that employers failed to 
deduct as much for social security, which eventually decapitalises a social 
allocation system. From 1997 (see Figure 12.10) the number of permanent 
workers decreased while sub-contracting increased exponentially. Today, 
there are some 2,300 employees working at Lisnave, of whom 2,000 are 
temporary and therefore in precarious employment.
The early retirement and sub-contracting policy increased the average 
age of workers from 43 in 1986 to 50 by 2007 (Figure 12.1). Permanent workers 
opting for early retirement stands out as a prime factor in the increasing 
casualisation of the Lisnave workforce (Figure 12.2). There are two less pro-
nounced peaks in 1989 and 1990 and a large peak in 1994 when 188 workers 
went to early retirement – in addition to the hundreds of voluntary termina-
tions – which together caused an overload to the social security fund.
In Figure 12.3, it can be seen that the average number of workers per 
year dropped by 53 per cent from 1986 to 1994, and from there dropped by 
86 per cent by 2008.
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One of the impacts of job precariousness was a decrease in non-worked 
hours motivated by internal unemployment. Until 1997, the year of the last 
restructuring, when there were no orders, this risk was assumed or covert 
by the social security system under vocational training programmes (see 
Figure 12.5); or directly by the company in so-called internal unemployment 
(Figure 12.4). We perceive two peaks in the mid-1980s and early 1990s which 
relate to the two periods of restructuring. Later there would be a sharp 
Figure 12.2  Outflow of workers by year, 1986-2007 (retirement because of 
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decline, which means that the company – not decreasing production – 
outsourced costs.
In Figure 12.5 there is a decrease in the number of man-hours not worked 
for vocational training in 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994. In 1995, however, at 
the point of the company’s restructuring, there is a peak of 572,355 hours 
– corresponding to an externalisation of costs with workers provided for 
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by the social security fund, which mainly funded vocational training, 
and the European Social Fund. From the moment that the company was 
restructured, however, the number of hours remains relatively constant, 
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with a slight increase in 2002, caused by a cyclical crisis that had an impact 
on the number of orders in Lisnave.
Casualisation and labour f lexibility have resulted in wages falling 
(see Figures 12.6 and 12.7). With regard to wages (euros in constant 2005 
deflated prices), we note that there was an increase until 1999. From that 
point onwards, there is a steady fall that corresponds with the interna-
tional economic crisis in 2008. Prof its, however, reach two peaks: one in 
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1999 and another in 2008. From 1999 to 2004 there is a decline in prof its, 
but then there is a recovery until 2008. The increased use of f lexibility of 
labour in the shipyards is accompanied by increased profits and decreased 
payrolls.
We can observe a similar pattern in Figure 12.7 regarding direct wages 
and salary in the form of the company’s social support. There is a peak 
between 2001 and 2002, and from there both wages and social support drop 
to 2008, but remain above the period 1997-2008.
There seems to be, in this case, a correlation but not necessarily a cause-
and-effect relationship between the reduction in the number of strikes and 
reductions in wages (see Figures 12.8 and 12.9).
There is also a clear increase in strikes in the two periods of restructuring 
of the company in late 1980 and in the f irst half of the 1990s. In 1997 – the 
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beginning of operation of the new company with precarious workers – there 
is a signif icant decrease in the number of strikes: i.e., labour f lexibility 
has not been accompanied by strike action by workers. We can also add 
that there is a relationship between the number of hours of strike and 
wage developments. We conclude that the number of strikes influences 
wages but it is not solely due to the existence, or not, of precariousness. 
Precarious workers could and did go on strike, as they did before 25 April 
1974 and during the dictatorial regime, but from 1997 onwards the number 
of man-hours lost to strikes declined dramatically.
Lisnave is, to this day, the fifth-largest ship repair yard in the world, and its 
workers perform three types of jobs: the cleaning of tank vessels that come 
from Asia and unload in the ports of Rotterdam, Antwerp, and others in North-
ern Europe), damage repairs on or periodic inspections of vessels, and major 
repairs or conversions. Its continued operation is primarily due to two factors: 
geographic location, and low wages and poor conditions of employment.
By analysing Lisnave’s number of permanent workers (Figure 12.10) we 
clearly observe two phases: a phase before the 25 April 1974 revolution, and 
another after it. As a result of the intense workers’ struggle, there is a large 
increase in permanent workers from 1969 to its peak in 1976. After that we 
see a sharp and constant decline in total numbers employed.
In 2007, the total number of workers with a permanent contract, 300 (Figure 
12.10), sharply contrasts to the figure of almost 10,000 in the mid-1970s. On the 
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other hand, f ixed-term contracts (Figure 12.11) peaked in 1998, registered a 
sharp decline in 1999, and a subsequent decline with only two slight increases 
in 2002 and 2008, coinciding with the productive periods immediately prior to 
the period of cyclical deflationary economic crises. The number of permanent 
workers with ties to Lisnave has increasingly been reduced. However, as 
already noted, there is a fairly large number of sub-contracted workers in 
undertakings outside Lisnave, or who, although a part of Lisnave, are not from 
the parent company. There were about 2,000 sub-contracted workers in 2012.
Fewer workers and fewer f ixed-term contracts does not mean that work-
ers were less productive (Figure 12.12). After stagnation in 1997 and 1998, 
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and a drastic decline in 1999, we see an increase in productivity to 2002 
and a marked increase from 2004 (when the level increases above that of 
1997-1998) to 2008. Figure 12.12 was constructed by dividing the gross value 
added in 2005 prices by the number of hours worked. This is explained not 
by greater productive eff iciency or technological development – nothing 
has changed during this time at a technological level and at the level of 
productive rationalisation – but by an increase in productivity that occurs 
simultaneously with a drastic reduction in the unit cost of labour (CUT).42
There is a direct relationship between the reduction in the absolute 
number of workers in the company and the number of unionised workers 
(Figures 12.13 and 12.14). Moreover, this process has resulted in a reduction 
in the number of unionised workers. We have argued that these facts are 
not the cause but the consequence of precariousness, because those who 
signed voluntary termination and pre-retirement agreements were the 
unions themselves when they still had some strength – in 1997 – resulting in 
almost 5,000 workers retiring at 55 and receiving full pay plus compensation.
Conclusions
This study of Lisnave workers is a contribution to further research in this 
sector of the Portuguese working class connected to heavy industry, influ-
enced over the years by different political groups, often in conflict with 
each other (Maoist, communist, socialist) and marked by distinct forms of 
labour organisation (vertically integrated unions, industry trade unions 
independent of the state, workers’ committees).
Lisnave served as a model of organisation of the workers with a knock-on 
effect for the whole of Portuguese society – either when their workers led 
struggles against the dictatorship until 1974 and then by “people power” in 
the revolutionary years of 1974-1975, or when they negotiated the social pact 
in the 1980s. It is precisely because the process of heavy industrialisation 
in Portugal took place in the early 1960s that the f irst Lisnave workers 
were young men; this remained roughly the same between 1960 and 1990, 
which adds possibilities for research, to the extent that we can study the 
evolution of a set of workers from these shipyards which remains relatively 
unchanged, in very different political, economic, and social times.
42 Relatório do Orçamento de Estado 2013, “The State Budget Report 2013”, http://www.dgo.
pt/Paginas/default.aspx.
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In this chapter we have sought to historicise this process of organisation 
and struggle of the workers of Lisnave who staged some of the most impor-
tant victories and simultaneously suffered some of the most signif icant 
defeats of the Portuguese labour movement of recent decades. Among the 
main conclusions we point out that the volume of accumulated capital from 
1974-1975 was partially allocated – from the time of the 1981-1984 crisis – 
to fund and regulate labour market flexibility, using unemployment and 
precariousness subsidised by the social security funds (social security was 
simultaneously used to finance various types of capital) against the workers.
The state has played a central role in this historical reconf iguration 
of the labour market in Portugal. Increasingly interventionist, the state 
had taken a central role in reversing the trend of decline in profit rate by 
transferring the social wage – the wage necessary for the maintenance 
and training of the workforce – to fund to profit/income or interest. The 
state is managing and executing policies of labour flexibility and welfare 
programmes that mitigate social instability resulting from labour unrest, 
with the decapitalisation of Social Security as a counterpart.
We have argued that f ive conditions had to be met in order for this 
process to happen:
1 Defeat of the most important sector of the organised labour movement 
setting an example for all other sectors of the working classes and 
middle classes – three years of wage arrears in Lisnave led to the defeat 
of the workers who signed the f irst f irm commitment ever made in 
Portugal in those terms (of “social peace”); this had a symbolic effect of 
constraining other sectors, similar to what happened with the defeat 
of the miners during the government of Margaret Thatcher in Britain, 
of air traff ic controllers in the USA, Fiat workers in Turin, and, later, 
oil workers in Brazil, as Alan Stoleroff43 and Bo Stråth,44 among others, 
have noted.
2 Close linkage between a strongly supported trade unionism in negotia-
tion and not in confrontation – although the trade union can be more 
or less compliant, depending if the major player is UGT or CGTP – and, 
with the strong links that this unionism has to the democratic regime, 
and co-operation with the state, seen not as an opponent, but as an 
umpire for which proposals were targeted, rather than for businesses, 
43 Stoleroff, “All’s Fair in Love and (Class) War”.
44 Stråth, La politica de desindustrializacion.
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as was characteristic of the period of the revolution.45 The main unions 
of that time, accepting the need to emerge from the crisis while keeping 
the same model of capitalist accumulation, also agreed that the way out 
of the crisis would be to grant massive direct aid to companies, on the 
one hand, and on the other, by indirect aid through transfer to the state 
of part of the costs of the workforce (by early retirement or exemptions 
from social security contributions).
3 Improvement of living standards and consumption levels of the middle 
and working classes. This improvement came about and was actually 
perceived, although we consider that it is not due to real wage increases 
but, among other factors, increasing low-interest credit for house pur-
chases (which today is extremely diff icult and restrains wages, which 
have fallen precipitously).
4 Changes in the international geo-political arena, following the fall of 
the Berlin Wall and the end of the USSR. We believe it is not the end of 
the USSR that determined the erosion of social rights – an argument 
often made – because this erosion has occurred via union negotia-
tions. This argument is accurate to the extent that the end of the USSR 
was met with hopelessness by those (especially in countries such as 
Portugal where there were strong communist parties) who believed 
that “somewhere in the East” there was a more egalitarian society.46
5 The use of the social security fund to manage precariousness and un-
employment, thus creating social protection, following the guidelines 
of the World Bank, preventing social disruption as a result of extreme 
poverty, inequality, or social regression. Such use was negotiated on 
a case-by-case basis and in most cases was accepted by the unions in 
the form of early retirement and compensation. In exchange, either 
the rights acquired are maintained for those who already were enti-
tled to them, or new workers are not hired, or those who do get hired 
are in a precarious situation, which implies a substantial reduction 
in social security contributions. What occurs is a close link between 
management of the workforce, social security funds, and the increasing 
establishment of welfare measures to mitigate the effects of social 
conflict arising from a situation of unemployment stated as being 
cyclical yet growing (unemployment benef its, support for layoffs, 
45 Lima, “Transformações das relações de trabalho e ação operária nas indústrias navais”, 541; 
Stoleroff, ‘Sindicalismo e relações industriais em Portugal”, 160.
46 See the interview with Valério Arcary, “Os limites da estabilidade social”.
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vocational training, welfare, social insertion income, unemployment 
social allowance, partial unemployment allowance).
From a business perspective, however, the story of Lisnave is largely one 
of missed opportunity. It was a small and relatively insignif icant shipyard 
until the late 1960s when, with the aid of the Dutch RSV Group and Swedish 
shipbuilders Kockums and Eriksberg, the f irm was transformed and a new 
yard built on the south side of the Tagus at Margueira in 1967 and another at 
Mitrena in 1973. The economic and political disarray arising from the 1974 
revolution, in tandem with the imposition of labour laws banning reduc-
tions in the workforce, had a deleterious effect on the yard’s international 
competitiveness in new construction. This position was made worse by the 
shipping recession after the OPEC price hike shocks of 1973-1974, strikes, 
and the consequent drop in demand for ship repair and conversion work. 
By the mid- to late 1980s the yard performed better in the ship repair sector, 
aided by currency devaluation and an overhaul of labour practices. Today, 
only the Mitrena yard at Setúbal remains, with six dry docks and nine 
ship repair berths dedicated to ship repair and conversion. The yard is 
evidently a going concern whose management have attempted to shift the 
industrial relations paradigm wholly in its favour by vastly reducing its 
direct workforce and in the main embracing precarious employment as 
a means to remain internationally competitive in a largely unpredictable 
market for its services. The company clearly sees a continuing transition to 
more flexible labour contracts as the basis for its future prosperity.

13 The Gdańsk Shipyard
Production regime and workers’ conflicts in the 1970s and 
1980s in the People’s Republic of Poland*
Sarah Graber Majchrzak
Introduction
This chapter analyses the development and the specif ics of the Polish 
shipbuilding industry in the second half of the twentieth century. The 
main focus is on the production regime1 and workers’ conflicts in the 
Gdańsk Shipyard2 in the 1970s and 1980s. The extant literature on the Polish 
shipbuilding industry after 1945 is quite limited, and focuses mainly on 
the structural and economic history of the sector.3 The topics of workers, 
workers’ culture, and labour relations are almost absent.4 Given this, this 
chapter attempts to complete what is up to now an unfinished jigsaw puzzle 
as well as tracing the yard’s troubles through to the present day.
* The following chapter represents my research results from 2012/2013. Actual and detailed 
results will be published in my PhD thesis: Im gleichen Boot trotz „Eisernen Vorhangs“? 
Produktionsregime in der westdeutschen und polnischen Schiffbauindustrie in den 1970er Jahren, 
forthcoming 2018.
1 I understand the term “production regime” as the assembly or interaction of labour organisa-
tion, labour relations, and the political and ideological framework of the enterprise. See Burawoy, 
The Politics of Production.
2 After the Second World War the shipyard was called Gdańsk Shipyard. From 1967 to 1989 
the name of the shipyard changed to the Lenin Shipyard (Stocznia Gdańska im. Lenina). Today, 
the shipyard is called the Gdańsk Shipyard SA (Stocznia Gdańska SA).
3 For the period 1945-70, see Wojciechowski, Gdańsk Shipyard, and Harbron, Communist Ships 
and Shipping. A short economic overview can be found in Dudziak, Rys historyczny polskiego 
przemysłu okrętowego. Jeliński, Międzynarodowa specjalizacja w przemyśle okrętowym, focuses 
on economic and technical issues in the shipbuilding industry. Jarecki, Stocznia Gdańska im. 
Lenina, deals with the political and economical history of the Lenin Shipyard from 1945 to 
1980. For the period from 1989 onwards there are some studies concerning the transformation 
of enterprises from a state socialist system to an economic market system; see, for example, 
Kon, Stocznia Gdańska a przemiany ustrojowe w Polsce, and Dragicevic, The Political Economy 
of Shipbuilding in Post Socialist Transition. There is no literature about the history of the Polish 
shipbuilding industry in general, or on the Gdańsk Shipyard specif ically for the 1980s.
4 An exception is the large body of literature on the topic of the Solidarity (Solidarność) 
union. This literature is only partly useful for this article as the main focus lies on the history 
of political opposition in Poland, and not on workers’ issues at enterprise level.
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The shipbuilding industry, in general, is strongly connected with politics 
and the state.5 This is a truism of the Polish shipbuilding industry and of 
the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk in particular. One can say that the history 
of the Lenin Shipyard in part also reflects the history of the country. It 
begins when the shipyard stood as a symbol of rapid and successful recon-
struction of the country after the Second World War. In the 1960s, Poland 
occupied sixth place in the world shipbuilding market. This continued 
until December 1970, when an outbreak of protests at the Lenin Shipyard 
triggered a general transformation of the country. With the subsequent 
change of government, the country’s fortunes changed dramatically: 
Poland turned towards the West, and an extensive investment policy 
and modernisation of the shipyard and of the country resulted in a brief 
economic boom. The workers in the shipbuilding industry were the source 
of change in August 1980, when the Solidarność labour movement was 
founded at the Lenin Shipyard. The events ushered in the demise of state 
socialism in Poland and sparked the transformation of Poland towards a 
capitalist economy in 1989.
In the 1980s, the state of the Polish shipbuilding industry reflected the 
poor situation in the country, when the Lenin Shipyard and the Polish 
economy were compromised by a large burden of accumulated debt. The 
state intended to alleviate this debt by concentrating on an export-led 
economy. When the Lenin Shipyard faced bankruptcy in 1988, it was symp-
tomatic of the end of the Polish People’s Republic. Shortly thereafter there 
began a series of unoff icial talks between the opposition and government 
that led to round-table negotiations on the future of the country.
Once it was saved from bankruptcy, the 1990s development of the Lenin 
Shipyard reflected the difficult social and economic situation in the country 
after the introduction of the capitalist economic system. The shipyard 
thereafter went through a series of changes in production and control result-
ing in privatisation and a loss of jobs for many workers. Contemporaneously, 
the historically important trade union Solidarność has become almost 
meaningless.
5 The entanglement between the shipbuilding industry and the Polish state is due among other 
things to the shipbuilding industry being seen as a part of the defence industry, the importance 
of ships for the state as a merchant power, and shipbuilding as an industry of synthesis, which 
helps to develop other industrial branches in the country.
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The history of the shipbuilding industry in Poland, 1945-1970
The shipbuilding industry in Poland is concentrated in the Gdańsk, Gdynia, 
and Szczecin coastal regions of the Baltic Sea. During the Second World 
War, a large number of the shipyards on the Baltic coast were destroyed. 
Only a few days after the liberation of Gdańsk, Szczecin, and Gdynia by 
the Soviet army, the newly founded Association of Shipbuilding Industry 
(Zjednoczenie Przemysłu Okrętowego) started rebuilding the shipyards. 
The biggest challenges it faced were the lack both of qualif ied workers 
and of construction material. During the war, more than 6 million Poles 
died, and Polish industry was almost totally destroyed. In the immediate 
post-war years, the shipyards concentrated mainly on ship repair and a little 
construction work. They repaired metal bridges and small f ishing boats, 
and performed all kinds of machine construction work, such as assembly 
of tractors and even cars.6
Up to June 1946 the question of the economic organisation of the 
shipbuilding industry was broadly discussed in Poland. Finally, the Polish 
Ministry of Sea Affairs decided to put the shipyards under state control. 
The shipyards were off icially declared state-owned on 14 June 1946 and 
were integrated in the Polish economic planning system. They were sub-
sumed under the Association of Shipyards, the ZPS (Zjednoczenie Stoczni 
Polskich).7 In 1948, ZPS comprised four large shipyards: Gdańsk Shipyard, 
Gdynia Shipyard, Northern Shipyard at Ostrów in Gdańsk, and Szczecin 
Shipyard. There were about 9,000 shipyard employees altogether in the 
four large shipyards.8 In the same year the Gdańsk Shipyard launched the 
f irst post-war ship completely built in Poland: a bulk carrier, Sołdek, with 
a length of 87 m.9 Although most ships were riveted because of the lack of 
welding material, they constructed the ship by way of a primitive block-
construction method.
After a phase of rebuilding plant and equipment, the shipbuilding sector 
quickly developed into an important export-oriented industry. Through 
licensing and expert contracts with Italian, French, and Belgian shipyards, 
Polish shipyard workers were brought up to speed in shipbuilding technol-
ogy by industry specialists. Concurrently, Poland developed a training 
system for the shipbuilding industry, which led to a high level of skills in the 
6 Wojciechowski, Gdańsk Shipyard, 16; see also Jarecki, Stocznia Gdańska im. Lenina, 16.
7 Wojciechowski, Gdańsk Shipyard, 11.
8 Dudziak, Rys historyczny polskiego przemysłu okrętowego, 18.
9 The ship was named after the “best” worker, Stanisław Sołdek.
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workforce in subsequent years. At the end of the 1950s, a phase of accelerated 
industrialisation was introduced in Poland. There was considerable invest-
ment, primarily in heavy industry, including the steel and shipbuilding 
industries. As a consequence of these investments, the shipbuilding sector 
developed into the second-largest shipbuilding industry of the Eastern bloc, 
following the Soviet Union.
COMECON
COMECON (the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) was founded 
in January 1949 by the Soviet Union and, as well as the USSR, its member-
ship consisted of f ive Soviet satellite countries: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Poland, and Romania. Like its Polish counterpart, the Soviet 
shipbuilding industry was in a poor condition after 1945. Because of the size 
of the task of rebuilding and equipping its own shipyards, the USSR ordered 
a large number of f ishing vessels and bulk carriers in Poland, to be delivered 
before 1955. This order was a huge challenge to the Polish shipbuilding 
industry. Due to the amount of orders, output had to be increased three 
times in relation to that of 1947, and the shipyard had to change form short-
series production to the construction of ships in long series.10 The prices 
paid by the Soviet Union for the ships were much less than world market 
prices. The Canadian historian John D. Harbron has termed the relationship 
between the Soviet Union and its satellite state up to 1956 “colonial”. The 
Soviet Union saw Poland primarily as a source of raw material.11 The positive 
consequences of the orders were that the Polish shipbuilding infrastructure 
and the production process improved. The target of the Six-Year Plan (1950-
1955) for the entire Polish shipbuilding industry proposed an increase in 
output to 575,00 dwt up to 1955. Both workers and management criticised 
this target, stating that it was impossible to fulf il and at the same time 
f inish the rebuilding of the shipyards. Up to the end of 1956 the output of 
the shipyards grew “only” to 300,000 dwt.12
The consequences of COMECON in Poland were criticised not only within 
the shipbuilding industry but within the Polish workforce generally, and 
by Polish intellectuals. This was one of the reasons for the protest that 
broke out in 1956 in the machine factory Cegielski Poznań in the west of 
10 Wojciechowski, Gdańsk Shipyard, 27.
11 Harbron, Communist Ships and Shipping, 12.
12 Ibid., 16.
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Poland. Not long before this, the Cegielski factory had begun to manufacture 
diesel engines under licence by Sulzer of Winterthur, Switzerland, and was 
also under pressure because of the large Soviet order for the shipbuilding 
industry. The main reasons for the protests were the rise in quotas, poor 
working conditions, and a general frustration about politics and society.13
In 1956, COMECON was reformed. In consequence, the economic and 
political relationship between Poland and the Soviet Union changed 
signif icantly. It was no longer a semi-mercantile relationship, but more 
of a co-operative system between the two states. After the reforms of 
1956, the industrial specialisation of each country in the Eastern bloc was 
redefined. The centres of the shipbuilding industry were to be in Poland 
and the German Democratic Republic. An additional contract between 
the Soviet Union and Poland did not allow Poland to build any warships. 
The contract also included new orders for the Polish shipbuilding industry 
with much improved terms. Indeed, the Soviet Union paid for the ships 
in convertible currency. This allowed the Polish shipbuilding industry to 
buy material in Western countries for f itting out ships – not just the ships 
which were exported to the USSR, but also ships for its own fleet. Ultimately, 
however, the Polish shipbuilding industry was dependent on orders from 
the Soviet Union. There were other advantages accruing from Soviet ship 
orders: investments in the shipbuilding industry grew, and the big orders 
from the Soviet Union kept a signif icant amount of workers employed; 
they also gave younger shipbuilding workers a future in their trades, and 
managers the possibility of introducing scale economies in series production 
of ships. Until the end of the 1950s riveting remained the main method of 
metal joining in the shipyards, and the construction lines were quite simple. 
In the 1960s, however, labour processes in the Polish shipbuilding industry 
improved. The qualif ications of the workforce were higher because of the 
generally good system of education that began just after the Second World 
War, and the big orders from the Soviet Union allowed construction in long 
cycles in which Polish shipbuilding specialists gained valuable experience.14
From 1955 to 1960 the proportion of the value of exports of the Polish 
shipbuilding industry to the total national export value grew from 3.5 
per cent to 6.5 per cent. After the coal industry, shipbuilding became the 
second-most important export industry in Poland.15 In 1960 the Gdańsk 
Shipyard was f ifth in the global ranking of shipbuilders with an output of 
13 Borodziej, Geschichte Polens im 20. Jahrhundert, 298.
14 Harbron, Communist Ships and Shipping, 21.
15 Dudziak, Rys historyczny polskiego przemysłu okrętowego, 22. 
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around 174,200 dwt. (or 152,640 grt).16 Although the vast majority of Polish 
shipbuilding output went to the Soviet Union, Brazil and China were also 
customers.
Originally, the Gdańsk Shipyard mainly built f ishing and cargo vessels of 
all kinds, and the size of ships launched was generally small by international 
comparisons. Although Daniel Ludwig’s National Bulk Carriers shipyard 
at Kure (Japan) had built a 103,000-dwt oil tanker, Universe Apollo, in 1959, 
ships completed by the Gdańsk Shipyard were generally less than 19,000 
dwt.17 In the mid-1960s, however, the shipyard built its f irst tankers using 
a two-block structure (stern-bow). Although the tankers were acceptable 
by international classif ication society standards, Gdańsk did not build this 
type of ship again until the 1980s.18
While heavy industry grew steadily in the People’s Republic of Poland at 
the beginning of the 1960s, agriculture, infrastructure, the energy sector, 
and the consumer industries were severely neglected. By the end of the 
1960s, in consequence, many consumer goods had become scarce, and 
standards of living had decreased dramatically. The queues in shops were 
getting longer, and the general feeling of the population of Poland had grown 
gloomier, spreading a feeling of hopelessness throughout the country.19 At 
this stage, after a quite successful period, the shipbuilding industry began 
to face up to its limiting factors: slipways and cranes were too small to build 
ships of a modern standard, and much of the plant and equipment were 
very old and no longer in good working order.
The economic system of state socialist Poland
Production regime
The specific political and ideological conditions under which the shipbuild-
ing industry in Poland developed after the Second World War is worth 
reflecting on further. How was the Polish economy organised? What was the 
relationship between shipyards and state? And what were the relationships 
between management and workers?
16 Wojciechowski, Gdańsk Shipyard, 43.
17 Todd, Industrial Dislocation,13. 
18 It is not yet clear why they did not build any more tankers in the 1960s and 1970s. The 
production capacity may have been too small to compete in the global tanker market.
19 See on this point Eisler, Grudzień 1970, 46.
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In the People’s Republic of Poland the means of production was the 
property of the state. Thus, f irms did not have to compete for prof it with 
other f irms as in a market economy, but had to bargain with the state for 
the level of inputs (resources, materials, investments, workforce, etc.) and 
output (products). The management of f irms negotiated with the state plan-
ning off ice about the process and outcome of the year plan. The aims of the 
management, unlike their capitalist counterparts, were to minimise output 
and maximise the inputs. To obtain plans that were advantageous, f irms 
tried to hide their real production capacity and demand good investment 
rates. The constant appetite for resources and a minimal level of output led 
to an economy of short supply, in which all f irms competed for materials, 
technologies, and workforce. Accordingly, f irms could never be sure about 
the level of resources they would be allocated. While management in a 
capitalist market economy cannot be sure of selling their products on the 
open market, the management in a state socialist economy cannot be sure 
if they will get the necessary means to keep production running.20 The 
permanent deficits of material, resources, and workforce were probably the 
main factors that influenced the labour process as well as labour relations 
in the Polish shipbuilding industry.
Labour relations
The Polish United Workers’ Party (PUWP, Polska Zjednoczona Partia Ro-
botnicza, PZPR) was the Communist Party, which governed the People’s 
Republic of Poland from 1948 to 1989. Because the means of production 
was the property of the state, the power over the distribution of the surplus 
was in the same hands as the power over political decisions: thus economic 
power was inextricably linked with political power.21 At the level of the 
individual f irm, there was interdependence between the management and 
a PUWP functionary, as the f irm was subordinated to the local party power. 
Indeed, in some cases, the secretary of the local party was often employed by 
the f irm.22 The position of the f irm’s director was not primarily dependent 
on economic success, but more on his integration in the party hierarchy. 
The career of white-collar workers in the f irm strongly depended on their 
20 Burawoy and Krotow, “Der Übergang vom Sozialismus zum Kapitalismus in der früheren 
Sowjetunion”, 514.
21 One of the best analyses of the Polish state socialist system remains the 1965 “Open Let-
ter to the Party” from Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzewlewski. See Kuron and Modzewlewski, 
Monopolsozialismus. Offener Brief on the Polnische Vereinigte Arbeiterpartei, 11.
22 Ibid., 15.
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aff iliation to the party. Management bargained with the political cadres 
about the strategy and output of the f irm and, as a result, about their own 
privileges. The closer the relationship the management had to the party 
functionary, the easier it was to obtain resources for the enterprise. Marc 
Weinstein formulated the position of the management in Poland from the 
1970s onwards as follows:
The ability to meet or exceed production targets, however, was not related 
to the managers’ technical expertise, but rather to the ability to secure 
scarce resources. This, in turn, was a function of political inf luence, 
lobbying efforts, and the size of their f irm. Successful bargaining for 
resources led to a spiral of growth. The larger the investment share 
managers could bargain, the more raw material they could acquire, the 
more workers they could hire, and the more resources for which they 
could bargain.23
While the denial of independent work representation was limited to 
employee interests, the logic of the production regime was the basis for 
a certain shop-f loor power of the workers. Here two factors need to be 
mentioned: a permanent workforce shortage and an irregular workflow 
due to supply shortages.
The logic of the production regime as generally practised continuously 
demanded new labour: the more people could be employed by a f irm, 
the easier it was to fulf il the planned targets. The salary of management 
depended on the number of workers in the f irm and was often tied to the 
f irm’s wage fund: as more people were employed, the f irm’s wage fund 
grew. Thus, management had increasing incentives to employ as many 
workers as possible. Due to this there was a continuous shortage of labour 
force in the Polish industry. Another reason for the shortage of labour was 
the relatively low technical standard of equipment in Polish industry.24 
The shortage of labour was also one of the most important topics in the 
relationship between shipyards and state, as I will explain.
Because of f irms’ propensity to employ as many workers as possible, 
blue-collar workers gained a certain power on the shop floor. If the workers 
were unsatisf ied with the workplace, they could easily get another job else-
where. Management, incentivised by numbers employed, had little choice 
but to enter again and again in bargaining processes with their workers. 
23 Weinstein, “The Remaking of the Polish Industrial Relations System”, 94.
24 Tatur, Arbeitersituation and Arbeiterschaft in Polen, 36.
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These bargaining processes concerned, for example, production labour 
standards, or bonus payments.25 The second point that gave the workers a 
certain power was a result of the labour supply shortage. The labour process 
was permanently unstable, and required continuous improvisation by the 
workforce as well as a willingness on their part to make adjustments to deal 
with the irregular workflow. However, the labour process was diff icult to 
control, which gave the blue-collar workers more bargaining power.
In what was a hierarchical bureaucratic system, management accu-
mulated resources to win workers’ support to fulf il planned targets, and 
demanded from the workers at least minimal co-operation to secure the 
plan’s fulf ilment, while the workers asked management to secure their 
living standards and to make workplace conditions bearable or better. The 
management largely left the production sphere to workers and compensated 
for their insufficient control over production by the bargaining process with 
the state. As a consequence, in Polish f irms, labour standards were quite 
lax. Management accepted absenteeism, or gave workers the opportunity 
to use workplace facilities for their own needs.26 Weinstein summarised 
the situation in Polish enterprises in the 1970s as follows:
On the one hand, Polish workers were denied the fundamental right to 
self-organization and independent representation in the workplace. On 
the other hand, the economic, institutional and ideological structures of 
state socialism created essential labour market and political conditions 
in which blue collar workers had some measure of implicit power. The 
authority that workers derived from these conditions was not sufficient to 
satisfy their aspirations for [an] independent voice in f irms and improved 
standard of living, but it was powerful enough to provide employees some 
bargaining power to influences wages and working conditions in many 
industrial enterprises.27
However, labour relations in the 1980s became more complex.
25 Weinstein, “The Remaking of the Polish Industrial Relations System”, 96. 
26 Ibid., 97.
27 Ibid., 129.
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The history of the Lenin Shipyard in 1970s and 1980s
The first wave of protests
In December 1970, workers at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk and at several 
other shipyards went on strike, participated in mass demonstrations, and 
organised “sit-in” strikes. The trigger for the protests was the announcement 
of general price increases, particularly for meat, from Władysław Gomułka’s 
government, announced just before Christmas. However, the reasons for the 
protests were more deeply rooted: working conditions in the shipyards had 
worsened, and due to a limitation of overtime hours in the same year the 
workforce of the shipyards suffered a drop in pay of about one-third. The 
protests began in the morning of 14 December in the Lenin Shipyard.28 At 11 
a.m. the workers decided to go to the local political headquarters to speak 
with the First Party Secretary of the region. In the afternoon there were 
also several clashes between workers and the police. The demonstrations 
spread to the whole coastal region and continued for several days. Strike 
committees of several shipyards wrote a list of twenty-one demands. Their 
numerous demands included a withdrawal of the price increases, decrease 
in the amount of work required to be done in a unit of time, increase in 
income, the introduction of a f ive-day week, extension of maternity leave, 
the resignation of the central union committee (Centralna Rada Związków 
Zawodowych), the right to strike, a reduction in the influence of the bureau-
crats (nomenklatura) at the shipyards, and much more.29 The state reacted 
immediately with strong show of repression, and police and army f ired on 
the workers. More than 40 people died and over 1,000 were injured.30
The protests of December 1970 ushered in a change in the leadership of 
the Polish government, as Edward Gierek took over from Gomułka. The 
strikes went on until the end of January. Gierek visited the strikers in the 
shipyard and talked with them for several hours. He strongly criticised the 
way Gomułka had repressed their protest, promised better pay and living 
conditions for the workers at the shipyard, and initiated economic reforms. 
His strategy was to get support from the workers for his political stance. 
At the end of the discussion in which the workers expressed their claims, 
he asked them if they would help him to bring the country forward and 
28 Hübner, “Die polnische Krise 1970/71”, 29.
29 Ibid., 37.
30 Ibid., 36.
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the workers answered: “Yes, we will help you.”31 Under the slogan “We are 
building a second Poland”, the new government banked on modernising 
the country and increasing individual consumption. At the same time, 
some of the workers who were responsible for the strike were dismissed.32
Interrupted modernisation
The process of modernising the Polish economy was to be pursued by 
importing capital and technology from capitalist countries. The conscious 
act of turning away from a single-minded economic orientation towards 
the Eastern bloc, towards further integration of Poland into the global 
market, had the intention of modernising the Polish economy by importing 
technical know-how, enabling qualitative economic growth, and making 
businesses more eff icient. At the same time it brought moderate liberali-
sation at every social level. The level of consumption grew, and working 
conditions improved. Inter alia, the average income increased, workers 
got twelve free Saturdays per annum, and maternity leave was extended 
three-fold.33 For a short time, the country experienced a period of boom.
During this period, state investment in the Polish shipbuilding industry 
was of the highest priority. This was firstly due to the fact that Gierek wanted 
to restore social harmony in the shipyards and win back the confidence 
of the workers; on the other hand, shipbuilding was an important indus-
try which, if exports were prioritised, could bring much-needed foreign 
exchange into the country.34 With foreign exchange, Poland would be 
able to buy in Western technology, plant, and equipment. From 1971, the 
export structure of the Lenin Shipyard changed signif icantly. Ships were 
no longer built solely for the Soviet Union, but also for Norway, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Britain, Colombia, Canada, and Iran, among other coun-
tries.35 After 1974 a major modernisation programme aimed to introduce 
the latest technologies at the Lenin Shipyard. This programme focused 
31 Gierek’s question and the answer from the workers is very famous in Poland because for the 
f irst time in Polish history a political event was staged in the new mass medium of television; 
see Borodziej, Geschichte Polens im 20. Jahrhundert, 341f.
32 In the summer of 1971, see Singer, The Road to Gdańsk, 181.
33 Borodziej, Geschichte Polens im 20. Jahrhundert, 345.
34 Archivum Panstwowe Gdańsk (hereafter APG), 1291/9768: 74, Konferencja Samorządu 
Robotniczego, Stoczni Gdańskiej im. Lenina, 29 maja 1974, speech by technical director of the 
Lenin Shipyard, Klemens Gniech, 4.
35 See the ship reference list of Stocznia Gdańsk SA 1945-2013: http//www.Gdańskshipyard.
pl/reference-list.html (accessed 31 March 2014).
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on the construction of new types of ships, a signif icant increase in labour 
productivity, greater exports to Western countries, and an improvement 
in the living and working conditions of the shipyard’s workers. The most 
important improvements were the introduction of machines such automatic 
plate-cutting machines and modern welding equipment and machines, and 
the construction of bigger slipways and cranes, allowing construction of 
larger blocks for hull construction. However, as a result of the persistence of 
the historically unstable labour process, rationalisation remained diff icult. 
These diff iculties were displayed in the Lenin Shipyard, especially the at-
tempt to introduce modern production techniques such as CAM (computer 
aided manufacturing) and CNC (computerised numerically controlled) 
machines. By the end of the 1980s only some parts of engineering and general 
production were automated. As regards the design and technology of hull 
construction, the Gdańsk Shipyard reached a certain level in computerisa-
tion. The biggest deficits in technology were seen in the internal ship system 
and the management system. An engineer at Gdynia Shipyard commented 
on the technological state of Polish shipyards at the end of the 1980s:
The work invested in computerization during the first half of the 1970s has 
not been updated to this day. As a result, in many instances, computers 
prolong instead of shorten our preliminary production cycles. The goal 
was a comprehensive computerization of engineering work, but this 
has not been accomplished since the mid-1970s! […] We still exist in the 
stage of conceptualization and experiments with certain specif ic pilot 
solutions. As for the integral concept, it is still absent.36
He concluded that the level of technology used in the Polish shipbuilding 
industry fell some fifteen years behind world level.37 Another fact that made 
the rationalisation of ship production in the Lenin Shipyard diff icult was 
its product range: from the 1970s onwards the shipyard built many different 
types of ships (among them a lot of prototypes) in short production circles. 
This made it nearly impossible to introduce a rational labour process.
Two years after the beginning of the modernisation of the Lenin Ship-
yard, and before the plan of modernisation could reach its stated goals, 
investment was drastically reduced and dried up altogether in 1978. The by 
then drastic economic situation in Poland was probably the main reason 
why the modernisation measures were not fully carried out at the Lenin 
36 “Developments in Polish Marine Technology”, 98.
37 Ibid., 100.
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Shipyard. In 1979 external debts consumed 75 per cent of the exchange 
value income of the country. Only one year later it was already 80 per cent.38
While there was a noticeable boom during the first half of the 1970s, during 
which standards of living increased, from the mid-1970s onwards the economy 
contracted. One reason for the breakdown was the global economic crisis 
sparked by the oil price rises of 1973-1974. Therefore, the goods that were 
produced could not be disposed of abroad as planned: a problem exacerbated 
by the protectionist measures of the European Economic Community, such as 
tariffs and restrictions on imports.39 In addition, due to the unequal investment 
politics in the decades before, fewer and fewer products could be produced 
in Poland, and more and more goods had to be imported at prices that had 
skyrocketed because of the oil crisis and the recession.40 These factors were 
particularly difficult for the Polish shipbuilding industry: the shipbuilding 
production plan consisted of building mainly high-quality ships, with special-
ised equipment that had to be imported at high prices. The economic disaster 
was due not only to external factors but also to the internal problems of the 
Polish planned economy such as barriers to innovation, a corrupt bureaucratic 
elite, inflexible management, and a general disorganisation prevalent in the 
economy, all of which contributed to the socio-economic problems of the late 
1970s.41 The modernisation programme stalled and remained unfinished, 
and productivity in the Lenin Shipyard decreased dramatically (Table 13.1).
Second wave of protests
There are interesting parallel developments between diminishing invest-
ment and increasing worker unrest. Local activists established an illegal 
“Founding Committee of Free Trade Unions” in the shipbuilding industry 
38 Borodziej, Geschichte Polens im 20. Jahrhundert, 359. The debts grew from USD $1.2 bn in 
1971 to USD $24.7 bn in 1980; see Altvater, Hübner et al., Die Armut der Nationen, 244. 
39 Ziemer, Polens Weg in die Krise, 250. See also APG 2384/15283: Informacje i oceny dot. […] 
przemysł okrętowego i inny sprawy 1977, 24.
40 The growth rate of imports from Western countries increased from 7.7 per cent (1960-1970) 
to 40.7 per cent (1970-1975), and then decreased to 0.1 per cent (1976-1980); see for example Rode 
and Jacobson, Wirtschaftskrieg oder Entspannung, 291.
41 The internal problems of the Polish planned economy are described in many publication; see, 
for example, Landau and Tomaszewski, The Polish Economy in the Twentieth Century; Poznanski, 
Poland’s Protracted Transition; Kozminski, “Market and State in Centrally Planned Economies”; 
Zielinski, Economic Reforms in Polish Industry.
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in February 1978,42 while investments dropped by almost 70 per cent in the 
Gdańsk Shipyard.43
In the summer of 1980, strikes across Poland, which were sparked by wage 
demands and issues of improving working conditions, aimed to reach new 
collective agreements. In most cases the management agreed to workers’ 
demands. In August a strike began in the Lenin Shipyard. The willingness 
to act was high on account of several issues: material shortages, production 
stoppages, wage losses, and politically motivated dismissals of respected 
workers including Lech Wałęsa. The flashpoint of the f irst strike was the 
political dismissal of Anna Walentynowicz, a very politically active crane 
operator at the shipyard. Primarily the workers demanded:
1 The rehiring of Anna Walentynowicz and Lech Wałęsa,
2 The establishment of a memorial for the dead of December 1970, and
3 A pay increase.
First, the workers bargained over their demands with the director of the 
shipyard, Klemens Gniech. As in other plants, the director was willing to 
fulf il these demands quite quickly after some hours of discussion. The 
strike was already announced as f inished when three women stopped 
the workers from leaving the shipyard, by shouting that they had to go 
on with the strike to show solidarity with other plants in Gdańsk, which 
were still on strike.44 It was Saturday evening and the workers wanted to go 
home to their families after three days of occupying the shipyard, but they 
were persuaded to continue; thus, the strikes in the shipyard went on and 
spread across the whole country. The protestors set up an inter-plant strike 
committee. Central to the protest was the Lenin Shipyard.45
Because of the collective memory of the events of December 1970, the 
shipbuilding strikers did not leave the shipyard; thus the political agent had 
42 The shipyard requested investments of 761 mn złoty for the year 1978 and received 265 mn 
złoty (APG 1291/9786: 93, Konferencja samorząd robotniczego Stoczni Gdańskiej im. Lenina 
30 stycznia 1979) – f ive times less than in 1975, when the investments came to 1,059 mn złoty. 
For the investments rate in 1971-1975, see Jarecki, Stocznia Gdańska im. Lenina, 119. In 1980 
the investment rate was 178 mn złoty (ibid., 99). See APG 1291/9792: Konferencja samorząd 
robotniczego Stoczni Gdańskiej im. Lenina 30 stycznia 1980.
43 See statistics in Jarecki, Stocznia Gdańska im. Lenina, 132.
44 The three women were Alina Pienkowska, Henryka Krzywonos, and Anna Walentynowicz; 
see Kühn, Das Jahrzehnt der Solidarność, 29.
45 There is a large body of literature about the history of the Solidarność movement; see, for 
example, Penn, Solidarity’s Secret; Laba, The Roots of Solidarity; Kennedy, Professionals, Power 
and Solidarity in Poland; Ost, Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-Politics; Garton Ash, The Polish 
Revolution.
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to go to the shipyard to speak with the workers. A committee composed of 
workers and intellectuals bargained with the government, and its demands 
became more political and social. The most important demand was to 
legalise a free, independent trade union. Ultimately, there was a list similar 
to that of 1970, with twenty-one economic, political, and social demands. 
The politicians met with the protestors and fulf illed many of the demands. 
In August 1980, the f irst independent union, Solidarność (Solidarity), was 
founded. The union was allowed to operate until 13 December 1981, when 
General Wojciech Jaruzelski proclaimed martial law; most of the union 
activists were arrested and the union was again banned.46
Not only were nearly all Polish workers organised under the auspices of 
Solidarność, but so too were engineers, and all kinds of employees, as well 
as managers and supervisors. How was this possible in a so-called workers’ 
state such as Poland? Workers appeared in politics not as workers but as 
citizens, and the “working class” included everyone who was employed in the 
“workers’ state”, that is, all people employed in any position. This composition 
of the “working class” in Poland made the workers paradoxically weak and 
strong at the same time. The historian David Ost summarised this paradox:
On the one hand, industrial workers felt they had a privileged claim 
on state policy, and the state felt this way too. When workers went on 
strike, the state had to listen. Strikes thus could not help but be powerful 
challenges to the political authorities. They could not help, but be political 
[…] On the other hand, the political context of proletarian protest robbed 
it of its working-class character. Workers were unable to f ight for their 
own interests; they always had to f ight for “everyone’s” interests.47
The Solidarność union was the f irst independent union in the Eastern bloc 
and also the largest mass civil movement. After martial law was introduced 
in December 1981, the workforce in the Lenin Shipyard announced a strike. 
Consequently, the Polish army broke up the protest with tanks; several 
people were injured and one man died. Some of the leaders of the strike were 
sent to prison, and about 1,500 workers were dismissed. Director Gniech, 
who was also a member of Solidarność, left his job because he did not agree 
46  See, for example, Skórzyński and Pernal, Kalendarium Solidarnośći 1980-1989, 86ff; Chmiel 
and Kaczyńska, Postulaty 1970-71 i 1980.
47 Ost, “Polish Labour Before and After Solidarity”, 31f.
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with the dismissals.48 In the following two years there were some smaller 
protest actions and symbolic strikes in the shipyard. Workers demanded the 
release of the imprisoned workers and the legalisation of Solidarność. The 
workers also refused to do overtime work and undertook some small acts of 
sabotage.49 Keeping up clandestine activity, the underground committee of 
Solidarność, called “S”, edited an underground newspaper for the shipyard.50
The 1980s
In 1980, Poland had around USD $25.5 bn of debt in the West.51 The entire 
economy was constrained by the primacy of debt repayment, and bank ac-
counts of enterprises were partly frozen.52 By 1982, the almost total collapse 
of the Polish economy, labour disputes, and the associated dip in production 
brought the shipbuilding industry to a near standstill. The crisis led to 
order cancellations, delivery delays, and penalty clauses on contracts at the 
shipyards. The biggest problems of the shipyards in the 1980s were material 
and labour shortages. The problem of a lack of material had two main causes: 
a general scarcity of imported goods, materials, plant, and equipment due to 
a lack of foreign-exchange earnings, and that 94 per cent of export earnings 
went towards debt repayments.53 In addition, due to inflationary pressures, 
the prices for products that were used in shipbuilding increased by more 
than 300 per cent between 1980 and 1986, while, on the other hand, ship 
prices on the world ship market dropped dramatically in the 1980s.54 This 
was a very big problem for the Polish shipbuilding industry as a special 
feature of the industry was that there was strong co-operation with foreign 
shipyards based on a division of labour. Thus, for example, shipbuilding 
companies in Spain, Portugal, and Yugoslavia produced hulls that were 
then f itted out in Polish shipyards.55
Another reason for the lack of materials was poor domestic co-operation. 
Many suppliers preferred to export their products rather than sell them 
48 See: http://www.encyklopediasolidarnosci.pl/wiki/index.php?title=T02101_Stocznia_
Gda%C5%84ska_im._Lenina (accessed 10 October 2013).
49 See APG 2384/15097: Program modernizacji i rozwój przemyłsu okrętowego na lata 1983-1985 
i do roku 1990, 10. 
50 Rozwaga i Solidarność. Biuletyn TKZ Stoczni Gdańskiej.
51 “Baltexpo ’88”, 42.
52 Gołębiowski, “Polish Shipyards Emerging from Troubles”, 27.
53 “Neue Vereinbarung über den Weiterbau der Stena-Fähren in Polen”, 50.
54 “Baltexpo ’88”, 42.
55 “Schiffbau und Maschinenbau in den sozialistischen Ländern”, 20.
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on the domestic market, as exports to the West were rewarded with tax 
relief and a foreign-exchange account.56 However, supplier and co-operation 
diff iculties also arose as a result of the uncoordinated investment activities 
of the 1970s, which led to an imbalance in the economy.
The labour shortages in the shipyards, already evident in the 1970s, 
heightened in the 1980s. The number of employees in the Lenin Shipyard de-
creased until in 1988 the f igure was 9,700, as a consequence of high turnover 
in the workforce from the end of the 1970s.57 While in the West thousands of 
shipyard workers were laid off, in Poland skilled workers were desperately 
sought after. By the beginning of 1983, there was a shortage of about 2,500 
production workers in the Lenin Shipyard. Thus the shipbuilding industry 
in Poland in the f irst half of the 1980s was not short of orders, but of the 
capacity to fulf il these orders. Late deliveries, huge penalty clauses, and the 
poor quality of the ships delivered increasingly impugned the reputation 
of the Polish shipbuilding industry.58 Together with the global shipbuilding 
crisis, this led to a continual decline in orders from the mid-1980s onwards.
In 1983, the minster of the metallurgical industry and machine indus-
try established a research group to examine the political and economic 
circumstances of the Lenin Shipyard. They came to the conclusion that 
the economic and political situation of the shipyard was very diff icult. In 
opinion of the experts, the economic reforms that had been introduced since 
the beginning of the 1980s to decentralise the economy and give the f irms 
more autonomy had further worsened the situation of the shipyards. The 
economic reforms were based on three factors: autonomy, self-government, 
and self-f inancing, which meant that more and more market elements were 
introduced into the Polish economic system. Because ships are built on 
medium-term production cycles, shipyards needed advanced stage pay-
ments from shipowners to produce at all. A lack of liquidity was apparent 
at the Lenin Shipyard, and the government announced an aid programme 
for it in 1984.59
This programme put the shipyard in a better position than hitherto but 
its fundamental problems persisted, and in May 1988 the Department of 
Industry announced its intention to close the Lenin Shipyard, although 
the orderbook situation was better than it had been in the mid-1980s and 
56 Gołębiowski, “Polish Shipyards Emerging from Troubles”, 27.
57 APG 1291/9849: Informacja statystyczna za rok 1989. 
58 See “Baltexpo ’88”, 42.
59 Ustawa 42/84 Rady Ministrów z dnia 19 marca 1984.
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better than in other Polish shipyards.60 In newspaper articles, the main 
reason given for this decision was the relatively strong political opposition 
in the shipyard. Also in 1988, there were smaller strikes in May and again 
in August, especially from young shipbuilding workers, who demanded 
better working conditions and better remuneration.61
In September 1988 the government decided to close the shipyard. The 
shipyard workers’ council took legal action against the decision, f irst at 
the district court, which refused the pledge, and then at the voivodship 
court.62 Before the voivodship court took a decision, the American company 
Johnson & Johnson expressed an interest, and the Bremer Vulkan shipyard 
in Germany made an offer to buy the Lenin Shipyard.63 At the same time 
(February-April 1989) the talks between the opposition and the communist 
government began (round-table negotiations). Thereafter, Poland began the 
f irst transition in the Eastern bloc, and the planned economy system was 
transformed into a capitalist market system. The new government stopped 
the liquidation process of the Lenin Shipyard and transformed it into a stock 
corporation.64 In 1990 the former Lenin Shipyard continued operations as 
a corporation under the name Gdańsk Shipyard, with the state holding 60 
per cent of the shares in the business, and the workers 40 per cent.
The workers
Composition of the workforce
A large proportion of industrial workers in Poland during the 1950s and 
1960s had a peasant background. After the Second World War, many Polish 
farmers and their families moved into urban centres because they could 
not make a suff icient living from agriculture. In the 1970s, the Polish 
workforce began to change in its composition and qualif ication structure. 
60 Informacja o wynikach kontroli działalności organów państwowych oraz władz Stoczni 
Gdańskiej w okresie od 1988 do upadłości Spółki. For information about the decision of the State 
Control Commission about the authorities of the Gdańsk Shipyard from 1988 to the company’s 
bankruptcy, see http://www.nik.gov.pl/kontrole/wyniki-kontroli-nik/kontrole,1354.html (ac-
cessed 10 October 2013), 28.
61 Giełżyński, Robotnicy ’88.
62 See for example Tagliabue, “Poland Announces December Closing of Lenin Shipyard”.
63 Staatsarchiv Bremen (SAB) 7,2121/1 – 3442: Bildung eines Konsortiums mit dem Ziel der 
Übernahme der Leninwerft (1989-1991).
64 Informacja o wynikach kontroli działalności organów państwowych oraz władz Stoczni 
Gdańskiej w okresie od 1988 do upadłości Spółki.
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The workforce of the 1970s was young and well-educated and came mostly 
from the proletarian or salaried strata of Polish society. The qualif ication 
level of the workforce increased steadily due to the education system, which 
was inaugurated just after the Second World War. Although on one hand 
the increasing qualif ication level in industry led initially to success for 
Poland, on the other hand it became more and more of a political problem. 
A substantial amount of the well-educated – particularly young – workers 
were employed in jobs for which they were underqualified, at the production 
level. The sociologist Melanie Tatur termed the young qualif ied workers in 
the production sphere “worker-technicians’” (Arbeiter-Techniker).65 They 
did not have suff icient opportunities to rise through the ranks, and this 
generated a huge sense of frustration among this cohort. The rise in the 
qualif ications of blue-collar workers also raised their consciousness of what 
had gone wrong in the labour processes. Edward Jarecki, writing about the 
workforce in the Lenin Shipyard, believed that they increasingly saw the 
disadvantages of the labour organisation of the company, and at the same 
time the possibility of improving economic and social mechanisms. The 
shipyard workers did not want to be passive any longer, and they understood 
their political power.66 This consciousness, among other factors, led to the 
protest in the Lenin Shipyard in August 1980.
The number of employees in the Lenin Shipyard rose steadily until 
the mid-1970s. In 1974, 16,295 people worked at the shipyard – the highest 
employment level in its history. After 1974, employment steadily decreased, 
with signif icant reductions in the workforce between 1980 and 1982 due to 
dismissals after the protest, and again between 1988 and 1990, when the 
shipyard faced bankruptcy. After the collapse of the state socialist system 
in 1989 and the economic “shock therapy”, employment in the shipbuilding 
industry decreased further. The development of employment in the Lenin 
Shipyard is shown in Table 13.2.
In 2004, Poland had the highest employment of all shipbuilding indus-
tries in Europe, with 23,106 employees, however; the average gross wage of 
Polish shipbuilding workers, at €7,449 per annum, was one of the lowest in 
Europe.67 Precipitated by the privatisation policy of the shipyard of 2006 and 
the international economic crisis of 2008, between 2007 and 2010 nine out 
65 APG 1291: Informacja Statystyczna.
66 Jarecki, Stocznia Gdańska im. Lenina, 195.
67 See Ludwig and Tholen, Schiffbau in Europa, 97f.
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of ten shipbuilding workers lost their jobs.68 Many left to f ind employment 
in Norwegian shipyards, while others are now employed by sub-contracting 
f irms.69
It is diff icult to be precise about the gender dimension in the Polish 
shipbuilding workforce in delineating what types of work women and men 
did, their relationship with colleagues, and wage differentials. In 1970, 11.3 
per cent of the workforce of the Lenin Shipyard was female.70 Several women 
worked in the production sphere and some of them did very strenuous 
jobs, for example, cleaning the hull after welding. For this, the women 
had to crawl into the small spaces between the plates.71 Others worked in 
the isolating hall, where they isolated the tubes and were in contact with 
asbestos.72 The most famous female shipbuilding worker in Poland is Anna 
Walentynowicz (mentioned earlier), who worked as a welder and crane 
operator in the Lenin Shipyard. Her dismissal became the focus of the strike 
in 1980.73 In the shipbuilding industry in general, before 1989 about 15 to 17 
per cent of the workforce was female. After the collapse of the state socialist 
system, the share of female workers slowly decreased, but increased again 
after the economic crisis of 2008. An interesting point is that most of the 
women have full-time jobs (Table 13.3).
Working and living conditions
In state socialism, enterprises were more than just a workplace. All social 
aspects of life functioned through the enterprise. The shipyard management 
was responsible for health care, housing, leisure and recreational facilities, 
68 In 2007, 12,800 people worked in the shipbuilding industry (building new ships); by 2010 
the number had decreased to 1,800 (http://www.forumokretowe.org.pl/eng/pdf/Annual%20
Report%202010-2011%20f inal.pdf, 74). 
69 See http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/documentation/studies/documents/poland_em-
ployment_trends_en.pdf, 7.
70 APG 1291/9757: 62. Konferencja Samocządu Robotniczego Stoczni Gdańskiej 1970 
(Materiały), 91.
71 See the interviews of the historical audio guide project: “Stocznia jest kobietą” (The Shipyard 




73 She is the hero of the movie Strajk (2005) directed by Volker Schlönhoff. The movie shows 
an unskilled woman who began work in the shipyard, and who went on to become an important 
political f igure.
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holiday centres, and much more. The “shipyard was like a village”, said a 
woman who worked in the Lenin Shipyard in the 1970s and 1980s; it even had 
its own cinema and hospital.74 The enterprise’s overarching responsibility 
for the entire communal and social life of its workers had consequences for 
working conditions, and also in terms of labour disputes. For example, the 
housing shortage of the 1970s had a direct impact on the labour situation in 
the shipyard. In 1976, every fourth worker in the shipyard was waiting for an 
apartment, although there had been considerable investment in building new 
houses at the beginning of the decade. This situation had a direct effect on 
worker morale, and was one of the reasons for the high labour turnover at the 
shipyard.75 The reasons for the labour shortage lay also in the Polish produc-
tion regime as mentioned above, in the relatively old state of equipment, poor 
work organisation, bad working conditions, and significant absenteeism.76
The poor work organisation, material shortages, and delays in delivery 
also had an impact on innovation opportunities. According to a 1970 survey 
among the engineers and technicians of the shipyard, 75 per cent of working 
time was needed to ensure the supply of materials, 15 per cent to support 
ongoing operations, and 10 per cent for the control of formal procedures. 
There was therefore no time for introducing innovations and improvements 
into technical processes and work structures.77
Concerning the question of overall workers’ incomes in the Polish ship-
building industry, one has to keep in mind that wages were only a small 
proportion of the benef its the enterprise offered. If the labour costs are 
composed only of the income of the workers, the share of labour costs to 
production costs was about 15 per cent.78 At a rough estimate from 1988, the 
total labour costs with social benefits included in the Lenin Shipyard were 
f ixed to 34 per cent. In comparison with the West German Bremer Vulkan 
Shipyard’s 22 per cent, this was quite high.79
74 “Stocznia jest kobietą” (http://metropolitanka.ikm.gda.pl/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/
Stocznia_jest_kobieta_audioprzewodnik.mp3); see also SAB 7,2121/1 – 3442: Bildung eines 
Konsortiums mit dem Ziel der Übernahme der Leninwerft (1989-1991); Zwischenbericht JVC-
Projekt Gdańsk-Shipyard September 1989.
75 Jarecki, Stocznia Gdańska im. Lenina, 185f.
76 The general reason lies in the specif ic of the Polish production regime: on this see the section 
“The economic system of state socialist Poland”.
77 APG 1291/9757: Konferencja Samorządu Robotniczego Stoczni Gdańskiej im. Lenina 29. 
września 1970, 21.
78 Tatur, Arbeitersituation und Arbeiterschaft in Polen, 36.
79 SAB 7,2121/1 – 3442: Bildung eines Konsortiums mit dem Ziel der Übernahme der Leninwerft 
(1989-1991).
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At the end of the 1960s the income of shipbuilding workers was very low and 
the workload correspondingly high. This was one of the reasons for the protest 
that broke out in 1970-1971. After the protests in December 1970, there was 
a real wage increase, and wages in shipbuilding became among the highest 
in Polish industry. However, in 1974 the government announced an income 
reform for all companies. The result of this was an average increase in wages of 
75 per cent for blue-collar workers, and 46 per cent for white-collar workers.80
The dissimilarities between the different work groups were small in 
comparison to Western countries. The average monthly income of a blue-
collar worker in the shipbuilding industry in 1975 was about 5,541 złoty. With 
overtime, he/she earned about 6,081 zł. Engineers and technicians earned 
about 5,879 zł. without overtime. Clerks had the lowest income, at 3,704 
zł.81 The average income in Poland at the same time was about 2,000-3,000 
zł. The numbers show that the workers in the shipyard industry were well 
paid, but this changed at the end of the 1970s.82
With the economic crisis since the end of the 1970s, as well as hidden 
inflation and a de facto rise in the cost of living, salaries did not keep pace. 
At the same time the inequality between different working groups rose. In 
an economy of short supply, as Poland had experienced since 1979, it was 
not the amount of income that was important, but access to goods and 
privileges. Here the economic and political cadres were at an advantage. 
Connections and foreign currency were the main ways to get what was 
needed, and the political cadres had the best access.83 The black market, 
where one could buy only with hard currency such as US dollars, was an 
unoff icial but integral part of the Polish economy.84
In regard to the working hours in Polish shipyards, one can say that 
generally they were flexibly organised. In the 1970s in the production sphere 
of the shipyard there were three shifts: off icially the f irst shift ran from 
6.00 a.m. to 2.00 p.m., the second shift from 2.00 p.m. to 10.00 p.m., and the 
80 Jarecki, Stocznia Gdańska im. Lenina, 184.
81 Ibid., 186.
82 In 1979 the Lenin Shipyard introduced the group wage. The question of whether changing 
of the income system had a serious influence on the 1980 protest has not yet been analysed. 
83 “The manager did not gain access to the semi-legal and illegal markets within the command 
economy through money, but almost exclusively through their own concrete compensation 
goods or the promise of granting undue advantages to their exchange partners”: Sattler and 
Boyer: “European Economic Elites Between a New Spirit of Capitalism and the Erosion of State 
Socialism”, 57.
84 See Kochanowski, “Geographie des Schwarzmarktes in der Volksrepublik Polen”.
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night shift from 10.00 p.m. to 6.00 a.m. The workers had a half-hour break.85 
The normal working time was 7.5 hours per day. However, the statistics of 
the shipyard show that overtime hours were quite high (Table 13.4). On 
average, the workers worked 1.5 hours overtime per day, so daytime work 
hours were, in reality, about 9 hours, but the working time was not regular. 
It could be that the workers had to work through two nights or over the 
whole weekend at the end of the month to f inish a ship, or to reach the 
plan target.86 Especially in the 1960s and 1970s the real working time of the 
shipyard worker was high. In 1980 one of the demands of Solidarity was free 
Saturdays. This demand was fulfilled. The free Saturdays and other free days 
were one of the reasons why the explicit working hours in the 1980s declined.
From 1970 to 1989 the average working time decreased from 1,913 hours 
per worker per year to 1,589 hours (Table 13.4).87
From 1984 to 1989 there was only one dayshift, from 7.00 a.m. to 3.00 
p.m.88 An anonymous survey of the working hours in the shipyard from 
1986 shows that working hours were not taken so strictly by the workers. 
Often the working time were used to “organise” something personal, like 
standing in queues to buy food, or having a private talk with somebody, 
which gives rise to the expression “coś załatwić” (to carry out something) 
85 “Stocznia jest kobietą” (http://metropolitanka.ikm.gda.pl/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/
Stocznia_jest_kobieta_audioprzewodnik.mp3).
86 Burawoy came to a similar result in the case study of an enterprise in the Soviet Union; 
see Burawoy and Krotow, “Der Übergang vom Sozialismus zum Kapitalismus in der früheren 
Sowjetunion”, 527.
87 APG 1291: Informacja Statystyczna.
88 “Stocznia jest kobietą” (http://metropolitanka.ikm.gda.pl/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/
Stocznia_jest_kobieta_audioprzewodnik.mp3, last accessed 7 September 2016). 
Table 13.4  Working time balance sheet for Lenin Shipyard in hours per 1 blue 
collar worker per year
1970 1974 1978 1980 1984 1988 1989
absolute 
working hours 
1,913 1,896 1,822 1,729 1,685 1,582 1,589
overtime hours 322 369 401 334 287 402 411
illness 135 166 197 202 230 231 277
Holiday 167 181 179 176 185 196 218
Source: apg 1291: informacja Statystyczna
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that is often found in survey responses. The survey also shows that a lot of 
the time was wasted by waiting for machines, materials, or tools.89
Union, workers’ self-organisation, and self-management
In the People’s Republic of Poland there were two institutionalised organisa-
tions which were designed to represent the interests of the workers: the 
main Polish union (Centralna Rada Związków Zawodowych) and, from 1984 
onwards, Ogólne Polski Związki Zawoda (OPZZ) which was subordinated to 
the PZPR (the ruling Communist Party); and the Conference of the Workers’ 
Self-Management (Konferencja Samorząd Robotnicza, KSR) which was 
replaced in the 1981 by the Workers’ Council (Rada Pracownicza).90 The 
union was responsible for the physical and social welfare of all workers. 
They were concerned with housing, the social life of the workplace, health 
care, income, holiday establishments, cultural life, etc. At the beginning 
of the 1970s the union at the Lenin Shipyard was relatively active and 
achieved some improvements for the workers. However, the union became 
increasingly dominated by party members and white-collar workers. By 
the mid-1970s, the union became much less important and acted more as 
a regulatory body against, instead of for, the workers, and consequently 
completely lost the confidence of the workers.91
Between 1971 and 1973, the KSR also had some influence in the man-
agement of the shipyard. The conference took place three to four times a 
year. It was responsible for the improvement of the labour process and the 
organisation of the enterprise and of labour conditions, and the allocation 
of bonuses. After 1973, similarly to the union, the KSR increasingly became 
a formal institution without any influence rather than a real representation 
of the workforce. The quasi-absence of a body representing the workers 
was one of the main causes for the demand of founding an independent 
union, after the strikes in the Lenin Shipyard and elsewhere in 1980. After 
the prohibition of Solidarność in 1981, the government tried to intensify 
the work of the so-called off icial workers’ self-organisation bodies, the 
workers’ council, and the off icial state union in the enterprises. After the 
passage of the law on workers’ self-management in state enterprises in 
September 1981, they gained more decision-making power in at least some 
89 APG 2384/11250: Mój dzień pracy. Ankieta anonimowa w stoczni: Czas zmarnowany.
90 See the 1981 law “O samorządzie załogi przedsiębiorstwa państwowego w PRLu”.
91 Jarecki, Stocznia Gdańska im. Lenina, 199.
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enterprises.92 The political leaders attempted many times to make these 
bodies more attractive and to have them accepted by the workforce. The 
hope of the government was, if the self-organisation bodies participated in 
the management of the enterprises in actuality – and not just formally – it 
would be easier to get support from the workers for “diff icult decisions”.93 
At the same time the government increased attempts to acquire more influ-
ence in these bodies. The calculations of the political leadership did not 
always work, however. While the activity of most workers’ self-organisation 
bodies in the enterprises increased, the influence of the Communist Party 
on them was limited. The workers’ council went its own way and was heavily 
influenced by critical intellectuals or workers; for example, they took part 
in an unoff icial nationwide meeting of workers’ self-organisation bodies in 
1986, which was at f irst banned by the government, and then allowed after 
the initiators took legal action against this prohibition.94
The Gdańsk Shipyard and Polish shipbuilding industry to the 
present
The “shock therapy” of 1989 destroyed many of the social gains that workers 
had achieved during state socialism in Poland. Recreational facilities and 
vacation centres were sold and the health system was privatised, while 
hyperinflation massively depressed wages. The Solidarność union sup-
ported market reform, privatisation, and the interest of the companies, 
and saw this as the basis of its workplace activity.95 In comparison to the 
analyses of Simon Johnson and Gary Loveman, the situation in the Gdańsk 
was somehow different.96 The shipyard tried, with the director Hans Szyc 
92 Mużiel, “Wirtschaftsreformen in Polen”, 134.
93 See APG 2384/11292: Narady aktywnu samorząd robotniczego, Spis przesiebiorstw w których 
działa samorząd robotniczy, 242.
94 APG 2384/11292: Narady aktywnu samorząd robotniczego, Spis przesiebiorstw w których 
działa samorząd robotniczy, 253.
95 “The union’s previous role as provider of diverse goods and services, including housing, 
vacations, and summer camps, decreased rapidly as such activities were spun off from the f irm 
and commodified”: Ost, The Defeat of Solidarity, 149. Ost gives many examples of how Solidarność 
representatives defended the interests of capital (ibid., 155).
96 The economic analysis of the history of the Gdańsk Shipyard from 1990 to 1993 of Johnson 
and Loveman differs completely from other literature about the transition process of Polish 
companies in this time. It has to be researched further whether the Gdańsk Shipyard was an 
exception and, if so, why. It probably has to do with the political role of the shipyard; see Johnson 
and Loveman, Starting over in Eastern Europe, 67-103.
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a member of Solidarnośc, to adapt to the new economic system as a state 
company. Johnson and Loveman argue that Szyc was not willing to deal 
with the requirements of the capitalist free market. He tried to maintain 
the social infrastructure for workers and failed to modernise the production 
process.97 Szyc preferred to hire more workers instead of investing in new 
technical equipment.98 The workforce rose from 7,452 in 1990 to 8,955 in 1993 
(Table 13.5). Additionally the loss of the Soviet market resulted in staggering 
f inancial setbacks in the Gdańsk Shipyard. The Soviet Union placed its last 
order in 1988, but was unable to pay for it.99 Despite these facts the Gdańsk 
Shipyard’s production grew steadily (up to 2004; Table 13.5). But the result 
of the management policy, the new economic situation, and an extended 
wage tax by the government was an increasing pile of debts. The troubles 
of the shipyard became clear at the end of 1995.
In 1996, the Gdańsk Shipyard went bankrupt. It was the first of the big state-
owned industries to go bankrupt after 1989. The workers protested in different 
ways: between December 1995 and August 1996 (when the bankruptcy was 
announced officially) nearly 2,000 workers left the shipyard (see Table 13.6). 
In the same time the absenteeism of workers during normal working time 
doubled in comparison to the preceding years, and there were several short 
strikes.100 The shipyard workers demanded a restructuring plan for the shipyard 
from the government.101 In comparison to the power of the workforce in 1981, 
the protest seemed defensive and individual. Solidarność was not willing to 
act and lost its organising power due to its policy in the preceding years.102
After the bankruptcy procedure was completed, a new company was 
created, and the Gdańsk Shipyard was purchased by the second major 
shipyard in Poland, the Gdynia Shipyard SA, a shareholder company with 
the state as the main shareholder.103 From this point, the production of the 
shipyard included mainly container ships, bulk carriers and sections, and 




100 Informacja o wynikach kontroli działalności organów państwowych oraz władz Stoczni 
Gdańskiej w okresie od 1988 do upadłości Spółki. 
101 See http://articles.latimes.com/1996-06-13/news/mn-14448_1_shipyard-workers-strike. 
102 Even Solidarność founder Lech Wałęsa said the bankruptcy decision “cannot be questioned 
on economic grounds”. And the leader of the Solidarność at that time said, that “there is no 
alternative to the bankruptcy”: http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1996/Gdansk-Shipyard-Strike-
to-Protest-Closing/id-c656e702d2263abde493c9ee10a5b7bb (accessed: 11 April 2014).
103 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/2009_3_13.pdf (accessed 8 April 2014). 
104 ???
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In 2006 Gdynia Shipyard SA sold its share to the State Development 
Agency. The Polish government decided to privatise and restructure the 
shipyard also because of pressure from the European Union.105 The site of 
the shipyard had already been reduced one year before to a f ifth of its former 
territory, and now a private f irm would reduce the production capacity 
again and carry out further job cuts.106 In 2008, ISD Polska, a subsidiary 
of Ukrainian steel producer Donbas, which was already a minority share-
holder, became a majority shareholder in the Gdańsk Shipyard. The workers 
of the Gdańsk Shipyard faced the same fate that many of their colleagues 
had suffered at the beginning of the 1990s, when privatisation was at its 
apex and resulted in job losses, declining working conditions and pay, and 
general uncertainty.
In 2013, about 2,100 people worked in the Gdańsk Shipyard, less than a 
third of the workforce of 1990. Two-thirds have fallen victim to privatisation 
and restructuring.
According to the information on the home webpage of the Gdańsk 
Shipyard, it specialises in shipbuilding, steel construction, and wind en-
ergy. They build offshore and research vessels, large steel constructions, 
high-altitude assemblies, and pipe systems.107 Since the summer of 2013, 
however, the Gdańsk Shipyard is once again threatened by bankruptcy. 
The workers did not receive their salaries and protested against this. Since 
then hundreds of workers have been laid off. Solidarność together with 
the shipyard worked out a redundancy payment scheme for those who 
left the shipyard voluntarily. In February 2014 the shipyard had to present 
a new business plan to the State Industry Development Agency (Agencji 
Rozwoju Przemysłu, ARP), and the state would decide whether to give 
further f inancial support to the shipyard. The Norwegian group Kleven is 
interested in investing in the shipyard.108
Polish shipbuilding industry after 1990
The Polish shipbuilding industry was, at the end of the 1990s, once again suc-
cessful. The industry profits from low working costs and labour conditions 
in comparison to West European standards. In 2000, Poland was in f ifth 
105 See below.
106 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/2009_3_13.pdf. 
107 See http://www.emship.ulg.ac.be/Documents/PRES_SAB/Gdansk%20Shipyard.pdf (ac-
cessed 10 April 2014).
108 See http://biznes.trojmiasto.pl/Gdanscy-stoczniowcy-odejda-z-pracy-dobrowolnie-n76694.
html (accessed 11 April 2014).
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place in the world shipbuilding league table, behind South Korea, Japan, 
China, and Germany, with 2.3 per cent of worldwide ship production.109 In 
2004 the industry employed around 28,700 people in the shipbuilding and 
ship-repair sector.110 Another 50,000 to 60,000 employees worked in the 
marine-equipment supply industry.111 In 2004 there were only four major 
shipyards in Poland with more than 1,000 employees112 and one large ship-
repair yard.113 From 1990 onwards, the Polish shipbuilding industry produced 
car ferries, bulk carriers, container vessels, and yachts, and in more recent 
times it has also participated in the offshore and wind energy market.
After 2004, two major factors also contributed to the slow demise of the 
Polish shipbuilding industry: Poland’s accession to the European Union in 
2004 and the global economic crisis of 2008 (Table 13.7).
Until 2005 the Polish shipbuilding industry could compete in the global 
shipbuilding market and was therefore a real competitor to the shipbuild-
ing industries of Germany and the Netherlands. This situation changed 
from 2005 onwards and experienced a radical turn in 2008 when the EU 
Commission on 6 November 2008 concluded that state aid granted to the 
shipyards in Gdynia and Szczecin “[had risen] to disproportionate distor-
tions of competition within the single market, in breach of EC treaty state 
aid rules and must be repaid”.114 Under EC rules, Poland was obligated to pay 
back state subsidies for its shipyards from recent years. Contemporaneously, 
the looming global economic crisis, which began in the United States in 
2008, hit the Polish shipbuilding industry hard. Due to this and the ending 
of state subsidies, the Gdynia and the Szczecin Shipyards were closed and 
all their machinery was sold off. This process is continuing.115
109 See http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/documentation/studies/documents/poland_em-
ployment_trends_en.pdf (accessed 11 April 2014). 
110 The data differ widely depending on the source. I refer in this chapter mainly to the of-
f icial Polish statistical yearbook, Główny Urząd Statystyczny, Rocznik statystyczny gospodarki 
morskiej.
111 See http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/documentation/studies/documents/poland_em-
ployment_trends_en.pdf (accessed 11 April 2014). 
112 Shipyard Gdynia; Szczecin New Shipyard; Shipyard Gdańsk; Northern Shipyard.
113 Szczecin Repair Shipyard. 
114 See http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/pl-shipbuilding.htm (accessed 
29 August 2012).
115 The shipyards in Gdynia went into bankruptcy 2009, and the Szczecin New Shipyard fol-
lowed in 2011. In 2009, the Polish share of worldwide ship production decreased to 0.1 per cent.
































































































































































































14 The shipbuilding industry in Galați 




Located on the maritime Danube (the 100-mile section of the river accessible 
to sea-going ships), the port city of Galați enjoys a favourable geographical 
position for developing signif icant shipbuilding installations. The only 
large f luvial outlet of the historical province of Moldavia, Galați lies on 
the left bank of the Danube, between two of its largest tributaries, the 
Siret and the Prut Rivers, which separate Moldavia from the neighbouring 
regions of Wallachia and Bessarabia respectively. Commerce in Galați 
increased gradually from the seventeenth century, when the port was visited 
by maritime ships wanting to convey the rich agro-pastoral resources of 
the Danubian principalities to the market of Constantinople. In the same 
period, historical sources refer to shipbuilding in a local shipyard, supplied 
with cheap and high-quality timber transported as rafts from the deep 
forests of the Carpathians down Moldavia’s network of rivers. Shipbuilding 
and ship repairing were the most lucrative industrial activities in Galați 
throughout the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, although 
construction techniques remained highly traditional and antiquated.
From a state-controlled enterprise, shipbuilding became, in the second 
quarter of the nineteenth century, a private venture, with dozens of ship-
wrights working in this f lourishing profession. Several decades later, the 
Navy Arsenal was established at Galaţi (1862), entrusted with the task of 
repairing Romania’s incipient military fleet. However, the modern history 
of the shipyard in Galați starts in 1893, when George Fernic founded a new 
industrial establishment, provided with state-of-the-art equipment and 
foreign know-how.
During the interwar years, it became one of the largest industrial 
organisations in Romania, with about 1,000 employees and a large total 
engine capacity. The Galaţi Shipyard was greatly affected by Romania’s 
involvement in the Second World War. Between 1940 and 1944, Romania was 
a close ally of Nazi Germany, so that all Danubian yards served the needs of 
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the German and Romanian navies. In 1944, when the course of war brought 
the front line closer to Romania’s eastern border, most naval installations 
were removed upstream along the Danube, to the port of Corabia, and only 
a smaller part of the industrial equipment and about 350 workers remained 
in Galați. The shipyard was seriously damaged when the German troops 
retreated, the destruction of the workshops and installations incurring a 
notable reduction of the yard’s productive capacity. In August 1944, the 
pro-Nazi government in Bucharest was overthrown in the very period when 
Romania was occupied by the Soviet armies. In the following months, the 
naval equipment was returned to Galați and shipbuilders restarted their 
activity in November 1944, this time serving Soviet military command. 
Besides repairing Soviet maritime and fluvial ships, the yard resumed the 
construction of several barges, tugs, and oil tankers.1 This opened a new 
phase for the shipbuilding industry in Galaţi, marked by profound trans-
formations in Romania’s political, economic, and social realities following 
the country’s alignment to the communist bloc.
The organisation of Romania’s shipbuilding industry under 
communism
According to the economic agreements concluded with the USSR, several 
mixed industrial companies, called SovRoms, were established in oc-
cupied Romania, with the aim of managing the war reparations that the 
satellite state was to pay to its almighty liberator. In August 1945 SovRom 
Transport (SRT), a newly founded shipping company, contracted Galaţi 
Shipyard to build six Soviet-designed oil tankers of 2,000 tons, opening 
the stage in which the Romanian shipbuilding industry switched to Soviet 
standards. In May 1946 the yard was rented by SRT for thirty years, but 
the absence of raw materials, the insuff icient supply of electricity, and 
the disastrous situation of staff resulted in the facility’s working at about 
half its capacity.2
A new phase in Romania’s economic history began on 11 June 1948 when 
the communist leadership nationalised the means of production, including 
1 Maftei et al. (eds), Șantierul naval Galați, 45-50; Maftei, “Dezvoltarea industriei navale”, 
321.
2 Maftei et al. (eds), Şantierul naval Galaţi, 50-51; Maftei, “Dezvoltarea industriei navale”, 
322; balanced historical references to the SovRoms can be found in Moşneagu, Politica navală 
postbelică a României, 261-262, and Cîmpineanu, “Marina comercială română”, 213-214.
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all “individual enterprises, societies of any type and private industrial, 
bank, insurance, mining, transport, and telecommunication associations”. 
The shipyard in Galaţi was also nationalised, but it remained part of SRT, 
whereas several other shipbuilding enterprises in Romania worked under 
the co-ordination of the Ministry of Industry and Trade.3
Based on the doctrine that only larger plants could provide integrated 
and economically eff icient production, similar enterprises were merged 
into giant industrial units. In 1950 the shipyard and the Navy Arsenal were 
merged, so as to allow a more systematic and cost-effective use of their 
industrial infrastructure. The military facility had better-equipped produc-
tion workshops, but it lacked a proper slipway. The shipyard had modern 
workshops for building block sections, three good slipways (one of them 
made of concrete and provided with two electrical cranes of six-ton capacity), 
machines for working ferrous laminates, and so forth, so that the new unit 
could improve its productivity and fulfil the tasks assigned from the centre.4
In 1952 the shipyard withdrew from SovRom Transport and established a 
separate company, called SovRom Naval. This operated until 1954, when all 
mixed enterprises were disbanded, following a political agreement between 
Romania and the USSR. From that point onward, the shipbuilding industry 
was co-ordinated from Bucharest by the General Directorate of Industrial 
Equipment and Naval Constructions, a division within the Ministry of Ma-
chine Constructions Industry. A significant administrative change occurred 
in 1969, from which time Romania’s economic development was co-ordinated 
by several industrial centrals. Analogous to the production associations of 
other socialist countries, they were autonomous organisations, created by 
grouping several similar economic units, and controlled all activities within 
their f ields of expertise. They could set up their own research institutes, 
supply and selling policies, maintenance and repairing facilities, educational 
institutions, etc., so as to maximise production by allowing a better division 
of investments and labour among the component units. The Industrial Cen-
tral for Naval Constructions, later renamed the Naval Industrial Central, was 
established in Galați in 1969, and co-ordinated the activity of most shipyards 
and shipbuilding equipment plants in Romania until 1990. Although these 
centrals were theoretically created to decentralise planning, investment, 
and other forms of economic decision-making, their functions remained 
rather ambiguous and they enjoyed only limited autonomy, mainly in terms 
3 Maftei et al. (eds), Şantierul naval Galaţi, 53; Maftei, “Dezvoltarea industriei navale”, 322.
4 Maftei et al. (eds), Şantierul naval Galaţi, 54; Lăcătuş, “Cercetare tehnologică pentru 
dezvoltarea Şantierului Naval Galaţi”, 8.
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of monitoring plan fulf ilment and of designating production schedules for 
the plants under their jurisdiction.5
On 25 November 1970, the communist leader Nicolae Ceauşescu an-
nounced a new programme for developing Romania’s shipbuilding industry. 
Huge investments were directed in these decades towards all shipyards, 
which were entrusted with the patriotic task of building a national f luvial 
and maritime fleet, able to diminish the country’s dependence on foreign 
transportation and to contribute to its exports and income of hard cur-
rency. An ambitious plan was drawn up, with a clear specialisation of each 
yard in a strongly centralised industry. The facility in Galaţi was to build 
maritime ships of 20,000-25,000 dwt and to gradually increase its capacity to 
vessels of 38,000-40,000 dwt. Similar duties were assigned to the shipyards 
in Constanţa, Olteniţa, Drobeta Turnu Severin, Brăila, Giurgiu, etc., and 
to the new facilities built from scratch at Tulcea, Mangalia, and Hârşova.6
During this period, naval design, research, and development activity 
was entrusted to several institutions. In 1951 the Institute of Naval Design 
(IPRONAV) was created in Bucharest, and worked until 1957, when it was 
dissolved following the decision to set up design sections in several major 
shipyards. However, in 1966, a new centralised institution was established 
in Galați, the Institute of Scientific Research and Technological Engineering 
for Naval Constructions (ICEPRONAV), which received the task of design-
ing ships for the entire Romanian shipbuilding industry. It started with a 
workforce of 159 and by 1988 had reached 1,388 employees, among whom 
there were 406 engineers and 310 technicians and designers, most of whom 
had qualif ied in local educational institutions. They drafted more than 
200 designs, used in Romanian shipyards for building, until 1990, a total of 
about 1,500 ships and other floating installations.7
Throughout the totalitarian era, Galaţi remained the centre of Romania’s 
shipbuilding industry, supported by four main pillars created or developed 
in the Danubian port city by the communist leadership: the Naval Industrial 
Central – the administrative co-ordinating body; ICEPRONAV – responsible for 
design, research, and development activities; the university – entrusted with 
the creation of qualified human resources; and the shipyard – involved in the 
productive activity of constructing and repairing fluvial and maritime vessels.
5 Maftei, Organizarea şi conducerea producţiei în şantierele navale, 14; Maftei, Organizarea 
şi conducerea şantierelor navale, 28-30. For general details on the functionality of Romanian 
centrals, see Bachman (ed.), Romania, 142-143.
6 Maftei et al. (eds), Şantierul naval Galaţi, 63-64.
7 Maftei, ICEPRONAV Galaţi, 24-34; Alexandru and Aburel, ICEPRONAV Galaţi, 27-28, 59.
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Shipbuilding in Galați Shipyard
Starting with the complete overthrow of the democratic regime in 1947, the 
communist authorities imposed an ambitious programme of industrialisa-
tion, which was seen as a way of swiftly achieving both social homogeneity 
and harmonious economic development throughout the country. In its 
early phase, industrialisation closely followed the Soviet model, although a 
more nationalistic approach followed in the late 1950s, as political relations 
between Bucharest and Moscow gradually cooled. Large amounts of capital 
(about half of Romania’s total investments) were directed towards developing 
industrial facilities, most of it (80 per cent) going to the heavy and machine 
construction industry, regarded as the foundation of further economic 
progress. Between 1950 and 1965 industrial output grew by 6.5 times and 
that of heavy industry 8.2 times, the share of machine construction industry 
increasing from 13.3 per cent to 21.2 per cent of the national economy. The 
pace of industrialisation speeded up following Nicolae Ceaușescu’s acces-
sion to power in 1965 and the instigation of his policy of removing Soviet 
tutelage and of securing Romania’s energetic and industrial independence.8 
In order to maintain a rate of growth of more than 10 per cent a year, industry 
had to be further streamlined and modernised, a goal accomplished with 
Western funding, technology, and know-how, provided in the 1970s due to 
Ceauşescu’s vocal anti-Soviet political line. This new programme was also 
related to the Soviet decision to curtail transfers of naval licences, forcing 
Romania to further invest in developing the national sector of shipbuilding.9
According to the initial plan for economic growth, specialised indus-
trial cores were created in order to exploit strategic resources throughout 
Romania. Considering its geographical position on the maritime Danube 
and the existing industrial infrastructure, Galați was off icially recognised 
as the centre of Romania’s shipbuilding industry, receiving large capital 
expenditures for developing the productive capacity of the local shipyard.
The first phase of investment started in 1951, aiming to increase the yard’s 
capacity to build maritime ships. The project, drafted by Centromor Proiect 
Design Institute in Odessa, stipulated that 90 per cent of activity should be 
directed to shipbuilding and 10 per cent to ship repair. Large amounts of 
capital were directed towards the acquisition of modern equipment and 
means of transport. New facilities were built, including a storehouse for 
8 Ianoş et al., “Characteristics of the Industrialization Process Around the Moment of Collapse 
of a Centralized Political System”, 163-166.
9 Bachman, Romania, 287.
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ferrous laminates (3,000 m2), a storehouse for f inished goods, a hall for 
assembling and welding block sections (provided with cranes allowing the 
execution of sections up to 40 tons), a slipway for ships of 5,000 dwt, a work-
shop for mechanical, electrical, carpentry, painting, and tapestry works, a 
f itting-out quay (84 m, provided with a crane of 10 tons’ capacity), etc. The 
shipyard acquired new machines, its total lifting and transport capacity 
(cranes and gantry cranes) increasing from 156.5 tons in 1950 to 253.5 tons in 
1960. Advanced technologies were also introduced, such as electric welding 
(1950), semi-automatic and automatic welding (1952), modern cutting of 
sheets and profiles, a new sandblasting procedure, and so forth.10
During the 1950s, the shipyard built a total of 285 ships (Table 14.1), 
ranging from simple f ishing boats to large barges and tankers. In the 
second part of the decade, a notable specialisation is obvious, allowing 
a quantitative increase in production (barges of 1,000 tons, ferry boats of 
100 tons, motorboats of 200 tons, tugboats of 1,200 hp). However, the most 
important technical accomplishment was the construction of two cargo 
boats of 4,500 dwt, the f irst large maritime vessels completely designed and 
manufactured by Romanian specialists. The project for the cargo ship of 
3,250/4,500 dwt was drafted by IPRONAV, but it was later adjusted to f it with 
the technical facilities of Galaţi Shipyard. The two ships were commenced 
in 1958, launched in 1959, and delivered in 1960, and their technical features 
(length – 100.6 m, breadth – 13.90 m, height – 8.10 m, draught – 6.58 m, 
weight – 2,000 tons) allowed them to carry general cargo, in pallets or bulk, 
except for heavy minerals.11
In 1958, as the Romanian fleet needed larger ships, the Ministry of the 
Machine-Building Industry decided to increase the productive capacity of 
Galaţi Shipyard. As the existing slipway allowed the construction of vessels 
of a maximum of 5,000 dwt, the main priority was to erect a larger slipway. 
The technical survey, completed in 1960, proposed the construction of a new 
slipway, with a length of 170 m and a maximum breadth of 25 m, provided 
with cranes of 50 tons, capable of supporting ships of up to 18,000 dwt. 
Important expenditures were directed to extend the storehouse for ferrous 
laminates and the workshop for cutting sheets and profiles, as well as for 
enlarging the f itting-out quay from 84 m to 120 m (provided with a 15-ton 
10 Maftei et al. (eds), Şantierul naval Galaţi, 67-68, 75-82; Lăcătuş, “Cercetare tehnologică. I”, 
11-14.
11 Lăcătuş, “Cercetare tehnologică. I”, 9-10. For the cargo boat, see Palamiuc, Nave româneşti 
pe meridianele globului, 7, and the technical details in Alexandru and Aburel, ICEPRONAV 
Galaţi, 73.
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capacity crane). A workshop for assembling and welding block sections, 
f itting-out workshops, two acetylene stations, and several other storehouses 
were also built from scratch.12
12 Maftei et al. (eds), Şantierul naval Galaţi, 69-70; Lăcătuş and Călina, “Cercetare tehnologică 
II”, 17-22.
Table 14.1  Shipbuilding in Galaţi, 1944-1960
No. Type of ship 1944-50 1951-55 1956-60 Total
Non-propelled fluvial ships
1 ergo barge for the danube 4 - - 4
2 Barge, 1,000 tons 12 50 52 114
3 tanker, 35 tons - - 1 1
4 tanker, 600 tons 2 - - 2
5 tanker, 1,000 tons 2 - - 2
6 tanker, 2,000 tons 10 4 - 14
7 Ferry boat, 100 tons - 31 13 44
8 Scow, 80 tons 9 5 - 14
9 tiltable lighter - 1 - 1
Self-propelled fluvial ships
10 Motorboat, Kd 35 - - 11 11
11 Study motorboat, 150 hp - - 2 2
12 tugboat, 160 hp 2 - - 2
13 tugboat, 200 hp 2 3 - 5
14 tugboat, 400 hp 4 4 - 8
15 tugboat, 2 x 300 hp 7 1 - 8
16 Motorboat, 2,000 tons - - 14 14
Technical ships
17 Floating dock, 600 tons 1 - - 1
18 drill pontoon - 1 - 1
19 pumping station - 1 - 1
Small maritime ships
20 Wooden fishing boats 29 15 - 44
21 Metal fishing boats - 22 - 22
22 tugboats, 900 hp - - 2 2
23 tugboats, 1,200 hp - 10 25 35
24 various ships (mine-sweeping 
vessels, etc.)
- 2 13 15
Large maritime ships
25 cargo boat, 4,500 dwt - - 2 2
TOTAL 84 150 135 369
Source: lăcătuş, “cercetare tehnologică. i”, 9-10
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The number of cranes increased from twenty-six in 1950 to seventy-one 
in 1970, and the lifting capacity reached almost 1,000 tons. Raw materials 
and component parts were transported within the site with electro-cars, 
lifts, tractors, plant locomotives, trailers, and mechanised wagons (Table 
14.2). The value of capital assets increased by 4.45 times during the period 
1950-1972, and the number of machines and welders by 62.7 per cent. New 
technologies were implemented, such as oxy-fuel cutting, new sandblast-
ing and passivation of sheets and prof iles, welding in protected dioxide 
medium, argon arc welding, plasma welding and cutting, gravitational weld-
ing, air arc cutting, etc. Propellers and larger pieces of non-ferrous metal 
were manufactured in a new foundry, provided with modern technological 
aggregates and installations, the most important of which were ten crucible 
furnaces with a capacity of 2,500 kg each. Not least, the shipyard increased 
its capacity to build block sections of up to 100 tons.13
In order to outf it the new vessels with Romanian equipment, the Me-
chanical Plant in Galaţi changed its industrial prof ile in 1961 and became 
the Naval Mechanical Plant, specialising in manufacturing shipbuilding 
equipment such as a large diversity of deck mechanisms, winches, capstans, 
mechanic caps, electro pumps, armour, electrical boards, etc.14 It organised 
its production on the basis of orders coming from all Romanian shipyards, 
and in 1969 it was also subordinated to the Industrial Naval Central.
These investments, most of them completed by 1965, allowed a new 
increase in the quantity and quality of industrial output. The number of 
non-propelled simple ships greatly decreased (only nine such ships were 
completed), whereas the construction of maritime vessels entered a new 
phase. Thirty motor boats of 2,000 tons each were built for export to the 
Soviet Union, but most ships were delivered to Romania’s navigation com-
panies (Table 14.3). The most representative ship is the ore carrier of 12,500 
dwt (maximum length – 151.5 m, maximum breadth – 19.7 m, height – 10.7 
m, speed – 15 knots, f ive electro-hydraulic cranes of 5 tons each for loading 
and unloading cargo), which was built starting in 1965.15
During this stage, ship repair amounted to only 0.3 per cent of the 
shipyard’s activity, which was even lower than the previous decade. The 
shipyard in Galaţi was the largest in Romania, contributing about a third of 
the country’s shipbuilding industry. Its production increased by 2.3 times in 
13 Maftei et al. (eds), Şantierul naval Galaţi, 69-82; Lăcătuş and Călina, “Cercetare tehnologică 
II”, 22-23.
14 Maftei et al. (eds), Şantierul naval Galaţi, 57.
15 Lăcătuş and Călina, “Cercetare tehnologică II”, 23-24.
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1970 as compared to 1965, more than the average growth rate of the national 
industry (1.75 times) and of the shipbuilding industry (2.0 times). If in 1965 
the yard held 32 per cent of Romania’s total ship production, it reached 
37 per cent by 1970, as compared to 18 per cent for Olteniţa, 12 per cent for 
Drobeta Turnu Severin, 10 per cent for Brăila, and 9 per cent for Constanţa.16
Romania’s shipbuilding exports increased by 2.57 times between 1965 
and 1970, whereas the exports of the shipyard in Galați grew by only 1.99 
16 Maftei et al. (eds), Şantierul naval Galaţi, 60-62.
Table 14.2  Technical facilities in Galaţi Shipyard, 1950-1970
1950 1960 1970
cranes and bridges (number) 26 32 71
total lifting power (tons) 156,5 253,5 932,6
Machines and welding machines (number) 1,063 1,276 1,508
total power (kw) 6,883 8,300 20,120
electro-cars (number) - 31 59
Source: Maftei et al. (eds), Şantierul naval Galaţi, 70; lăcătuş and călina, “cercetare tehnologică ii”, 
22-23
Table 14.3  Shipbuilding in Galaţi, 1961-1970
No. Type of ship 1961-65 1966-70 Total
Non-propelled fluvial ships
1 Barge for fruit, 1,000 tons 5 - 5
2 Barge block for fruit, 1,700 tons 4 - 4
Propelled fluvial ships
3 Motorboat, 2,000 tons 30 - 30
Technical ships
4 Floating pile hammer 2 - 2
5 Block for floating pile hammer 1 - 1
6 Floating pile hammer for the iron gates 2 - 2
Propelled maritime ships
7 cargo boat, 4,500 dwt, project 262 13 15 28
8 cargo boat, 4,200 dwt, project 351 5 - 5
9 cargo boat, 4,800 tons, project 382 - 2 2
10 cargo boat, 3,400 tons, project 357 3 2 5
11 timber cargo boat, 3,800 tons, project 450B - 22 22
12 ore carrier, 12,500 dwt, project 354 - 4 4
Total 65 45 110
Source: lăcătuş and călina, “cercetare tehnologică ii”, 23
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times.17 Most products were exported to other member nations of the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) or to states from 
the Non-Aligned Movement: USSR, China, Poland, India, Vietnam, Bulgaria, 
Egypt, etc.18 In 1970, for example, more than 59 per cent of the production 
of the Galaţi Shipyard was exported to shipping corporations such as India 
Ltd Bombay, the Mogul Line Ltd Bombay, Naviera SA Panama, Merchant 
Marine Greece, Marine Société Anonyme Greece, Zim Israel, and Navigation 
Company Ltd Haifa.19 In 1971, a special company, called NAVIMPEX, was 
founded at Galaţi and was entrusted with the foreign trade of Romania’s 
naval industry. It co-ordinated both the acquisition of the equipment that 
could not be domestically manufactured and the completion of the sale of 
ships constructed in Romanian shipyards.
In 1970, the State Planning Committee drafted the new f ive-year plan for 
the period 1971-1975, which required a growth of 2.5 times for the national 
shipbuilding industry. To accomplish this task, the Naval Industrial Central 
assigned Galaţi Shipyard the task of building ships of 40,000 dwt. This 
third phase of investment included the construction of a new storehouse 
of ferrous laminates, provided with all necessary transportation and lift-
ing equipment, a new workhouse for cutting sheets and prof iles, and a 
workhouse for assembling and welding larger block sections placed closer 
to the Danube slipway. However, the most important asset completed was a 
dry dock with a length of 235 m and a breadth of 35 m, allowing the building 
of ships of up to 60,000 dwt and having the capacity to operate with block 
sections of up to 300 tons. In the same time, until 1977, local engineers built 
from scratch a f itting-out quay of 180 m, provided with a crane of 40 tons 
and two mooring spots, a new basin, an assembling and welding workshop, 
an acetylene factory, f itting-out workshops, an open storehouse for large 
pieces, an oxygen factory, a compressed-air plant, a fuel storehouse, a steam 
power plant, and several other warehouses.20 In 1976, a new industrial plant, 
INETOF, was founded in Galaţi, with the task of manufacturing propellers, 
steal and cast iron pieces, forged pieces, etc., which were either produced 
in Romanian shipyards with low productivity or were imported. In 1978 
it delivered the f irst products, and by the late 1980s it had a workforce of 
about 1,100 employees.21
17 Ibid., 61.
18 Nistor, “Romania’s Participation in the Specialization and Cooperation on Production in 
the Shipbuilding Program of COMECON Member Nations”. 
19 The National Archives, Galaţi County, Şantierul Naval Galaţi, File 7/1971.
20 Lăcătuş and Aruscuţei, “Cercetare tehnologică III”, 36-40. 
21 M.A.S., “INETOF, Mircea Roibu şi elicele pentru nave realizate la Galaţi”.
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The most representative ships for this decade were the 7,500-dwt cargo 
boats, commenced in 1970 and delivered in 1972. With a length of 131 m, a 
breadth of 17.7 m, a draught of 8.10 m, and a speed of 16 knots, they were 
equipped with 6,100-hp engines manufactured in Poland under a licence 
from Sulzer. Thereafter, in order to decrease the importation of foreign 
technology, 6,000-hp engines were built in Romania at a factory located in 
Reşiţa, under a licence from MAN. Ro-Ro ships were built for Israel, and coal 
carriers were exported to India. Container ships were built after a design 
drafted in Norway, whereas a licence from the American Offshore Company 
based in Houston was used for building maritime drilling platforms. They 
were constructed to drill at a maximum depth of 94 m, with maximum 
wave height of 10 m and a wind speed of 185 km/hr, maximum load per 
each of the four feet – 2,300 tons, and length of feet – 121.9 m.22 The f irst 
installation, Gloria, started to drill in the Black Sea in September 1976, 72 
miles off Romania’s coast, at a depth of 65 m. Romania was thus one of 
only ten countries producing offshore oil-drilling rigs. In 1988 seven such 
platforms operated in the Black Sea under the supervision of Petromar 
Company.23 The bulk carrier of 55,000 dwt (length – 220 m, breadth – 32.2 
m, draught – 12.40 m, force – 17,400 hp, speed – 16 knots) was delivered to 
the Romanian fleet, as well as several complex refrigerated ships.24 A total of 
116 ships, among which 95 complex maritime vessels and 1 drilling platform 
were delivered in the golden decade of Galaţi Shipyard (Table 14.4).
A fourth phase of investment started in 1982, allowing a further increase 
in production. The most important developments were the construction 
of new f itting-out workshops closer to the dry dock, of new berths for 
ships, and of a workshop for sandblasting and painting block sections; 
the consolidation of the basin slipway so as support ships of up to 10,000 
dwt; new storage areas; increased mechanisation; new equipment; etc. The 
proportion of ship repairing slightly increased, providing capital repair 
to the ships built in Galaţi. A new workshop, especially designed for ship 
repair, started work in 1980.25
During this decade, production suffered greatly due to several problems 
Romania was facing as a result of Ceauşescu’s decision to repay the entire 
foreign debt to the country’s “imperialist” creditors. The need for hard 
22 Lăcătuş and Aruscuţei, “Cercetare tehnologică III”, 40-42.
23 Details in Lăcătuş, “Epopeea construirii platformelor de foraj marin româneşti”.
24 Lăcătuş and Aruscuţei, “Cercetare tehnologică III”, 41-42. Technical details of the Ro-Ro 
ships for the drilling platforms can be found in Alexandru and Aburel, ICEPRONAV Galaţi, 81, 
104-105.
25 Lăcătuş and Popescu, “Cercetare tehnologică IV”, 52-56. 
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Table 14.4  Shipbuilding in Galaţi, 1971-1980
No. Type of ship 1971-75 1976-80 Total
1 cargo boat, 4,800 dwt 17 - 17
2 cargo boat, 7,500 dwt (slow engine, Sulzer) 11 - 11
3 cargo boat, 8,700 dwt (slow engine, Sulzer) 1 15 16
4
cargo boat, 8,700 dwt (semi-rapid engine, 
Man)
- 9 9
5 Refrigerated cargo boat, 7,000 dwt - 2 2
6 port container cargo boat, 8,250 dwt 5 - 5
7 Multi-functional cargo boat, 15,000 dwt 4 4 8
8 ore carrier, 12,500 dwt 4 - 4
9 coal carrier, 15,000 dwt 10 - 10
10 Bulk carrier, 18,200 dwt - 8 8
11 Bulk carrier, 55,000 dwt - 3 3
12 Ro-Ro ship, 3,800 tons 2 - 2
13 drilling platform - 1 1
14 dredging machine - 20 20
Total 54 62 116
Source: lăcătuş and aruscuţei, “cercetare tehnologică iii”, 41
Table 14.5  Shipbuilding in Galaţi, 1981-1990
No. Type of ship 1981-85 1986-90 Total
1 Refrigerated cargo boat, 7,000 dwt 4 - 4
2 cargo boat, 8,700 dwt 5 - 5
3 Multi-functional cargo boat, 15,000 dwt 2 4 6
4 cargo boat, 15,000 dwt, liner 8 - 8
5 universal cargo boat, 15,000 dwt - 9 9
7 Ro-Ro cargo boat, 3,800 dwt 4 - 4
8 Ro-Ro cargo boat, 4,000 dwt 8 - 8
9 port container, 8,000 dwt - 2 2
10 Bulk carrier, 55,000 dwt 2 - 2
11 oil tanker, 10,000 dwt - 1 1
12 oil tanker, 39,000 dwt - 2 2
13 tugboat, 2 x 2,000 hp 3 1 4
14 Maritime drilling platform 4 2 6
15 Rock-cutting platform 1 - 1
16 Barge, 3,000 tons 10 - 10
17 coastal ship, 300 dwt 10 - 10
Total 61 21 82
Source: lăcătuş and popescu, “cercetare tehnologică iv”, 56-57
tHe SHipBuilding induStRy in galați (RoMania) undeR coMMuniSM, 1948-1989 409
currency imposed a policy of extreme cutbacks on imports, and the building 
of all equipment was entrusted to Romanian factories. However, these 
products arrived late and their quality was usually unsatisfactory. In the 
same time, exports dwindled, as Romania lost several traditional clients, 
such as the USSR and China, and competition on the market sharpened.
In these years 82 ships were delivered (Table 14.5), the most representa-
tive of which is the cargo boat of 15,000 dwt. Multi-functional cargo boats 
(six ships), universal cargo boats (nine ships), and liner cargo boats (eight 
ships) were built along with other extremely complex ships (Ro-Ro, port 
containers, bulk carriers, oil tankers, refrigerated ships, offshore drilling 
platforms, etc.). In 1990 45 ships were under construction in the shipyard, 
in different phases of production.26
Socio-economic working conditions of shipbuilders in Galaţi
Signif icant qualitative and quantitative changes were recorded in relation 
to the workforce employed in Galați Shipyard during communist times. In 
the early 1950s it had about 3,000 workers, and in 1964 the f igure reached 
3,762 employees, among whom there were 487 engineers and technicians, 71 
foremen, 2,929 workers, 250 administrative staff, 74 guards and f irefighters, 
and 22 janitors. Additional staff served at the canteen (21 persons) and the 
nursery. In 1971 the yard had 5,105 employees, with 4,419 people hired as 
workers (as opposed to managerial or administrative staff, for example).27 
In 1988, it counted 7,900 labourers, among whom 7,250 workers involved 
in production and 650 in the administrative staff.28 Besides these, the 
shipbuilding industry in Galaţi included about 2,000 people employed at 
the Naval Mechanical Plant (1,259 employees in 1971 and 1,664 in 1975),29 
1,100 working for INETOF and 1,300 for ICEPRONAV, amounting to a total 
of more than 12,000.
Available sources do not allow us to differentiate between male and 
female employees. However, under communism women were highly encour-
aged to work in industrial plants, as the regime needed their labour, but 
traditional social and educational patterns allowed them to occupy only 
inferior positions in those industries favoured by the regime. In a list of 
26 Ibid., 56-58. 
27 The National Archives, Galaţi County, Şantierul Naval Galaţi, File 12/1971, f. 103.
28 Maftei, Organizarea şi conducerea şantierelor navale, 328.
29 The National Archives, Galaţi County, Şantierul Naval Galaţi, File 12/1971, f. 327.
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those who worked in Galaţi Shipyard, only 5 women out of a total of about 
100 people are mentioned as having occupied top management positions.30 
However, 53 per cent of the employees of ICEPRONAV were women.31
The socialist salary system was introduced in Romania in February 1949. 
Wages were increased regularly, according to the party’s directives, with a 
new unique tariff settled at the level of the national economy, stressing the 
accomplishment of planned norms and giving bonuses for extra labour. In 
1964 the average annual salary in Romania was 11,500 lei (about USD $760 
at an average exchange parity of 15 lei for USD $1), and in the shipyard it was 
13,667 lei for workers, 21,652 lei for engineers, 22,957 lei for foremen, 12,356 
lei for clerks, 8,897 lei for f irefighters, and 8,109 lei for janitors. Workers from 
the capital repairs sections had an average salary of 9,785 lei a year, whereas 
canteen personnel earned 8,273 lei and nursery staff 7,800 lei a year. As it 
is clearly visible, the leadership encouraged productive professions, which 
were better paid according to state policy.32
The work schedule remained strenuous throughout the period, with an 
average of 48 hours per week, not including unpaid “patriotic labour”. Of 
the nominal salary 80 per cent was paid regardless of performance, and 
the remaining 20 per cent was dependent on the individual’s productivity. 
However, in 1983 Ceauşescu abolished f ixed wages in favour of a policy that 
tied workers’ income directly to plan fulf ilment by the enterprise.33
The new technical equipment and procedures induced a notable shift in 
working professions. About 120 engineers were employed in the shipyard in 
the early 1970s, but new professions also appeared that had been completely 
unknown before, such as welders, electricians, electronicians, electro-
technicians, refrigerationists, etc. Thus, it was decisive to also invest in 
getting human resources trained and qualif ied. The need to train engineers 
for the shipbuilding industry led the authorities to establish in Galaţi, in 
1951, a Mechanic Naval Institute, divided into two faculties – the Faculty 
of Naval Construction and the Faculty of Ship and Port Exploitation. The 
f irst had two specialisations, body construction and construction of ship 
machinery and deck instruments, which remained unique in Romania 
throughout this period. In 1971 a group of junior shipbuilding engineers was 
also created, with two sections: body construction and ships’ mechanism 
assembling. In the same period, starting with the academic year 1972/73, 
30 Lăcătuş, “Personalităţi din cadrul Şantierului Naval din Galaţi”.
31 Alexandru and Aburel, ICEPRONAV Galaţi, 50-51.
32 The National Archives, Galaţi County, Şantierul Naval Galaţi, File 8/1965, ff. 1-10.
33 Bachman, Romania, 159-160.
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a section in welding technology was established. During this period more 
than 1,000 shipbuilding engineers graduated from this Polytechnic Institute 
(now the University of Galaţi) and were employed throughout Romania.34
The same need for qualif ied workers resulted in 1955 in the creation of 
a school of foremen within the shipyard, which schooled specialists for all 
Romanian shipyards. In 1956 a post-high school specialisation was also 
founded. All these professional schools were merged in 1962 with the Al.I. 
Cuza High School, qualifying labourers for the professions of tabulators, 
naval builders, electricians, etc. Within a decade, between 1963 and 1972, it 
schooled 1,690 workers who were deployed in shipyards around Romania. 
Two other high schools in Galaţi, the Machine Constructions High School 
and the High School for Naval Transport also provided technical educa-
tion for shipbuilders. The school of foremen trained for the shipyard in 
Galați, during the period 1962-1972, a total of 147 foremen in the following 
specialisations: boiler forges and welding, ships’ ironware, naval buildings, 
welding, metal splintering, etc.35
The shipyard also educated its own apprentices, so that between 1948 
and 1960 the professional school trained 1,622 linesmen, shipbuilders, adjus-
tors, mechanics, assemblers, carpenters, etc. Over the course of a decade, 
about 850 workers qualif ied as apprentices and studied at a school near 
the shipyard. In 1966 it also had an industrial school for machine building, 
which trained qualif ied labourers and technicians for three professions: 
ship construction, technology of machine construction, and machine and 
electrical f ittings. In the 1970s the shipyard co-ordinated the technical 
activity in several secondary and high schools in Galaţi: the Al.I. Cuza 
High School, the Industrial School for Machine Construction, a secondary 
school in Galaţi, and one in a small village called Vânători, by investing 
in building and equipping the schools’ workshops and employing most of 
the graduates.36
The communist leadership invested heavily in providing social facilities 
to workers. The shipyard was endowed with a medical section (1950), reor-
ganised in 1955 when a small hospital with f ifty beds for internal diseases 
and a polyclinic were created. The employees were served their meals in 
a canteen with a capacity of 500, extended in the 1980s, when it could no 
longer cope with the demand. Families with children were supported by a 
new nursery for children aged between 4 months and 3 years old, most of 
34 Brezeanu, Universitatea din Galaţi, 41-85.
35 Maftei et al. (eds), Şantierul naval Galaţi, 69, 100-101.
36 Ibid., 100-102.
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the monthly expenses being covered by the shipyard. In the early 1970s it 
had eighteen employees, among whom were twelve nurses.37
During the 1950s, the shipyard was the largest industrial plant in Galaţi, 
but the city’s position on the Danube and the need for steel to develop 
the national industry led the central authorities to start the construction 
(1962) of the largest industrial establishment in communist Romania, the 
Sidex steel plant, which also provided sheet and ferrous laminates for the 
shipbuilding industry. With huge investment in the heavy and machine 
construction industry, Galaţi emerged in the 1960s as one of the fastest-
growing municipalities of Romania. Population spiked, and from 80,411 in 
1948 it grew to 151,412 in 1966 and 307,376 in 1989. This completely changed 
the architecture of the city, whole quarters of blocks of flats being built from 
scratch. This marked urbanisation was not a simple consequence of forced 
industrialisation, being centrally directed by the communist authorities 
under the guiding influence of Marxist concepts. Urbanisation was deci-
sive in the creation of a new socialist society, in which urban areas were 
considered economically, socially, and culturally superior. Cities swelled 
from migration of workers from the rural areas, so that the industrial plants 
needed to provide housing for their employees. In 1953, the Galaţi Shipyard 
built three blocks with f ifty-eight f lats each, and in the following years 
thirty-two more flats. In 1969 it established a hostel for bachelor employees, 
with 300 beds in 79 rooms, 2 more such constructions being f inished in the 
next decade.38
Throughout this period, the authorities also invested in “building” the 
new man, who was to be educated according to communist ideology. Work 
was a respected method of education, and labour was regarded as a way in 
which respectable citizens served and showed devotion to the party and the 
country. Labour had to endow employees with the highest moral qualities, 
to make them militant activists, capable of defending their social class 
and the entire nation against all domestic and foreign enemies. Workers 
had to be disciplined, to obey the commandments of their leaders, and to 
contribute their best to the welfare of the socialist state. But they were not 
human machines that only produced material goods, so they also received 
a literary, artistic, and sporting education to make them worthy members 
of the community.39
37 “Din activitatea creşei de copii SNG”, Şantierul Roşu, 17 October 1972; Maftei et al. (eds), 
Şantierul naval Galaţi, 152-154.
38 Maftei et al. (eds), Şantierul naval Galaţi, 154.
39 Dascălu, “Modelul ‘Omului nou’ în ideologiile totalitare din România secolului XX”, 41-42.
tHe SHipBuilding induStRy in galați (RoMania) undeR coMMuniSM, 1948-1989 413
Propaganda was an important part of the shipbuilders’ professional 
life. All employees had to join artistic and cultural organisations and 
take part in social activities in their free time, closely organised by the 
trade union and the local branches of the Communist Party, activities 
that served the double goals of indoctrination and surveillance. In Galaţi 
Shipyard propaganda was co-ordinated until the mid-1970s by means of a 
bi-monthly organ called Șantierul Roșu (The Red Shipyard). It published 
in 3,500 copies per issue, enough for a copy for each employee. The journal 
shared all kinds of information, from technical data to columns devoted 
to the political and moral values of the working class. It commended 
diligent labourers, preached working discipline, and strongly criticised 
those employees who did not fulf il their material, social, or moral obliga-
tions towards the factory, their colleagues, their families, or the country’s 
leaders. Men who divorced their wives were cited as bad social examples,40 
and the validity of the proverb “like father, like son” was demonstrated by 
the low school performance of children whose parents were not diligent 
workers.41
Another means of propaganda was the loudspeaker system, which 
broadcast a large variety of programmes, from those popularising technical 
or literary books to those related to the need to respect the work schedule. 
Employees who arrived late at work or spent too much time in the canteen 
during the lunch break were publicly criticised.42 Not least of all, wall 
gazettes presented the activity of each workshop, and provided details on 
competitions for increasing production.43
Propaganda lectures were periodically organised in the shipyard, with 
courses on the new directives of the party, but also on the political values 
of the “new man”. An Evening University of Marxism-Leninism educated 
the participants in the values of socialist doctrine. However, propagandists 
and lecturers complained of poor attendance. In January 1967, 72 per cent 
of the students attended these courses, with only 50 per cent attendance 
at the course on “Problems of Industrial Economy”. A “working university” 
40 “Un ‘f lăcău’ la 40 de ani”, Şantierul Roşu, 15 May 1967.
41 “Educarea copiilor – preocupare de seamă a f iecărui comunist, a întregii organizații”, 
Şantierul Roşu, 1 April 1970.
42 “De ce mai sunt carențe în activitatea stației de amplif icare”, Şantierul Roşu, 1 April 1967; 
“Staţia de radioamplif icarea SNG transmite”, Şantierul Roşu, 15 May 1972.
43 “Gazetele de perete – mijloc ef icient în munca educativă cu oamenii”, Şantierul Roşu, 
15 April 1970; “Concursul gazetelor de perete”, Şantierul Roşu, 1 May 1972; “Gazetele de perete 
în concurs”, Şantierul Roşu, 17 October 1972.
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also offered courses in legislation and geography, with 120 people enrolled 
to attend.44
Technical propaganda, def ined “as the popularisation and spread by 
mass actions of the new conquests in science and technology, of advanced 
working procedures and exercises, of the elite workers’ activity in the social-
ist competition”, was organised by conferences, lectures, and scientif ic 
symposia. Regular meetings were scheduled among workers in different 
sections, with, for instance, mechanics debating the necessity of accom-
plishing their working plan and of showing discipline and seriousness in 
their productive activities.45
In the same time, employees were included in different forms of cultural, 
social, and sporting activities. The shipyard’s library included 9,180 volumes 
in 1950 and almost 30,000 in the early 1970s, including both technical books 
and general literature. According to official statistics (most probably rigged), 
80 per cent of workers borrowed and read books in 1966, with an annual 
average of sixteen literary and two technical books per employee.46
In 1957 the shipyard established a sporting association called Ancora 
(The Anchor), with 3,000 members involved in mass sport and 190 in of-
f icial competitions. In the 1970s it had eight sections: canoeing-kayaking, 
rugby, football, volleyball, handball, table tennis, chess, and orienteering.47 
Sporting competitions were organised in the workers’ free time; Spartakiada 
followed the Soviet model, the hero being embodied by a slave, a true social 
model. During the national communist phase, the leadership organised 
the Daciada, preaching the qualities of the Romanians’ brave forbearers, 
the ancient Dacians.
There were also artistic troops of folk and modern dance, theatre, music, 
and so forth, with about 100 amateur artists involved in these activities. Ar-
tistic performances in each workshop were adapted to serving propaganda 
needs. Two of the shows presented in 1967 were called “Competition Is in 
Full Swing” and “We Are the Youth Brigade”, and they referred to model 
workers, preaching respect and good organisation of production. A new 
show was entitled “A Good Day Starts in the Morning”, which was conceived 
44 Lucreția Maftei and Ion Palamiuc, “Conținutul corespunde cerințelor. Notă slabă frecvenței 
și muncii unor propagandiști. Carențe la capitolul: însușirea problemelor”, Şantierul Roşu, 
16 February 1967; “La universitatea muncitorească tematica a fost judicios întocmită. De ce nu 
s-a respectat? Frecvența slabă. Uneori sub 25%”, Şantierul Roşu, 1 April 1967.
45 “Ridicarea continuă a calității personalului”, Şantierul Roşu, 16 January 1967.
46 “Propaganda tehnică în Șantier”, Şantierul Roşu; Maftei et al. (eds), Şantierul naval Galaţi, 
155-156.
47 Maftei et al. (eds), Şantierul naval Galaţi, 160-162.
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as “a lyrical incursion into how working time is used”.48 In the same time, a 
literary club, called Nicolae Labiş, was founded in 1961, with poems preach-
ing the productive activity of the shipyard, of the party leaders, and of the 
country. The following lines (literally translated, without respecting rhyme 
and measure) are extracted from a poem devoted by a local planner to his 
beloved shipyard, a good example of proletarian culture encouraged by 
the regime:49
The Danube godfathered it at its baptism
And people brought it up and made it great,
Its name has ever since appeared in all chronicles,
Written in our pure alphabet in golden letters
That stand all storms: GALAŢI SHIPYARD.
I see the Danube at a twilight hour and a new song
Caresses the shipyard with every new wave
And the yard kisses back the old river
And lays in Danube’s arms a charming cargo boat.
By 1989, almost all Romanian workers belonged to trade unions, which were 
organs for worker representation in name only. In fact labour unions were 
completely controlled by the party and acted as transmission belts carrying 
directives from the central administration to the rank and f ile. Workers 
had to join unions to receive social welfare and several other benefits, as 
they were responsible for distributing flats, for subsidising holiday permits 
to Romanian resorts, and for providing f inancial support in times of need 
(when children were born or close relatives died). In 1971 workers’ councils 
were established in all economic enterprises, allegedly to involve workers 
in economic decision-making, but in reality to shore up support for the 
regime. However, the employees’ interest in such organisations remained 
limited, as they were dominated by the same diligent activists.50
The Union of Communist Youth (UCY) had the same structure as the 
Communist Party and was both a youth political party and a mass organisa-
tion. Membership was open to those between the ages of 15 and 26, and 
employees over 18 could also become members of the party. Its mission 
was to educate young people in the spirit of communism and mobilise 
48 “Activitate rodnică a brigăzii artistice de agitație din atelierul strungărie”, Şantierul Roşu, 
15 May 1967; Maftei et al. (eds), Şantierul naval Galaţi, 156-159.
49 Jan Parfeni, “Şantierul Naval”, Şantierul Roşu, 3 March 1973.
50 Bachman, Romania, 100-101.
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them for building a socialist society.51 It organised political and patriotic 
courses in schools and factories, but also had regular meetings to analyse 
social behaviour and to condemn those workers accused of immoral at-
titudes. A certain Ion Oprea was publicly admonished for his deeds (theft 
and drunkenness), but also for his lack of interest in reading the shipyard’s 
newspaper and in improving his working capacities, because he was smug 
and disrespectful with his elders.52 A list of the activities UCY held in Sep-
tember 1973 is illustrative of the organisation’s role: 200 young workers did 
patriotic labour cleaning a street in Galaţi; on a free Sunday 235 youngsters 
worked to dehusk seventy tons of corn in a neighbouring village; forty 
people made a trip to a resort in the Carpathians; 600 men were trained to 
f ire weapons in the compulsory lessons for defending the country; and the 
UCY members collected 150 tons of waste iron.53
Conclusions
After four decades of continuous transformation and four phases of in-
vestment, the balance sheet for the local shipbuilding industry indicated 
a marked quantitative increase. Under the co-ordination of the Naval 
Industrial Central, 2,281 ships amounting to 6,191,000 dwt were built in 
Romanian shipyard between 1971 and 1988, almost twenty times more than 
the displacement of the vessels constructed in the previous two decades. 
Of these ships, 90 per cent were Romanian-designed projects drafted by 
ICEPRONAV Galaţi and were f itted with engines, naval equipment, electri-
cal cables, and radio-navigation equipment manufactured in the country. 
About 12,000 employees worked in Galaţi in the naval industry, with about 
8,000 in Galaţi Shipyard, about 2.5 times more than in the early 1950s. 
Engineers were trained in a naval engineering department within the local 
university, with about 1,000 graduates in these four decades. The shipyard 
had three modern production lines, two with side launch facilities and a 
dry dock, in which about 500 ships were built throughout this period.
However, things were not as good in terms of quality. Many components 
manufactured in Romania lacked the proper quality, delivery times were 
hardly respected, and acquisitions of foreign technologies and equipment 
51 Ibid., 220-221.
52 “UTC-iştii nu l-au iertat pe tovarășul Ion Oprea”, Șantierul Roșu, 16 February 1967; “În 
contradicție cu etica. Bun e vinul ghiurghiuliu”, Șantierul Roșu, 1 February 1969.
53 “Acţiuni iniţiate de UTC din SNG”, Șantierul Roșu, 3 October 1972.
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were blocked due to the lack of hard currency. In the last years of the totali-
tarian regime, production visibly dwindled, a trend confirmed after 1990. 
The f irst effects of the transition to a private economy and to a free market 
were quickly apparent, as the shipyard lost its main clients, the shipping 
companies of the Romanian state, which no longer had capital to pay for the 
contracted ships. In a diff icult market, the yard survived by building ship 
bodies for Western contractors, and was f inally privatised in 1999, when 
99 per cent of the shares were bought by the Holland Damen Shipyards 
Group. However, the number of employees continuously decreased, with 
only about 2,000 workers left in the shipyard and about 2,000 more people 
in outsourcing companies. In a post-communist country still in transition 
towards economic and political stability, the current decline in heavy and 
machine construction industry, accentuated by the f inancial crisis of the 
past f ive years, is rendered even more painful by a concomitant growth of 
nostalgia after the golden times of the industrial boom.

The Americas and Australia

15 Charting a new course
US shipbuilding labour, 1950-2014
Robin Dearmon Muhammad
Introduction
This chapter explores the trajectory of United States shipbuilding in the 
second half of the twentieth century and the impact of the declining US 
shipbuilding industry on shipyard workers. During this period US industrial 
workers faced many challenges as urban deindustrialisation led to wage 
stagnation and accelerated unemployment. However, US shipyard work-
ers who remained employed were also among the highest-paid industrial 
workers in the country. As US shipbuilding declined, the role of the US 
government and specif ically the US Maritime Administration (MARAD) 
became increasingly important as private ship production of large mer-
chant ships rapidly diminished by the end of the twentieth century. For 
the shipyard workers who remained on the job, the increased dependence 
on naval contracts meant comparatively stable wages, but at the expense 
of shrinking employment. Moreover, labour legislation in the late twen-
tieth century extended protections and forms of redress to US shipyard 
and other industrial workers, but such protective labour policies proved 
inadequate for many who worked in welding and other shipyard trades. 
Understanding how and why US shipbuilding shifted from supporting both 
private and naval production to an almost exclusive focus on naval ships 
will demonstrate the transformation of the US shipyard worker during the 
late twentieth century.
Maritime subsidies and national defence
As with other shipbuilding nations in the late twentieth century, the United 
States government grappled with how to compete in world trade and 
maintain national security. Historically US shipyards were either private 
enterprises or naval yards, but by the early twentieth century this division 
of production was beginning to blur. The First World War was a watershed 
moment for US shipbuilding, paving the way for subsidies to shipbuilders 
in times of war and peace. To meet wartime demand the US Navy built and 
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repaired vessels as well as contracting to private shipbuilders for partial or 
complete production of cargo and strategic ships.1 Furthermore, to maintain 
both a merchant and naval f leet the US government passed the Merchant 
Marine Act of 1920 (known as the Jones Act) to authorise shipbuilding subsi-
dies and to require US ships only on domestic shipping routes.2 Protectionist 
policies covering US shipbuilding are deemed appropriate by the US public, 
politicians, and labour to maintain an advantageous position in the world 
market and to secure a regular and reliable naval fleet for national defence.3
Although business subsidies appeared to be an anathema to US politics, 
the US Maritime Commission used competitive tendering for government 
contracts as a means to avoid high costs to taxpayers. Cost-cutting in this 
manner was not successful, although the subsidisation system continued 
to be ref ined. Under the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, cost-plus contracts 
(as they were called) allowed shipbuilders to capture up to 10 per cent of 
the contract price. Cost-plus contracts were intended to provide an incen-
tive to private shipbuilding while giving the navy control over design and 
production.4 During the Second World War, however, there were several 
attempts to curb costs and this cost-effectiveness goal persisted in the 
post-war period. Studies of the Second World War production of cargo and 
1 For the American shipbuilding effort in the First World War, see Kelly and Allen, The 
Shipbuilding Industry, Hutchins, “History and Development of the Shipbuilding Industry in 
the United States”, Powell, “Labor in Shipbuilding”, Mattox, Building the Emergency Fleet, and 
Hurley, The New Merchant Marine and The Bridge to France. For the Second World War, see 
Lane, Ships for Victory. See also Lindberg and Todd, Anglo-American Shipbuilding in World War 
II. For the US relationship with the sea generally, see Labaree et al., America and the Sea. During 
the First World War, the US Emergency Fleet Corporation yards output peaked in 1919, and the 
last ships were delivered in 1921. Of a total of 1,409 ships built between 1916 and 1921, 1,033 were 
delivered after the war ended. In 1921 the Emergency shipyards were closed down. Thereafter, 
naval work and ship repair kept a nucleus of private yards in business during the interwar period, 
See Murphy, “The British Shipbuilding Industry During the Great War”, 63. Such was the glut 
of American-built ships after 1918 that it inhibited US domestic shipbuilding for most of the 
1920s and 1930s; some two-thirds of steel ships built rusted laid up. See Hutchins, “History and 
Development of the Shipbuilding Industry in the United States”, 55.
2 The Merchant Marine Act of 1920 is a federal law which provides for the promotion and 
maintenance of the US merchant marine. Inter alia, the act regulates maritime commerce in 
US territorial waters and between US ports. Section 27 of the Jones Act deals with cabotage 
(coastal shipping) and requires that all goods transported by water between US ports be carried 
on US-flagged ships, built in the United States, owned by US citizens, and crewed by US citizens 
and US permanent residents. The Jones Act is applicable along the Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacif ic 
Coasts, down the St Lawrence Seaway, and between the East and West Coasts via the Panama 
Canal. The act also applies to Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and Guam. 
3 Whitehurst, The US Shipbuilding Industry, Past, Present and Future, 26-27.
4 Lane, Ships for Victory, 101-104.
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strategic vessels reveal that 41 per cent of the costs were attributed to labour, 
and another 41 per cent of more than USD $14 bn in costs arose from the 
cost of materials.5
Although unique in many respects, US shipyard production must be 
seen within an international exchange of technologies. US shipbuilding 
has shared aspects with other national shipbuilding industries. During 
both world wars, US shipyards borrowed designs from other countries and 
produced emergency ships in what became associated with the American 
method of assembly-line production. During the Second World War, the 
basis of the American Liberty-ship programme was a modif ied British 
design by J.L. Thompson of Sunderland.6 In addition some sixty Ocean-class 
cargo vessels were built in US shipyards to the Thompson design during 
1941-1942.7 After 1945, the San Francisco Bay Area defence industries closed 
and left behind empty industrial plants, shipyards, and temporary wartime 
housing. This was particularly true of “Emergency shipyards” built primarily 
to construct cargo vessels, many of which were located there.8 Emergency 
shipyards were hastily erected along the waterfront and competed with the 
more established shipyards for labour, resources, and government contracts.
After the Second World War, the contracting system remained com-
petitive in theory, but the f inancing incorporated by subsidies and loans 
was administered by MARAD. In addition, Titles 5 and 6 of the Merchant 
Marine Act of 1936 allowed for a construction differential subsidy (CDS) 
5 Ibid., 819-822.
6 For the Liberty Ship programme, see Sawyer and Mitchell, The Liberty Ships, and Elphick, 
Liberty. 
7 The Ocean-class ships were built in two new shipyards under the aegis of Todd Shipbuilding 
Corporation at Portland, Maine, and Richmond, California. Both were owned by the British 
government, which sold them in 1943 to the United States Maritime Commission. See Johnman 
and Murphy, British Shipbuilding and the State Since 1918, 63, 85. See also Johnman and Murphy, 
“The British Merchant Mission in the United States and British Merchant Shipbuilding during 
the Second World War”.
8 Richmond was particularly congested; the Kaiser Corporation built four Emergency 
shipyards there, while Marinship was located across the Bay in Marin County, and Moore Dry 
Dock in Oakland. Prior to the war, Richmond had a population of 24,000; by 1945 the population 
had increased to over 100,000. The rapid increase in population led to increased expenditure, 
overcrowded schools, barrack-like public housing, overloaded sewerage, high crime, increased 
traff ic, and a city administration unable to keep pace with the demand for social services. See 
“Richmond Took a Beating”, Fortune, February 1945, 262-264. See also seven oral testimonies 
on Richmond during the Second World War, “On the Waterfront: An Oral History of Richmond, 
California”, held at the Regional Oral History Off ice, The Bancroft Library, University of Califor-
nia, Berkeley. For Marinship, see Finnie, Marinship, and for Kaiser, see Adams, Mr Kaiser Goes 
to Washington.
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by which the shipbuilder was subsidised between one-third and one-half 
of the differences between the costs of producing a given ship in a foreign 
shipyard in comparison to one in the United States.9
The decline in the post-war merchant fleet signalled a new era for US 
shipbuilding in which the historical connection between the US merchant 
marine being an auxiliary to naval defence was steadily being severed. 
Although subsidies continued throughout the post-war period; these 
subsidies could not prevent the eventual decline of US shipbuilding. As a 
counter-cyclical corrective, naval contracts remained relatively stable with 
increased production during the Korean and Vietnam Wars.10
Shipyard processes elsewhere required workers to work in groups of 
two or more trades embracing a f lexible approach to work organisation. 
However, post-war market patterns of demand were not conducive to the 
use of the assembly-line approach and standardisation of product developed 
during the First and Second World Wars in US Emergency shipyards, and, 
like the Emergency shipyards of the First World War, their counterparts 
in the Second World War went the same way. For the most part the long-
established private US shipbuilders did not alter the layout of their shipyards 
after 1950. Other international shipbuilders modernised their shipyards to 
facilitate production f low and standardisation in the post-1945 period.11 
9 Gibson and Donovan, Abandoned Ocean, 138-142.
10 Ibid., 197-203.
11 A good example is the American shipowner Daniel Ludwig, who took over the lease of the 
former Kure naval yard in Japan and formed National Bulk Carriers utilising production methods 
of the US War Emergency Shipbuilding Programme. His production methods were not lost on 
other Japanese shipbuilders, and by 1956 Japan had overtaken Britain as the world’s premier 
Table 15.1  Ship Production in U.S. Shipyards, 1950-2004
Year Merchant Tonnage Naval Tonnage
Ships 000gt ships 000 LD
1950 26 415  o   0
1960 25 404 12  39
1970 13 370 32 166
1980 23 788 19 102
1990  0   0 14 102
2000  1   7  8 124
2004  2 243  4 142
Sources: MaRad (u.S. Maritime administration); MaRad ceased publication of its annual Survey of 
Shipyards in 2004, http://www.shipbuilding history.com/today/statistics/deliver2.htm
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Undercutting production was the decline in the numbers of privately owned 
tonnage.
Cycles of shipbuilding boom and bust were not new to the shipyard 
workers of the late twentieth century. However, after the Second World 
War a number of factors contributed to a declining shipyard workforce 
and an undermining of traditional working-class communities in many 
US port cities. By 1946, it was clear that there was a huge amount of excess 
capacity relative to normal peacetime demand in US shipbuilding. By March 
1946, 171 large naval warships ordered had been cancelled.12 Emergency 
wartime shipyards were closed and, by 1947, the US government had sold 
off much of its surplus wartime tonnage to private American buyers or 
Allied governments under the Ship Sales Act of 1946,13and laid up a huge 
amount of merchant and naval tonnage as a National Defense Reserve 
Fleet (NRDF), administered by MARAD. In 1947, US merchant shipbuilding 
output was 54 per cent below that of the previous year, and by 1955 output 
had plummeted to a paltry 119,000 grt. Employment, primarily due to naval 
construction and repair, stood at 77,867 at the beginning of 1949, not far 
off the 1939 total of 80,100, but had dropped to 72,000 by 1950 as the last of 
wartime naval tonnage was completed. During the 1950s and 1960s, as it 
had done after the First World War, the United States reverted to a relatively 
high-cost shipbuilding industry and, as it had been during the interwar 
shipbuilder – a position it retained for the rest of the century. See Davies, “The Role of National 
Bulk Carriers and the Advance of Shipbuilding Technology in Post-War Japan”.
12 Todd and Lindberg, Anglo-American Shipbuilding, 200.
13 By some estimates, more than 2,000 vessels were sold under this process by 1949. See Gibson 
and Donovan, Abandoned Ocean, 170.
Table 15.2  Privately Owned U.S. Merchant Fleet, 1950-1999 ( vessels of at least 
1000 gross register tons)
Year No. of Ships Gross tons (000) DWT tons (000)
1950 1,087  8,795 13,195
1960 1,003  9,491 13,898
1970  793  9,782 14,404
1980  578 13,467 21,103
1990  406 13,085 20,529
1999  281  9,544 13,213
Sources: MaRad (u.S. Maritime administration); http://www.shipbuildinghistory.com/today/
statistics/totalfleet.htm
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period, it basically became a ward of state – the mercantile side depend-
ent on constructing Jones Act tonnage, and the naval and larger mixed 
naval and commercial yards dependent on warship construction for the 
US Navy. Employment and production increased as a result of the Korean 
War, but many of the vessels used in that conflict were reactivated from 
the NRDF. Other factors impinging on US shipbuilding demand were that, 
unlike Europe and other economies dependent on maritime trade for food 
imports, the United States has remained more self-reliant in agricultural 
production. Consequently, US trade routes did not expand as widely as in 
other countries. Perhaps a larger barrier has been labour costs, tax laws, 
and restrictive maritime legislation (Jones Act) encouraging US owners to 
register their ships outside the USA.14
After the Korean War, the USA retained the world’s largest navy, and 
naval construction, not least for power projection and Cold War realities, 
remained steady with short-lived spikes in output during the Vietnam 
War. In the naval-only yards from 1952 to 1972, ninety-two new ships were 
built, ranging from aircraft carriers to landing craft, and wartime cruis-
ers were converted into guided missile destroyers. However, by 1972 new 
construction in naval-only yards had ceased, as Daniel Todd and Michael 
Lindberg noted, to preserve private naval-shipbuilding capacity and not 
least because ships built in naval yards cost 30 per cent more than those 
built in commercial mixed naval and mercantile yards.15
The 1980s witnessed two major changes in governmental policy applied 
to US shipbuilding. First, federal subsidies were terminated and, second, 
defence spending increased signif icantly for nearly a decade.16 From 1981 
onwards, President Ronald Reagan – a committed advocate of free markets 
and laissez-faire economics – promoted a 600-ship navy policy which en-
sured continued naval construction. Moreover, the increasing dependence 
14 Stopford, Maritime Economics, 144-145, 152-157, 157-158. Registration of a ship under a par-
ticular national f lag requires the shipowner to comply with the national law of the registering 
country. Consequently, the registered ship becomes “an extension of national territory while it 
is in international waters”. The modern practice of f lagging ships in foreign countries began in 
the 1920s in the United States when shipowners frustrated by increased regulation and rising 
labour costs began to register their ships to Panama. The use of open registries steadily increased, 
and in 1968, Liberia surpassed the United Kingdom as the world’s largest shipping register. At 
2010[update], more than half of the world’s merchant ships were registered with open registries, 
and Panamanian-, Liberian-, and Marshall Islands-f lagged ships accounted for almost 40 per 
cent of the entire world f leet, by deadweight tonnage.
15 Todd and Lindberg, Anglo-American Shipbuilding, 202.
16 John J. Stocker, President of the Shipbuilders Council of America, Statement to US Coast 
Guard’s Plan to Improve Deepwater Accountability, 21 March 1991.
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of US shipbuilders on government contracts was brought into sharp focus 
with the ending by the Reagan administration in 1981 of the Construction 
Differential Subsidy Program (CDS). Prior to this, the US shipbuilding 
industry had delivered, on average, around twenty ships per annum since 
1955. The CDS was a programme whereby the US government attempted 
to offset the higher shipbuilding cost in the United States by paying up to 
50 per cent of the difference between cost of US and non-US construction. 
The difference went to the US shipyard.17 The CDS was unfunded after 1982, 
when no new funds were requested, and has remained dormant since then. 
However, there was almost USD $50 mn available in carry-over funding for 
extant contracts and a temporary one-year building subsidy was given to 
US owners building abroad.18 As a result commercial shipbuilding in US 
shipyards was dealt a near-fatal body blow, and those yards which survived 
became largely dependent on government naval contracts. Prior to this, 
commercial shipbuilding contracts under Jones Act provisions accounted 
for about two-thirds of the total US shipbuilding workload from 1973 to 
1978. By this stage the naval market had begun to pick up, and by the end of 
the decade US shipyards employed around 180,000 people on the Atlantic, 
Pacif ic, and Gulf coasts and on the Great Lakes. This high dependency on 
17 The CDS was legislatively enshrined in the 1936 Merchant Marine Act, Title V. For a succinct 
description of CDS, see Caras, “US Maritime Administration Financing Procedures Available 
for New Ship Construction”.
18 Forty-three container ships were built in the USA up to 2010 – thirty-one with CDS, twelve 
without. The f irst was American Lancer for US Lines, built by Sun Shipbuilding, Chester, Penn-
sylvania, 1968, 22,225 dwt. Sun built f ive of these vessels for US Lines from 1968-69. The last 
built with CDS was the President Monroe, built in 1983 by the Avondale Shipbuilding, Bridge 
City, Louisiana, 32,000 dwt. The last built without CDS was Muanalei, 30,00 dwt built by Aker 
Philadelphia in 2006. See http//www.shipbuildinghistory.com (accessed 1 July 2014).
Table 15.3  Output Value in U.S. Shipbuilding and Repairing, 1960-2010
Year Total Value of shipments
(000’USD)
Value Added as %
of Total
1960  1,461 59%
1970  2,682 60%




Sources: Bureau of census; http://shipbuildinghistory.com/today/statistics/bocsales.htm
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naval contracts led to around 40,000 jobs being lost in the commercial 
shipbuilding sector in the 1980s. Indeed, for the majority of the 1980s the 
United States had hardly any commercial ships on order or under construc-
tion, and in 1988 it registered, rather ignominiously, given its heritage, a 0 
per cent share of the world commercial shipbuilding market – a situation 
which continued to 1991.
American shipbuilding unions
Shipyard workers, welders, riveters, ship f itters, and others organised 
throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to encour-
age both private and government investment in order to expand union 
membership. They remain among the most organised industrial workers 
in North America. By the 1950s there were several trade unions in the US 
shipyards, including the International Association of Machinists (IAM), the 
United Electrical Workers (UE), and the largest trade union for shipyard 
workers, the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, 
Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers (IBB).19
From the 1930s US shipyard workers were covered by labour legislation 
and governmental policies seeking to protect the workers’ right to organise. 
In addition, unions supported the extension of Roosevelt’s New Deal labour 
laws well into the second half of the twentieth century. Consequently 
many workers’ unions pursued legislative means of redress for disputes 
over wages and working conditions that could not be settled through the 
normal negotiations with shipyard owners. Historically, most of the skilled 
positions in US shipbuilding, such as boilermakers and ships’ f itters were 
almost exclusively held by male Caucasians, who were highly unionised, 
particularly in the Bay Area of San Francisco. Immigrants and other workers 
of colour were largely relegated to non-union and unskilled positions. This 
position altered during the two world wars but did not fundamentally 
change in their aftermath.20
19 Dubofsky and McCartin (eds), American Labor: A Documentary Collection. For the IBB, 
founded in 1893, see their off icial history, Grace Under Pressure.
20 Included in the non-white category of workers were Filipinos, Portuguese, Mexicans, South 
Americans, and Chinese. See Archibald, Wartime Shipyard, 100-109. Archibald, a sociologist, 
worked at Moore Dry Dock in Oakland, California, during the war. By 1940 most African-
American shipyard workers remained concentrated in Southern and mid-Atlantic shipyards, 
and by March 1943 they comprised 8.4 per cent of all shipyard workers. In the First World War, 
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During the Second World War US industrial workers transferred to 
shipyard and other defence industries to meet the demand for skilled 
labour. This was a consistent national pattern with the exception of the less-
industrialised West Coast where most of the shipyard labour demand had 
to be met by workers from non-manufacturing industries and by women. 
African-American shipyard workers, particularly in the San Francisco Bay 
Area, had historically used the shipbuilding and maritime industries to 
launch labour and civil rights campaigns. Nevertheless, entering skilled 
positions required them to challenge both unions and shipbuilding employ-
ers on racial and gender exclusion.21
After 1945, shipyard closures swept through many parts of the United 
States. In south-eastern and Gulf Coast shipbuilding centres such as 
Newport News and New Orleans, shipyard workers experienced high 
unemployment, but not as high as in the Bay Area of San Francisco, the 
home of many war Emergency shipyards primarily building cargo ves-
sels. Even repair work, which had enabled the IBB to retain their hold on 
shipbuilding, had receded by the 1950s as the naval and merchant marine 
demanded fewer cargo vessels and warships. Post-war reconversion became 
synonymous with a reversal of fortunes for shipbuilding and workers alike, 
sharing many features with what we now associate with globalisation, 
the corresponding f igure was approximately 10 per cent. See Rubin, The Negro in the Shipbuilding 
Industry, 37-43. 
21 For female participation, see, for example, Archibald, Wartime Shipyard, Kessleman, Fleeting 
Opportunities, Gregory, Women in Defense Work during World War II, and Anderson, Wartime 
Women. The only comparable British study is Murphy, “From the Crinoline to the Boilersuit”. 
For early twentieth-century African-American labour struggles along the Bay Area waterfront, 
see DearmonJenkins, “Linking Up the Golden Gate”.









Sources: MaRad Bureau of labor Statistics (Sic 3731); http/www.shipbuildinghistory.com/today/
statistics/jobs/htm
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employment instability, and outsourcing of industries and undermining 
labour organisations.22
The International Association of Machinists (IAM) and the IBB, both 
members of the larger organisation the American Federation of Labor (AFL) 
adopted the No-Strike Pledge for the duration of the Second World War. 
Although there were wildcat strikes called despite the pledge, most ship-
yard workers did not strike. The IAM became more prominent in airplane 
production while the IBB dominated shipbuilding. The IBB, in particular, 
received congressional support in the form of the Frey Amendment whereby 
they were given almost exclusive rights to organise shipyards on the West 
Coast.23
During the 1950s the IBB remained a dominant union in many shipyards 
but as closures continued and merchant shipbuilding began to decline, 
shipyard workers in the IBB began to see signs of dwindling member-
ship. The 1950s also witnessed a purging of radical labour organising in a 
variety of unions. Long-standing conflicts with another national labour 
organisation, the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), had taken 
its toll on both organisations. When the AFL and CIO merged in 1955 to 
form the AFL-CIO, national labour leaders campaigned more directly with 
Congress for legislative change. Shipyard workers in some instances felt 
that the effort to increase membership and to protest against shipyard 
closures was diminished. Indeed, the merger did not translate into sustained 
membership in Southern port cities, where most of the remaining shipyards 
remained open.24
To avoid labour problems many shipbuilders looked for more favourable 
policies for US ships while shipping companies often hired ships under 
foreign flags, thereby stimulating shipbuilding in countries outside North 
America. Subsidies in peacetime were not common in US maritime history. 
However US shipbuilders that formed joint partnerships with the state 
often shared a pattern of investment with other countries where subsidies 
were more common. The concept of a “eurocracy” might have encouraged 
co-operation among European shipbuilding nations but the United States 
remained aloof to further co-operation. The post-war years encouraged a 
brief period of international co-operation among shipbuilders. The Treaty 
of Rome (1957) further encouraged co-operation, especially within Europe. 
By the 1970s, however, the West European focus was to press back against 
22 Wollenberg, Marinship at War, 83; “Outlook for Employment in the Shipbuilding Industry”.
23 Zieger, The CIO, 1935-1955, 170-174.
24 Ibid., 367-369; Lichtenstein, Labor’s War at Home, 244-245.
cHaRting a neW couRSe 431
Japanese competition. But a succession of world economic crises knocked 
all parties back into a nationalist orientation.25
Whether or not collaboration could be found, all shipbuilding countries 
witnessed technological advances in shipbuilding, particularly in the mili-
tary sphere. Nuclear submarines were a case in point, their construction 
and fitting-out involving a wide range of industries.26 Gaining from wartime 
experience, welding techniques had also improved. Faster and better weld-
ing techniques improved productivity. There was an increasing demand 
for larger ships, particularly bulk carriers and tankers to reap economies 
of scale, making many older and smaller vessels obsolete. The implica-
tions of ageing ships vary with different market demands. US shipbuilding 
advanced with new technological designs. As Martin Stopford explains, 
merchant ships deteriorate over time, causing a reduction in their market 
value. Once the market value drops below the scrap value, the ship is likely 
to be scrapped. New technology or operating economics can accelerate the 
ship’s obsolescence, as was the case in 1973-1974 when rising oil prices made 
turbine tankers technically obsolete owing to their high fuel consumption.27 
Merchant ships take several years to build and have a physical life of f ifteen 
to thirty years.28
After the Suez Canal closure of 1967 and thereafter, the demand for 
ever-larger tanker and other bulk vessels grew, to carry more goods and fuel 
around the continent of Africa via the Cape of Good Hope, thereby bypass-
ing the trade route through the canal and the Mediterranean. Building ships 
that could hold containers to be transported to truck or rail cars shifted 
the emphasis away from building and maintaining merchant fleets. One 
container ship could replace several cargo vessels and facilitate the trans-
portation of many different types of dry break-bulk cargoes.29 During the 
1960s, despite periodic passage of new shipbuilding subsidies, US merchant 
shipping was wilting under competition from non-US flagged vessels, which 
were appearing in increasing numbers to meet commercial demand. Naval 
25 Stråth, The Politics of De-Industrialisation, 207-223.
26 For this, see Weir, Forged in War.
27 Stopford, Maritime Economics, 40-41.
28 Ibid., 72.
29 The United States is generally credited with the rise of containerisation through the Mat-
son Shipping Line and the “father of containerisation”, the Scots-American trucker Malcolm 
McLean, who acquired thirty-seven wartime C-2 cargo vessels in 1955 and began a roll-on-roll-off 
container service linked to road and rail transport, giving rise to intermodalism of sea and 
land transportation. In 1969, McLean’s Sealand company ordered an entirely new f leet of eight 
container ships from West German and Dutch shipyards. For containerisation in general, see 
Broeze, The Globalisation of the Oceans, Levinson, The Box, and Cudahy, Box Boats.
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shipbuilding became the steady and growing focus of US shipbuilding from 
this point forward.30 US commercial shipbuilding remained a relatively 
high-cost enterprise. Japanese shipyard workers did not earn as much as US 
shipyard workers but their shipbuilding industry was more productive and 
eff icient.31 Moreover, by the 1990s the cost of building a ship in the United 
States was double the cost anywhere else. Petitioning the US government, 
shipbuilders claimed that foreign subsidies to foreign shipbuilders made 
fair competition impossible. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in the 
United States investigated the shipbuilders’ claims and found that even the 
elimination of foreign subsidies would offer little benefit to US shipyards.32 
Beforehand, Japan moved ahead with integrated production methodolo-
gies – using robotics to streamline shipyard processes33 – and Japanese 
shipbuilders maintained strong ties with specif ic shipping lines.34
The greatest challenge came to US workers affected by mergers and shut-
downs. Growing production paralleled a growing body of workers directly 
involved in shipbuilding. In 1950, there were 72,800 workers in US shipyards 
but that number had more than doubled by 1981 to 186,700. Following this 
zenith of shipyard employment, the 1990s witnessed a steady decline until a 
levelling off in 2004 of 97,800 shipbuilding workers. The 1990s also marked 
a decline in naval employment. By the eve of the twenty-f irst century, the 
US Navy had reduced the number of its aircraft carriers from 15 to 11, and 
the number of nuclear submarines from 100 to 75. The civilian employ-
ment was also reduced by half during this period in the naval shipyards.35 
Earlier, at the Fore River yard in Quincy, Massachusetts, which closed in the 
1980s, there was a campaign to reopen the yard under workers’ ownership.36 
Worker-ownership programmes also occurred during this period while 
maritime unions fought American ownership of foreign-flag shipping.37 
Aaron Schneider’s work suggests that traditional methods of shipyard labour 
organising gave way to more community-oriented strategies. In the past, 
US shipyard workers had poured their energies into unionisation. Before 
the Second World War, shipyard unionisation relied on racial exclusion 
and limited labour legislation. The Second World War ushered in a period 
30 Latorre, “US Shipbuilding Potential in the World Market”, 248-249.
31 Gibson and Donovan, Abandoned Ocean, 269.
32 Ibid., 270.
33 Stopford, Maritime Economics, 293.
34 Ibid., 295.
35 Riposo et al., US Navy Shipyards, 13.
36 Palmer, Organizing the Shipyards, 245.
37 Gibson and Donovan, Abandoned Ocean, 232.
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of greater labour legislation protecting the rights of shipyard workers and 
others. Schneider explains that port cities were able to thrive so long as 
trade and industry grew. However, New Orleans needed governmental 
intervention. “The first half of the twentieth century,” he writes, “saw limited 
diversif ication, and it was federal infrastructure investment of the New 
Deal and World War II stimulus that boosted military-industrial production 
around the middle of the century.”38During the 1990s, US shipyard workers 
faced an uncertain future. The shipyard workforce was divided between 
those who struggled to keep shipyards open and those who were embedded, 
in many ways, in the military-industrial complex.
In 1993 the IBB was voted in as the shipbuilding industry union of choice. 
However, the Avondale shipyard owners f iled objections with the National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB). Litigation dragged on for four years until the 
NLRB certif ied the union, but the Avondale owners protested and f iled suit 
in federal court.39 Wages had risen steadily, if not spectacularly.
Open registries were debated among the US shipbuilding community 
but ultimately were defeated. US shipping companies by law must build 
US ships to fly under the US flag. With that requirement come additional 
restrictions on maritime labour (not shipyard labour) and taxation.40 Some 
attempts have been made to chip away at, even abolish, the Jones Act. For 
example, by the end of the 1990s several US congressional attempts had 
38 Schneider, “Dualist Development, Globalized Growth, Segmented Labor Markets, and 
Community-Based Resistance”, 48.
39 US Congressional Record, Senate, S7090, 19 June 1999.
40 Gibson and Donovan, Abandoned Ocean, 225-229.
Table 15.5  Hourly Wages in U.S. Shipbuilding and Repairing, 1970-2004









Sources: MaRad (u.S. Maritime administration);. http//shipbuildinghistory.com/today/
statistics/$perhour.htm. 
2004 is the last available year for hourly wage statistics.
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been made to pass a federal law that would roll back the Jones Act.41 These 
attempts were ultimately unsuccessful.
During the 1980s and 1990s US shipyard workers consequently witnessed a 
decline in naval contracts and the highest number of shipyard closures since 
the end of the Second World War.42 Employment was maintained in the major 
shipyards through a series of corporate takeovers. By 2000 (notwithstanding 
the myriad small-ship and boatbuilding companies and a small number of 
medium-sized companies, comprising the US shipbuilding and repair indus-
try) around 10 per cent of f irms accounted for 85 per cent of the business.43 
The six largest companies are often referred to as the “Big Six.” They represent 
two-thirds of the overall US shipbuilding/repair business and 90 per cent 
of naval construction work. These six shipyards are now owned by just two 
companies: General Dynamics owns Electric Boat at Groton, Connecticut, 
Bath Iron Works at Bath, Maine, and National Steel and Shipbuilding Co., on 
San Diego Bay, the largest shipyard on the West Coast; Huntington Ingalls 
Industries owns the largest US shipyard, Newport News Shipbuilding at 
Newport News, Virginia, Ingalls at Pascagoula, Mississippi, and Avondale at 
Bridge City, Louisiana. Collectively, they now employ approximately some 
60,000 workers, nearly two-thirds of those employed in the industry.44 US 
shipbuilding is no longer a national industry as it had been in the past, and 
it largely relies on government contracts and subsidies to survive.
Conclusion
By the end of the twentieth century US shipbuilding faced many of the same 
problems that had bedevilled it from 1945 onwards. Despite building some 
of the most sophisticated warships in the world in naval and commercial 
shipyards, the mercantile side of the industry hardly made a dent in the 
export market for ships, concentrating instead on protected Jones Act 
construction.45 High labour costs and low productivity in American yards 
41 US Congressional Record, Senate, 1999 S. 1032; 106 S. 1032.
42 Lovett, “Realistic Maritime Renewal”, 312-313.
43 At May 2013, there were 117 shipyards in the United States, spread across 26 states, that 
were classif ied as active shipbuilders. In addition, there are more than 200 shipyards engaged 
in ship repairs or capable of building ships but not actively engaged in shipbuilding: MARAD, 
“The Economic Importance of the US Shipbuilding and Repairing Industry”.
44 This f igure is gleaned from the individual company websites (accessed 9 July 2014).
45 This chapter does not cover public naval yards owned by the US government. After 1945 
there were eleven naval yards, but by 2000 the number had been reduced to just four. One of 
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ceded the building of large merchant vessels to other countries, particularly 
to East Asia. Despite a union presence in politics, most of the campaigns to 
end the Jones Act came from agricultural interests rather than industrial 
groups. Why would shipyard unions or shipbuilding f irms, for that matter, 
eschew a protective blanket, which would at least assure a minimum of 
orders to what remains of the domestic industry?
Throughout the period under discussion, the merchant fleet continued 
to lose ground, and defence contracts were not numerous enough to keep 
more than a few yards in business. That closures of yards occurred and merg-
ers of others consolidated production in fewer producers was inevitable. 
Throughout this process, commercial shipyard labour unions developed 
new strategies, including promoting construction for internal waterways 
and coastal tourism. Shipyard communities faced with closures emerged at 
the forefront of urban economic sustainability campaigns. However, naval 
work mostly sustains the ageing shipyard workforce on the East Coast, with 
those yards specialising in nuclear attack submarines, aircraft carriers, and 
guided missile destroyer work sustaining most of the high-end technical 
workforce in US shipbuilding. The domestic and geo-strategic demands of 
US maritime and naval policy, particularly the latter, ensure a core naval 
construction capability in US shipyards in future. However, even in this 
sphere, further consolidation of the major yards and its subsequent effects 
on employment cannot be ruled out, given that on average ten naval vessels 
have been completed annually from 1990 to 2013. On the mercantile side, the 
industry’s export performance (the acid test of international competitive-
ness) has been lamentable. An annual average of six ships of over 1,000 grt 
completed from 1990 to 2013 is indicative of why US mercantile shipbuilding 
is statistically insignif icant in world terms today.
the four naval yards closed in the 1990s; the Philadelphia Naval yard closed in 1996, but reverted 
to being a private shipyard, Kvaerner Philadelphia, in 1997. The Norwegian-based company 
secured funds from the city of Philadelphia, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and the US 
government to rebuild the shipyard, and in 2000 it began to construct ships there under Jones 
Act provisions. The Kvaerner group imploded in 2005, and in that year another Norwegian 
company, Aker took over the yard. The yard has an orderbook stretching into 2018, and has 
built a series of four container ships and fourteen product tankers for American owners, such 
as the Matson Line.

16 The Argentinean shipbuilding 
industry
Workers’ struggles in a state shipyard
Cintia Russo
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the trajectory and survival of one of 
the oldest and largest ship repair yards in Argentina – Talleres Dársena 
Norte (also known as TANDANOR, and today known as Complejo industrial 
naval argentino, CINAR).
I will also identify and analyse stages in the history of the Argentine 
shipbuilding industry (ASI) to provide context to the two Argentinean 
shipyards studied in this book. In this sense, I highlight the role played in 
this path by two social actors, the state and trade unions: the former is a 
key factor in the trajectory of the ASI, and the struggles of the latter have 
achieved the shipyard’s survival.1
Founded in 1879, TANDANOR was originally established for the 
maintenance of the Argentinean naval f leet. TANANDOR/CINAR, with 
a history of more than a century, has acquired, in the past twenty years, a 
symbolic status as one of the oldest shipyards in Argentina, and the f irst to 
be privatised in 1991, then managed by its workers for nearly a decade, and 
f inally renationalised in 2007. TANDANOR is a representative example of 
the peaks and troughs of the Argentinean economy.
1 The sources used in these pages are: statistics (national, provincial, and chambers of com-
merce), institutional documents, and reports and balance sheets of TANDANOR and the trade 
associations: the Federation of Industry Naval Argentina (FINA), the Association of Buenos 
Aires shipbuilding (ABIN). For the diagnosis and proposals of the shipbuilding trade unions, I 
privileged two sources: key informant interviews and the local press.
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The shipbuilding industry in Argentina
There are three key periods in the ASI’s history during the past f ifty years: 
the f irst covers nearly three decades, from the 1960s to the 1980s, the second 
the decade of the 1990s, and the last from 2002-2003 to date.
The f irst period corresponds to the import-substitution industrialisation 
period: this period was specif ically characterised by the expansion of the 
industry supported by protectionist policies, investment in equipment, 
and technological modernisation.2 According to the economic objec-
tives of the First Five-Year Plan (1947-1951) of the Peron government, the 
industrialisation effort was related to the needs and concerns of military 
defence. The Second Five Year Plan (1952-1957) was explicit about the need 
to provide military equipment to support the decision “to constitute a free 
and sovereign nation”. Astilleros y Fábricas Navales del Estado (AFNE-ARS) 
was formed in 1953 under this plan, near the Naval Base Rio Santiago, with 
the explicit mission of ensuring that the shipbuilding industry existed “to 
strengthen defence and economic independence”.3
The engine of economic growth during the import-substitution industri-
alisation period was an active state (as regulator, producer, client, planner, 
and funds provider).4 Through a set of regulations and subsidies the state 
in its role as producer created shipyards for shipbuilding and repair that 
explained, in large part, the national shipbuilding industry; among the 
most important were: Astillero Rio Santiago (AFNE-ARS), the leader in 
building large vessels; and TANDANOR and Taller de Reparaciones Navales 
(TARENA), both for ship repair.5
During the import-substitution industrialisation period, state-owned 
shipping companies were the most important source of demand for ships, 
the driving force behind the activities of both public and private shipyards. 
The state-owned companies and agencies were: the Argentinean navy, 
Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF), Yacimientos Carboníferos Fiscales 
(YCF), Empresa Flota Fluvial del Estado Argentino (EFFEA), and Empresa 
Líneas Marítimas Argentinas (ELMA).6 Also, during this phase, technical 
and professional skills were developed and nurtured, which improved the 
2 Decree-Law 10267/53, 15 June 1953 (created by AFNE); see Kosacoff (ed.), El desempeño 
industrial argentino más allá de la sustitución de importaciones, and López, “Una puesta en 
perspectiva de la industrialización sustitutiva de importaciones”.
3 Decree-Law 10267/53, 15 June 1953 (created by AFNE).
4 See Bellini, Stato e industria nelle economie contemparanee.
5 See Calá et al., La industria naval argentina.
6 See Ugalde, Las empresas públicas en la argentina. 
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performance of the ASI in the long run. AFNE, TANDANOR, Alianza, Asta-
rsa , Puerto Belgrano, and Arsenal Naval Zárate created technical schools 
for training the labour force, which generated a positive spill-over for the 
rest of the regional industry. AFNE, as the leading shipyard in technical 
studies for the industry, developed a signif icant capability in local design 
engineering, contributing personnel to the wider economy.7
From the late 1950s, as a funds provider, the state improved f inancing 
mechanisms managed by the Banco Industrial of the time. In the early 
1960s, the Merchant Marine Fund (MMF) was created for f inancing public 
and private shipyards, with money acquired from a levy of about 12 per cent 
of the value of freight.8 In addition, the MMF provided loans and subsidies 
to public and private shipyards to acquire and build merchant ships, or to 
modernise shipyards.
In the 1960s the federal government approved a plan to renovate and 
expand the shipping fleet of state-owned companies’.9 In 1969, the Cargo 
Preference Act established that imports and exports had to be transported 
in Argentinean-flagged vessels.10 In this regulatory regime, the merchant 
navy and the state-owned shipyards were two sides of the same coin. On 
one hand, ELMA assured participation in foreign trade freight and, on the 
other, merchant navy ships became one of the main drivers of demand for 
big yards. Until the 1980s, ELMA was the main shipping line of the country, 
with 25 per cent of the national f leet, followed by YPF with 15 per cent.11
Consequences of orthodox policies
Decree-Law 2687/93 states:
To dissolve the Merchant Marine Fund […] that is the intention of the state 
reforms […] to leave the f ield of private functions that do not specif ically 
concern the state. The public sphere should not interfere with free supply 
and demand, or hinder increased supply and transport services.12
7 See González Climent, Historia de la industria naval argentina.
8 Decree-Law 6677/63, 19 August 1963, National Merchant Marine, Creation of the Merchant 
Marine Fund.
9 Decree-Law 15761/60, 30 September 1960 (ELMA, YPF, etc.).
10 Cargo Preference Act 18250/1969, Transport in National Flag Vessels.
11 CEP, La industria naval en la Argentina, 17..
12 Decree-Law 2687/93, 28 December 1993, Dissolution of Merchant Marine Fund.
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In the 1990s, Argentina’s neo-liberal policies were enthusiastically imple-
mented, and had an adverse effect on the maritime sector. The reforms 
were combined as follows: privatisation of state-owned companies that 
supplied goods and services, market deregulation (regulatory framework 
reconf iguration), and commercial liberalisation.13 The deregulation and 
denationalisation applied also had an effect on transport because of the 
privatisation of state-owned shipping companies, the repeal of the cargo-
preference policy, and the assignment to private owners, mainly through 
international investments, of the infrastructure and port management.14 
The three large state-owned shipyards still operating until the 1980s – ARS, 
TANDANOR, and Domecq García – were declared subject to privatisation: 
TANDANOR was privatised in 1991; Domecq García was liquidated and closed 
in 1994; and ARS avoided privatisation by being transferred in 1993 from the 
federal government to the government of the province of Buenos Aires.15
The state intervened to dismantle, piece by piece, the institutional setting 
of the import-substitution industrialisation period. This process began with 
Decree-Law 1772/1991, which allowed the registration of owners of other 
countries, and which led to the widespread use of f lags of convenience.16 
Foreign ships enjoyed, then, the right to be considered national-f lagged 
carriers. In turn, the Domestic Trade Deregulation Act17 annulled the Cargo 
Preference Act 18250/69, arguing that, as cited above, “the public sphere 
should not interfere with free supply and demand, or hinder increased 
supply and transport services”. Moreover, Decree-Law 1493/1992 allowed 
foreign vessels bareboat charter for all kinds of activities for a period of 
three years, including the right to appoint the master and crew.18
The institutional framework of the import-substitution industrialisation 
period that sustained the ASI for three decades was destroyed in each of its 
key strategies, namely: the annulment of laws and decrees through the en-
actment of legislation based on the neo-liberal paradigm, the privatisation 
and closure of public enterprises (YPF, YCF, etc.), and the dismantling of the 
national merchant navy and funding mechanisms. ELMA was dismantled 
in 1997,19 and the MMF was dissolved in 1993.20 This marked a turning 
13 See Azpiazu and Basualdo, Las privatizaciones en la argentina.
14 Decree-Law 24045, 4 December 1991, Privatisation of Entities of the Ministery of Defence.
15 Decree-Law 1787/93, 26 August 1993, AFNE SA, Transfer to the Province of Buenos Aires.
16 Decree-Law 1772, 3 September 1991, Merchant Marine.
17 Decree-Law 2284/91, 1 November 1991, Deregulation of Domestic and Foreign Trade.
18 Decree-Law 1493/92, 24 August 1992, Registration of Foreign Naval Vessels and Artifacts.
19 Decree-Law 343/97, 16 April 1997, Fluvial Maritime Transport.
20 Decree-Law 2687/93, 28 December 1993, Dissolution of Merchant Marine Fund.
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point, the beginning of the decline that led to the cessation of activities of 
some state and private shipyards. The consequences of these policies were 
the reduction in supply of domestic shipyards, and the contraction of the 
Argentinean merchant navy. In summary, in 2005, only 0.9 per cent of the 
sea freight foreign trade was of national origin.21
The ASI operated on a consistent basis between 1974 and 1985 (in the 
number of facilities and employment level); however, between 1985 and 
1994, there was a clear downturn characterised by significant declines in the 
number of facilities and workers. In all, twenty-f ive shipyards were closed, 
shipbuilding suppliers almost disappeared, and an estimated 30,000 people 
directly and indirectly employed in the sector lost their jobs.22
From 1991 to 2009 there was a signif icant drop in the index of physical 
volume of production, followed by a slow recovery in 2002, a period known 
as “post-convertibility”. But it was only in 2007 that this index returned to 
1997 levels, which, in turn, represented only 22.4 per cent of 1991 values.23 
Productivity evolution shows the same trend, whether by per person 
employed or per hour worked. In 2009 the two indices reached 57 per cent 
and 54 per cent less than in 1997. Generally speaking, production levels and 
productivity rates showed a clear decline from 1995 to 2002, when the situ-
ation changed and there was a slight growth. Decree-Law 1010/2004 states:
Considering […] that is urgent to reorganise trade and navigation, con-
sidering the interest of the national treasury […] to preserve the national 
cabotage services and allow this activity to be conducted by Argentine 
companies.
The hegemonic policies of the 1990s began to change with the new federal 
administration in 2003, whose objective was the recovery of economic 
activity. In large part, the regulatory and institutional framework was 
reformulated; consequently, the measures taken in recent years have tended 
to partly offset the effects of adjustment. One such example is Decree-Law 
1010/2004 for the shipbuilding industry, in which the rationale for repeal-
ing some of the previous rules is stated as being in order to “provide the 
necessary conditions to substantially increase the supply of Argentine 
21 CEP, La industria naval en la Argentina, 17.
22 Eng. Podetti, Board member of Federación de la Industria Naval Argentina (FINA), inter-
viewed 25 October 2011. According to the National Economic Census of 1985, direct jobs in the 
shipbuilding industry amounted to 10,200 (Censo Nacional Económico, 1985, INDEC).
23 CEP, Fichas sectoriales: estructura y evolución 1991-2012.
442 cintia RuSSo 
shipowners, reducing operating costs and allowing them to reach prof i-
ciency levels that the market demands”.24
Under Decree-Law 1010/2004, foreign-f lag ships rented through the 
import regime were forced to re-register as national-f lag ships. At the 
same time a special regime was established for the import of supplies and 
manufactured ship parts, in order to build and repair ships in the country. 
Two other measures influenced the sector’s reactivation: a special fund 
created for f inancing shipbuilding in national shipyards, and a national 
Ministry of Labour programme called “Más y Mejor Empleo” (More and 
Better Jobs) to train the workforce.
In the face of the shipbuilding recession of the 1990s, state-owned ship-
yards restructured their activities and turned to ship repair, while others 
cut down on their operations or simply closed down. The ASI today operates 
at 60 per cent of installed capacity, with productivity 40 per cent lower than 
the world average, largely because there has been no significant investment 
in capital goods and new technologies in the past thirty years.25 As for the 
origin of inputs in the domestic shipbuilding industry, in the 1970s about 
60 per cent were national; in 2010 this f igure was 35 per cent.26
Since 2004, increasing levels of foreign trade have improved maritime 
transport business opportunities and, indirectly, shipbuilding as well. Cur-
rency devaluation and the accumulated productive experience of surviving 
shipyards are the cornerstones of the sector’s reactivation. However, this 
process faces some major obstacles: irregularity of orders for shipbuilding, 
f inancial shortcomings, and high levels of unused capacity, infrequent tech-
nological updates, and an inadequately skilled workforce. The dismantling 
of state-owned companies during the 1990s eradicated domestic demand 
for vessels, and today local shipyards basically work on foreign orders.
Almost 90 per cent of the capacity of the ASI (the major shipyards and 
shipbuilding suppliers and service companies involved in the sector) is pro-
vided by: Astillero Río Santiago (ARS, 1953), TANDANOR/CINAR (1879/2007), 
Shipyards Corrientes (1958), Astillero Punta Alvear (2009), Mestrina (1960), 
Tecnao (1978), SPI-ALNAVI (2009), SPI-API (2004), Servicios portuarios in-
tegrado SA, (Spisa, 1976), Coserena (1980), and Astillero Federico Contessi 
24 “This decree establishes the treatment of national f lags and foreign f lags under the tem-
porary import regime by Argentine owners […] Moreover, it is only allowed the import of 
those inputs, parts and/or components that are not produced in the Mercosur”: Decree-Law 
1010/2004. 
25 Eng. Podetti, interviewed 25 October 2011.
26 José Carlos Pietranera. Eng. Naval, former president of TANDANOR and Astillero Rio 
Santiago, interviewed 25 July 2010.
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(1949).27 The main activity of the two state-owned shipyards, ARS and CI-
NAR, is the construction and repair of large vessels. The rest of the shipyards 
mainly construct and repair f ishing boats and river barges; out of these 
private shipyards, only three have been created since 2004.28 In 2013 there 
were nearly 9,000 workers, technicians, and professionals directly employed 
in the shipbuilding industry in Argentina.29 Of this total, 3,500 employees 
belonged to Astillero Rio Santiago, ARS, and 1,300 belonged to the Complejo 
Naval industrial argentino, CINAR; these two public shipyards represent 
more than half of the employment in Argentine shipbuilding sector.
Although the ASI was favoured by the set of new laws and policies imple-
mented since 2004, it cannot overlook that the recovery of a capital goods 
industry is a long-term process. To some extent, this recovery is unlikely if 
not co-ordinated with the rest of the national productive structure, access 
to credit, and the creation of institutional conditions for continued employ-
ment and the best use of human resources.
The workers and the survival of the state-owned shipyards30
The survival of state-owned shipyards in Argentina through the years of 
neo-liberal experiment can be explained by the conjunction, sometimes 
27 In terms of location, 80 per cent of the ASI production capacity and institutional conditions 
(shipyards, supply companies for the shipbuilding industry, infrastructure, f inancing, and 
training institutions) is concentrated in Buenos Aires province. The three main zones in this 
province are Mar del Plata (f ishing vessels), Tigre (pleasure craft), and the Southern Metropolitan 
Region of Buenos Aires. The latter area has the largest capacity in building and repairing large 
vessels, mainly represented by two state-owned companies, ARS and TANDANOR/CINAR. The 
concentration of capacity of the domestic shipbuilding industry suggests some characteristics 
of industrial districts, an attribute that could play a signif icant role in the region and the ASI 
in the medium term.
28 Servicios portuarios integrados SA (Spisa) (ALNAVI -2009, located in Campana, Buenos Aires 
province) specialises in river barges, and Astilleros patagonicos integrados (SPI-API, 2004, in 
Caleta Paula, Santa Cruz province) has the capacity to build and repair vessels up to 800 tons. 
Ultrapetrol Company opened in 2009, in the province of Santa Fe, Astillero Punta Alvear, to 
build barges in series.
29 Figure courtesy of Jorge Moreno, general secretary of the union Sindicato de Trabajadores de 
Talleres y Astilleros Navales (SITTAN) (1990-2009). Today he is a representative of the workers’ 
ownership in the company directorate of TANDANOR; interviewed 7 August 2013.
30 The most important Argentinean maritime trade unions include: Sindicato Argentino de 
Obreros Navales y Servicios de la Industria Naval de la República Argentina (SOINRA), Feder-
ación marítima, portuaria y de la industria naval de la Republica argentina, Sindicato Argentino 
de Obreros Navales (SAON); Sindicato Obreros de la Industria Naval (SOIN); Asociación de 
Trabajadores del Estado (ATE); and SITTAN.
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contradictory, of a set of elements, namely: the participation of the ship-
building unions; the workers’ actions of resistance that strongly confronted 
the hegemonic project through union struggles to keep the shipyards run-
ning; and the workers’ organised resistance to privatisation, which was 
strengthened by regional and social movements (supported by a national-
ist and industrialist ideology). In addition, I include the resistance of the 
managers in charge of the public shipyards and those responsible for the 
strategic needs of the Argentinean navy, whose interests seem to have 
played in favour of resisting privatisation.31
At the end of the crisis of 2001, the consensus among the shipbuilding 
unions considered the main cause of the collapse of the ASI to be the regula-
tory framework of the 1990s that facilitated the importation of vessels, 
discouraging the purchase of locally produced ships. Although Decree-Law 
1010/2004 changed the institutional conditions for the ASI, for the unions, 
the future viability of the industry depends on the implementation of 
specif ic public policies.
They argue not only for the repeal of 1990s regulations, but the restoration 
of policies and institutional conditions that somehow recreate those of the 
industrialisation by import substitution.32
The maritime unions propose, then, a new law for the merchant marine 
and shipbuilding industry – an explicit policy referring to the introduc-
tion of ship mortgage credit, strengthening of human resources training, 
modernisation of transport infrastructure, improving the navigability of 
the waterway Paraguay-Paraná-Rio de la Plata, and other issues. Above 
all, they consider that the restoration of the level of previous production in 
the shipbuilding industry requires the integration of these policies. Even if 
Decree-Law 1010/2004 can be identif ied as a turning point in the recovery of 
the ASI it is considered that “a decree has no force of law”.33 The unions are 
concerned with the present conditions of production and the perspective 
of the shipbuilding industry in order to preserve the employment level in 
the sector. Therefore, the unions debate the necessity of establishing a new 
regulatory framework and a new set of policies for the entire system as a 
31 Russo and Frassa, “Trayectoria reciente y perspectivas futuras de la industria naval pesada 
argentina”, 84.
32 Daniel Zárate, responsible for the institutional relationships department, TANDANOR/
CINAR, interviewed 25 February 2013; Jorge Moreno, interviewed 7 August 2013; Juan Carlos 
Casarico, welder, forty-seven years working in Astillero Rio Santiago, thirty years on board 
ship and twelve years as an instructor at School of Astillero Rio Santiago (ETARS), interviewed 
15 July 2012.
33 Jorge Moreno, interviewed 7 August 2013.
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whole: water transport, port infrastructure, and domestic shipbuilding 
f irms.
The propositions cover a wide range of public policies to sustain the com-
petitiveness of the maritime sector in the medium term. Thus, from 2004 
to the present, a consensus was reached among the unions, which founded 
the National Dialogue Table of the Argentina Shipbuilding Industry.34 In 
2008, they presented a document that summarised this consensus: “The 
Strategic Plan for the Development and Growth of the Shipbuilding Industry 
in Argentina”. The propositions of the round-table basically emphasise the 
following agenda:35
1 A single law for the shipbuilding industry and merchant marine that 
gives sustainability and predictability to the sector, through incentives 
for national f leet renewal and incorporation of new vessels to avoid 
buying used vessels;
2 The creation of a shipbuilding division in the federal administration;
3 The creation of a development-oriented f inancial institution that 
includes the shipping industry; and
4 The promotion of human resources training.
These propositions consider the need to:
a Increase domestic shipbuilding and repair, including for recreational 
and tourism purposes.
b Promote the conversion and technological modernisation of naval ship-
yards and workshops, complementing public and private investment.
c Evaluate customs taxes.
d Evaluate asymmetries with Brazil.
e Participate in projects related to production for defence and security 
in Argentine interior waters, and seas, working with the National Navy 
and the Argentine Naval Prefecture.
f In terms of human resources, it is considered a vital step to encourage 
professional naval technical education as part of the National Education 
System.
34 This committee is also integrated with other associations of shipowners, business chambers, 
entrepreneurs, and business leaders: Federación de la Industria Naval Argentina (FINA); Consejo 
Profesional de Ingeniería Naval (CAPIN); Asociación Bonaerense de la Industria naval (ABIN); 
Astillero Río Santiago; Cámara santafecina de la industria Naval (CSIAN); Facultad de Ingeniería 
Universidad de Buenos Aires (and other Argentinean universities), Facultades de ingeniería, 
Universidad Tecnológica Nacional (UTN).
35 Estigarribia, “La mesa nacional de concertación de la industria naval argentina”.
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TANDANOR/CINAR: the recovery of a state-owned shipyard
The shipyard was created in 1879 for the repair of large ships. In 1922, it 
became the Buenos Aires Naval Arsenal (ANBA), run by the navy and the 
General Administration of Ports, legally established as a corporation, with 
a signif icant share of state capital. The shipyard inherited its infrastructure 
from the navy and the Port Administration, and in 1970 ANBA became 
Talleres Dársena Norte.
In the 1970s, in order to respond to the increased demand for repairs, 
TANDANOR expanded its facilities, joining another state-owned shipyard, 
TARENA. By agreement with the American company Pearlson Engineering 
in 1978, TANDANOR acquired a ship-lift system, Syncrolift, which remains 
in operation until today.
For almost a century, from 1879 until 1983, the shipyard depended on the 
commander in chief of the navy, when it was transferred to the Ministry of 
Defence until its privatisation in 1991. After a period of private management, 
1991-1999, the workers assumed management of TANDANOR, between 1999 
and 2007; in 2007, the shipyard returned to the jurisdiction of the Ministry 
of Defence.
In the early 1990s, the f irst privatisation of a public company in Ar-
gentina took place: after more than a century as a state-owned shipyard, 
TANDANOR was privatised in 1991. That year, the Ministry of Defence 
ordered the sale of a 90 per cent stake in TANDANOR, and authorised the 
sales contract and the call for tenders. On 1 January 1992, Investing North 
Dock (INDARSA) acquired the shipyard. According to the State Reform Law 
(which regulated the privatisation programme), a stock-ownership plan 
was considered, in which workers would own 10 per cent of the shares.36 
However, this programme was not implemented during INDARSA’s manage-
ment of the shipyard (1991-1999). In 1999, as INDARSA had not completed the 
transaction (of USD $59,760,000), the federal courts declared the shipyard 
bankrupt.37 From that point until 2007, the company was operated and 
managed by its workers with a legal auditor.
During the “post-convertibility” period, there was debate about the 
uncertainty caused by the privatisation of infrastructure and services.38 
36 Decree-Law 23696, 17 August 1989, State Reform.
37 Eng. Mospán, naval engineer, former production manager of TANDANOR, interviewed 
14 April 2012.
38 See Reinert, “The Role of the State in Economic Growth”, and Schorr, Modelo nacional 
industrial.
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The government reconsidered the need to participate in certain privatised 
companies with investments or directly in management (Energía Argentina, 
Enarsa, Aguas y Saneamiento, AySA, and ArSat Argentina Satelital). The 
government’s decision on TANDANOR marked the beginning of a policy to 
confront the detrimental effects of the privatisations of the 1990s, a policy 
that culminated with an important milestone, the 2012 renationalisation 
of the petroleum company Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales.
From 2005, TANDANOR’s case was the subject of National Congress 
debates that focused on the transfer of the company to the state and the 
creation of a new state-owned corporation (Astilleros Argentinos SA). 
General agreement about its renationalisation had been reached but there 
was still a controversial point: the expenditure to be made in order to 
purchase the bankruptcy of INDARSA, a concessionaire company. In the 
end, Decree-Law 315/2007 was signed, allowing the renationalisation of the 
shipyard TANDANOR.39
Under the Ministry of Defence’s ruling, in 2009 TANDANOR and the 
Almirante Storni shipyard formed the Complejo Industrial Naval Argentino 
(CINAR), a company-owned property with 90 per cent equity held by the 
Ministry of Defence, and 10 per cent in the hands of workers.40
CINAR has a strategic location within the port area of Buenos Aires city, 
situated in the south channel of the estuary of the Rio de la Plata. Today 
this channel is the only access to the waterway of the Rivers Paraguay, 
Parana, and La Plata with suitable ports for ocean vessel operations. The 
strategic importance of this naval site lies not only in the fact that Buenos 
Aires is a terminal port in the Southern Cone but also in the dimensions of 
the complex, allowing the repair of ships and submarines on a large scale.
The Almirante Storni shipyard (previously named Domecq García), a 
manufacturing plant of submarines for the National Navy, was shut down 
in 1994 with two hulls about half-completed. The closure of this specialised 
facility forced the navy to send the ARA Santa Cruz to Brazil for her mid-life 
upgrade. In 2003, the shipyard was reopened and the submarine ARA San 
Juan completed her overhaul there.
As a state-owned shipyard, CINAR belongs to the Production System 
for National Defence (Ministry of Defence) along with other companies:41 
39 The Ministry of Defence requested, in 2012, the reopening of the summary proceedings 
against the off icials involved in the fraudulent privatisation of the shipyards.
40 Decree-Law 23696, 17 August 1989, State Reform; Jorge Moreno, interviewed 7 August 2013.
41 Investigaciones Aplicadas, INVAP, established in 1976, manufactures satellites and nuclear 
power plants; Fabricaciones Militares, founded in 1941, and Fábrica argentina de aviones, FAdeA, 
was created in 1926 and reopened in 2009.
448 cintia RuSSo 
INVAP, Investigaciones Aplicadas, Fabricaciones Militares, and Fábrica 
argentina de aviones, FAdeA. The management of CINAR as part of the 
strategy of the Production System for National Defence diversif ied their 
production and services, offering construction and repair of oil platforms 
for the Brazilian oil company Odebrecht, entering the heavy engineering 
industry.42
CINAR’s current performance is based on the technical capacity of the 
workforce and the investments made and technology installed during the 
late 1970s. The skilled component in repair shipyards is crucial, which is why 
TANDANOR continues its investment in the technical skills of its workers.43 
Although in the past f ive years it has invested in equipment and infrastruc-
ture maintenance,44 the cornerstone of TANDANOR’s competitiveness is 
still the Syncrolift: a system for lifting boats and ships out of the water for 
maintenance work or repair. The vessel is manoeuvred over a submerged 
cradle, which is then lifted by a set of synchronised hoists or winches. The 
vessel can be worked on in place, or it can be moved inland so the Syncrolift 
can be freed for other use.45
CINAR, with very little spare capacity, is able to perform technologically 
complex repairs (such as on icebreakers and submarines). Some 70 per cent 
of CINAR repairs target the private sector, and of that total 35 per cent are 
foreign vessels. The repair and modernisation of the Argentinean navy 
icebreaker Almirante Iriziar are paradigmatic of the technical capacity of 
CINAR.46
CINAR’s reputation is based on its location, facilities, equipment, and 
skilled labour force. The sum of these components allows CINAR to compete 
in the MERCOSUR ship repair service market.47
42 See http://www.mindef.gob.ar/mindef_ciencia_tecno_prod/cinar_index.php (accessed 
27 May 2013).
43 Jorge Moreno, interviewed 7 August 2013.
44 This includes re-equipping the complex, recovering cranes, and recovering and replacing 
all the machines that were sold by the weight during the 1990s.
45 José Carlos Pietranera, interviewed 25 July 2010.
46 In April 2007 the icebreaker suffered an accident and was badly damaged. Then the following 
alternatives were considered: buying a new icebreaker, repair in the owner’s yard in Finland, 
repair only the damage, or a reconstruction and upgrading of the icebreaker. The Ministry of 
Defence f inally decided on the last option and then discussed which shipyard would perform 
this reconstruction. Finally, TANDANOR was chosen as the shipyard responsible for the repair, 
and on 15 September 2009 the contract was signed between TANDANOR and the National Navy. 
The completion of the work is proposed for 2014.
47 José Carlos Pietranera, interviewed 25 July 2010.
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TANDANOR workers face the ups and downs of politics and 
national economy
Since the late 1960s and mid-1970s, in large industrial centres of Argentina, 
workers have taken part in a movement of intense struggle. This proletariat, 
with a signif icant degree of autonomy from national union leaders, car-
ried on strong and rebellious practices, questioned existing relations of 
exploitation, such as the ways in which labour organisations represented 
their interests. Opposition to the union bureaucracies and the persistent 
exercise of direct democracy became privileged instruments of struggle 
and organisation which spread to many associations in different parts of 
the country. At the same time, these groups of workers maintained varying 
degrees of commitment to political movements of both Marxist leftist as 
well as Peronist origins.
The union of TANDANOR is politically identif ied with the Peronist 
movement and had characteristics different from those of the working 
organisation of other yards. Although TANDANOR workers in the 1970s 
carried on fighting for improvements in working conditions and wages, they 
had less conflict with business leaders than other yards (e.g., the private 
shipyard ASTARA and  Rio Santiago Shipyard).48 With the coup d’état of 
March 1976, as part of a climate of violence that was becoming more intense, 
off icial and paramilitary repression repeatedly targeted the unions and 
their leaders, whether they were independent or were linked to different 
organisations. In TANDANOR there was persecution of workers’ leaders 
with the collaboration of and allegations by certain union and business 
leaders who supported the coup, denouncing the activists and workers’ 
delegates, and increasing the pressure and internal controls within the yard.
During the military dictatorship (1976-1983), the state-owned shipyard, 
TANDANOR had a strong link with the interests of the Argentinean navy, 
so the controls on the workers and the work process within the shipyard 
were intensif ied.
48 Two cases are notable: the struggles in the private shipyard ASTARSA  and in the state-owned 
shipyard Rio Santiago. In ASTARSA , under the radicalisation of political and union experiences 
of those years, a group of workers created an organisation independent of the traditional union 
of ASTARSA (SOIN). Clashes with the owners of the shipyard intensif ied while the company 
adopted an increasingly intransigent position against the workers’ demands. This process led 
to the intervention of the independent workers’ organisation. Between mid-1974 and late 1976, 
as part of a growing climate of repression, the military and paramilitaries abducted and killed 
militant workers of ASTARSA. Río Santiago Shipyard is analysed in Chapter 16 of this book.
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With the advent of democracy in 1984, working conditions and work-
ers’ income, in general, improved. There were no signif icant conflicts in 
TANDANOR but the level of production of the yard began to show signs of 
slowdown, accentuated at the end of the 1980s. This process was not specific 
to TANDANOR; it affected the entire maritime sector. In this period, TAN-
DANOR workers focused their claims on maintaining the purchasing power 
of wages in the face of severe inflation. Successive quasi-hyperinflation 
episodes between 1989 and 1991 formed the national context of the strug-
gles in the yard. In this recessionary environment, the implementation of 
neo-liberal reforms has been intensif ied. The government proposed the 
f irst privatisation of a state-owned enterprise: TANDANOR.
From the very beginning, the TANDANOR workers resisted privatisation. 
The union of TANDANOR that led these struggles against privatisation was 
SITTAN (Sindicato de Trabajadores de Talleres y Astilleros Navales). SITTAN 
is an enterprise-level union whose main goal since the 1990s has been to 
preserve its members’ source of employment, yet the union had to face and 
develop strategies and actions that exceeded the limit of the company. In 
the protest demonstrations in front of the seat of national government, 
the TANDANOR workers, with the support of their families, joined the 
struggle of other workers who were also resisting privatisation of public 
enterprises. Given that the union has historically had more of a negotiating 
tradition, it agreed, initially, to adjust to new conditions. Finally, SITTAN led 
negotiations with the government to keep the shipyard open, and accepted 
privatisation and promises to improve pay and working conditions. It must 
be emphasised, however, that in 1991 TANDANOR/INDARSA owed the 
workers several months’ wages.
During the private administration of TANDANOR, 1991-1999, the f inan-
cial results were very poor (see Figure 16.1). TANDANOR’s performance 
deteriorated rapidly in this period, since the aim of the owners was to 
dismantle the shipyard to conclude a real-estate deal more profitable than 
the repair of ships.49 The shipyard is located in an urban area near the port 
of Buenos Aires, which during the 1990s was subject to restructuring and 
real-estate appreciation with high levels of prof itability. From 1999 until 
2007 the shipyard was operated and managed by its workers with a legal 
auditor. When the workers took over the management of the shipyard, 
INDARSA owed  them 18 months’ salary.50 By 2000, there were 140 workers 
49 Eng. Mospán, interviewed 14 April 2012.
50 Eng. Mospán, interviewed 14 April 2012; Haydee Raubvogel, Assistant to the Vice President, 
TANDANOR/CINAR, interviewed 15 August 2013.
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and about 10 naval engineers and technicians with an average age of 57.51 
The deep crisis and high unemployment in the Argentina of 2001-2002, 
and the near dismantling of the domestic shipbuilding industry, formed 
the context of the resistance and struggle of TANDANOR’s workers. These 
struggles had two basic objectives: to collect the debt owed to them and to 
keep the shipyard open. They collected the debt accumulated in 2006 and 
retained the source of employment.
The workers’ participation and actions, although defensive, paved the 
way to the company’s renationalisation. And, when the new government 
elected in 2002 decided to reverse the privatisation, the workers demanded 
participation in the strategic decisions of the company until their future 
share in management and def inite nationalisation were decided. From 
51 Jorge Moreno, interviewed 7 August 2013.



















1999: private shareholder bankruptcy 
2003: tandanoR reorganisation 
2007: reconversion and capitalisation 
Source: author’s calculation based on data from company balances: tandanoR/cinaR, 1991-2011, 
http://www.tandanoR.com.ar/espanol / noticias/03acciones/acciones.htm (accessed 25 august 
2013)
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2007 until the creation of CINAR, the shipyard recuperated slowly, but 
from 2009 onwards there began a strong revival in the level of production 
(see Figure 16.1).
The management in the hands of the unions and the involvement of 
middle management of the company – engineers and managers – spanned 
nearly f ive years. During that time the yard was maintained with repairs 
that had been negotiated in previous years, but the level of productivity 
was very low. The few repair orders that were received at this stage hardly 
allowed the retention of labour. Funding was central to the continuity 
of the activities of the shipyard. In principle, repair contracts required a 
downpayment, so it was possible to pay part wages. But these resources 
were very limited, and many workers had to leave the yard.52 Many skilled 
workers (especially welders) went looking for work in other metallurgical 
industries. In those years of resistance, the workers, with the support of 
their families, chose to accept low incomes in exchange for retaining their 
jobs. All were convinced that the yard must return to state control. During 
this period, the workers’ organisation did not undergo major changes, but 
decision-making was more participatory and democratic.53 This can be 
linked to management models of the recuperated factories movement that 
had already begun in Argentina with the 2001 crisis.54
Since nationalisation, changes in the extent of production and the 
technological conditions of the shipyard have had signif icant impacts on 
the workforce, and have influenced production and labour relations in 
many aspects, not merely in the increase of the numbers of workers, but 
especially in the decrease in the average age of workers, which dropped 
from 57 in the 1990s to 35 in 2010.55 Historically, the participation of women 
in the labour force of the yard was always very low: in 2010 this percentage 
did not exceed 5 per cent.56
From the wage scale I would highlight just two aspects. First, we can see 
that the gap in wages between the highest- and lowest-paid categories has 
reduced; and, second, if we compare the national minimum wage with the 
monthly salary of the lowest-category operator of CINAR, for 2010 and 2012 
52 Jorge Moreno, interviewed 7 August 2013
53 Jorge Moreno, interviewed 7 August 2013.
54 Azpiazu and Shorr, Hecho en Argentina.
55 Daniel Zárate, responsible for the Institutional Relationships Department, TANDANOR/
CINAR, interviewed 25 August 2013.
56 Haydee Raubvogel, Assistant to the Vice President, TANDANOR/CINAR, interviewed 
15 March 2013.
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(approx. ARG $3,800 and ARG $7,000, respectively) we observe that these 
wages are remarkably higher.57
Figure 16.3 shows the different stages of the shipyard’s trajectory since 
1970: between 1990 and 2007 there was a low level of employment for a period 
in which the shipyard kept its doors open despite its mediocre performance, 
and almost no return.58 As noted earlier, the recovery of the shipyard can 
be observed from the renationalisation in 2007 and the creation of CINAR. 
The level of employment follows this trajectory. In this sense, since 2009, the 
number of direct employees has increased, but this phenomenon has had 
a special feature: the increase in sub-contracted (non-unionised) workers 
as shown in Figure 16.3.
As noted above, unionised workers have been involved in the design of 
the company’s strategy, particularly after 2000. It is, however, necessary 
to clarify that workers who have a stake of 10 per cent of the shares in the 
57 The minimum salary is set by the National Council for Employment, Productivity, and 
Minimum Wage (Ministry of Labour). The minimum monthly salary in 2010 was ARG $1,840 
and in 2012 ARG $2,670.
58 Eng. Mospán, interviewed 14 April 2012; Daniel Zárate, interviewed 25 August 2013.
































































































































































































































note: category i: Mechanical engineering, naval boilermaker, naval electrician, surface treatment 
operator, helmsman, plant maintenance operator, official firefighter; category ii: operator general 
tasks, security guard, service operator; category iii: operator general tasks. 
Source: Based on data from collective Bargaining agreements. Sittan, 2012
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company are those working in the yard at the time of nationalisation in 
2007.59 In 2011-2012, there were 1,258 workers: of this total, only 390 were un-
ionised workers; 700 were non-unionised workers and 146 in administrative 
and other services (42 naval technicians, and 44 professionals, comprising 
23 engineers, 6 engineer off icers, 6 accountants, and 9 other professions).60
The non-unionised workers are in reality the “adjustment variable” or 
weakest link when the activity level of the shipyard drops. The current 
union of CINAR is SITTAN, and working conditions and wages differ be-
tween workers who belong to SITTAN and those who are sub-contracted. 
Those aff iliated to SITTAN enjoy a labour and wage system that guarantees 
stability in jobs, with wages adjusted annually in joint negotiations. While 
the information about categories and wages refers to unionised workers, 
SITTAN workers admit in interviews that there is a remarkable difference 
59 Jorge Moreno, interviewed 7 August 2013.
60 CINAR, Informe al Honorable Congreso de la nación, 3.







1970 1980 1990 2000 2003 2007 2010
Workers Non-unionized workers
Source: Based on data from interviews and cinaR: cinaR, Informe al Congreso de la Nación, 2011, 4; 
eng. Mospán. eng. naval, interviewed 14 april 2012; Jorge Moreno, interviewed 7 august 2013; 
daniel zárate, interviewed 25 august 2013; Haydee Raubvogel, interviewed 15 august 2013
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between the labour regime and wage levels of both types of workers. For 
sub-contracted workers, the labour regime is more precarious and wages 
are lower.61
Conclusions
Founded in 1879, TANDANOR was established for the maintenance of the 
Argentinean navy’s f leet. In 1991, under President Carlos Menem’s priva-
tisation plan, the shipyard was privatised and in 1999, after the principal 
stockholder declared bankruptcy, its workers took over the management 
of the shipyard until its renationalisation in 2007.
In order to understand the trajectory of this shipyard I have contextu-
alised the evolution of the entire shipbuilding industry in Argentina. The 
consequences of the 1990s orthodox neo-liberal policies in the shipbuilding 
industry were mainly: the closure of private shipyards, the almost complete 
disappearance of the maritime manufacturing workshops, a signif icant 
technological setback, and the eventual loss of know-how through the loss 
of skilled labour. Thus, for two decades, the deterioration in competitive 
conditions in the evolutionary path of the ASI was persistent.
In spite of political change since 2003, which promoted a sustained 
industrial growth model to reverse the regressive tendencies of the previous 
period, the ASI did not undergo structural changes in its composition or in 
its dynamics. Although 80 per cent of Argentine shipyards are located in the 
province of Buenos Aires, neither the provincial nor the federal government 
has a special division which could articulate policy for the sector. Lack of 
substantial investment, bureaucracy, and, especially, lack of long-term 
growth have placed this industry in “survival” mode, with operations based 
on old technical and material capacities.
The performance and trajectory of the ASI have shown a marked depend-
ence on an institutional, regulatory framework, and strategic state policy 
relating to defence and industry as a whole. However, the unions consider 
that for two decades, in the maritime value chain, a special link has been 
missing: the state.
From 2004 to date, as noted above, the maritime unions have begun 
a National Dialogue Table of the Argentina Shipbuilding Industry. This 
consensus has led to a comprehensive vision and a common agenda between 
the different links in the production chain.
61 Jorge Moreno, interviewed 7 August 2013.
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Located in the Southern Metropolitan Region of Buenos Aires, the state-
owned companies, TANANDOR/CINAR and Astillero Río Santiago, have 
most of the productive capacity and represent more than 50 per cent of 
the workforce of the country’s maritime sector. In the past twenty years, 
TANDANOR/CINAR’s workers have been the main actors in attempting to 
ensure the continued survival of the shipyard, demanding that the govern-
ment recognise the importance of maintaining a repair yard, to preserve 
not only their source of employment but also their productive capacity 
and human resources. They fought for public management of the shipyard. 
Cristina Kirchner’s government’s decision to recover the ASI with Decree-
Law 1010 in 2004 was reaff irmed, and culminated in the renationalisation 
of TANDANOR in 2007 and the creation of CINAR in 2009.
Nevertheless, the National Dialogue Table of the Argentina Shipbuilding 
Industry considers it imperative to strengthen the domestic value chain: 
construction and repair of vessels (large-sized, f ishing, tourism, and 
commercial transportation), naval workshops and industry services, and 
technical and professional training institutions. In short, in the view of 
the maritime unions, the state should address not only the modif ication 
of the regulatory framework for the shipbuilding industry, but also the 
establishment of a clear policy of regional integration for it.
17 Production and labour of a state-
owned enterprise




With a regulatory protectionist framework promoting the construction 
of ships in the country, the development of the shipbuilding industry in 
Argentina was characterised by strong state intervention. The state played 
an important part in supply, being the owner of large shipyards, and also 
in demand for ships for the Argentinean navy and for the country’s main 
transport and production companies, constituting an important public, 
productive, and commercial framework.
The characteristics of the Argentine shipbuilding industry, its recent 
history, and the role of the state were presented in Chapter 16 by Cintia 
Russo. In the present chapter, I adopt a case perspective to observe how 
some macro-social processes (changes in capitalism and in the organisa-
tion of production, and the economic role of the state) are expressed at a 
micro-social level, in this case, at company level. The aim of this chapter, 
therefore, is to characterise several dimensions of Argentina’s largest and 
most signif icant state-owned shipyard, Astillero Rio Santiago (ARS), and to 
highlight the most signif icant developments in production, employment, 
working conditions, and industrial relations at the shipyard over the past 
f ive decades.
The chapter is divided into f ive sections. First, I trace the history of the 
enterprise, as well as its relationship with the National Industrial Policy and 
the role of the state. Secondly, I describe the characteristics of production 
and organisation of labour present in the shipyard. Thirdly, the character-
istics of workers in ARS are analysed, along with their working conditions 
and the features of the internal labour market. Fourthly, and in relation 
with the previous topic, I describe the specific work culture built around the 
shipyard, highlighting the material and symbolic (values, visions, symbols) 
aspects which supported it. Fifthly, I will analyse the recent history and 
current characteristics of labour relations in the company. I will also focus 
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on two key points in the history of labour disputes in the shipyard: the 
strategies of workers during the 1976-1982 military dictatorship in Argentina 
and the struggles of resistance faced in the 1990s privatisation onslaught. 
Finally, I ref lect upon developments in the company, remarking on the 
current organisational and productive challenges, and the place that social 
actors (especially unions) have within the enterprise.
A brief history: the construction of a state-owned company
Astillero Río Santiago (ARS), located in Ensenada (Buenos Aires province, 
Argentina) on the Rio de La Plata,1 was created on 15 June 1953 by Astilleros 
y Fabricas Navales del Estado (AFNE), a company comprising Astillero Rio 
Santiago (ARS) and Fábrica Navales de Explosivos Azul (FANAZUL). ARS 
depended on the Argentinean navy which managed it.2
The shipyard was conceived as a part of a strategic industrialisation 
plan set in motion by President Juan Domingo Perón during his second 
term of off ice to strengthen heavy industry and to promote the creation 
of a nationwide industrial framework.3 The shipyard was designed to meet 
the needs of the domestic merchant marine and the Argentinean navy. It 
specialised in manufacturing and repairing ships (naval and mercantile). 
ARS was, and still is, the biggest shipyard in Argentina, and one of the two 
state-owned companies today. To 1993, ARS was state-owned; since then, 
it has depended on the Buenos Aires provincial government. In this, the 
state played four signif icant roles: producer and consumer of ships, market 
regulator, and f inancer.
After its formation, ARS expanded in terms of production and employment, 
as well as installation capacity. Within a framework of an import-substitution 
industrialisation model, the company developed a wide range of services 
connected to the navy incorporating new technologies, and development of 
know-how and specific skills. ARS built almost all components of ships aided 
by its comprehensive technical and administrative infrastructure and highly 
qualif ied workforce. Over the years, the company achieved an important 
place among the factories in the region and was considered, towards the 
middle of the 1970s, the biggest shipyard in South America.
1 Currently the shipyard occupies an area of 42 hectares.
2 ARS was created by Executive Decree No. 10,627, dated 15 June 1953. 
3 It should be noted that the Argentinean shipbuilding industry had relevance only at the 
local level, nad has never reached a signif icant share of worldwide shipbuilding.
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Until the mid-1970s, ARS, in addition to constructing ships, also manufac-
tured diesel engines,4 railway infrastructure, lock gates for docks, pressure 
vessels for the oil and petrochemical industries, turbines and generators for 
hydroelectric-power plants, and nuclear components. Most of this diverse 
production was terminated in the 1980s as a result of a fall in domestic 
demand and strong competition from foreign manufacturers, which came 
with the opening up of of national economy to external markets during 
that decade.
In short, until the mid-1980s, ARS was a diversif ied producer with 
high-value, extensive auxiliary productive capacity, heavy dependence 
on the state, and high levels of employment. Due to its military origin, the 
internal organisation of the company was characterised by a bureaucratic, 
pyramidal, and hierarchical structure. It had a state-oriented organisational 
discourse, stressing the consolidation of economic and commercial sover-
eignty through building ships locally. In this sense, the administration of 
the shipyard promoted a strong nationalist feeling among its workers. Being 
a public company, it had a role of strengthening and expanding national 
industrial development.5 Indeed, the state developed a corporate policy of 
paternalism that structured workers’ lives inside and outside the factory, 
including housing, education, and recreation.
A high exchange rate, the sudden opening of the market to international 
competition, and the closing and/or privatisation of the largest state-owned 
companies6 were the new features which ARS had to deal with in the 1990s. 
In 1991, ARS was declared subject to privatisation, under the Economic 
Emergency and State Reform Acts.7
The decreasing demand for ships and changes introduced in the regula-
tory framework induced nearly complete paralysis in ARS. Moreover, aiming 
at “healing” the company before it was to be privatised, the national govern-
ment implemented a rationalisation plan to reduce employee numbers. 
Between 1990 and 1993, through voluntary retirements, ARS cut 60 per cent 
4 ARS built marine slow- and medium-speed diesel engines through diverse licences signed 
with companies such as Burmeister and Wain (Copenhagen), Sulzer (Winterthur), Fiat (Turin), 
and Ateliers des Charmilles (Geneva).
5 Among the objectives of the Statute of AFNE (1953) one stands out: “to participate, for the 
purposes of national defence, in the industrial mobilisation of the nation”.
6 State-owned companies (especially the oil company YPF and the transport company ELMA) 
were ARS’s main clients.
7 Act 23.696 from 1989 declared a state of emergency in the public environment, the take-
over of all entities, companies, and state-owned partnerships and the privatisation of public 
companies. Act 24.045 of State Reform from 1991, among other things, details the entities to be 
privatised.
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of its staff (from 2,460 employees to 1,036). These years witnessed severe 
conflicts within the company, in which workers argued for the reactivation 
and retention of ARS as a state-owned company.
Due to the implementation of neo-liberal policies by the Argentinean 
government, ARS experienced a lower level and degree of diversif ication 
of production, loss of auxiliary production and domestic market competi-
tion, reductions in qualif ied personnel, less productive capacity, and a 
deterioration and/or loss of certain organisational policies. However, from 
1997, production and employment started to grow because of new orders 
from the provincial government and new foreign orders for ships.
The nature and volume of production had changed radically in the 
previous four decades. Until the beginning of the 1980s, ARS’s production 
comprised warships for the navy and merchant ships whose main clients 
were national state enterprises. To date, sixty-four ships have been built by 
ARS, forty-eight of which are owned by the state or the Argentinean navy. 
Since the end of the 1990s, production of ships has shrunk and the focus 
was on the foreign market. Actual production is concentrated on foreign 
shipbuilding orders (from Venezuela and Germany) and metal-mechanical 
constructions for government works.8
In the past three decades Argentina’s productive orientation, based on 
natural resource extraction and processing of raw materials, discouraged 
the development of heavy industry. In this context, the role of shipbuilding 
and the ship repair sector in the national economy is not very signif icant. 
According to statistics and off icial data from 2009, the shipbuilding sector 
represents just 0.1 per cent of industrial gross production value (GPV)9 and 
0.5 per cent of industrial employment. In 2009, the Physical Production 
Volume Index reattained 1997 values, while the productivity-per-worker 
index presented a value at 57 per cent lower than in 1997.10
Summing up, we can see f ive stages in the production history of the 
shipyard:
1 1953-mid 1980s: consolidation and expansion of volume and lines of 
production, based on the demand of the navy and state-owned enter-
prises, in a context of a semi-closed economy.
8 Shipbuilding production between 1997 and 2012 (f ive bulk ships and an oil tanker) was 
focused on foreign shipowners. Currently, ARS’s major contract is with the Venezuelan oil 
company PDVSA for several oil tankers.
9 GPV was calculated based on industrial survey data from Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas 
y Censos (INDEC) Wholesale Price Index and 2004 National Economic Census.
10 Center for Production Studies (CEP), based on INDEC.
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2 Mid- to end 1980s: national economic crisis and reduction in orders 
from state companies.
3 1989-1992: new macro-economic and institutional context (government 
of Carlos Menem) marked by the deregulation of strategic economic 
sectors and the shrinking of the state; cessation of productive activ-
ity, reduction of employment, and a privatisation policy that caused 
signif icant and prolonged labour protests at the shipyard.
4 1993-1997: transfer of the shipyard to the provincial government and 
gradual reactivation of production with small works.
5 1998-2012: reactivation of shipbuilding for export with employment 
growth.
Production capacity and organisation of work
ARS’s three lines of production are shipbuilding, ship repair, and metal-
mechanical constructions. However, shipbuilding is the most important 
in terms of sales and number of jobs. Moreover, ARS is currently the only 
shipyard in the country that builds large ships.
On the three slipways (220 m, 180 m, and 160 m long) several types of ves-
sels can be built: warships and merchant ships (bulk carriers, general cargo 
ships, and tankers) of up to 80,000 dwt, as well as offshore constructions 
and platforms. The last signif icant ships built at ARS were f ive 27,000-dwt 
bulk carriers for the German company Wilhelm Finance Inc., and two 
47,000-dwt product carriers for PDVSA from Venezuela.
In relation to metal-mechanical construction areas, there are more than 
250 machine tools of every type and dimension installed in the workshop 
for machining operations and additional tasks. ARS supplied engineering, 
fabrication, and erection of large mechanical structures, among which 
are some outstanding infrastructure works, such as parts of hydroelectric 
power stations, and large infrastructure road works, ARS being the only 
company in the country to build metal roadway bridges. This line of produc-
tion had an important role during the reactivation of production in the 
mid-1990s.
Production in the shipyard is organised according to the specific task and 
is structured around individual crafts. The organisation of labour allows 
the simultaneous performance of different trades at different stages of the 
process, as well as joint work by technicians, supervisors, and operators. 
In this planning and organisation of production, trade groups still have 
an important margin of autonomy. Indeed, the productive process and 
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labour organisation have not experienced signif icant changes in the past 
four decades.11
Related to the level of technology used, ARS did introduce some new 
equipment; however, management did not develop a long-term strategy 
of technology modernisation to radically change production processes, or 
relations of production in structural terms. In the past few decades, ARS has 
made insufficient investments in technological development and equipment, 
and largely kept the original infrastructure of the 1950s. Improvements were 
introduced only in equipment for steel cutting and welding processes. Conse-
quently, ARS’s equipment and infrastructure (between other variables) have 
not allowed its workforce to reach international standards of productivity.
The absence of certain labour-saving machinery, of modern management 
techniques, and of other equipment results in many operations being done 
in a “craft” way. Production time rises because of climatic effects or, for 
example, preparation work at height. In the same manner ARS has not 
developed a long-term policy of research and innovation. All these variables 
go against a radical improvement of production quality, competitiveness, 
and productivity.
Workers and working conditions
The expansion of production in the shipyard was also reflected in employ-
ment growth, which reached its peak in the mid-1970s at around 4,500 
employees and around 1,800 workers who were employed by different 
sub-contracting companies. As Figure 17.1 shows, the level of employment 
is related to the stages of growth and crisis of the shipyard in recent decades.
In general terms, the workforce of ARS is highly qualif ied, comprises a 
wide range of professions and specialities, and has on average been with 
the company for a considerable time. Most workers have worked in the 
shipyard continually, and it is the f irst and only job in their entire working 
life. Also, many of the current workers began their careers as students in the 
company’s Technical School (ETARS), later being hired as permanent staff.
The current staff comprises 3,500 workers of whom 3,200 are under the 
Collective Labour Convention and 300 are managerial staff. The distribu-
tion of workers by production area has altered in recent years, respecting 
the traditional distribution between direct and indirect workers. In 1977, 
11 The changes introduced in production implied some new equipment and minor modif ica-
tions in vessel design.
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workers involved directly in production represented 64 per cent of the 
workforce; in the past f ive years, this percentage has reduced to 44 per cent.
According to data from the Personnel Department of ARS, in 2010, 28 per 
cent of the total workforce under the Convention have less than thirty-two 
years in the company’s employ and 69 per cent of the workforce have less 
than f ifteen years’ employment. This data about age composition of the 
workforce reflect a growing renewal of the workforce caused by the recruit-
ment of young workers. In 2007, for example, 51 per cent of the workers 
under the Convention were 46 or older, while workers under 32 years old 
represented 22 per cent.
The recruitment of the workforce in the shipyard is carried out through 
two formal mechanisms: registration in the company and the “job bank” of 
the union. These mechanisms are mainly used for the recruitment of staff 
for production areas, the union path being the more used. Recruitment 
searches for professionals and management are mainly made on an informal 
basis, drawing on the recommendations of existing staff.
According to the rules incorporated in the existing collective labour 
agreement,12 the relatives of employees have priority for jobs in the company; 
12 The collective agreement 91/75 was signed in 1975 between ARS and Asociación Trabajadores 
del Estado (ATE), a union for state workers. The labour agreement remains in force.
































































Source: personal department of astillero Río Santiago (1971-2012)
464 Juliana FRaSSa 
accordingly, many fathers and sons work for ARS. Informally, those workers 
who reside in Ensenada are also favoured.
In accordance with data from a survey conducted in 2010,13 64.8 per cent 
of workers have or have had family members working in the enterprise 
and, within this group, 48 per cent are the father or son of another ARS 
worker. Around 89 per cent reside in the cities of Ensenada, La Plata, or 
Berisso, within 20 km of the company, and 25 per cent are graduates of 
the company’s Technical School. In short, the typical prof ile of the ARS 
workforce corresponds to a middle-aged male (men represent 91 per 
cent of the labour force) with labour experience related to the area of 
production, who was born in the region, and has relatives among other 
workers.
The labour conditions formally set by the collective labour agreement 
correspond to the prevailing regime of labour relations in public compa-
nies in Argentina until the mid-1980s. It was characterised by strong state 
intervention and a labour protection policy. The current labour conditions 
are clearly protective of the workforce, guaranteeing hiring on a permanent 
basis, stability in post, professional training, and the possibility of promo-
tion, among others. The working day is f ixed for all sectors and categories 
at 8 hours per day, without considering the possibility of rotating shifts or 
working hours to demand increased productivity.
With reference to the remuneration system, the collective agreement 
includes wage rules that determine increments through a system of auto-
matic adjustment which is established on the basis of a minimum wage. 
Compared with the average industrial wage in Argentina, today, ARS has 
high levels of remuneration. Up to this stage, it can be concluded that the 
maintenance of such labour conditions in the company has been, largely, 
an achievement of the trade union policy developed in the past f ifteen 
years.
Contrary to the trend observed at international levels, ARS has not 
developed wholesale strategies of outsourcing or sub-contracting labour 
in the past two decades, with an exception during the period 1997-2000, 
in which the staff hired on short-term contracts represented almost 25 per 
cent of those employed. That increased levels of sub-contracting have not 
occurred is explained by the strong and sustained policy of the union, which 
13 The survey was conducted by the author of the paper in the framework of the Research 
Project “Trajectory of a State-Owned Enterprise: Shipyard Rio Santiago” from Universidad 
Nacional de Quilmes. The sample included 265 workers; it was non-random and opportunistic, 
and is not statistically representative of the workforce. 
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puts pressure on the provincial government and the company to create jobs 
with stable and regulated conditions.14
After the transfer of the shipyard to the provincial government in 1993, 
the balance of power between company management and the union 
changed in favour the latter. Claims and trade union actions have achieved 
agreement avoiding outsourcing activities and hiring of temporary labour.15 
Currently, there are no observable changes in working conditions that may 
be associated with flexible and precarious employment criteria (such as 
rotating shifts, variable of wages, or rotation between different jobs).
In the framework of a protectionist internal labour market, two chal-
lenges presented themselves to management that questioned the level of 
productivity: absenteeism and increased labour costs. Currently, in ARS, 
there is a 15 per cent absenteeism rate and between 18 and 20 per cent of 
unproductive hours lost (caused by lack of materials, equipment repair, 
climatic factors, preparation of work, lack of power supply, etc.). These 
failures result in high man-hour costs (an average of USD $80 per hour 
in 2012), which makes it almost impossible to compete with prices at an 
international level.
In conjunction with other variables (such as the technological level 
of equipment and machinery, problems of internal organisation, limited 
availability of f inancial resources, etc.) these elements largely account for 
the fall in productivity observed in recent years. Considering only data from 
the Structures Workshop, which represents around 30 per cent of the labour 
force of the shipyard, a signif icant drop in productivity can be observed.
14 See Frassa, “Los límites a la precarización del empleo”.
15 In 1998, there was a strong labour conflict because of the expiration of the contract of 200 
temporary workers, which culminated in the resolution to retain seventy of them. 
Table 17.1  Index of productivity, Structures Workshop, ARS, 2004-2010
Year
Tons of steel produced 
per year (1)
Number of workers 
equivalent (2)
Index of productivity 
(1)/(2)
2004 3596 635 5.66
2005 3955 607 6.52
2006 3239 599 5.41
2007 1966 562 3.50
2008 2496 501 4.98
2009 2166 464 4.67
2010 2877 639 4.50
Source: Structures Workshop, production department, aRS
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Culture of work: “Astillero Río Santiago: National Will, Building 
for the Sea”16
Added to the “objective” features of the employment relationship in the 
company, the presence of kinship relations, the local origins of the work-
force, the maintenance of traditions of knowledge transfer and training, and 
the sustainability of craft-type working have given the company peculiar 
traits that are reflected in a certain culture of work. These elements ensure 
the transmission, from generation to generation, of values and symbolic 
representations that make up the organisational culture, and that form a 
collective labour culture identif ied with the company.
The organisational culture of the ARS was shaped in close relation with 
the management of the navy, which permeated the company with specif ic 
traits based on the principles of hierarchy, order, eff iciency, and profes-
sional expertise. From its origin, ARS was conceived as a company at the 
service of the national state, which promoted among its workers a strong 
nationalist feeling based on the company’s public character, and on its role 
in strengthening the development of local industry. This discourse, together 
with the material benef its and work stability the shipyard traditionally 
provided, developed in the workers a strong social and work identity closely 
related to the company.
The national and state-owned character of the shipyard was a funda-
mental pillar of the organisational culture that is expressed in the value 
acquired by the “public question”. This value constituted the ideological 
premise on which was based the action of labour resistance to the policy 
of privatisation in the 1990s. It was not only the source of employment that 
was being defended, but also the values and concepts (of sovereignty and 
national industrial development) that the company stood for. The opposi-
tion strategy was against the attempt to privatise ARS as well as against 
the neo-liberal economic model.
According to one of the workers interviewed:
For us the shipyard is a bastion of sovereignty, is strategic […] For us to 
defend the shipyard in part is to defend national sovereignty. That’s the 
reason why the ARS workers defended the company for so many years 
[…] it is a part of them (Angel, interviewed in 2009).
16 Commercial slogan adopted by the company up to the 1980s.
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In this sense, the privatisation attempt was understood by workers not 
only as a transformation of the ownership and property of the company, 
but also as an attempt to establish a cultural change. In this conflict, the 
confrontation between two different political and ideological positions 
was crystallised in a question that posed two different models of country 
and enterprise.
The development of this organisational culture, together with material 
benefits and job security that traditionally characterised the shipyard, led 
to a strong labour identity forged by the workers intimately associated with 
the company. This identity was and is built on two fundamental pillars: on 
the one hand, the know-how and accumulated experience of work (which 
has a special importance in the case of craft workers), and, on the other 
hand, the sense of belonging to the company. Workers’ identif ication with 
the company responds both to its symbolic dimension (represented as a 
nationalist ideological project) and its material dimension (as source of 
income, job security and training provider).
These features have remained unchanged to the present day. According 
to the aforementioned survey, conducted in ARS in 2010 on representations 
and meanings around the enterprise and work in it, the shipyard features 
most valued by workers were, in the following order: “job security” (44.7 
per cent), “that it is a state-owned company” (19 per cent), and the “good 
wage level” (17 per cent).
In respect of the implications of working in a state-owned enterprise, 
82 per cent of respondents said that it is “very important”. In the kind of 
companies surveyed, the most important features for the workers were the 
“guarantee of continuity and stability of job” (29.2 per cent), the “guarantee 
of respect for trade union rights” (24.8 per cent) and “promotion of national 
economic development” (13.2 per cent).
Finally, in relation to the degree of identif ication of workers with the 
company, I found that 90 per cent declared themselves to be proud to work 
at the shipyard. An equal percentage of workers hoped that their job at ARS 
would last for the rest of their lives, explaining this choice for “economic 
reasons” (41 per cent), “labour and professional satisfaction” (32 per cent), 
“emotional/affective reasons” (15 per cent), and “political reasons” (12 per 
cent).
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Industrial relations and labour protest
The features of the industrial relations system in the company correspond 
to the characteristics of the “classic” model prevailing in Argentina until the 
1990s. This model is characterised by a high degree of state intervention that 
assumed a labour protection policy and promoted the institutional power 
of the trade union recognised as having “off icial status”. Public enterprises, 
in comparison with the private sector, guaranteed benefits and preferential 
conditions to workers (job stability, social benefits, exemption from certain 
payments, etc.), at the same time as they set periodic wage agreements in 
which the level of remuneration was f ixed according to the cost of living 
index.17
Despite this labour-protective framework, the struggle of the union 
has a long tradition at ARS going back to 1955, with the f irst conf licts 
arising from the Perón coup d’état to and the political prohibition on 
Peronism. In the decades of 1960s and 1970s, labour protests centred on 
refusal to approve the installation of a dictatorial government. By then 
the ARS delegates, linked mostly to the Peronist resistance and the class 
unionism movement, opposed, on the one hand, the bureaucracy and 
the practice of corporate negotiation of the Confederación General del 
Trabajo (CGT) and, on the other, the authoritarian practices of business 
management.
During the dictatorship initiated in 1976, trade union activities were 
virtually eliminated. However, military forces continued repressing and 
kidnapping workers from the shipyard, with forty missing workers.18
Given the limits of this chapter, I will focus here on exposing two “key 
points” in the history of labour disputes in the company. The f irst refers to 
the strategy of workers against the establishment of the 1976-1983 military 
dictatorship in Argentina; the second describes the struggles of resistance 
against the privatisation of the shipyard at the beginning of the 1990s. This 
does not mean that other moments of protest in the f ifty-year history of the 
shipyard are not equally important, but I believe that these two conflicts 
are the most relevant to the present.
17 For this, see Senén González, “Teoría y práctica de las relaciones industriales”, and Gaudio, 
Sindicatos y empresas públicas. 
18 The number of unoff icially recognised victims. For more details, see Corzo, Un sentimiento 
llamado Astillero.
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Repression of trade union organisations during military 
dictatorship
During the military dictatorship in Argentina (1976-83), strong repressive 
policies that had the organised labour movement as their main target were 
put into practice. From March 1976, with the establishment of the dictator-
ship, abduction, disappearance, torture, and murder of workers came to 
be off icially sanctioned, with the objectives, among others, of eliminating 
the power of workers’ organisations. Some of these repressive practices, 
however, were developed by security forces and illegal groups linked to 
right-wing ideologies during the previous democratic government of Estela 
Martínez de Perón (1974-76).
The shipyard was characterised by an important tradition of worker 
organisation and mobilisation, as well as the presence of different union 
groups, which represented the political ideologies that existed in the 
national scene (orthodox Peronism, Peronism of the left, socialism, and 
communism). The ARS workers belonged to the trade union Asociación 
Trabajadores del Estado (ATE) which organised state workers, and which, 
until 1992, belonged to the CGT, a confederation linked to Peronist 
ideology.
Traditionally, elected union authorities at local level belonged to the 
off icial “Blue and White” list that represented the Peronist trade union 
orthodoxy. However, the election of union delegates by sector of production 
(instead of from a unique list) enabled the participation of new union 
leaders who could confront with the bureaucracy of the union. This allowed 
expansion of trade union democracy into the shipyard. At the beginning 
of 1970s most of these new delegates belonged to political ideologies of 
the Left.
During these days, the main reasons for trade union conflicts at the 
factory were wage levels, participation in wage negotiations, and discussion 
of collective labour agreements. Health, safety, and working conditions 
were additional demands of the workers presented in conflicts. Many of 
the demonstrations undertaken during 1974-75 demanded increased wages, 
and collective labour agreements were jointly co-ordinated with other 
industrial workers in the region (petrochemical, steel, and metallurgical 
workers). These actions were also discussed in the local press, putting in 
context the labour dispute presented in Ensenada, Berisso, and La Plata 
that reflected the action existing at national level.
In February 1975 an assembly of 2,500 workers, protesting against the 
administration of the shipyard, requested a wage increase based on the 
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increase in the cost of living. This wage conflict had a positive resolution for 
the workers. In July 1975, a demonstration at the headquarters of the CGT 
(La Plata Section) was held in defence of the collective labour agreements 
suspended by the national government that year. Workers in the major 
factories in the region joined the demonstration, which culminated in a 
massive mobilisation of 10,000 workers.
However, during the military regime, and according to the repressive 
policy put in practice by the employer with the support of military force, 
labour strategies were transformed. To avoid direct repression, workers 
developed “underground” practices of resistance at the level of their job: 
working slowly and reluctantly, partial interruptions of tasks, sabotage, 
and so forth.19 The f irst explicit demonstration of ARS workers after the 
dictatorship period took place in 1983, when the democratic political process 
in Argentina began.
The role played by the state, navy, and armed forces generally was clearly 
repressive. The most significant practices implemented were: militarisation 
of the factory, arrest of workers, disappearance and murder of workers, and 
repression of meetings and strikes. The explosion of a bomb in the frigate 
Trinity on 22 August 1975 deepened the repressive climate in the factory. 
Interventions and other forms of repression of workers increased after the 
attack. Although the attack was attributed to an armed political organisa-
tion without explicit links to ARS workers, the navy saw the militancy of 
the workers of the ARS as a real threat to its plans.
The repressive policy applied to the company during the dictatorship 
had tragic results in the disappearance of forty-two workers and the mur-
ders of eleven militant workers. This policy interrupted the participation 
and representation of employees in the workplace, eliminated potential 
new union leaders, and increased the distance between the trade union 
leadership and workers, since the trade union bureaucracy was often a 
silent witness to the repressive process. The new forced internal discipline 
resulted in the demobilisation of the workers and the modification of power 
relations between capital and labour, with a clear advantage to the former. 
Unsurprisingly, with the alternative of death or disappearance – usually 
the same outcome – the repressive policies succeeded in increasing labour 
productivity and the rationalisation of production.
19 See Barragán, “Disciplinamiento industrial, represión y conf lictividad obrera en una 
empresa estatal”, and “Acción obrera durante la última dictadura militar, la represión en una 
empresa estatal”.
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Labour protest and strategies of resistance to privatisation in the 
1990s
The high exchange rate, the sudden opening of the internal market to 
international capital, and the closing and/or privatisation of the largest 
state-owned companies were the new features of the context in which 
the ARS had to survive.20 In this sector, new policies of liberalisation were 
introduced, which established the deregulation of maritime transport, 
elimination of cargo-reserve requirements for national ships, elimination 
of tax benefits, dissolution of the Fund for the Merchant Navy (the main 
source of f inancing), and implementation of strategic privatisation prac-
tices in state-owned shipyards.21 Thus, in 1991, ARS was declared subject 
to privatisation, under the Economic Emergency and State Reform Acts.
This, the decreasing demand for ships, and the changes introduced in 
the regulatory framework produced an almost complete paralysis at ARS. 
Moreover, the government implemented a rationalisation plan to cut down 
on the numbers of employees. From 1990 to 1993, ARS cut 60 per cent of 
its workforce.
During those years, there were severe conflicts within the company, 
in which workers, together with their union leaders, argued for ARS to be 
productively active again and returned completely and permanently to 
state-ownership.22 As a result of the particular articulation of strategies, 
ARS was able to avoid privatisation in the end and was transferred in 1993 
to the government of the province of Buenos Aires. The company’s “rescue” 
by the provincial government did not save it, though, from the policies of 
readjustment. In 1995, the installation of a free trade zone on a lot owned 
by the shipyard was approved, leaving only 23 of its 229 hectares to the 
shipyard.23 This measure resulted in the loss of several facilities and pieces 
of equipment, that is, a reduction in its installed capacity. Moreover, the 
provincial budget adjustment caused the company’s equipment to become 
obsolete due to lack of replacement, a personnel freeze, and lack of f inancial 
resources to embark on new projects.
20 See, Murillo, “La adaptación del sindicalismo argentino a las reformas de mercado en la 
primera presidencia de Menem”.
21 See Frassa and Russo, “Trayectoria reciente y perspectivas futuras de la industria naval 
pesada argentina”.
22 Pérez Pradal, Contra el naufragio. 
23 In 2006 part of that territory was recovered and, with it, some areas essential for production 
such as workshops and working yards.
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It is noteworthy that the company continued to keep its traditional or-
ganisational structure on the production side, but this was not accompanied 
by a business strategy of modernisation and restructuring, which were the 
options adopted by the most important shipbuilding countries as a result 
of the strong recession and deregulation suffered by the sector since the 
1980s.24
The dynamic articulation of social actors’ strategies
Up to the transfer of ARS to the provincial government in 1993 the workers’ 
strategies were to avoid privatisation and to maintain productive capacity 
at ARS. Between 1989 and 1993 the ARS workers, belonging to ATE from 
CTA,25 initiated more and more politicised open labour disputes in response 
to attempts at privatisation and company readjustment. These conflicts 
took different forms: factory seizures, the withdrawal of collaboration, 
demonstrations at government off ices, road blockades, and seizures of 
public buildings. The main claims were payment of outstanding salaries, 
opposition to privatisation, and national industry defence.
To make its resistance stronger, the union gained the support of the 
local community to the claim and made alliances with other workers in 
the area. Conflict visibility was another key element. Since the company 
became public, the “pluralisation” and “publicity” of labour disputes were 
fundamental for the strategy’s success. The democratic and pluralist 
characteristics of the ARS structure (a Board of Union Delegates and a 
General Assembly) contributed to the resistance.26 This structure fostered 
democratic decisions, permitted the workers to take control of the union 
leadership, and allowed the quick organisation of collective action. Moreo-
ver, the concentration of workers at the same place and the bond created 
outside the factory with neighbours from the towns of Berisso and Ensenada 
encouraged united action.
The opposition strategy undertaken jointly by union leaders, workers, 
and middle management conditioned, mostly, the strategies developed 
by government off icials. In the state sector, however, three actors with 
24 For this, see, for example, Todd, Industrial Dislocation, and Stråth, The Politics of 
De-Industrialisation.
25 Since 1992, ATE joined with Central de Trabajadores Argentinos (CTA), a new central union 
that was created as opposition to neo-liberal policies implemented by the Menem government.
26 See Montes, Astillero Río Santiago, su historia y su lucha relatada por sus trabajadores.
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interests and different forms of conduct towards the company must be 
distinguished. First, the national government, in order to reduce the public 
def icit, tried to terminate the relationship with every productive asset and 
implemented a strong and fast adjustment policy. Due to the diff iculty in 
f inding a buyer for the shipyard in the short term,27 and the high level of 
resistance to privatisation on the part of the ARS workers, the executives 
decided to make a politically feasible deal with the provincial government, 
and transferred the company to it. This alternative allowed the national 
government to disregard the social conflict engendered by the privatisation 
process in the area28 and to continue moving forward with its privatisation 
policies in other big companies, which were far more profitable and could 
therefore attract more private capital.29
Second, the navy, responsible for managing the company since the begin-
ning, launched an ambivalent strategy. While its management depended on 
the policies set by the executive, it did have a certain room to manoeuvre 
inside the organisation. Even if it followed central government policies, 
when faced with workers’ resistance, it changed its attitude to let workers 
keep a certain amount of power over the company. The navy shared with 
workers the nationalist ideology which had inspired the company’s creation; 
and the goal was to keep the productive operation of the ARS as a bastion 
of the local naval industry. Although the navy sought to protect its own 
interests and resources which were threatened by the national government’s 
privatisation policies, in the end it lost its involvement in the company after 
the province took over the ARS.30
Third, the provincial government’s decision to take over the company 
mainly responded to political and economic interests: political, because 
ARS control allowed it to stifle the regional struggles which were becoming 
27 The deep recession in the international shipbuilding sector did not help in f inding a 
potential buyer for the company.
28 The privatisation of the YPF distillery and the restructuring of other factories in the area 
had a strong impact on Berisso and Ensenada, two industrial towns which began to suffer high 
unemployment.
29 Being smaller than the other state-owned companies participating in the privatisation 
process (the oil company YPF, the national telecommunications company ENTEL, the energy 
provider SEGBA, the airline Aerolíneas Argentinas, etc.), ARS was not a priority, and this fact 
helped delay the privatisation attempt.
30 According to the testimonies, collected in interviews, of the manager auditor between 
1990 and 1993 and union leaders of ARS, who were privileged witnesses in negotiations about 
the shipyard’s future, the navy developed an ambivalent and defensive business strategy. For 
details about actors’ strategies in facing the attempts at privatising ARS, see Frassa, “Estrategias 
de resistencia laboral frente a la política privatizadora neoliberal”.
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increasingly more visible, and to add a new source of power for partisan 
use; economic, because, on top of the funds transferred by the national 
government, the installation of a free trade zone in that area allowed the 
government to obtain important commercial prof its in a previously non-
productive space.
All in all, each government actor launched a rational strategy which best 
suited its interests, even if they did not always achieve their “maximum” 
objective. Such strategies, rational in the context,31 reached a satisfactory 
if not optimal solution.
The ARS workers, also, developed a defensive strategy to confront the 
government’s privatisation policies, taking an active role to keep the com-
pany productive and, later, to reactivate it. This strategy was supported by 
the organisation of production by trade groups, the specif ic organisational 
culture, and the strong sense of identity associated with the shipyard. With 
its production almost totally paralysed and lacking a business strategy for 
restructuring, the high level of expertise of the workers and the organisation 
by trade groups allowed ARS to keep its operation going using informal 
labour rules and accumulated productive capacities.32 Retaining the work-
ers’ know-how was vital to be able to reactivate the shipyard later.
Conclusions
Based on the portrayal up to here, I will try, f irst, to point out the biggest 
challenges that the company faces in the different dimensions analysed 
in this chapter and, second, to reflect upon the role played by social actors 
(especially workers) on the trajectory of the company.
In terms of production challenges, there is a signif icant underutilisa-
tion of the workforce as well as the technical and productive capacity 
accumulated in the company throughout its history. The lack of a long-term 
national policy for the shipbuilding industry, the prevalence of political 
criteria above technical-productive ones in business management, the 
loss of organisational routines, the reduction of value-added production, 
31 According to Simon, El comportamiento administrativo, the satisfaction criteria of the 
decision-taker is influenced by the characteristic features of the context, which is why actor 
strategies must always be understood within the system of action they correspond to.
32 I am making particular reference to the maintenance of machinery at times of production 
stoppages and its ability to embark on new projects in a restricted economic context.
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and the disappearance of the areas of design and development of pro-
jects, among other variables, resulted in a deterioration in the shipyard’s 
competitiveness.
Among the main productive challenges that lie ahead for the shipyard 
as a consequence of approaching international standards of production, 
the following could be pointed out: it should modernise its equipment 
and infrastructure; reverse the current ratio between direct and indirect 
workers; diversify production and promote construction of new ships for the 
navy; increase the number of construction orders through marketing; attain 
funding to carry out an investment plan; make productive and technical 
agreements with national agencies and state-owned enterprises (such as the 
recently nationalised YPF, Dirección de Vialidad, and La Plata Port, among 
others) for the building of ships and mechanical works; and reorganise 
administrative processes to match the purchase and supply of materials 
to production needs.
Likewise, the productive-economic logic, on one hand, and the political 
logic, on the other, present in the specif ic functioning of any state-owned 
enterprise, are currently in clear tension at ARS. This condition has led the 
shipyard to a situation of confusion in direction, lack of global guidelines, 
and organisational and productive imbalances, often with consequences 
for industrial relations.
On the other hand, analysis of the work culture demonstrates the current 
validity of the values, goals, and historical assumptions of the company 
(especially the promotion of economic sovereignty and commitment to the 
development of national industry).
These symbolic supports, combined with the material benef its that 
provided employment in ARS, built up a strong labour identity in their 
workers. This identity was reinforced by a sense of “professional pride” 
present in craft workers and by the validation of the working-class protests 
that occurred in the shipyard in the past four decades, which are part of 
the collective memory of the workers.
In relation to the characteristics of industrial relations existing in 
the shipyard and the labour disputes analysed here, it could be con-
cluded that, as shown in the recent history of ARS, the path followed 
by management cannot be explained solely by external logic such as 
changed and changing market conditions or the macro-economic policies 
implemented, which would have imposed universal and homogeneous 
changes on them. On the contrary, if we want to explain the companies’ 
business tracks and assess their differences, we must consider the actions 
taken by the social actors (workers, unions, employers, governments, 
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etc.) within each productive organisation versus the restrictions and 
opportunities available.
In conclusion, this case study shows how relevant the strategies of the 
social actors are33 to the business tracks taken by the companies. The actors 
are the ones who, with a greater or lesser degree of restriction on their 
actions, perceive, understand, and deal with changes in the environment. 
Accepting that no logic of action imposes itself completely on the organisa-
tion is the f irst step in accounting for the true complexity of the social 
relationships developed within. This statement shows the tension existing 
in every social analysis: how much constraint there is on social action, or 
how much unpredictability and originality of behaviour there is which is 
not explained by the social system or the macro-economic determinants.
In this analysis, without trying to minimise the structural impacts of 
applied policies, as several authors have pointed out,34 it is highlighted that 
the results of public policies can never be totally predictable because the 
articulation between the imposition of a macro-economic policy and the 
actors’ behaviour is always unexpected. Track diversity, as I have analysed, is 
explained by structural conditions (characteristic features of the company, 
national and international conditions in the f ield) as well as by the actions 
of the intervening actors, suggesting that the macro-economic contextual 
constraints must be considered relatively if the transformation of companies 
over time is to be properly explored.
Reassessing the actions of social actors within the enterprise, I believe, is 
the most adequate approach to explaining the way in which recent global 
changes (corporate restructuring, production outsourcing, precarious em-
ployment conditions, labour market flexibility) affect the world of labour.
33 This element is usually underestimated or forgotten in analyses done from an economic 
point of view.
34 See Wainer and Schorr, “Trayectorias empresarias diferenciales durante la desindustriali-
zación en la Argentina”.
18 Labour in the Brazilian shipbuilding 
industry
A contribution to an analysis of the recovery period
Claudiana Guedes de Jesus
Introduction
This chapter analyses the changes that took place in labour relations and 
activities within the Brazilian shipbuilding industry during the recovery 
in activity in the main shipyards from the late 1990s. The study has three 
central parts: f irst, the start and increase in the regional employment 
decentralisation process in the country’s shipbuilding industry; secondly, 
it considers variables, mainly those linked to the number of jobs, education 
level, time working in the same company, age, and wage rate; the third part 
analyses information regarding manpower costs and productivity.1
The Brazilian shipbuilding industry has passed through distinct stages 
during its development. The period from the mid-1950s through to the 
early 1980s witnessed the sector’s structural development, growth, and 
peak;2 thereafter, during the 1980s and 1990s, the industry faced a marked 
drop in production and in employment leading to the closure of a number 
of shipyards.
In the late 1990s, government policies promoted the sector’s recovery in 
Brazil. The Brazilian government stimulated production through orders 
from the state-owned Petrobras/Transpetro monopolies, and the state 
demanded minimum local-content percentages in oil and gas exploration 
1 The main sources utilised in this chapter, besides the technical literature, are the Work and 
Employment Ministry Annual List of Social Information-RAIS/MET Database and interviews 
with key industry personnel. In order to set methodological information, data from RAIS/MET 
was used to verify information about shipbuilding workers at year-end (31 December) in Brazil 
from 1995 to 2010. It is important to highlight that due to changes in the National Classif ication 
on Economic Activities (CNAE), in 2006, the shipbuilding labour categories were adjusted. In 
this chapter I used the following categories: CNAE 1.0 (between 1995 and 2005); CLASS 35114 
– construction and recovery of ships and f loating structures; CLASS 35112 – construction and 
recovery of ships for sports and leisure); CNAE 2.0 (since 2006): CLASS 30113 – construction of 
ships and f loating structures; CLASS 30121 – construction of ships for sports and leisure; CLASS 
33171 – ship maintenance and recovery. 
2 In steel processing volume.
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and production activities, and promoted tax and credit incentives from the 
Merchant Marine Fund (Fundo de Marinha Mercante, FMM).3
The current study highlights the definition of the Brazilian shipbuilding 
industry as a collection of small and medium-sized shipyards.4 Within the 
production chain, shipyards are responsible for the construction and assem-
bling of ships often involving complex production processes. Employment 
3 The FMM is the accounting fund used to provide resources to merchant navy and shipbuild-
ing industry development. Its basic source is the Additional Freight and the Freight for Merchant 
Navy Recovery (AFRMM) fees paid for waterway transportation of any nature and unloaded 
in a Brazilian harbour, i.e., a fee paid based on goods’ cabotage and importation activities. See 
Dores, Lage, and Processi, “A retomada da indústria naval brasileira”.
4 According to the CNAE, the shipbuilding industry is part of the transformation industry 
within the metal-mechanical sector within Transportation Equipment Manufacturing. Thus, 
shipbuilding workers are also called steelworkers.
















































note: RaiS/Met: for 1995 to 2005 – cnae 1.0 (claSS 35114 – construction and recovery of ships and 
floating structures and claSS 35122 – construction and recovery of ships for sports and leisure); 
from 2006 – cnae 2.0 (claSS 30113 – construction of ships and floating structures: claSS 30121 – 
construction of ships for sports and leisure and claSS 33171 – ship maintenance and recovery). all 
the attributes describe the situation of those who were working on 31 december of that year 
Source: data from RaiS/Met from 1995 to 2013 (group 301, cnae 1.0 and cnae 2.0)
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peaked during the 1970s at approximately 39,000 workers, and thereafter 
declined to the year 2000 when just over 5,000 workers remained in the 
sector. However, in the subsequent recovery period, there were more than 
68,000 workers by 2013 (see Figure 18.1).
The increase and start of the decentralisation of employment in 
the Brazilian shipbuilding industry
From 1995 to 2013, there was a signif icant increase – 464.2 per cent – in the 
number of workers in the shipbuilding industry in Brazil. Employment rose 
from 14,700 workers in 1995 to 68,000 in 2013 (see Figure 18.1). Throughout 
the period analysed, there were distinct moments. There was reduction 
and expansion in numbers employed. First, between 1995 and 2000, during 
the crisis period, there was a 257 per cent reduction – from 14,700 to 5,600 
workers. At this time, the shipyards were closing. The recovery arrived after 
2000 when the number of jobs constantly increased.
When we observe the distribution of these workers within the Brazilian 
states, their concentration in Rio de Janeiro state is clear. This state is the 
origin of the sector, and historically it hosted most of the shipyards. In 
1995, the percentage of workers in Rio de Janeiro went from 74 per cent of 

















































Source: data from RaiS/Met data between 1995 and 2013 (group 301, cnae 1.0 and cnae 2.0)
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the national total to approximately 48 per cent, in 2013 (Figure 18.2 and 
Table 18.1).
Although shipyards were concentrated in the state of Rio de Janeiro, the 
state had a small loss in its participation during the years analysed (Figure 
18.2) with state investment transferred mainly to the north-east region, and 
from 2007 particularly to the state of Pernambuco.
In Table 18.1, we can observe the percentage of employment from the 
f ive main states in 1995 and 2013, i.e., Rio de Janeiro, Pernambuco, Santa 
Catarina, São Paulo, and Amazonas. Pernambuco stands out for its sharp 
growth. Until 2007, it had virtually no representation in the industry. 
However, when the Atlântico Sul Shipyard (EAS) began its activities in 
2008, it hired more than 1,500 workers in its f irst year.5 In 2013, it reached 
16.2 per cent of the total employment in the industry and occupied the 
second position in the national ranking.
Santa Catarina and São Paulo states had historical representation within 
the shipbuilding industry because they hosted important shipyards such 
as Itajaí (1996) and Navship (2005) as well as the old Wilson Sons Shipyard 
(SP), which had been operating since 1937. Amazonas state stands out for 
its large amount of small and medium-sized shipyards.
5 In 2010, 4,748 workers were registered in the EAS/PE. 
Table 18.1  Employment distribution, by state, in the Brazilian shipbuilding 
industry, 1995 and 2013
Position State  1995 % 2013 %
1 Rio de Janeiro 10,906 74.40 32,476 47.73
2 pernambuco 80 0.55 11,027 16.21
3 Santa catarina 360 2.46 6,029 8.86
4 São paulo 1,425 9.72 3,522 5.18
5 amazonas 231 1.58 2,416 3.55
  others 1,657 11.30 12,572 18.48
  Brazil 14,659 100.00 68,042 100.00
Source: RaiS/Met data 1995 and 2013 (group 301, cnae 1.0 and cnae 2.0)
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Time working in the same company, age, education level, and 
wage rate in the Brazilian shipbuilding industry
Another trend that can be observed is the reduction in the time workers 
remained in the same company throughout the period, indicative of high 
manpower turnover in an industry, which responds to the demand cycle 
with a propensity to use short-term working contracts. Between 1995 and 
2010, the percentage of workers who stayed f ive years or more in the same 
company went down from 35.4 per cent to 15 per cent, whereas employees 
who stayed up to two years went up from 23.8 per cent to 26.1 per cent 
(Table 18.2).
By analysing the changes in the workers’ age distribution in the Brazilian 
shipbuilding industry during the period, we can observe an increase in the 
number of younger individuals. On the other hand, we can highlight the 
increase in the number of workers over 50 years old. Between 1995 and 2010, 
employees up to 29 years old increased from 9.3 per cent to 17.8 per cent. 
In 1995, more than 67 per cent of employees were concentrated in the age 
group between 30 and 49; this scenario has changed and the number had 
dropped down to approximately 46 per cent in 2010. A decrease both in the 
length of employment contracts and in workers’ age have led to younger 
workers in Brazilian shipbuilding.
Regarding Table 18.3 on wage evolution, in the period analysed there 
was a strong increase in the number of workers who earn f ive or fewer 
minimum wages; in all together they jumped from 32.6 per cent to 74 per 
cent, whereas all ranges regarding workers who have earned more than 
f ive minimum wages had diminished. In 1995 they were almost 66 per cent 
and in 2002, just 21.5 per cent of the total. In 1995, the higher percentage of 
workers, 26.3 per cent, was within the range of wages above seven and up to 
ten minimum wages. This group went down to just 5 per cent of the total. 
In 2010, the situation changed the range with the higher percentage – 21.6 
per cent – which corresponds to employees who earn between two and 
three minimum wages. We concluded that there was a significant reduction 
in shipbuilding workers’ incomes, in minimum wages, during the period. 
However, it is salient to note the increase in the minimum wage values 
in the country between May 1995 and January 2010, a real accumulated 
increase of 71.8 per cent.6
6 From May 1995 to January 2010, as reported by Jesus, “Retomada da indústria de construção 
naval brasileira”, 113, the minimum wage had a nominal adjustment of 410 per cent and an 
adjustment of approximately 197 per cent according to the INPC-IBGE.
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Training of workers in the Brazilian shipbuilding industry varies from 
shipyard to shipyard. Manpower levels in shipyards have a signif icant 
impact on productivity and ship production.7 The division of labour within 
Brazilian shipyards was based on the master-apprentice relationship. Thus, 
it is linked to a vertical organisation in which the professional groups clearly 
reflect the education level achieved.
Usually, a worker starts his career in shipbuilding as a “freshman” worker, 
directly after training. For instance, in the BrasFels shipyard in Angra 
dos Reis, the worker begins as an assistant and takes steps upward until 
achieving the “in charge of” position. It is highlighted that, in this shipyard, 
workers follow a functional progression set by the job category’s collective 
agreements as described by Paulo Inácio Furtuozo:
even by the power of the agreement, our collective agreement, just for you 
to have an idea, a young worker who starts as assistant, he has a complete 
scale to get the “in charge of” position; this will depend on him alone […] 
7 Marins, “Técnicas avançadas em planejamento e controle da construção naval”, 31. 
Table 18.3  Percentage distribution of workers in the Brazilian shipbuilding 























1995 8.93 8.46 8.06 7.15 17.03 26.26 22.61
1996 14.35 14.1 11.17 10.93 14.25 18.65 12.91
1997 16.03 19.57 12.73 8.50 20.48 14.5 8.09
1998 19.95 21.19 14.08 11.25 17.21 9.21 6.82
1999 20.84 19.51 16.30 10.95 17.91 7.54 6.70
2000 22.70 23.87 15.26 12.78 12.48 6.27 6.46
2001 22.12 21.35 15.46 15.35 14.22 6.12 5.27
2002 14.15 17.42 13.29 17.44 22.8 8.02 6.81
2003 11.53 15.40 14.32 20.07 22.44 9.23 6.89
2004 12.45 14.14 14.58 13.88 24.01 11.05 8.59
2005 13.10 15.18 17.46 13.92 22.53 8.60 6.77
2006 13.85 17.19 15.58 14.42 21.82 7.81 6.35
2007 16.97 18.44 17.42 14.18 16.89 6.21 5.74
2008 18.13 18.16 17.78 16.55 14.50 5.52 5.75
2009 21.37 19.03 17.83 15.01 12.16 4.74 5.55
2010 19.61 21.57 18.35 14.47 11.30 4.54 5.67
Source: RaiS/Met data between 1995 and 2010 (group 301, cnae 1.0 and cnae 2.0)
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he starts up and within two years he already has to become off icial, in his 
third year he becomes a professional and then professional 1, professional 
2, and after that leader, master and “in charge of”. The last criterion in 
there is a test and the attendance, punctuality.8
Training among shipbuilding workers is, to a great extent, characterised by 
learning by doing. The professional training based on real working practices 
remains the practical way of transmitting knowledge and skills, mainly in 
cases of master workers (or “in charge of” ones) responsible for part of the 
production process.
When the shipyards were relaunched, it was observed that this kind of 
shipbuilding culture was valorised. Brazil and mainly Rio de Janeiro state – 
due to its background in the industry – have specialised manpower trained 
on the shop floor. An example is the case of Angra dos Reis workers. When 
the BrasFels shipyard was reopened, the masters and the more experienced 
workers, who had been dismissed when the Verolme shipyard was closed in 
1990, were all hired back by the new shipyard in order to work in their old 
positions. Since the recovery period, these expert workers have also been 
contracted by the new shipyards such as the Atlântico Sul Shipyard – EAS 
– in Pernambuco, which invited workers from Rio de Janeiro to work there.
In regard to shipbuilding culture and its technology in the Brazilian 
shipyards, Roberto Coelho Gonçalves, EISA CEO, highlighted in a 2011 
interview that:
This is a thing which is sophisticated; Brazil had produced vessels since 
the 1950s, so experience has accumulated. Many people, initially, left 
Brazil, studied abroad, [and] brought the technology back here.
However, he highlighted that, as there are few records and documents 
regarding the working processes, a lot can be lost.
Almost all shipyards have their own professional training and employee 
development systems. According to the employers’ organisation, SINAVAL,9 
the amounts invested are not reported publicly because of commercial 
confidentiality. Training is crucial. Although the shipyards do their own 
training, they prefer people with some education and technical background. 
8 Paulo Inácio Furtuozo, interviewed 2 December 2011.
9 Sindicato Nacional da Indústria da Construção e Reparação Naval e Offshore, the national 
association representing shipbuilding, ship repairing and offshore work in Brazil: SINAVAL, 
Report 2010, 10.
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Speaking a second language is especially important to working in areas 
such as project development and sales, since the technical documentation is 
often in English. Speaking a second language is fundamental to shipbuilding 
engineers and, in many cases, to the master workers.
Table 18.4 shows the range of employees who have f inished high school. 
They increased from 14 per cent to 42.6 per cent within the period. Yet, it 
shows the concentration of such workers in 2010. The range corresponding 
to workers who f inished elementary school (17.9 per cent) and to the group 
with college graduation (7.2 per cent) remained relatively stable (Table 18.4). 
It is also worth highlighting that the number of workers with post-graduate 
degrees (master’s degree and/or PhD) remained low, going up from 0.01 per 
cent to 0.04 per cent within the period.10 In 1995, there was only one PhD 
professional; f ifteen years later, there were eleven with master’s degrees 
and three with PhDs.
10 In Table 18.4, data correspond to post-graduate individuals who are within the range of 
graduate workers, in view of their reduced number.






















1995 54.84 17.92 5.57 14.01 7.18 100.00 14,659
1996 59.51 17.42 6.20 11.20 5.47 100.00 10,428
1997 51.49 23.15 7.12 12.24 5.62 100.00 6,725
1998 48.23 22.17 8.75 15.51 5.19 100.00 6,178
1999 43.20 27.35 9.75 14.24 5.39 100.00 6,180
2000 42.45 26.87 8.00 16.24 6.41 100.00 5,696
2001 42.86 26.81 7.78 16.42 6.09 100.00 6,900
2002 35.67 29.55 8.50 20.48 5.78 100.00 11,961
2003 34.84 28.03 8.50 22.57 6.04 100.00 15,970
2004 31.81 28.35 8.51 25.21 6.1 100.00 18,692
2005 31.52 25.55 9.60 27.42 5.88 100.00 21,381
2006 30.93 24.33 9.48 28.85 6.32 100.00 25,138
2007 30.26 21.44 10.27 31.57 6.36 100.00 25,739
2008 26.04 20.69 9.92 36.57 6.71 100.00 33,112
2009 23.60 19.15 10.06 39.85 7.27 100.00 35,431
2010 22.30 17.39 9.91 42.60 7.72 100.00 41,554
Source: RaiS/Met data between 1995 to 2010 (group 301, cnae 1.0 and cnae 2.0)
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By analysing the income and education level rates, by comparing Tables 
18.3 and 18.4, it is possible to see that those who had f inished or were study-
ing for college degrees together ranged from 7.2 per cent in the income table 
and those who earned ten minimum wages or more ranged more than 5.7 
per cent. Certainly, higher salaries were paid to the most qualif ied workers.
The number of engineers in Brazil is much lower than the total number 
of employees, particularly in comparison to other countries. According to 
Cassiano Marins:
generally, Brazilian shipyards contain a small number of engineers in 
relation to the total number of employees. The percentage of engineers, 
overall, falls below 5 per cent. As a general comparison, Korean shipyards 
can have up to 2,000 engineers who represent approximately 10 per cent 
of the total manpower.11
Two Shipbuilding Engineering Schools in Brazil stand out, one at USP in 
São Paulo (launched in 1956) and another one in UFRJ in Rio de Janeiro 
(launched in 1959). Both universities have important shipbuilding research 
centres, engineering schools, and post-graduate courses, which also cover 
waterway transportation and ocean systems. Recently, a third shipbuilding 
engineering formation course was launched at UFPA in Belém (PA). Its f irst 
class graduated in 2010.12 In addition, a new Shipbuilding Engineering School 
at the Federal University of Pernambuco (UFPE) was launched in 2010. Its 
f irst classes started in 2011. It was the f irst Shipbuilding Engineering School 
in the north-east of Brazil.
According to a study by the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES),13 it 
is necessary to highlight
the great demand for qualif ied manpower in Brazil due to the indiffer-
ence to training in the sector in the past few years: the level of investment 
is almost zero. Such a scenario may change in the medium term, since 
different training programmes have been launched by the industry and 
11 Marins, “Técnicas avançadas em planejamento e controle da construção naval”, 31. 
12 Assis, “Desaf ios, necessidades e perspectivas na formação e capacitação de recursos 
humanos na área aeronáutica e aquaviária”. In 1959, the f irst shipbuilding engineering class 
graduated in Brazil – from the Escola Politécnica da Universidade de São Paulo – and in 1962, 
another class graduated in Rio de Janeiro from the Escola Politécnica da Universidade Federal 
do Rio de Janeiro (at that time, the institution was known as National Engineering School).
13 Dores, Lage, and Process, “A retomada da indústria naval brasileira”, 293.
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the government as well as by some university schools related to the 
shipbuilding industry.
As for gender distribution, the percentage of women among shipbuilding 
workers in Brazil increased from 5.3 per cent in 1995 to 6.8 per cent in 2010.
Manpower cost and productivity in the Brazilian shipbuilding 
industry
Manpower costs represent between 15 and 20 per cent of the total costs 
within Brazilian shipbuilding; they can vary according to two factors: the 
position of the shipyard on the learning curve, which def ines the speed 
of productivity gains, and its level of technology, which determines the 
mechanisation level in its process.14
Studies done by consultancies at the time PROMEF (Program to Mod-
ernise the Fleet of Transpetro/Petrobras) was launched, in 2011, showed 
that the learning curve in the Brazilian shipbuilding industry presented a 
drop of 85 per cent. This means that every time the accumulated production 
doubles, there is 15 per cent reduction in manpower – measured by the mh/
cgt (man-hours/compensated gross tonnage) indicator.15 The curve declivity 
in the Asian countries is of approximately 70 per cent.16
The cost of manpower in this sector in Brazil is low in comparison to the 
cost in the leader countries. According to Priscila Dores, Elisa Lage, and 
Lukas Processi, such costs vary between USD $11 and USD $19/mh, which 
is lower than that of some Asian and European countries, although it is 
higher than in China.17 According to C.G. Jesus in 2008, the cost including 
manpower varied between USD $6 and USD $10/mh (Table 18.5).18
In Table 18.5, we can observe the variation (from minimum to maximum) 
and the best estimation for the average cost per hour of shipbuilding man-
power in Europe, Japan, Korea, China, and Brazil. China is in the leading 
position due to its very low cost in comparison to other countries, varying 
between USD $1 and USD $4/mh.
14 Ibid., 292-293.
15 This is the standard manpower productivity indicator in the shipbuilding industry; it 
balances the variations in the level of complexity among the existing ship types. As for the 
offshore sector, mainly for probes and platforms, the mh/t indicator is used: ibid., 291.
16 Ibid., 292-93.
17 Ibid.
18 Jesus, “Retomada da indústria de construção naval brasileira”.
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According to Jesus, Brazil does not need to reach the same productivity 
rates as Asian shipyards in order to become competitive, because one of the 
great advantages of the national industry is low manpower costs.19
In regard to the numbers of workers in the Brazilian shipbuilding in-
dustry, Jorge Roberto Coelho Gonçalves, CEO of EISA, pinpointed in an 
interview from 2011 that the productivity of labour in Brazil is lower than 
in Japan:
The more their [Japanese] workers produce, the less they need man-
power. And, if you go deep in the MH, what these guys spend are 
numbers which go beyond perception, like, they reach 1/10 of what we 
spend to make the same thing. But I always say that you do not count 
the robot hours; isn’t it so? The robot hours do not count. But, robot 
have a high cost, in fact, a huge cost from mobilising assets they order, 
and this is another problem. Today we import almost 100 per cent of the 
machines – imagine that.20
As it is a manpower-intensive industry, reduced costs due to the experi-
ence of workers used to be signif icant in Brazilian shipbuilding, since it 
has a high share of manpower in its production process. Thus, if the costs 
19 Some recent research co-ordinated by Prof. Floriano Pires (UFRJ), “Benchmarking internac-
ional para indicadores e desempenho na construção naval”, which is not yet publicly available, 
conclusions were shown in August 2007 in seminars on shipbuilding in COPPE/UFRJ (Alberto 
Luiz Coimbra Institute for Graduate Studies and Research in Engineering, Federal University of 
Rio de Janeiro). Brazil does not need to reach productivity levels like those from Asian shipyards 
in order to become competitive. According to the research, one of the great advantages of the 
national shipbuilding industry is its low manpower cost: Jesus, “Retomada da indústria de 
construção naval brasileira”, 122.
20 Jorge Roberto Coelho Gonçalves, interviewed 23 February 2011.
Table 18.5  Average cost of manpower, per hour, in the shipbuilding industry (in 
USD), 2008
Minimum Best estimate Maximum
europe 27.0 30.0 36.0
Japan 22.0 25.0 30.0
South Korea 11.5 13.0 17.0
china  1.0  1.4  4.0
Brazil  6.0  8.0 10.0
Source: Jesus, “Retomada da indústria de construção naval brasileira”, 122
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with experience drop and if experience must be retained by these stable 
companies, then this effect will lead to an entry barrier.21
A common feature among all shipyards worldwide is the growing use 
of outsourcing. Outsourcing has been adopted by Brazilian shipbuilding 
on a wide scale, and not just in complementary f ields in the industry (such 
as cleaning, provision of meals for workers, etc.) but actually as part of the 
production process. According to Leda Gitahy: in this sense, the reduction 
in the number of formal jobs and the consequent elimination of expenses of 
social insurance, as well as the reduction in the interference of trade unions 
within an economic crisis context, give rise to production externalisations.22
Therefore, what we have observed in the Brazilian shipyards is a more and 
more intense outsourcing as a traditional cost-reduction strategy, thus rein-
forcing the deverticalisation and externalisation of the company’s activities. 
This makes it diff icult to measure the number of jobs in this industry due to 
high manpower turnover (short-term working contracts). As the shipbuilding 
industry operates in cycles, it depends on purchase orders. Outsourcing 
processes are used more and more. In an interview from 2011, Paulo Inácio 
Furtuozo highlights: “there are two things which are the evil of the century: 
[…] drugs […] and here for us [it is] the sub-contractors, contractors”.23
Both safety and working conditions in the shipyards in 2010 deserve 
attention. The Regulatory Police – following NR 34, termed “Working Condi-
tions and Environment in the Shipbuilding and Repair Industry” – aimed 
at setting the minimum requirements and safety protection actions to 
support health and the working environment in this industry’s activities in 
Brazil. Such legislation considers shipbuilding as all the activities performed 
within the building plants or within ships and floating structures such as 
vessels, boats, speedboats, and fixed and floating platforms, among others.24
The process was laid out by a three-part commission formed by govern-
ment representatives, companies, and workers who, for approximately 
two and a half years, discussed and approved all that is written in the 
standardisation rules. The labour category points out that this is a victory 
and that the rules were essential to the formulation process. Other countries 
are using this regulation as their basis since it is a pioneer project in this 
21 Fadda, “Construção naval – uma indústria global”.
22 Gitahy, “Inovação tecnológica, subcontratação e mercado de trabalho”.
23 Interview, 2 December 2011.
24 NR 34 – Working Conditions and Environment in the Shipbuilding and Recovery Industry, 
Publication DOU Ordinance SIT no. 200, from 20 January 2011, Changes/updates DOU, Ordinance 
SIT no. 317, from 8 May 2012. For more details see: http://portal.mte.gov.br/data/f iles/8A7C816A
36A27C14013750E887B25674/NR-34%20(Atualizada%202012).pdf (last accessed 8 May 2012).
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particular matter. Therefore, NR-34 regulated safe working in shipbuild-
ing. Thus, the basis for the regulations on working conditions will be the 
same in the national territory for all the different activities. This of course 
raises another question: is it fully observed more in the breach than in the 
actuality?
Conclusion
The Brazilian shipbuilding industry’s recovery relied on a signif icant 
increase in the number of jobs to satisfy mainly domestic demand in 
shipbuilding and offshore work. The level of certainty in the increase in 
the number of domestic orders brought up the expectancy that the number 
of jobs would keep growing (mainly the purchase orders from Petrobras 
to 2020). Thus, the need for trained manpower also grew and it reflected 
on the opening of new shipbuilding engineering schools in the country, in 
addition to all the technical schools inside the shipyards.
However, on the other hand, we can observe the trend of casualisation 
of working conditions, resulting from manpower turnover linked to shorter 
work contracts and to the hiring of younger individuals as well as to lower 
salaries and the use of outsourcing. By following world market trends, it is 
interesting to observe that, in comparison to leading Asian and European 
countries, with the exception of China, Brazil has lower manpower costs 
and a lower number of engineers, especially in relation to the industry’s 
total number of employees. The differential in this labour market is the 
importance given to the “learning by doing” process and to the contracting 
processes based on orderbook demand.
The current indicators from the Brazilian shipbuilding industry cor-
roborate the recovery of this sector in the country. The annual publication 
“Review of Maritime Transport of the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development” (UNCTAD), published in 2012, noted that Brazil is the 
country producing the highest volume of ships when its present fleet is taken 
under consideration. Moreover, it is the highest volume in the domestic 
shipbuilding industry’s history. This, combined with expectations relative 
to oil exploration in the pre-salt Libra layer, gives rise to projections of an 
increase in orders, in conjunction with the effective guarantee of demand 
from Petrobras/Transpetro. This combination of demand factors promises 
a potentially new era for the shipbuilding industry in Brazil, which goes 
beyond the “recovery period”, not only in fulf illing domestic demand but 
also in reducing dependence on foreign technologies.
19 Brazilian shipbuilding and workers 
between tradition and innovation
Shipyards Caneco/Rio Nave and Mauá – Rio de Janeiro, 
1950-2014
Elina G. da Fonte Pessanha and Luisa Barbosa Pereira
Introduction
This chapter analyses how labour relations developed in the shipyards 
Caneco/Rio Nave and Mauá (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil) from 1950 to 2014, 
in terms of production relations and working conditions. We ref lect 
on the role of state in the Brazilian shipbuilding industry; the labour 
process under different conditions; the prof ile of the workers; the workers’ 
culture; the different forms of collective resistance of workers; and the 
historical action of their trade unions. We aim to show that both the 
Shipyards Caneco/Rio Nave and Mauá were central for the development 
of the shipbuilding industry in Brazil. Although both are privately owned 
shipyards, government f inancial support was vital to their continued 
survival.
Although huge changes have taken place in the shipbuilding industry 
from the 1950s until today, Brazilian shipbuilding workers have not 
lost their autonomy and have retained a distinct workers’ culture. 
This culture was also key to making them one of the most important 
categories of workers in Brazil. In recent years, workers have improved 
their terms and conditions of employment through various forms of 
collective action.
Brazilian shipbuilding production and Mauá and Caneco 
Shipyards
In 1845, the f irst major private shipyard in Brazil, the Company Foundry and 
Shipyards of Ponta D’Areia (later known as Shipyard Mauá), was formed in 
Niterói. Owned by Irineu Evangelista de Souza, the baron of Mauá of the 
Brazilian Empire independent from Portugal (1822-1889), between 1849 and 
1857 the company built about seventy vessels, including some used during 
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the War of Paraguay.1 The pioneering initiative of Mauá was f inally aborted 
in 1857 when, after the suspension of customs protection against foreign 
competition, a f ire destroyed the shipyard, along with the shipbuilding 
models and moulds. Only at the beginning of twentieth century did the 
Company of Commerce and Navigation (CCN) put the shipyard of Mauá 
to work again.
Caneco Shipyard was founded by Vicente dos Santos Caneco, who began 
with a small repair shipyard in Saúde, Rio de Janeiro, in 1886. At the end of 
the nineteenth century, with the advent of the republic, the region became 
a maritime cluster with some 3,000 workers. In 1909 the Caneco Shipyard 
expanded by moving to Caju, also in Rio de Janeiro. Up to 1915 Caneco 
had constructed only small vessels. After 1928, renamed as Indústrias 
Reunidas Caneco SA, the shipyard comprised about 12,000 m2 and had a 
bridge crane with capacity to lift up to 5,000 tons; its principal client was 
the War Ministry of Brazil.
Although there had been some growth in the sector during the in-
terwar period, Brazil had not yet developed a heavy steel industry.2 By 
1940, however, its small domestic industry (the f irst steel mills were built 
in the 1930s where large proven reserves of iron ore were located) was 
self-suff icient in pig iron and ingot steel and could produce 75 per cent 
of all light sections and bars, but could not provide heavy rolled steel 
plate in suff icient quantity needed to grow its shipbuilding industry, with 
some 90 per cent of rolled steel imported. Only after the Second World 
War was an integrated steel mill established at Volta Redonda in Rio de 
Janeiro state; once opened in 1946 under the state-owned Companhia 
Siderúrgica Nacional it became the f irst fully integrated steel mill in South 
America, signalling the beginning of a new era in Brazilian steel-making 
and industrialisation.3
1 The War of Paraguay (also known as the War of the Triple Alliance) lasted from late 1864 
to 1870, by which stage it had long descended into a guerrilla war, and ended in utter defeat for 
Paraguay, with Brazil occupying the country until 1876. In May 1865, the Treaty of the Triple 
Alliance was signed between Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. In the aftermath of war, Brazil 
sought to retain Paraguay as a buffer state to check Argentinean expansionism.
2 For the history of Brazilian economic development, see Furtado, The Economic Growth of 
Brazil, and Baer, The Brazilian Economy.
3 The Volta Redonda steel mill embodied the import-substitution industrial policies that 
prevailed in Latin American economies from the Second World War until the Latin American 
debt crisis in the 1980s. In 1993, the steel mill was privatised and is now known as the Presidente 
Vargas Steelworks.
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The great stimulus to Brazilian shipbuilding after 1956
An important stimulus to Caneco and Mauá Shipyards occurred in the late 
1950s after efforts to increase industrialisation by Getulio Vargas’s govern-
ment. Inspired by developmental objectives, the political initiatives of Presi-
dent Juscelino Kubstichek, with specific goals (Goals Plan/Plano de Metas) 
for the ports, merchant marine, and shipbuilding industry, were essential 
in this process. The state began to invest more in the shipbuilding industry.
In a 1956 report, the Ministry of Transport pointed to the low performance 
of Brazil’s merchant marine, with a commercial fleet for heavy loads of only 
twenty ships,4 built in the period 1947-1948, a fleet of coastal vessels more 
than twenty years old, and high expenditure on chartering foreign vessels. 
The report proposed reform of the financial basis of Brazil’s industry – public 
and private – with the creation of taxes to compose a Merchant Marine Fund 
(Fundo de Marinha Mercante, FMM),5 in order to renovate and expand the 
national fleet and stimulate shipbuilding. An executive group called GEICON 
was created,6 which approved projects of shipyard expansion (Caneco, Mauá, 
and Emaq) and construction of others to facilitate the boom in building 
tankers. Ishikawajima Heavy Industries (IHI), with Japanese capital (Ishibrás 
shipyard opened in 1959, in Rio de Janeiro, and closed in 1994) and Verolme, 
with Dutch capital (opened in Angra dos Reis in 1959 and closed in 1997). 
Both IHI and Verolme were attracted, despite an initial paucity of skilled 
labour, by access to a previously protected market and cheap labour, and, in 
the case of IHI, the prospect of using its heavy machinery division to export 
plant and equipment to Brazil.7 The Goals Plan aided the cluster of shipyards 
in Rio de Janeiro, and Caneco expanded its facilities to 147,000 m2.
The taxes to support the shipbuilding industry were created by the 
Decree No. 47,818 of 25 February 1960. This decree, inter alia, imposed 
4 The Brazilian commercial f leet carried only 4 per cent of the volume of exports. For a 
detailed analysis, see Goularti Filho, “A trajetória da marinha mercante brasileira”.
5 The Merchant Marine Fund was created by Law 3381/1958 during the government of 
Juscelino Kubistschek. It has been changing since 1970. For more information, see http://www.
planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/1950-1969/L3381.htm (accessed on 22 January 2013). The fund is 
now governed by Law 10893/ 2004. 
6 Grupo Executivo da Indústria de Construção Naval (Executive Group for Shipbuilding In-
dustry). The GEICON (Grupo Executivo da Indústria de Construção Naval – Executive Group for 
Shipbuilding Industry) was a federal government organisation that controlled shipyards and their 
building activities. For Geicon, see Grupo Executivo da Industria de Construção Naval (GEICON). 
7 For the mobility of shipbuilding industry worldwide, a classical study is Todd, Industrial 
Dislocation. In terms of global social division of labour, see mainly van der Linden, Workers of 
the World.
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taxes on goods transported by sea, at the rate of 5 per cent on all freight in 
international shipping (import or export), to build up a “fund for renewal 
of the fleet”. In addition, a tax amounting to 15 per cent was levied on all 
freight received by ships plying between Brazilian ports (coastal shipping) 
to establish the Merchant Marine Fund.
The “fund for renewal of the fleet” could be used for the purchase, by 
Brazilian shipowners, of new tonnage, both in Brazil and abroad. On the 
other hand, the FMM could also be used for repairing and maintaining 
Brazilian ships, either in Brazil or abroad, if this work could not be per-
formed in Brazil.8 A public body, the Council of Merchant Marine (CMM), 
administered both funds.
Ships purchased by CMM were resold to Brazilian shipowners with CMM 
funding. The shipowners paid 20 per cent in cash, while the balance could 
be paid off over a period of up to 20 years in monthly instalments and at an 
8 per cent annual rate of interest. As far as the FMM was concerned, sums 
were paid in cash, the shipowners having access also to a special fund, used 
solely for repairs, maintenance in dry docks, and restoration of ships in this 
fleet.9 In 1961, however, the expansion began to present problems, and the 
level of shipyard production began to decline. Factors such as the disruption 
of port administration, disjointed action by shipowners, and the high cost of 
production due to the concomitant effort to expand businesses combined to 
spur on an inflationary process. Entrepreneurs also bemoaned the influence of 
prevailing high wage costs, since wages in the sector were above the national 
average in industry generally, in part due to the strength of the union move-
ment of shipbuilding workers in association with the Seamen’s Confederation.
Modernisation under authoritarianism after the military coup of 
1964
After the military coup of 1964 the shipbuilding industry in Brazil faced a 
critical situation due to lack of planning and weakness of the market.10 There 
8 Archive of International Metalworkers Federation Collection at International Institute of 
Social History, Amsterdam, Netherlands, IMF’s 6th Shipbuilding Conference in Newcastle upon 
Tyne, 1967. According to the IMF the costs at those yards were higher than on the world market.
9 IMF’s Shipbuilding Conference in Newcastle upon Tyne, 1967.
10 The 1964 Brazilian coup d’état by the armed forces on 31 March 1964, culminated in the 
overthrow of President João Goulart, covertly supported by the United States. The military 
regime would last until 1985, when Tancredo Neves was indirectly elected the f irst civilian 
president of Brazil since the 1960 elections.
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began a process of privatisation of production and changes to the state’s role 
as a promoter and protector of Brazilian industry, which throughout the 
authoritarian regime would largely reflect the internal tensions between 
military groups that were more or less “nationalist”. Only from the late 
1960s were there signs of a new orientation, with the Emergency Plan 
for Shipbuilding (EPS), but the privatisation prof ile continued. The EPS 
established new rules of reciprocity in maritime transport between Brazil 
and other countries; ensured a 40 per cent share of national-flag vessels in 
foreign trade freight; and gave a stimulus to shipowners by guaranteeing 
them long-haul routes, formerly under the exclusive control of the state 
shipping company Lloyd Brasileiro. The new ship orders, for long-range 
navigation, injected new dynamism into the sector. The rates of companies’ 
capacity utilisation rose to 60 per cent from 1967 to 1970, and production 
reached 344,000 dwt. In 1969, the CMM became SUNAMAM (National 
Superintendence of Merchant Marine).11
The end of the EPS in 1970 brought in its wake a new crisis in orders, in 
a clear demonstration, once again, of the dependence of the sector on the 
state. The government undertook the 1st Naval Construction Plan (PCN), 
which had the aim of increasing mechanisation and automation in steel 
preparation, use of welding, hydraulic jacks and cranes, and centralisation of 
production systems. The plan provided orders of 1.8 mn dwt in total, worth 
USD $1 bn, facilitated further importation of equipment, and improved the 
functioning of the Merchant Marine Fund.12
A government directive of 1971 led to Shipyard Mauá signing contracts 
with seven shipping companies for forty-five vessels worth USD $500 mn, 
orders made possible by state financing arrangements. By 1973, Mauá reached 
maximum production, with the construction of twelve cargo ships of type 
SD-14, and two patrol vessels for the Brazilian navy. In 1974, under the authori-
tarian “nationalist” orientation of Ernesto Geisel’s government, a second PCN 
was promulgated. This plan aimed for a volume of orders of 5.3 mn dwt, and 
planned expenditures of nearly USD $4 bn that corresponded to the tripling of 
tonnage and financial resources of the 1st PCN. By 1979 the industry directly 
employed over 39,000 workers, and in the first half of 1980 Brazil had reached 
the second-highest volume of orders worldwide, behind Japan.13 In this period, 
the shipyards Ishibrás, Verolme, Caneco, and Mauá became leaders of the 
Brazilian shipbuilding until the crisis in the 1980s-1990s.
11 Pessanha, Operários navais, 60.
12 Goularti Filho, “A trajetória da marinha mercante brasileira”, 261.
13 Pessanha, Operários navais, 64.
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Earlier, in June 1976, the expansion and modernisation programme 
undertaken by CCN Mauá, then the world’s fourth-largest builder of series 
of ships over 10,000 dwt, was nearing completion. The programme involved 
a total investment of approximately USD $29.3 mn, and doubled Mauá’s 
shipbuilding capacity by giving the yard two building berths instead of 
one, and brought into operation a substantial amount of automatic and 
semi-automatic equipment. The expansion allowed Mauá to construct ten 
to twelve series vessels a year instead of six, and enabled it to carry out its 
USD $640.5-mn orderbook, which stretched through to 1980, from Brazilian, 
Greek, and Chilean owners. A slipway had been enlarged (820 ft in length by 
138 ft wide), modernised and reinforced to enable the construction of vessels 
up to 90,000 dwt. In addition a second building berth had been created by 
converting the yard’s graving dock to shipbuilding by widening it by 100 
ft, giving a building capacity of up to 27,000 dwt. This concentration on 
shipbuilding meant that Mauá’s ship repairing interests were transferred to 
Renave, then a new ship repairing consortium in which Mauá had a 16.3 per 
cent stake. The other partners were Petrobas, Lloyd Brasileiro, Vale Do Rio 












1969-70 0.5 0.4 n.a.  56.9
First Shipbuilding plan 1971-74 1.6 0.8 1.2  76.9
Second Shipbuilding 
plan
1975-79 5.3 2.6 3.2 367.5
Source: Ministry of transport, Merchant Marine department
Table 19.2  Main Brazilian shipyards in 1978
Shipyard Capital Workers Capacity (dwt)
ishibrás Japanese 3,900 400,000
verolme dutch 4,000 150,000 and 40,000*




note: *two shipyard berths in use 
Source: international Metalworkers Federation collection/iiSH 2nd asian Shipbuilding Seminary 
(1978)
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Doce, Ishibrás, and IHI. Renave would operate from the island of Costeira, 
opposite Mauá’s yard in the Bay of Guanabara, and had four graving docks, 
including two floating docks transferred from Mauá.14
Table 19.2 gives details of ownership, capital, employment, and capacity 
in 1978 of four principal Brazilian shipyards, all beneficiaries of government 
subsidies, direct and indirect.
Recession and crisis, 1980-1990
Despite huge state support, the upward trajectory of Brazil’s shipbuilding 
industry was not immune from the effects of the oil crises and international 
downturns in the market for ships. Indeed, from the mid- to late 1980s, when 
Brazil was experiencing a political transition to democracy, the worldwide 
shipbuilding depression reached the country with a vengeance. By this 
stage the state body responsible for shipping and shipbuilding, SUNAMAM, 
had been plunged into a deep crisis and an investigation was made into 
its bills. Subsequently, cases of alleged corruption were discovered. The 
principal such case was connected with credits given to shipyards without 
proper f inancial controls and with prejudice to the state.15 The government 
took the option of reducing its intervention in the economy. This policy 
change had a profound effect on Brazilian shipbuilding. The collapse of the 
Dutch shipbuilding conglomerate, RSV (which included Verolme’s Brazilian 
shipyard), meant that the shipyard passed into local control in 1983. That 
this occurred proved the strength, and in this case the weakness, of the 
Brazilian government’s policy on shipbuilding. The strength of the policy 
was the encouragement of foreign direct investment and ownership as a 
way to stimulate its domestic industry to grow and emulate international 
competition, and foster employment and greater technological know-how 
in Brazilian companies. The weakness was that the cost of subsidisation to 
achieve this was high and could ultimately be successful only if all shipyards 
were working to capacity.
A prolonged recession from the late 1980s and during the 1990s, already 
under the new democratic constitution of 1988, resulted in dwindling or-
derbooks and underutilisation of capacity, and from the mid- to late 1990s 
14 Marine Reporter and Engineering News, 15 June 1976.
15 “Investigação pode levar a prova de crime na SUNAMAM”, Jornal do Brasil, 1 February 1985, 
19. A few days later, the owner of Mauá Shipyard, Paulo Ferraz, pressed by debts, committed 
suicide ( “Caso SUNAMAM leva Ferraz ao suicídio”, Jornal do Brasil, 8 February 1985, 1).
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onwards the vast majority of workers in all Brazilian shipyards lost their 
jobs. In 1979, with 1,394 mn dwt delivered, the shipbuilding workforce in 
Brazil comprised 39,155 workers; in 1998, with 149,117 dwt delivered, there 
were only 1,880.16
Caneco Shipyard was one of the last shipyards to face a crisis. In 1985 
Caneco could build ships up to 100,000 dwt and had around 10,000 workers 
(including sub-contracted workers). As the market for shipbuilding steadily 
diminished, the government withdrew funding for shipbuilding and, in 
1994, Caneco worked only in small repairs and ship-breaking with a small 
sub-contracted workforce. According to our research the shipyard ceased 
activities in 1997. In 2000, however, on the initiative of a group of former 
employees, the shipyard was reactivated with the signing of a lease between 
Industrias Reunidas Caneco and Rio Nave Serviços Navais Ltd, established 
with its headquarters at the same Rio de Janeiro address in order to use the 
facilities, technology, and expertise of the landlord. Operated by Shipyard 
Rio Nave, ship repair, conversion of vessels, and processing and assembly 
of structural blocks for others were undertaken, in addition to the continu-
ation of the traditional activity of building new ships. Nonetheless, the 
process of f inal bankruptcy of Caneco was exceedingly slow, and Caneco 
Shipyard was declared bankrupt only in 2006. Rio Nave Serviços Navais 
Ltd continued its activities under the same contract immediately after the 
passage of the new bankruptcy law.17 In late 2009, the Shipyard Rio Nave had 
95 per cent of its shares acquired by ESTAI (Escritório de Serviços Técnicos 
e Assessoria Industrial), whose majority shareholder is Mauro Orof ino 
Campos, a marine engineer with extensive experience in the shipping 
industry and shipbuilding in Brazil. Currently, ESTAI controls 66.67 per cent 
of the company’s shares with 28.33 per cent belonging to Nitpar Holdings, 
another company controlled by Campos. Around 900 of Caneco’s workers 
who were laid off in 1997 have been receiving their late salaries and labour 
benefits in lower portions, year by year, until today (early 2014).
According to Pedro Batista, who had worked at the yard since the 1980s, 
f irst at Caneco and now at Rio Nave, the deep crisis at Caneco really started 
16 Data from SINAVAL-Sindicato Nacional das Indústrias da Construção Naval (the off icial 
union of the owners of shipyards). Labour legislation in Brazil regulates the formation of separate 
local unions of workers and of owners, to manage conflict and conduct negotiations under the 
control of Labour Courts.
17 The new bankruptcy law (Law 11.101, in 2005) limited the preference of labour credits and 
the credits of labour accidents for 150 “minimum wages”, which is around USD $100,000. This 
politically biased law removed a labour right with the argument of saving workers’ contracts 
that “could be in danger” with the bankruptcy process.
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during Fernando Collor’s neo-liberal government (1990-1992). The workers 
were forced to take collective holiday, there was a lack of jobs, and wages 
were frequently late. According to Batista:
I was working at the shipyard […] One day, we went to the shipyard door, 
to work, and the door was closed. We thought: “It is over.”18
The neo-liberal orientation was maintained during the eight years of the 
government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1994-2002), with serious 
damage to workers’ rights. In the early 2000s Rio Nave started to operate 
in only a part of the total area of the shipyard, and now occupies an area 
of 94,766 m2 with 43,052 m² of this space indoors. The company Intercan 
Terminais de Containeres e Logística rents a small part of the yard. The 
Rio Nave Company employed some labourers, but did not assume past 
labour claims or take responsibility for late wages. At this moment, Rio 
Nave have a workforce of 1,550 workers (650 on sub-contracting jobs), with 
projected increases, in the short term, to 2,500 workers,19 but the situation 
of the shipyard is unstable. Even new employees faced problems of non-
compliance with the job contract, and government support was not as 
strong as the industry needed.20
In the case of Mauá, from March 1997 to December 1998, the shipyard 
was leased by the group SEAPAR, which kept the ship repairing activities 
and some platform work. From the year 1999 Mauá Shipyard was leased 
to Naval Maritime Constructions which continued the same activities.21 
However, in September 2000, the Singaporean ship repairing and conversion 
conglomerate, Jurong, assumed the lease of Mauá Shipyard, under the name 
Mauá-Jurong SA. Production resumed with the construction of modules for 
oil and gas platforms, and the activity of ship repair was also maintained. In-
deed, the number of employees reached 2,000, according to SINAVAL. Today, 
Mauá Shipyard has more than 4,000 effective workers,22 and is controlled by 
the Synergy Group Corporation, a South American conglomerate, created 
and owned by German Efromovich, and headquartered in Rio de Janeiro.
18 Pedro Batista, 59 years old, interview with Luisa Barbosa Pereira, 29 May 2012.
19 Information avaliable on Rio Nave website: www.rionave.com.br (accessed 12 March 2013). 
20 Barbosa Pereira, “Navegar é preciso”, 278.
21 Jornal do Brasil, Economia, 26 August 1999, 15.
22 This estimate is given by the local workers’ metal union, Sindicato dos Metalúrgicos de 
Niterói.
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The Brazilian shipbuilding industry in the 2000s: the affirmative 
role of the state
In the early 2000s, the picture seemed to improve for shipbuilding industry, 
at least at the regional level. Earlier, in 1999, under pressure from trade 
unions, the secretariat of the shipbuilding industry, energy, and gas was 
created in Rio de Janeiro. In that year, a programme called Fleet Naval 
Renovation and Maritime Support was implemented; followed in 2000 
by the programme Navigate Brazil; neither had a strong impact on the 
shipbuilding industry. In 2001, under pressure from Rio de Janeiro deputies, 
a National Agency of Aquatic Transport (ANTAQ) was formed. The Brazilian 
government has also established a specif ic programme to nationalise oil 
platforms. In addition, trade unions created the Inter Unions Forum for the 
Development of the Shipbuilding Industry in Rio de Janeiro.23
The most important government stimulus took place only after 2003, 
when the Workers’ Party government (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) came 
to power. The federal government of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva,24 from the 
time of its election worked for the development of the shipbuilding industry, 
through subsidies, f inancial support for local shipyards, special laws, and – 
mainly – with orders from the state-owned oil and gas company, Petrobras, 
and its transport subsidiary company, Transpetro.
The government launched various plans for the expansion of the national 
f leet. The principal plans were: the Mobilisation Programme for the Na-
tional Industry of Oil and Natural Gas (PROMINP) and the Programme of 
Expansion and Modernisation of the Fleet of Maritime Support (PROMEF). 
By presidential decree in 2003, PROMINP was created aiming to improve 
qualif ication policies for workers, and to encourage the participation of 
domestic goods and services industries in the implementation of oil and 
gas projects in Brazil and abroad.
In 2005 PROMEF – the main instrument of renewal of the shipbuilding 
industry in Brazil in recent years – was launched.25 The f irst orders were for 
forty-nine ships, eleven to Rio de Janeiro shipyards, with Mauá receiving 
four orders. In the following period the orders increased to 149 maritime 
23 Barbosa Pereira, “Navegar é preciso”, 211.
24 Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula) was president of Brazil between 2003 and 2010. He was the 
main leader of the “new unionism” in Brazil and one of the founders of CUT (Central Única 
dosTrabalhadores) and PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores).
25 Guedes de Jesus and Gitahy, “Transformações na indústria de construção naval brasileira”, 
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support ships, 11 platforms, and 19 oil and gas tankers, in addition to others.26 
In November 2011, Mauá Shipyard launched the first ship under the PROMEF 
programme, a tanker vessel – for oil “white derivatives” – named Celso 
Furtado (a leading economist punished by the military coup of 1964). Up 
to April 2014, thanks to PROMEF, seven ships had already been delivered 
to Transpetro, as we can see in Table 19.3.
There were also other important f inancing initiatives. One of the most 
signif icant was the restructuring of the Merchant Marine Fund, begun in 
2009.27 The FMM subsidies, which were vital for supporting the shipbuilding 
industry, declined during the international f inancial crisis period after 
2008, and the fund suffered many changes up to the end of the decade, 
when the government created a tax added to freight, for the renewal of the 
merchant marine fleet (AFRMM, Adicional de Frete para Renovação da 
Marinha Mercante). The FMM got bigger, and this combination of factors, 
coupled with the discovery of oil in the Brazilian pre-salt layer, reintroduced 
the Brazilian shipbuilding industry to the group of big producers of the 
world.28 Rio Nave has directly benefited from FMM subsidies (through STX 
OSV and Guanabara Consórcio), by PROMINP; and indirectly through the 
subsidies given by Transpetro/Petrobras in PROMEF. Today, the Petrobras 
Company is Rio Nave’s principal client.
As the Shipyards Caneco/Rio Nave and Mauá are private, throughout 
their history the state has frequently given them subsidies to develop their 
shipyards, and shipbuilding in general. The role of the state has always been 
26 SINAVAL, Balanço Anual de Atividades, Rio de Janeiro, 2008.
27 Resolution CMN 3.828, in 2009, and Act 11.786, in 2008.
28 In 2012 the disbursement of FMM was of R$ 2,924 bn (USD $1,439 bn at that time): SINAVAL, 
SIM- SINAVAL Informa Mensal, December 2012, 2.
Table 19.3  Ships delivered to Transpetro, 2011-2014
Date Shipyard Tanker Type of tanker
november 2011 Mauá Celso Furtado product tanker
May 2012 eaS João Cândido oil tanker
July 2012 Mauá Sérgio Buarque Holanda product tanker
January 2013 Mauá Rômulo Almeida product tanker
May 2013 eaS Zumbi dos Palmares oil tanker
January 2014 Mauá José Alencar product tanker
april 2014 eaS Dragão do Mar oil tanker
note: eaS: atlantico Sul Shipyard 
Source: Sinaval (information for candidates in the 2014 elections, august 2014)
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fundamental for the Brazilian shipbuilding industry, and in recent years 
the renewal of this sector and its reorientation towards offshore work has 
been possible only because of this strategy. Because of these programmes 
and f inancial support, by 2011 the number of shipbuilding workers in Brazil 
had grown to 62,000 contract workers.29
Naval workers: labour conditions and collective action
Workers’ profile
At the beginning of Brazilian industrialisation as well as during its initial 
expansion, the workers had mainly a rural background. With the evolution 
and consolidation of industrial growth after 1950, shipyard workers increas-
ingly came to feel themselves a “working-class family”. Our research shows 
that, until the 1980s, a referral from a family member was the principal 
way to get a job. The new workers were sons, brothers, or relatives of older 
shipbuilding workers or ex-workers. Frequently sons tried to follow their 
fathers into these jobs, although some interviews have indicated that many 
fathers did not recommend the job to their sons or relatives because of the 
hard and dangerous conditions inherent to it.
The workers were also recruited by the shipyards from technical schools 
such as SENAI’s, to work as trainees.30 SENAI had courses for platers, plumb-
ers, f itter mechanics, electricians, cutters, carpenters, locksmiths, and 
lathe turners.
In terms of regular education, more than half of workers in 1995 (54.8 
per cent) had not completed high school. In 2010, this percentage was 22.3 
per cent. The proprotion of workers who had completed high school (the 
educational stage before college) was 14 per cent in 1995 and grew to 42.6 
per cent in 2010; 7.18 per cent of workers had gone to college in 1995 and 
7.72 per cent in 2010. The number of engineers is also low. The average for 
engineers/shipyards in Brazil was 5 per cent in 2010.31
29 According to SINAVAL, Cenário da Construção Naval Brasileira – Cenário do 4º trimestre 
– Balanço 2011, www.sinaval.org.br (accessed 12 March 2013).
30 National Service of Industrial Learning (SENAI) is a Brazilian private institution of public 
interest, a non-profit, with a legal personality. SENAI was created by Decree 4.0482 of 22 January 
1942. Its main goal is to support twenty-eight industrial areas through training of human 
resources and the provision of technical and technological services. The institution is still active.
31 Guedes de Jesus, “A retomada da indústria de construção naval brasileira”, 119-121.
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Until the 1980s the workforce in the production line at the shipyard was 
exclusively male. By the advent of the 2000s there had been little change, 
despite the growth of the female workforce in Brazil.
The interviews conducted show that the workers who were on production 
at Caneco, Rio Nave, and Mauá after 2000 were younger than before the 
1990s. According to the interviewees the predominant age range before 
the 1990s was between 18 and 35 years old; after 2000 it is between 18 and 
28 years old.
Labour conditions
Before the Second World War the shipbuilding industry in Brazil was very 
rudimental in terms of technology and was based heavily on the workers’ 
inherited knowledge of ship construction. The sections were controlled by 
the most experienced workers, and know-how was passed from generation 
to generation. Shipbuilding is an assembly industry and involves various 
stages of work of varying complexity. The fact that the capital good that 
had been commissioned was non-standard empowered the workers in the 
labour process.
The labour process in the shipbuilding industry allows the workers 
to control part of their time and to follow the production of ships as a 
whole. Many of them remembered ships by name and/or number and 
followed their trajectory through the seas of the country and the world 
until they became inactive. During the interviews their pride in their 
work was evident. Many of them are able to “read the drawings” of the 
ship design to “make the parts” and assemble the hull. Because of that 
we can speak of a particular work culture, that, despite the increased 
technical control allied to modern methods of production such as block 
and section assembly and construction, leads to a perception of a kind 
of “iron handicraft”, a phrase the workers often used to describe some of 
their activities:32
The ship is drawn there, in the section of risk, piece by piece, the ship’s 
structure […] The structure is steel, as are the building blocks that form 
the ship, the craft that we see […] Iron craft we call, the workers usually 
call it […] So you draw these pieces, cut them up […] and they are as-
sembled […] forming blocks. Then those blocks […] go to the dyke, these 
32 Pessanha, Operários navais, 96.
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blocks are placed accordingly, in their places, and adjusted […] and there 
the ship will be taking shape.33
After 1950, new techniques began to be introduced into Brazilian ship-
building. By the 1970s, technical changes in production methods and 
in labour organisation resulted in a decline in workers’ autonomy and 
the qualif ications of the collective of workers. IHI’s Ishibrás shipyard 
unsurprisingly adopted the Japanese model of production utilising 
automatic welding, which allowed pre-assembly of entire sections of 
the ship, and detailed production planning. Other shipyards such as 
Caneco, Mauá, and Emaq/Eisa at that time imported German and British 
technologies.34
In spite of workers’ resistance, after the military coup in 1964, forms 
of recruitment and professional formation brought some changes for 
the workers’ prof ile. There was a tendency to build a “new generation of 
workers”, and a clear distinction appeared between the older and younger 
generations, based on changes in professional socialisation and social and 
political participation of the older cohort under the “populist regime”. 
The workers at this moment were suffering the intensif ication of working 
conditions, repression, suppression of their rights, and prohibition of free 
unionism.
The progressive implementation of the 1st PCN (1971-1974) by the mili-
tary dictatorship corresponded to the consolidation of new administra-
tive and industrial methods: increased mechanisation and automation of 
the process of preparation of steel, extensive use of welding, considerable 
improvement in the handling capacity of plates and blocks inside the 
yard (by the use of hydraulic jacks and hoists), diffusion and applica-
tion of advanced f inishing methods, and concomitant centralisation 
of systems of planning and controlling the execution of the work, thus 
redef ining the relationship between sectors and production projects. 
In the second period of technical change (1972-1976), fundamental in 
order to spread and try to consolidate the modernisation of the sector, 
the imposition of Japanese methods of production pioneered at Ishibrás 
33 Worker in a fabrication shop of Mauá Shipyard, 29 years old, Niterói, interviewed by Elina 
Pessanha, 1985. The names of workers interviewed in this period are omitted to protect them 
from possible persecution by the management of the yard or the military authorities.
34 Technical document, National Social and Economic Development bank (BNDES): 
“Contribuição para o Aperfeiçoamento de uma Política para a Indústria Naval e a Marinha 
Mercante”m www.bndes.gov.br (accessed 12 March 2013).
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Shipyard became more widespread.35 Technicians became divorced from 
actual production and concentrated on managing the production pro-
cess, and the premium for skilled workers in the occupational hierarchy 
radically altered.
The combination of these factors allowed production volume to grow 
extraordinarily during this period, and by 1978 Brazil was second to Japan 
in shipbuilding output, due largely to VLCC construction.
The implementation of the 2nd PCN (1974-1979) was also marked by a 
further expansion in the process of automation within the shipyards, the 
installation of modern machinery, and a renewed emphasis on project man-
agement, coupled with the introduction of the use of computers to control 
the flows of materials and production. During this period a kind of euphoria 
reigned among businessmen and technocrats involved in shipbuilding, as its 
economic importance was recognised internally and the relative position of 
the country in international shipbuilding production improved significantly. 
Table 19.4 shows that output increased steadily to 1978, dropped in 1979, 
recovered in 1980, and thereafter from 1981 to 1986 averaged 421,000 gross 
tons, before a disastrous year in 1987 and a six-fold recovery in 1988.
However, this transformation in the technical basis of ship production 
did not erode the importance of workers in the production process. Indeed, 
the distribution of shipyard workers in small groups contributed to preserv-
ing their control over the working day.
By this stage and especially between the most repressive years of dictator-
ship in Brazil (between 1968 and the end of the 1970s), the military also 
35 Pedro Motta Veiga describes in detail these processes and their changes: “Mudança técnica 
e processo de trabalho na construção naval brasileira”.
Table 19.4  Launching output of the Brazilian shipbuilding industry, 1975-1988 
(000 grt)
1975 389 1982 455
1976 426 1983 359
1977 572 1984 460
1978 698 1985 401
1979 467 1986 316
1980 615 1987  41
1981 549 1988 269
Source: lloyd’s Register of Shipping data
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tried to rationalise the training of workers through technical schools and 
with Ishibrás’s assistance.
Elina Pessanha and Regina Morel in their paper about shipbuilding work-
ers and steel industry workers in Rio de Janeiro showed how the relationship 
between old and young workers was improved during this period, and how 
the new generation established a strong connection with the expertise of the 
older.36 This connection was due to a permanent process of professional and 
political socialisation of the younger workers trained by the older ones, and 
also conjoined the “old unionism” to the “new unionism” that took place at 
the end of 1970s, under the influence of São Paulo’s metalworkers’ unionism 
(in the car industry).37 In Rio de Janeiro, where the “old unionism” led by com-
munists and workers in state enterprises had predominated, this process of 
disruption could be seen more clearly alongside one of continuity between the 
generations. Reacting to the authoritarianism of 1964 regime, they helped to 
make the transition to democracy that the 1988 constitution had consolidated.
Nevertheless, the crisis of the 1990s, under a neo-liberal economic ori-
entation, produced a gap with a large majority of the workforce having left 
shipbuilding; when the shipbuilding industry re-emerged in Brazil in the 
2000s, the scenario was a shortage of a specialised workforce:
The shipbuilding industry stopped in the 1990s and now, when it is com-
ing back, the shipyards have a big problem in f inding a skilled workforce 
[…] The Metalworkers Union is struggling to make for SENAI training 
free for workers. Because nowadays one worker has to pay R$ 1,000 (USD 
$500) to graduate into the shipbuilding industry.38
After 2000, new techniques of production were also introduced. The 
principal change is the reorganisation of production in terms of products, 
with a reduction in direct suppliers and change to supplies just in time, 
with systems and pre-assembled blocks. When the productivity of the 
sector returned, after 2003, shipbuilding was a faster-moving industry 
that involved a larger chain of production and many more workers in the 
main shipyards (old or new), necessitating more sophisticated planning 
and management systems.
36 Pessanha and Morel, “Gerações operárias”.
37 On the “new unionism” in Brazil, see Rodrigues (org.), O novo sindicalismo 20 anos depois, 
Antunes, O novo sindicalismo, and Badaró Mattos, Novos e velhos sindicalismos no Rio de Janeiro.
38 Anelsino Bento, Shipbuilding Industry Director at Metalworkers Union of Rio de Janeiro, 
interview with Juliana Marques, 21 March 2013.
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In terms of technology, the growing use of pre-assembly work manu-
factured outside the shipyard was an important point highlighted by the 
workers. The panels are more modern. The sections of the ship came to the 
shipyard already cut, ready to f it:
The ship is a big puzzle. We have to f it it together, piece by piece. If a piece 
is too big or too small, we lose time and the puzzle doesn’t f it. This kind 
of thing didn’t happen in the past but now it does.39
The productivity of the shipbuilding sector is associated with quicker 
delivery times, less stock, and less waste all along the production 
process. Interdependence between the shipyard and outside assembly 
contractors became fundamental to meet deadlines. The rate of con-
struction has grown by incorporating increased automation in welding 
for sub-assemblies and hull sections. Previously in Brazilian shipyards 
the majority of welding tasks were conducted manually, but this has 
gradually changed from semi-automatic processes to fully automated 
machine welding.
39 Willian Cardoso, worker at Caneco in the past and at Rio Nave today, interview with Juliana 
Marques on 21 March 2013.
Table 19.5  Number of workers employed in shipyards associated with SINAVAL, 
2004-2014
State 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014*
Rio de Janeiro 10, 636 17,052 20,403 25,987 29,967 35,458
espírito Santo - - - - - 508 
São paulo 661 795 1,065 781 1,604 1,858
Sta catarina 1,046 1,208 2,395 1,958 3,039 5,172
Rio grande Sul - - - 5,500 6,174 9,454
pará 175 225 341 411 316 810
amazonas - - 2,500 9,244 13,372 12,110
ceará 133 320 960 1,300 202 703
Sergipe - - - 350 38 58
Bahia - - - - 1,628 100
pernambuco - - 5,613 10,581 5,696 15,680
TOTAL 12,651 19,600 33,277 56,112 62,036 81,911
note: * up to July 
Source: Sinaval
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The introduction, for instance, of computerised welding at Rio Nave and 
especially MIG (metal inert gas) welding (used in semi- and fully automated 
welding processes) is seen as the most important change in construction 
methods by the workers but it is not without critics:
The welding process now is 20 per cent faster than in the past but the 
quality is low. In the end, many times, we have to do the work again.40
According to data from Sinaval, in December 2011 the Brazilian shipbuilding 
industry was working with orders in seven main areas: offshore support 
vessels; port support; PROMEF (the tanker fleet renewal programme noted 
above); the Brazilian Navigation Companies (EBN) Programme; platforms 
and rigs; vessels for internal commerce; and vessels for inland navigation.
Over the course of 2013, Rio Nave constructed four vessels for Trans-
petro. Two vessels were for carrying “dark products” and two vessels for 
carrying “white products”, such as naphtha, diesel, kerosene, and gasoline. 
The contract for construction was signed by Transpetro to improve the 
EBN Programme. All the vessels together have the capacity of 120,000 dwt. 
The EBN Programme is part of a series of Petrobras initiatives to boost 
shipbuilding in Brazil and aims to reduce dependence on foreign markets 
for sea freight.41
40 Willian Cardoso, worker at Caneco in the past, and at Rio Nave today, interview with Juliana 
Marques, 21 March 2013.
41 According to Rio Nave’s website, www.rionave.com.br (accessed 12 March 2013).
Table 19.6  Ship orders, worldwide and Brazil, 2010
Type World Brazil % participation of Brazil
tankers 1,594  56 3.51
gas tankers  164  12 7.20
chemical tankers  754   0 0
Bulk carriers 3,387   2 0.05
container ships  672   5 0.72
Ro-Ro and passenger ships  343   0 0
offshore 1,006 154 15.31
TOTAL 7,920 229 2.89
Source: clarksons. June 2010; Sinaval
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Labour rights
Despite the increasing use of mechanisation, our research shows that the 
workers did not on the whole lose control of the production process; and, 
largely because of a shortage of skilled workers, they can ask for more rights 
and are continually trying to regain the rights lost in the years of dictator-
ship and recession.
Only in the f irst decade of the 2000s did rights begin to be regained, and 
then only in part. In 1963 the working week comprised 40 hours, after the 
military coup it grew to 48 hours and after 2000 it is 44. In 1963, overtime 
was paid at double the normal hourly rate of pay. Only in 2009 did workers 
recover a part of this old right when the payment of overtime on Sundays 
and holidays started to be paid at double the hourly rate (100 per cent). But 
overtime at night only attracted a premium of 20 per cent and in a normal 
day 50 per cent of the hourly wage (Table 19.7).
In October 2012, the average wage in the shipbuilding industry in Rio de 
Janeiro was around USD $885 (skilled worker) and USD $351.51 (unskilled 
worker). The minimum wage was USD $304, only 34.35 per cent of the skilled 
worker’s salary. In May 1985, the average wage in the shipbuilding industry 
was around USD $1,440 (skilled worker) and USD $879 (unskilled worker). 
The minimum wage was USD $610.42, corresponding to 36 per cent of the 
skilled worker’s salary. It is important to say that these f igures do not take 
inflation into account, but serve to illustrate the difference between the 
shipbuilding and minimum wages.42
The number of workers who received f ive minimum wages or less grew 
between 1995 and 2010 from 32.6 per cent in 1995 to 74 per cent in 2010. In 
the same period, the number of workers who have received f ive minimum 
wages or more reduced from 66 per cent in 1995 to 21.5 per cent in 2010. The 
workers who received seven minimum wages or more also decreased from 
26.3 per cent in 1995 to 5 per cent in 2010.43
42 Salary in Brazil means a wage paid monthly to all workers. The minimum wage in current 
money in 1985 (cruzeiro) was: Cr$ 333.000,00; in current money in 2012, R$ 1,211; in USD $610.38. 
The shipbuilding industry wage in current money in 1985 was: Cr$ 480.000,00 (unskilled worker); 
in current money in 2012, R$ 1.745; in USD $879.53. The shipbuilding industry wage in current 
money in 1985 was: Cr$ 786.000,00 (skilled worker); in current money in 2012 R$ 2.858; in USD 
$1440.52. We used http://www.igf.com.br/calculadoras/conversor/conversor.htm (accessed on 
20 March 2013 to convert cruzerios into reais.
43 Guedes de Jesus, “A retomada da indústria de construção naval brasileira”, 112. 
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It is possible to say that the living circumstances and the status of the work-
ers were better in the past than today. Until the 1980s a shipbuilding worker 
had a good salary, rights, a good home, and easy credit. They were a privileged 
and valued category of workers, even more so than the metalworkers. They 
had better salaries because of the specialised work they undertook, and 
also the frequent addition of the insalubrity tax, payment for overtime, etc.
After 2000, after the renewed growth of the shipbuilding industry, the 
situation has changed, but the shipbuilding workers up to the present do 
not have the possibility of attaining the status that a shipbuilding worker 
Table 19.7  Working hours and paid overtime, 1963-2012 (selected years; 











october 2012 44  50 100 100  20
october 2009 44  50 100 100   0
1985 48  50 100   0 100
1964 48   0   0   0   0
1963 40 100 100 100 100
Source: original data from Metalworkers collective convention (2009 and 2012); pessanha, 
Operários navais; and Brazilian Ministry of labour
Table 19.8  Monthly wage in US dollars
Skilled Unskilled Minimum wage
october 2012 uSd $885.12 uSd $351.51 uSd $304
october 2009 uSd $662 uSd $304.08 uSd $277
May 1985 uSd $1440.52 uSd $879 uSd $610
Source: original data from: Metalworkers collective convention (2009 and 2012); pessanha, 
Operários navais; and Brazilian Ministry of labour
Table 19.9  Minimum salary as a percentage of shipbuilding salary




Source: original data from Metalworkers collective convention (2009 and 2012), pessanha, 
Operários navais; and central Bank of Brazil
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had had in the past. The older workers remember that time with a mixture 
of sadness and pride:
I became a shipbuilding worker because it had one of the best wages in 
Brazil! I bought my own home with my salary. The social rights were 
better, [as was] the quality for our family life […] nowadays it is different. 
A guy became a shipbuilding worker because of necessity, because his 
father [was one], and because there are many jobs today.44
In this way of recuperation of rights, the role of the state – through the 
Labour Justice and Public Labour Prosecutors – is also very important. 
Privileged mediators in the relationship between workers and employers, 
these institutions deal with the demands of workers and give them some 
assurance that labour laws will be respected.45
Collective action: union and political ideology
Over the years Caneco’s and Mauá’s workers have been important combative 
groups. On many occasions they were connected with actions of the Metal-
workers Union (the union representing shipbuilding workers in Rio de Janeiro 
and Niterói since 1964), but frequently they did not agree with the union; they 
had the power to disagree with them, and sometimes “convince” (by argu-
ments and pressure) the collective of workers to disagree with the union line.
All union organisations in Brazil receive a compulsory union tariff, 
paid by workers and collected by the government. In turn, the government 
shares this money out between local unions and national union federations 
(such as the Central Union of Workers – CUT – and Força Sindical, the 
biggest federations in Brazil). This tariff corresponds to the payment for 
one workday per year. All the workers are required to pay this tariff; thus 
all unions have f ixed f inancial support. In addition, workers can also be 
associated to a union and pay a monthly union fee. The value is stipulated 
by the workers’ collective convention. The Metalworkers’ Unions rate is 1.5 
per cent of the workers’ wage.
44 Willian Cardoso, worker at Caneco in the past and at Rio Nave today, interview with Juliana 
Marques, 21 March 2013.
45 This relation of workers and their unions with the judicial institutions has also been ob-
served by others researchers. See for example Cardoso, A década neoliberal; Werneck Vianna, 
et al., A judicialização da política e das relações sociais no Brasil.
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The Metalworkers’ Unions of Rio de Janeiro (which brings together 
Caneco’s and Rio Nave’s workers) and Niterói (Mauá workers) had been 
under the influence of the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) for decades. 
From the years 1940 to 1970, those communists, often allied to members 
of the so-called Labour Brazilian Party (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro, 
PTB), inspired by Getúlio Vargas, had great influence on trade unionism.46 
More recently, the Communist Party of Brazil (PC do B)47 and the Workers’ 
Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) have won the elections for the main 
positions of the Metalworkers’ Unions, but some groups from the so-called 
radical left also have been quarrelling with the unions. The last election 
in Rio de Janeiro’s union was contested by a coalition, with many different 
political groups, including the radical left.48
Protests and strikes
The shipbuilding workers have been a mobilised category of workers from 
modern times, and Caneco’s and Mauá’s workers, from two of the most 
traditional shipyards, have played an important role in the shipbuilding 
workers’ movement.
Different forms of labour protest occurred over the years at the shipyards, 
such as strikes, shutdowns, and picketing. These protests were organised 
by the unions (in the past the Naval Workers’ Union of Rio de Janeiro, 
Niterói, and Angra dos Reis), by workers’ commissions, or by the workers 
independently. One of the most important struggles was the Maritimes 
General Strike, between June and October 1953.
The national context was of Vargas’s second government (1951-1954) and 
the general strike of “maritimes” began only one day after the ministerial 
reform that put João Goulart (a politician with a strong relationship with 
the unions) into the Labour Ministry. The general strikers issued twenty-five 
demands, including the protection of the National Merchant Navy, better 
working conditions, regulation of the conditions of workers on board ships, 
the payment of insalubrity tax, etc.49
46 See Santana, Homens partidos.
47 The Communist Party of Brazil (PCB), founded in 1922, split in 1960 into the Brazilian 
Communist Party (PCB) and the Communist Party of Brazil (PC do B). 
48 According to our research and interviews. 
49 Barsted, Medição de Forças, 113-120.
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This period can be divided into two stages: the end of the f irst general 
strike (June 1953) and the time after the end of the second general strike 
(October 1953). After June, the workers’ demands were partially met, but 
the employers and the state did not fulf il the accord, leading to a second 
general strike. This strike was repressed, the union headquarters was raided 
by the police, and the leaders were imprisoned until November.50
However, the strike showed the potential of the workers to mobilise 
and organise, and over the years from 1953 onwards the inion won some 
important rights including remunerated weekly rest, salary payments on 
holidays, the right to induct the ship workers union directory, 35 per cent for 
insalubrity tax, payment of 100 per cent for overtime, limitation of weekly 
working hours to 40 hours,51 and other rights. The real salaries were mark-
edly higher than the minimum salary (see Table 19.5).
The workers’ situation changed abruptly, as we have seen, in the aftermath 
of the 1964 coup. The shipbuilding workers – who were part of the maritime 
category – were moved to the metalworkers’ union category. It was an old 
requirement demanded by the shipyard owners, and consequently the 
workers lost all the rights they had won beforehand, and the category was 
fragmented by different local unions (Metalworkers Union of Rio de Janeiro, 
Metalworkers Union of Niterói, Metalworkers Union of Angra dos Reis, and 
so on). Some of these rights could not be recovered until today. After April 
1964, many workers were forced to retire, or persecuted and arrested. All 
kinds of union associations were forbidden by the military junta.52
Only in 1979 did the f irst strike occur since 1964, with strong participa-
tion and workers demanding the restoration of lost rights. Afterwards the 
workers around the country, and in particular at the region of ABC Paulista53 
in São Paulo, began a protest – on a scale unusual in that period – that 
made that moment signif icant for Brazilian labour history.54 The pressure 
on the military government was sustained until 1985, when civilian rule 
was reinstated; this was strengthened in 1988 when a new constitution was 
promulgated.
The so-called Citizen Constitution approved important labour rights 
such as a reduction in the working day; the extension of maternity leave; 
the right to strike; a ban on dismissal without cause by the employer; union 
50 Ibid., 173.
51 Brazil has adopted a work week of 44 hours up to 2014. 
52 Barsted, Medição de Forças, 191-193.
53 ABC comes from the name of three cities: Santo André, São Bernardo, and São Caetano.
54 Lula da Silva was the leader of this movement.
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autonomy; the establishment of the Unif ied Health System (SUS), which 
expanded access to health care in Brazil; Rural and Social Security, which 
encouraged equal rights for agricultural and urban workers; and others. The 
constitution was an example of an attempt to universalise social rights.55 
It remains to be seen whether it would be more honoured in the breach 
rather than in the observance.
Workers and the crisis in the 1990s: for and against negotiation
The strategies of the Metalworkers Unions in Rio de Janeiro and Niterói in 
the 1990s, when Brazil was facing an economic crisis and when the par-
ticipation of the state in the economy decreased signif icantly, comprised 
negotiations involving the state, owners, and national and international 
groups. The unions were also partners of the “Sectorial Chamber of Capital 
Goods”, for shipbuilding and ship repair, and tried to make deals to maintain 
their jobs.56
The Sectorial Chamber began with contacts among the state, owners, 
and workers at the Secretariat of Industry and Commerce, in Rio de Janeiro, 
and afterwards with the Ministry of Labour. This group accelerated discus-
sions for establishing a Short-Term Agreement and made plans to develop a 
Global Deal for the long term. The f irst deal was fulf illed on 27 May 1993. Its 
objectives were: renovation of the Brazilian naval f leet, an increase in jobs, 
better salaries and labour relationships, expansion of exports, increased 
productivity, and growth of industry competitiveness, production, and 
direct revenue.
This Short-Term Agreement established, for the period 1993-1994, the 
goal of producing 1.6m dwt of shipping, the creation of 7,000 jobs, and the 
liberation of USD $232 mn of FAT (Fund for Supporting Worker) money 
to conclude construction and other actions involving Petrobras and the 
Merchant Marine Fund. All these activities would ensure more employ-
ment, job stability for one year, and an agreed readjustment of salaries 
month by month. The one year’s job stability was the most contested item, 
according to the workers. The owners did not want to make an agreement 
in these terms because of the insecurity of the economy.
55 See Ramalho, “Trabalho, direitos sociais e sindicato na constituição de 1988”.
56 This Sectorial Chamber of Capital Goods was a tentative to negotiate with the owners and 
state with the pretext of saving the shipbuilding industry in Brazil.
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Some shipbuilding workers from older yards such as Caneco and Mauá 
had not agreed with the strategy of conciliation. The Metalworkers Union 
of Niterói also disagreed. All were inherently sceptical that good results 
would be achieved. The Metalworkers Unions of Rio de Janeiro, Angra dos 
Reis, and Belém do Para57 and other metalworkers’ leaders were the main 
actors who tried these strategies of conciliation and negotiation.
The parity commission that was f inally formed attempted to f ind 
solutions for the shipbuilding industry crisis, and had some success. 
The sector, which had 5,000 workers between 1992 and 1993, increased 
to 12,000 after the f irst deal. But the profound crisis did not permit the 
fulf ilment of the other requests. Many workers, as the deals were not 
fulf illed, believed that this was a consequence of submission to and 
conciliation with owners and the state. Afterwards the group that had 
supported the Rio de Janeiro union’s inclination to negotiate lost the 
union elections to a group f irmly against the politics of conciliation. 
The collective negotiation was an important point of discussion and 
dispute within the unions and had accentuated the divergences between 
political groups.58
The election of July 1996 in Rio de Janeiro’s Metalworkers Union was 
disputed. Three groups had acquiesced to the union’s direction. The f irst 
group was formed by the majority faction of the Central Union of Workers 
and was supported by modern shipyards such as Ishibrás and Emaq. The 
second group was formed by the CUT’s opposition group and was supported 
by old shipyards. The third group was formed by a group connected to 
Força Sindical, another central union, more associated with “unionism of 
results”. The f irst group, which was under the union’s direction since 1993, 
lost the election to the second group, and the Sectorial Chamber came to 
be remembered as mere submission.
After 2000, in each year, the Metalworkers Unions have conducted a 
“wage campaign” to attempt to reclaim the owners’ gains for themselves and 
to recover inflationary losses by wage increases.59 Even with the recupera-
tion of the sector, the workers, most of them from Caneco, Rio Nave and 
Mauá Shipyards, f ight against low salaries, absence of security deposit, 
decline of standard of living, etc. For all these reasons, there are frequent 
57 The cities of Angra dos Reis and Rio de Janeiro are in Rio de Janeiro state. The city of Belém 
do Pará is in Pará state.
58 Pessanha, Operários Navais, 241.
59 For an analysis of recent cycles of strikes in Brazil, see Noronha, “Ciclo de greves, transição 
política e estabilização”.
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strikes, pickets, and protests inside or outside the shipyard, with or without 
their union’s support.
The situation of relative stability in the Brazilian economy, the develop-
ment of the shipbuilding industry towards the oil and gas sectors, and the 
increasing role of the state have empowered the workers to continue to 
f ight for their rights. Given the permanent challenges to their labour class 
position, which associates the harsh working conditions with pride in their 
professional expertise, the strategies of collective action try to honour the 
memory of the past and pave the way for effective resistance.
Conclusion
This chapter has aimed to show how labour relations developed in the 
Shipyards Mauá from the 1950s, Caneco from the 1950s until the 1990s, 
and then Rio Nave from the 2000s, in terms of production relations and 
the situation of workers.
After 1950, although they were private concerns, Caneco and Mauá were 
very dependent on government subsidies, orders, and general support to 
the industry. Indeed, the role of state was central for the development of 
shipbuilding. Even the military dictatorship of the 1960s, in part attempting 
to prop up the authoritarian regime by reinforcing economic centralisation, 
invested heavily in the shipbuilding industry, ultimately with a strategy 
of privatisation and the strong exploitation and repression of the workers. 
When the subsidies and government f inancial support ended in the 1980s, 
the shipbuilding industry suffered accordingly, and signif icant unemploy-
ment ensued. The scenario changed only in the 2000s, when the government 
of President Lula da Silva introduced a strong policy to rebuild and reorient 
the Brazilian shipbuilding industry through Petrobras’s support.
Our research also shows that in spite of the changes to the Brazilian 
shipbuilding industry – automation, new techniques of welding, and the 
new methodology of block assembly of sections – the workers have not lost 
their degree of autonomy and have built a workers’ culture connected with 
their history of struggle, capacity, and work experiences.
It is also possible to state that on many occasions shipbuilding workers 
have acted like a workers’ vanguard, albeit unsuccessfully at times. They 
organised one of the most famous strikes in Brazilian labour history (in 
1953) when they were part of the “maritimes category” of workers and won 
many rights. However, as a result of this, the dictatorship (in response to an 
old employers’ claim) moved these workers to the “metalworkers category”, 
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which had the effect of their losing the hard-won rights gained after the 
1953 strike. During the 1990s those shipbuilding workers who remained in 
employment were very much on the defensive.
In the 2000s, when the shipbuilding industry was restructured, workers 
came to be more proactive in attempting to improve their rights as a skilled 
category of workers. They also attempted to use different types of collective 
action, including strikes, mobilisations, joint actions, the establishment of 
Labour Justice and Public Labour Prosecutors, and even conciliation under 
some circumstances.
Over the years, these shipbuilding workers have built a trajectory of 
conciliation and tension between tradition and innovation in some of the 
oldest shipbuilding and repair f irms in Brazil, while attempting to maintain 
their working-class culture in a changing economic and political landscape. 
However, in the end analysis, world market forces help dictate and deter-
mine the future of the industry along with government intervention and 
protection. Caught between national priorities and international realities, 
the shipbuilding workers of Caneco/Rio Nave and Mauá face the future.

20 Cockatoo Island, Australia
Industry, labour, and protest culture
Lisa Milner
Introduction
With reference to the broader Australian shipbuilding industry and mari-
time culture, this chapter analyses both production and labour that has 
been undertaken at Cockatoo Island, New South Wales (NSW), Australia, 
during its use as a dockyard from 1850 to 1992.1
History
The island’s earliest use by Europeans was as a penal settlement from 1839. 
Subsequently, it was used by the NSW state government as a dockyard for 
ship repair from 1850. In 1870 when shipbuilding proper began, the dockyard 
was placed under the control of the Engineer-in-Chief for Harbours and 
Rivers, passing in turn to the NSW Government Shipyard in 1908, and the 
Royal Australian Navy in 1911.2 In 1913, the Commonwealth government 
purchased the freehold title to Cockatoo Island, along with all facilities and 
buildings, for £867,716, as the f irst naval dockyard for the Royal Australian 
Navy. The navy lost control of Cockatoo Island Dockyard in 1921, when the 
Shipbuilding Board assumed responsibility for it. In 1923, Cockatoo Island 
was transferred to the Australian Commonwealth Shipping Board, and 
operated on a commercial basis, working on navy, Commonwealth Line 
(merchant), and commercial ships.3
In 1932, the Commonwealth, recognising that its direct control inhibited 
the ability of its Naval Dockyard to actually survive except through public 
subsidy, negotiated with several Australian companies, and, in January 
1933, a consortium was formed to take over the operation of the dockyard. 
In February 1933, the Commonwealth government leased the island to 
a company, Cockatoo Docks and Engineering Company Ltd, which was 
1 Cockatoo Island is a small 17-hectare island in Sydney Harbour, New South Wales, Australia. 
2 Aplin and Storey, Waterfront Sydney, 104.
3 Mackay, Cockatoo Island, I, 25.
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founded specif ically to take over all shipbuilding and maintenance opera-
tions, with rent based on a percentage of turnover.4 From this time until its 
closure in 1992, the dock was run as it if was a private concern, with major 
government contracts, both Australian and international.
Cockatoo Dockyard built Australia’s f irst steel ship, f irst modern war-
ship, and f irst all-welded warship, and built the then-largest roll-on/roll-off 
passenger ship in the world. It was the f irst naval dockyard for the Royal 
Australian Navy and continued to support and build ships for the navy for 
some eighty years through two world wars, and the Korean and Vietnam 
Wars. It has also supported the Royal Navy and the US Navy. Cockatoo 
Dockyard was also the nation’s largest steam-turbine builder and repairer, 
servicing turbines for ships, power plants, sugar mills, oil ref ineries, and 
other industries. The dockyard has contributed greatly to the non-maritime 
development of Australia by producing products for power stations, bridges, 
dams, ports, mines, and major projects including the Snowy Mountains 
Scheme. From 1931 to 1934, the dockyard also produced seaplanes.5 The 
combination of such a wide range of work in one establishment reflects the 
strength of the position of Cockatoo Dockyard in the heavy engineering 
industry of the day.
Cockatoo Dockyard introduced the f irst formal quality-control system 
in any Australian dockyard and trained many thousands of young Aus-
tralians through the dockyard apprentice-training scheme. Its operation 
as an engineering enterprise developed and implemented standards of 
excellence which set best-practice benchmarks throughout the country. 
It was Australia’s largest post-First World War Commonwealth employer, 
and the complexity of its union and guild membership, and the history of 
its demarcation and industrial disputes, acted as a catalyst for the federal 
government to establish the f irst federal wage and conditions award in Aus-
tralia in 1918, and apply it to Cockatoo Island. The federal award established 
was the model for many subsequent federal awards that have operated 
alongside various state award systems in Australia until very recently.6
The period of the Second World War can be regarded as Cockatoo Island’s 
“golden age”, with very high workloads, extensions of the island’s landmass 
itself along with construction of new foundries, facilities, buildings, roads, 
tunnels, and so on. The workers on the dockyard at this time were classif ied 
as being in a protected industry, which meant that they were required to 
4 Ibid., I, 26.
5 National Archives of Australia, Cockatoo Island Dockyard series CA2778.
6 Sydney Harbour Federation Trust, Management Plan – Cockatoo Island, III, 50.
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stay on at the yard during the war. Importantly, the island became the 
only dockyard in the south-west Pacif ic area where major naval repair and 
construction could take place.7
In 1947, an important management change took place on the island, when 
Vickers Ltd, a large British shipbuilding and engineering company, which 
had been a shareholder of the Cockatoo Docks and Engineering Company 
and enjoyed a strong working relationship with the dockyard, bought the 
majority of shares in the company as part of an expansion of their engineer-
ing interests in Australia.8 Vickers operated the dockyard until 1986, when 
Australian National Industries Ltd acquired that company. With modern 
naval ships requiring less intensive maintenance, particularly with the 
Oberon-class conventional submarines being phased out,9 and the move of 
the bulk of the dockyard’s work from the Royal Australian Navy to Western 
Australia, the Commonwealth government took the decision to shut down 
the dockyard. In the run-down prior to closure of the dockyard from the 
late 1980s, most Commonwealth and company assets were sold, a number of 
buildings were sold and demolished for scrap, and the docks flooded. After 
years of speculation, planning, and a massive fourteen-week occupation 
strike by workers, the island was decommissioned as a dockyard in 1992.10
After extensive remediation works, Cockatoo Island was opened to the 
public in 2007. The Sydney Harbour Federation Trust now manages the 
island. Although some large workshops, slipways, wharves, residences, 
and other buildings remain, most major buildings were demolished. It 
currently enjoys UNESCO World Heritage Listing and is one of Sydney’s 
most delightful publicly owned urban parks, with tourism, camping, and 
cultural events on the island year round. Cockatoo Island retains the largest 
convict-built dry dock in Australia and one of the largest examples of a 
convict-built dry dock in the world.
7 Ireland, Cockatoo Island, I, 45.
8 For Vickers, see Scott, Vickers, and Shore, Vickers’ Master Shipbuilder. Sir Leonard Redshaw 
(1911-1989) was one of the most innovative British shipbuilders of the twentieth century. He was 
a pioneer in Britain of welded submarine and ship construction, and under his command the 
Vickers Barrow shipyard launched the world’s f irst all-welded passenger liner; the f irst British 
liner having all-welded aluminium superstructure; Britain’s f irst nuclear submarine; the nation’s 
f irst Polaris submarine; the f irst 100,000-ton tanker built in Europe; the f irst Type 42 destroyer; 
and the Royal Navy’s f irst command cruiser.
9 All Oberon-class conventional submarines for the Royal Australian Navy were built at 
Scotts of Greenock, Scotland; see Johnman and Murphy, “Scott’s of Greenock and Submarine 
Building”.
10 Kelly, No Surrender.
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Shipbuilding and the Australian economy
In earlier years, the shipping industry of Australia was much more impor-
tant than it is today. Howard Dick writes:
After the mid-nineteenth century, Australia became on a world scale 
a large generator of export cargo as well as a signif icant destination 
for imported goods and immigrants. Unlike many other commodity-
producing regions, the resources and the technical and organisational 
capabilities to sustain a modest international shipping industry were all 
available in the form of large domestic shipping companies.11
Yet Australia did not support its own large shipping f irms for this trade; 
importantly for this global shipbuilding research study, the output of ships 
built in Australia has never matched the role of shipping transport.
The Australian shipbuilding industry began in 1789 with the construction 
of the 10-ton Rose Hill Packet. The year 1797 saw the establishment of the 
colonial government’s shipyard, and the following year the f irst privately 
owned shipyard began operations. In 1857 the f irst iron-hulled vessel built 
in Australia was launched. Ship construction did not expand signif icantly 
until, in 1911, a naval shipbuilding programme was introduced at Cockatoo 
Island. Over the course of the twentieth century shipyards operated in 
various parts of Australia, notably Whyalla and Adelaide in South Australia, 
Newcastle and Sydney in NSW, Brisbane in Queensland, and Tasmania.12
Since 1970, along with much of the nation’s other manufacturing indus-
tries, Australia’s large shipbuilding capacity has suffered a major decline. 
The national government has been criticised over the years for not arresting 
this collapse: Daniel Todd claimed that the government “casually watched 
its merchant shipbuilding industry expire”.13 Construction of large vessels 
has been phased out and the industry is reduced to speciality craft and naval 
vessels.14 In particular, the lightweight fast-ferry industry has developed 
rapidly over the past few decades with a great deal of economic success; this 
is an area in which Mark Beeson claims Australia is “a world leader, albeit 
it in a specialised niche”.15 Currently, the Australian shipbuilding sector 
11 Dick, “Shipping”, 158.
12 Inglis, “Transport”.
13 Todd, Industrial Dislocation, 241.
14 Inglis, “Transport”.
15 Beeson, “Who Pays the Ferryman?”
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comprises two main categories: defence-related shipbuilding comprises 
65 per cent of the national industry, with commercial shipbuilding, repair, 
and maintenance making up the remainder.
According to industry analyst Ricky Willianto, “the shipbuilding 
industry’s lack of participation in the marketplace for large commercial 
ships proved to be a blessing in disguise over the past f ive years”.16 The 
global commercial shipbuilding sector entered a tailspin due to the severe 
oversupply of cargo ships in the wake of falling shipping rates during the 
global downturn. In contrast, the lack of market-led volatility in defence 
spending created signif icant stability for Australian industry’s revenue.
The contemporary Australian shipbuilding and -repair industry is very 
small on an international scale; nevertheless, Australia enjoys one of the 
highest conversion rates of any signif icant shipbuilding nation. In 2009 
2,611 businesses provided shipbuilding and boatbuilding and related repair 
services in Australia.17 There were 12,305 employees at the 2011 census.18
Shipbuilding at Cockatoo Island
Most vessels constructed at Cockatoo Island were for the Royal Austral-
ian Navy, while others were for other Commonwealth departments, state 
governments, and private clients. From 1870 to 1913 around 144 ships were 
built, mostly dredgers, barges, and tugs. From 1913 to 1992, 242 ships over 
30 feet in length were built, predominantly for the navy, along with ap-
proximately 850 small craft.19
Over the history of the dockyard’s operation, a great deal of change has 
occurred in the production, maintenance, and repair of ships. From the 
beginning of ship construction on Cockatoo Island in 1857 until 1864, only 
timber ships were built and maintained. The period 1864 to 1918 saw the 
change to steel ship construction, and, with that, the construction of new 
dockyard facilities. After the island was taken over by the private company 
in 1933, major physical development of the island commenced, with areas 
of land reclaimed and new roads built and surfaced.20
16 IBIS, IBIS World Database (Online 2003), at www.ibisworld.com.au.
17 Manufacturing Skills Australia, “Metal, Engineering and Boating Industry Statistics as at 
August 2011”.
18 Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2011 Census of Population and Housing.
19 Jeremy, Cockatoo Island, Appendix 2.
20 Ireland, Cockatoo Island, 2, 3.
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The Second World War saw a massive increase in activity at the dockyard. 
Following the fall of Singapore (Britain’s main naval facility in the region) in 
1942, Cockatoo Island became the only dockyard in the south-west Pacif ic 
where naval construction, turbine work, and major ship repairs could be 
carried out.21 Workers fitted out troop carriers and converted some very large 
passenger ships to troop carriers, among them the Queen Mary, Mauritania, 
and Acquitania, built naval vessels, and repaired damaged Australian and 
Allied warships. During this period, the dockyard was managed through 
a special wartime agreement that supplemented the government’s lease 
of the island to the company; this agreement saw Cockatoo Docks and 
Engineering Company Ltd receive a yearly management fee based on its 
production turnover. During both world wars, employment on the island 
soared, with some 3,200 workers listed in the Second World War years.22
Cockatoo Island’s shipbuilding work during both world wars sustained 
and improved the dockyard’s productivity immensely. Naval orders always 
played a large role in sustaining a heavy iron and, after the First World 
War, steel shipbuilding industry in Australia. This was because Australian 
shipbuilders were never big enough to compete with the yards of Glasgow 
and Belfast in particular. During the Second World War, the location of the 
dockyard was crucial for Allied vessels.
It was after the end of that war that the downturn began. Australia’s 
increasing resort over the 1960s and 1970s to purchasing foreign naval 
vessels for the Royal Australian Navy reflected the poor performance of 
domestic naval shipbuilding projects. The navy continued to purchase naval 
vessels from the United Kingdom, and by 1964 had ordered three missile 
destroyers from the USA. Paul Earnshaw has noted that: “from about 1960 
[…] Australia had become a more discriminating customer, obtaining its 
naval requirements from the most appropriate source”.23
In 1967 a modernisation operation paved the way for the dockyard to 
work on submarines: these were to be the last major advances for the island. 
Up until recent times, it was the sole submarine-ref itting yard in Australia, 
and with one of the few slave docks in the world. The slave dock was a 
purpose-built dock, specif ically for use in ref itting submarines. Cockatoo 
Dockyard provided specialised support for the Royal Australian Navy 
submarines throughout most of the twentieth century, and in particular 
for the Oberon-class submarines between 1971 and 1991 when the dockyard 
21  Mackay, Cockatoo Island, I, 18.
22 Sydney Harbour Federation Trust, Management Plan – Cockatoo Island, II, 26.
23 Earnshaw, “Australian Naval Shipbuilding”, 22.
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had one of the most advanced non-nuclear submarine-ref it facilities in the 
world. But not all the changes were positive, as Beeson writes:
By the end of the 1970s shipbuilding was emblematic of a wider malaise 
that seemed endemic to Australian manufacturing. Nowhere was this 
pattern of decline more apparent than in the shipbuilding industry, 
which had become a byword for ineff iciency, poor management and 
antagonistic industrial relations practices. The contraction of shipbuild-
ing was not conf ined to Australia, but was part of a worldwide trend, 
which saw the industry decline through a combination of oversupply 
and contracting demand.24
Cockatoo Island closed due to these global and local changes, as well as 
political initiatives. By the early 1980s the government recognised the need 
to reform highly ineff icient, government-owned shipyards. At this stage, 
the Australian government “showed that defence construction projects 
would no longer be used for job creation when it resisted union demands 
to build a second tanker at Cockatoo Island, ultimately condemning the 
yard to extinction”.25
The island has always been owned by the Australian national govern-
ment, and had a varied history of state and non-state control:
During its life, it has been operated as a government business under the 
NSW Colonial Government, NSW State Government and the Australian 
Commonwealth Government control. It has also been operated (under 
leasehold) as an Australian-owned private company and as a subsidi-
ary company of a multinational company. In each circumstance, the 
dockyard has both expanded and contracted in its activities subject to 
both market forces and government policies.26
Australia has a long history of assistance to the shipbuilding industry, 
reflecting the importance of shipping to the country. From 1940 until 2005, 
the Australian government has paid some form of bounty or subsidy. The 
Australian government’s Bureau of Industry Economics review of the 
bounty concluded: “it seems certain that bounty assistance of the scale 
24 Beeson, “Who Pays the Ferryman”, 437.
25 Woolner, Procuring Change, 10.
26 Sydney Harbour Federation Trust, Cockatoo Island: Conservation Management Plan, 71.
526 liSa MilneR 
and type that has been given to Australian shipyards [has] contributed 
signif icantly to the development of the present industry”.27
Workers of Cockatoo Island
Recruitment
The transport and recruitment practices of Cockatoo Island are important 
to note, as obviously this dockyard was in a very unusual situation, being 
on an island that was only accessible by ship. Ships built on the island were 
often used to transport workers; the f irst of these was the steamer Biloela, 
completed in 1916, with a passenger capacity of 650. But the majority of island 
workers used commercial services, which began in 1842 with the Balmain 
Ferry Company servicing the island. In 1867 the Parramatta Steamship 
Company began stopping at Cockatoo Island on its Sydney-to-Parramatta 
run.28 In the late 1880s and 1890s a number of newly established ferry opera-
tors provided strong competition, for instance in 1895 when the Drummoyne 
and West Balmain Ferry Company also included a stop at Cockatoo Island 
on its Sydney-to-Balmain run.29 Up to 1897 the Cockatoo Island trips were 
free for Cockatoo Island workers, being subsidised by the dock owner – 
the government. But in 1897 the premier, Thomas Farnell, questioned this 
situation in the NSW Parliament, suggesting that “a private ferry company 
could do the work more cheaply”.30 Local Balmain businessman Thomas 
Henley (who was later to be a Sydney council alderman, member of the 
New South Wales Legislative Assembly, minister for railways and housing, 
and minister for state industrial enterprises) agreed, calling the subsidy an 
“unwarranted expenditure of public money […] give the men the current 
rate of wages and they’ll get to work”.31 The following year, the subsidy 
ceased, the workers on the island had to pay their own fares, and Henley 
bought out the Balmain Ferry Company and established the Drummoyne, 
27 Dempster, Maidment, and Poole, Review of the Shipbuilding Bounty, 25.
28 “Parramatta River Steam Company”, Sydney Morning Herald, 29 August 1873, 1.
29 “The Drummoyne and West Balmain Ferry Service”, Sydney Morning Herald, 30 July 1895, 
5.
30 “NSW Parliament”, Wagga Wagga Express, 12 August 1897, 2.
31 Thomas Henley, “Free Travelling at the Public Expense”, Sydney Morning Herald, 14 August 
1897, 10.
cocK atoo iSland, auStRalia 527
West Balmain and Leichhardt Steam Ferry Company. Ironically, Henley 
died in “sensational circumstances” from a fall from a Manly ferry in 1935.32
A number of existing ferry services were integrated into Sydney Ferries 
Ltd in 1899, which then became the largest carrier of dockyard workers. 
In 1913, Sydney Ferries increased their fares by 33 per cent, causing uproar 
among both island workers and other ferry users. It was reported that “over 
300 employees of Fitzroy Dock signed a petition to the naval authorities 
asking them to provide a free boat. In the event of no arrangement being 
arrived at the men have decided to remain on Circular Quay wharf on 
Monday morning till a free boat is sent to take them to work”.33 On the 
Monday morning, island workers held a mass meeting in Balmain. The 
workers did carry out their threat to boycott Sydney Ferries, and ended 
up chartering a private boat themselves to get to work: “The steamer Bulli 
moved along at the critical moment and the men travelled to work on her.”34
The ferry ride to and from work was a great opportunity for socialisation 
and politicisation. From the time when the island was used as a dockyard, 
labour was recruited at nearby wharves on the Sydney Harbour waterfront, 
notably Circular Quay, Pyrmont, Mort’s Dock, and Balmain. In the early years, 
up until the period of the Second World War, when there was little certainty 
of employment, the maritime and wharfside employers used the corrupt and 
exploitative “bull” or “pick-up” system for recruitment of casual day-labour, 
which generally made up the bulk of the workforce. This was a crucial feature 
in preventing reform of working conditions, with its discriminatory system 
of recruitment that promoted corruption to a high degree. This system was 
one of the main areas of union-management dispute from the 1870s until the 
1940s, from all unions represented, in many areas – the places of recruitment, 
their provision with shelters for the men waiting their turn to be engaged for 
labour, etc. It was not until 1925 that a ruling was made in which the princi-
pal place of engagement for Cockatoo Island was to be on the island itself, 
rather than at a randomly changing series of harbourside sites – yards out 
in the weather, exposed to the elements, with no facilities. But this still had 
problems for job seekers, as Issy Wyner, a Cockatoo Island worker, explains:
In effect, it meant that to be picked up for Cockatoo Island, members had 
to get across the water to the Island, where work started at 7.30 a.m. and, if 
there was no work, they then had to f ind their way back to the mainland 
32 “Obituary: Sir Thomas Henley”, Sydney Morning Herald, 15 May 1935, 13.
33 “The Pass It On Game: Ferry Fares Resented”, Bathurst Times, 7 April 1913, 2.
34 “Ferry Fares: Dockyard Employees Protest”, Sydney Morning Herald, 8 April 1913, 8.
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on whatever company launch might be available and at whatever time it 
might be running. In other words, men were more or less stranded and 
unable to seek work elsewhere when Cockatoo had no jobs.35
The recruitment of workers had always been a major issue, which unions 
took to the industrial courts often. Justice H.B. Higgins of the High Court of 
Australia, in handing down a new award in 1918, commented on this aspect 
of the island’s working conditions:
It is lamentable that so many men, mostly in the prime of life, should 
have to stand about, idle, waiting for a job at their usual places of hiring 
– earning nothing some days, nothing even some weeks, and […] earning 
high wages in some weeks by excessive hours of toil. The frequent bouts 
of idleness must of necessity lead to bad habits and to loss of muscular 
condition. There is a tremendous waste of human potential energy 
involved. Yet, under existing conditions, it is essential for the carrying 
on of this industry that these men shall hold themselves free from other 
engagements, and ready for the ships when they come.36
It was not until 1946 that the island’s major unions achieved a legal roster 
system of employment, a result of a decades-long battle between union and 
management. Up until that time, Wyner comments, “employers, of course, 
rejected any form of Union control over employment and insisted on Foremen 
control with all its pernicious overtones of selection on the basis of strength 
or skill, of favouritism (regardless of strength or skill), of buying favours with 
presents or free services, of nepotism”.37 The roster system’s implementation 
as a result of concerted efforts by the militant unions represented a major 
breakthrough in improving the industry: it was designed to “visibly demon-
strate equity in the distribution of work”.38 Over the years of the operation 
of the dockyard, recruitment practices continued to improve, as a result of 
concerted efforts by those same activist unions represented there.39
35 Wyner, My Union Right or Wrong.
36 8 Commonwealth Arbitration Reports, 72-73, p. 4, cited in Wyner, My Union Right or Wrong.
37 Wyner, My Union Right or Wrong.
38 Morris, “The Employer’s Free Selection of Labour and the Waterfront Closed Shop”, 51.
39  Taylor, “Sectionalism, Solidarity and Action in Shipbuilding and Shiprepair”; Rimmer and 
Sutcliffe, “The Origins of Australian Workshop Organisation”; Morris, “The Employer’s Free 
Selection of Labour and the Waterfront Closed Shop”; Murray and White, The Ironworkers; 
Turner, Industrial Labour and Politics; Inaba, “Industrial Relations in the Australian Engineering 
Industry”; Reeves and Dettmer (eds), Organise, Educate, Control.
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Social origins
Workers at Cockatoo Island were originally prisoners – when the island was 
used as a penal settlement from 1839, and later as a reform school for boys 
and girls, until it was used by the NSW government as a dockyard for ship 
repair from 1850. The prisoners were the ones to begin clearing the island, 
and to construct buildings and docks.
The period during which the island’s activities fully turned from in-
carceration to shipbuilding coincided with – for the Australian labour 
movement – an important shift in population. John Jeremy notes that, 
during this era, “many men came to Cockatoo Island from British shipyards 
bringing their skills and traditions with them”, and the influx of working-
class skills and culture from on the Clyde, the Tyne, and the Mersey could be 
heard in the myriad of accents on the island, as well as on other inner-city 
blue-collar worksites.40 Importantly, they brought with them their strong 
labour and unionist traditions. Here was a fairly concentrated input of 
skilled, consciously working-class men arriving at Cockatoo Island, many 
already versed in class struggle, steeped in the world of industrial disputes 
from their Old World dockyards, and immigrating to work with Austral-
ian working-class men.41 The leading founders of the Communist Party 
of Australia (CPA) in 1920 were Scots: Jock Garden migrated to Australia 
from the north of Scotland in 1904, while William Earsman had voyaged 
from Edinburgh in 1908. Adding to this early migration, from the end of the 
Second World War onwards, the national immigration scheme introduced 
many “New Australians” from war-torn Europe to major workplaces includ-
ing Cockatoo Island.
Up until the 1950s, most Cockatoo Island workers lived in proximity to 
their place of work: the inner-city area of Sydney, Milsons Point, Woolloo-
mooloo, the Rocks, Glebe, and the greater Balmain area, including Rozelle, 
Woolwich, and Gladesville. Balmain, a notable working-class suburb of great 
political activity, also housed many other industrial workers, and was the 
site of the origin of three of the most active unions representing workers 
on Cockatoo Island. Many of these workers, and their extended families, 
were politically active, particularly on the left.
The distinctive working-class culture of these inner-city suburbs began to 
change after the end of the Second World War, when, particularly through 
the 1950s, Sydney’s harbourside precinct experienced many changes. 
40 Jeremy, The Island Shipyard, 247.
41 See Macintyre, “Bloodstained Wattle or Red Heather?”
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The shipping industry was on the cusp of modernisation as automation 
and mechanisation of port operations started; upgrading of wharves and 
containerisation were only a few years away. The old wharves had been 
congested for many years and, as construction began of shipyards and 
docking facilities to the south of Sydney, the work of inner-city dockyards 
became a little less apparent. By 1958 the Bulletin happily reported that 
“a welcome change is coming over Australian unionism and labour. It is 
evident in the industrial peace, prosperity and employment which are 
at a peak in unions which have shed the Communist leadership”.42 Many 
of the aspects of the blue-collar union movement of the 1950s that were 
concerned with preserving tradition may be attributed to rising wages and 
living standards, as well as the anti-communist mood.
The traditional waterside worker community was changing too: in this 
time of rising wages and heightened suburbanisation, it became more 
desirable to live outside the inner-city area. The sudden post-war influx of 
migrants and those returning from the war, combined with a high fertility 
rate, made for crowded conditions in the inner-city environs. Housing there 
was cramped and substandard after years of neglect. Rent controls did 
nothing to persuade landlords to maintain their properties, and there was a 
desperate f ight for adequate and reasonably priced rental accommodation. 
Partly in response to the rhetoric of progress of the period, a number of inner 
suburbs were designated as “slums”.43 In their study of the cultural trans-
formations in Australian society since the post-war immigration program, 
Adam Jamrozik, Cathy Boland, and Robert Urquhart point to the changing 
nature of the inner city due to this preference, and the consequent upward 
social mobility of former inner-city Anglo-Australian working-class people 
moving to the suburbs.44
With these rising standards of living conditions and effects of the devel-
oping consumer society, along with the rise of the white-collar sector of the 
workforce, the decline of the organised left, and the loss in popularity of 
the CPA through the Cold War period, the idea of class was becoming less 
pronounced. Older notions of the strength of the industrial proletariat were 
waning, and a different concept of class was developing which focused more 
on income, consumption, and living standards, all of which drew attention 
away from the issues of power and structure that still existed.
42 “Changing Unionism”, Bulletin, 26 February 1958, 4.
43 Solling, “The Labour Party in Inner Sydney”; Engels, “The Gentrif ication of Glebe”.
44 Jamrozik, Boland, and Urquhart. Social Change and Cultural Transformation in Australia, 
169-174.
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A number of studies point to the general decline of class consciousness 
in the post-war era in Australia.45 A.F. Davies’s 1962 study pointed to an 
“impression of evaporating proletarian feeling” compared to a 1949 study.46 
R.W. Connell and Terry Irving have also argued that the debilitated and 
segmented character of the labour movement led to a change in working-
class consciousness:
The political defeats around 1950 were followed by a demobilisation, and 
the reasons plainly extend far beyond politics into changes in domestic 
life, new patterns of division in the working class, and changes in the 
role of the state as well as the cultural ascendancy of the industrial 
bourgeoisie.47
The working class of this period experienced a general reduction in class-
distinctiveness and class-consciousness, as working and living conditions 
were improving, and as the other outcomes noted above were reshaping 
the nature of Sydney workers’ lives. As stated earlier, the nature of the 
working class was undergoing massive structural and numerical changes. 
The percentage of workers in trade unions reached its peak in 1954 and then 
began a decline, and the number and intensity of industrial disputes simi-
larly experienced a general decrease. The growth in home ownership of the 
period contributed to this general feeling of changing class-consciousness.
Composition of the workforce
Throughout the operation of the dockyard, the age group of workers on 
Cockatoo Island was wide, from 15 up to 65 (Australia’s retirement age, 
which was set in 1909). The island’s apprentices were always large in number: 
in 1984 there were over 400 apprentices (aged 14 and upwards). There was 
a strong apprenticeship-training scheme, covering many trades, with a 
special apprentice-training school established in 1945. Many of the island’s 
older and more senior workers had begun their careers decades before, as 
apprentices.
Up until the 1980s, almost all workers on the island were men: a small 
number of women worked in canteen and clerical jobs only. Norma Disher, 
45 Notably, Davies, Images of Class; Connell, Ruling Class, Ruling Culture; Wild, Social Stratifica-
tion in Australia; Connell and Irving, Class Structure in Australian History.
46 Oeser and Hammond, eds. Social Structure and Personality in a City.
47 Connell and Irving, Class Structure in Australian History, 298.
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a f ilm-maker for the Waterside Workers Federation, worked on a f ilm on the 
island in 1956, with no small amount of consternation from male manage-
ment, and said: “it was really a prohibited area for women. There were no 
women there at all, except one or two in an off ice.”48 Nonetheless, the f irst 
small group of female apprentices were taken on in 1980.
Workplace conditions
As in shipyards around the world, early workplace conditions at Cockatoo 
Island were very demanding. Wyner describes circumstances in the early 
days:
Much of this work in dry docks and in slips is dusty, steamy, and swelter-
ingly hot in summer; cold, damp and draughty in winter. Dock work is to 
a great extent carried out in cramped, stooped positions, in the gloomy 
area beneath a ship’s bottom as it sits on the dock keel blocks about 3’6” 
above the dock floor. It is arduous, back-breaking, dangerous […] inboard 
work on vessels, too, was, and still is, mostly carried out in a cold, dank 
atmosphere, such as when cleaning and coating ship’s tanks, where the 
work is done in a crouched position in the restricted sections of tanks.49
Over the years, working conditions were gradually improved with union 
successes in protests, but the fact was that most work on Cockatoo Island 
was blue-collar labouring. Lew Hillier writes that “there were no mess 
rooms – men ate their meals on the wharf or on the deck of the ship in all 
weather”.50
Working conditions were also dangerous. Men worked with some of the 
largest engineering equipment in the country – lathes, band saws, cutting 
gear – plus live electricity, molten metal, and the possibility of explosions. 
It was through awards that unions secured protection for workers in dan-
gerous occupations. From 1904 when it was established, the Australian 
Industrial Relations Commission created awards that set the minimum 
standards of employment for workers in various industries.
The union movement continually agitated for health and safety improve-
ments. Painters and dockers, for example, suffered lead and arsenic poison-
ing from paints and noxious fumes. It was years before employers supplied 
48 Norma Disher, personal interview, 22 August 1996.
49 Wyner, My Union Right or Wrong.
50 Hillier, Meet the Ship Painters & Dockers, 11.
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them with oilskins and gumboots to work in the water beneath a ship’s 
keel. In all trades, generally, protective clothing was minimal. In 1957, the 
Metal Trades Award stipulated the use of protective equipment for welders.51 
Getting clean during and after work was another perpetual industrial issue. 
For many years, showers were not provided; men covered in dust and grease 
caught the ferry and walked the streets to their homes. Noise, also, was 
a constant source of irritation, and for many workers deafness was the 
consequence. Asbestos dust was an unknown hazard that permeated the 
workshops and the ships being built or repaired in the docks and on the 
slipways, and cases are still being brought against the Commonwealth 
government for asbestos-related diseases and deaths of former Cockatoo 
Island workers. The use of asbestos in Australian workplaces was banned 
in 2004 as a result of union campaigns.
In the early years of work at Cockatoo Island, some shifts were for very 
long periods, of 48 hours or even more.52 Cockatoo Island was therefore a 
focus of union campaigns for shorter working weeks. A standard 44-hour 
week was won in 1930. The decision of the Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission in 1947 reduced this to 40. In 1982, the metal trades industry 
gained the 38-hour week, which then became the national standard. Over 
the years there were a large number of disputes surrounding overtime 
(unpaid during the Second World War) and long shifts. Weekend, night 
work, and 24-hour on-call work were not uncommon.
Wages and awards
Wages were paid to the workers on the island from the 1850s. From the 
1890s onwards a very large number of wage rates were paid to members of 
the various occupational groups employed at the dockyard, and disputes 
on wages, demarcation, and awards have been conducted on behalf of 
the island’s workers: the large volume of awards covering the workers on 
Cockatoo Island had been an issue since earliest times. At one stage, in 
1919, f ifty-one awards covered the waged workers on Cockatoo Island, a 
situation that made negotiations by management diff icult to say the least.53
51 For the health of welders in the f irst country to build an all-welded ship, see Murphy, “The 
Health of Electric Arc Welders”.
52 Mitchell, “Sydney’s Wharf ies”, 26-28.
53 Australian Government, Report from the Joint Committee of Public Accounts upon the Com-
monwealth Naval Dockyard, Cockatoo Island. 
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Wages and conditions of overtime and shift work were changed during 
both world wars to take account of the extra work. During the Second 
World War, a special Wartime Agreement between the company and the 
government included provision that no wages would be varied without 
Commonwealth agreement, a source of friction when wartime prices for 
staple goods had risen sharply and other non-government workplaces 
were not so restricted. Under wartime legislation, workers in these in-
dustries were able to be directed to undertake work and were not free 
to resign without approval. While the unions, especially in the early 
part of the war, largely accepted these conditions, the non-payment of 
penalty rates for compulsory overtime was a matter of ongoing tensions 
and disputes.54
In 1968, the Port of Sydney Shipbuilding and Ship Repairing Industry In-
dustrial Agreement provided for common wages and conditions throughout 
the waterfront industries. In 1976, this agreement became a federal award, 
known as the Waterfront Agreement, and was considered to be reasonably 
successful at stabilising what had traditionally been a highly disputatious 
industry.
Local influence and working-class culture
As described earlier, Cockatoo Island workers were overwhelmingly 
working-class. Many of the houses they could afford to rent were very 
small “workers’ cottages” and, because Balmain and surrounding suburbs 
were not far from the centre of the city, they were popular with blue-collar 
workers. By the late 1880s, due to poor planning and the greed of developers, 
the suburb was overcrowded and badly organised. Factories were opened 
next door to houses and schools, and new streets had been created in the 
most inappropriate places. The depression of the 1930s saw a lot of poverty 
in the area: in 1933, 38.1 per cent of Balmain workers were unemployed, 
when the NSW average was 18.4 per cent.
Over the course of the twentieth century, however, Balmain residents 
enjoyed a wide range of leisure-time pursuits, but everyday life in Balmain 
was not ideal. The industrial origins of the suburb gave rise to many environ-
mental problems. Sites and factories such as the Balmain Coal Loader and 
coal mine, Balmain Power Station, Unilever, Colgate-Palmolive, Monsanto, 
and Caltex, while sources of employment for many Balmain locals, gave the 
suburb a deserved reputation for noise and pollution.
54 Mackay, Cockatoo Island, I, 88.
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There has always been a strong working-class culture in inner-city Syd-
ney: the area was characterised as “working class, Labor, and turbulent”.55 
A tightly concentrated area on a peninsula jutting out into Sydney Harbour, 
Balmain was accessible by road, ferry, tram, and bus, and had rapidly 
industrialised with settlement from 1836, with factories and industries 
springing up. Working-class culture was “not only unchallenged here but 
perhaps more pronounced than elsewhere” in Sydney.56 Rosemary Webb 
writes of this area, where:
Multiple aff iliations and identities came together to meet the demands of 
their industrial work. The spaces hosting and connecting the communi-
ties were critical to this process. Labour organising is highly reliant on 
the spatial links between labour – for example labour precincts – and 
working class precincts. The notion of hubs of community reinforcing 
identity is useful as a way of understanding communities in Sydney’s 
inner working class suburbs, from Newtown through Ultimo and Balmain 
– places where workers and their families could live, congregate and 
easily communicate […] Inner city residents and workers maintained a 
strong sense of place, particularly of the places such as meeting halls and 
streets, which facilitated the habits of lifetime activism.57
With its working-class culture, Balmain was a hotbed of political activity, 
and the people involved in running and attending the Balmain branches of 
political parties and waterfront unions were among the prominent citizens 
of Balmain. The Australian Labor Party was formed in Balmain in 1891. 
Nick Origlass, a Trotskyist, ex-communist, and leader of one of the local 
Federated Ironworkers Association (FIA) branches, became the local lord 
mayor. Laurie Short, long-term national secretary of the FIA, and head of 
the Cockatoo Island Shop Committee, helped form the Workers Party of 
Australia in Balmain. The 1940s and 1950s in particular saw much political 
activity in the area, when there was a f ight for control of the Balmain Branch 
of the FIA from the CPA. This political activity continued until the late 1960s, 
when development and gentrif ication began, prices for inner-city housing 
rose, and the cultural face of the area began to change.
The Balmain branches of the CPA, the Unemployed Workers Movement 
(UWM), the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), and the Australian 
55 Cahill and Irving, Radical Sydney, 306.
56 Murray and White, The Ironworkers, 130.
57 Webb, “You Could Go to the Trades Hall and Meet Organisers”, 225.
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Labor Party (ALP) were particularly active. As stated, the ALP was estab-
lished in Balmain in 1891, as was the Painters and Dockers (P&D) in 1883. 
Wyner writes that in those early years as well as later:
Balmain was a main centre for political discussion. It seemed that every 
known facet of political thought found expression within its bounda-
ries. Clubs, leagues, movements, societies; all had their adherents. The 
inevitable Sunday night lectures drew large audiences. Discussion circles 
were to be found wherever men [sic] would congregate, such as in Billy 
Hughes’ bookshop in Beattie Street. The general embroilment in political 
thinking and political activity – within a district based on a hazardous, 
prof it-hungry industry which inexorably drew men in a radical, militant 
direction – eventually made Balmain the right place, at the right time, 
for the formation of the [P&D] union and of the Australian Labor Party.58
Protests
Australian shipyard workers, dockers, wharfies, the “men on the margins”,59 
have hugely influenced the industrial and cultural landscape of their nation; 
as the vanguard of the labour movement in Australia they have been termed 
“social levers in their own right”.60 They have always been crucial to the life 
and development of island nations, and Australia has been no exception.
The traditional waterfront community was very strong during most 
of the twentieth century, and the majority of Sydney wharf ies lived in 
and around the port area. Waterside Workers Federation Sydney Branch 
president Jim “Dutchy” Young grew up and lived in the area. He considers 
that “there’s a kinship among the working class, especially in that area. 
There’s two [sic] groups stands out for working class solidarity, just like a 
beacon: the miners, and seamen and dockers. This seems to arise from the 
tendency to live next door to their employment.”61 Cockatoo Island and the 
Sydney waterfront constituted, then, a geographically concentrated force 
of power: solidarity, while never comprehensive, was heightened by the 
fact that workers lived together, near their work. The struggles to improve 
conditions were important parts of the history of the waterfront unions, and 
were vital to the constitution of their militant, radical, nationalist outlook.
58 Wyner, My Union Right or Wrong, 16.
59 Brett, Robert Menzies’ Forgotten People, 88.
60 Turner, Industrial Labour and Politics, xvii.
61 Jim Young, interview with Wendy Lowenstein, in Lowenstein, Weevils in the Flour, 242.
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Since the development of Australian trade unions in the 1850s, the na-
tion’s workforce has been notably militant and energetic in f ighting for the 
rights of working people. One of the distinguishing features of Australian 
industrial relations is its high union density. The growing wave of union 
militancy and activism among blue-collar workers in Australia around the 
early 1900s was matched by the growth in union membership. Later, the 
1950s in particular sustained a high level of employment, and even during 
economic recessions in 1952 and 1956, unemployment was never higher 
than 3 per cent. Along with peak levels of unionisation, this placed workers 
in an advantageous position to achieve many of the gains they had been 
refused throughout the war years. Australian employees’ membership in 
trade unions reached its highest point in 1954 of 59 per cent.62 After the 
lifting of wartime prohibitions on industrial action, the number of disputes 
was high, particularly on Cockatoo Island; throughout the 1950s, a range of 
issues, which included the improved economic climate, resulted in a slight 
decrease in this number. As in most nations, union membership has fallen 
since the 1970s in Australia; even though union membership is falling, 18 per 
cent of the labour force was still unionised in 2011.63 Historically, Australia 
has been one of the most strike-prone nations in the world: Stephen Creigh 
reported that during the period 1962-1981, Australia was f ifth in a list of 
twenty industrial nations in terms of working days lost per employee.64
At various times, Australian trade unions operated within a range of po-
litical persuasions and strengths; much union leadership, especially in the 
blue-collar industries, tended towards the dogmatic and sectarian. Many 
were also proactive and worked in the interests of their members. Com-
munist activists were often most recognised and influential in a number of 
unions. From the late 1930s until the late 1950s CPA members were especially 
prominent in left-wing trade union leadership, most notably in those unions 
represented on Cockatoo Island. Working-class communists found their way 
into mainly manual trade unions, and this period was particularly active 
in protest. The maritime industries operated as particularly strong closed 
shops: the Painters and Dockers had, back in 1900, won a strike to enforce 
a closed shop. At Cockatoo Island, many disputes centred around issues of 
health and safety, and demarcation. Quite a few stemmed from the basic 
fact that so many unions and industrial awards covered the workers there.
62 Martin, Trade Unions in Australia, 3.
63 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Employee Earnings, Benefits and Trade Union Membership.
64 Creigh, Australia’s Strike Record.
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There were many, many strikes at Cockatoo Island over its history as a 
working shipyard, too many to detail in this chapter. I will note just some 
of the disputes.
Health and safety was the issue at the heart of the Painters and Dockers 
strike of 1915. The secretary of the P&D reported to a meeting that he had 
been sent for to deal with a strike of painters and dockers at Cockatoo 
Island and found that the men had held a meeting during the dinner hour 
when they decided not to start work unless time was allowed them to clean 
their hands and kerosene provided. After discussion with management, 
it was agreed that the men be granted f ive minutes for washing and that 
kerosene be provided.
The New South Wales General Strike of 1917 was the largest union move-
ment since the Australian maritime dispute of 1890, and involved at least 
14 per cent of the state’s workforce. It occurred because the government, 
through the New South Wales Department of Railways and Tramways, 
introduced an American costing system, to determine where its workers 
could increase eff iciency; poor working conditions and wage cuts followed, 
prompted by the continuing home-front demands of the First World War, 
leading to a wave of strikes in the steel industry. The railway workers were 
the f irst to strike, but this soon spread to other unions, including the coke 
workers, seamen, miners, ship painters, and dockers in Sydney including 
Cockatoo Island.65
Wartime strikes were not as common as in peacetime. However, during 
1939, Hillier writes: “with the outbreak of the war things changed very 
quickly […] the Union had a stroke of luck when the Government froze 
wages. Our rates were loaded by 35 per cent because of the casual nature 
of the work and this gave us a high rate of pay when the men were working 
full time as well as a great deal of overtime. Not having to worry about wage 
rates the Union concentrated on conditions for the workers […] when the 
war ended was when the disputes started because the employers had to go 
back to the contract system.”66
The “Battle of Balmain”, as it is known, was a six-week 1945 strike of FIA 
members begun when that union’s Executive Committee attempted to 
replace local delegates with members from the head off ice of the union. 
Here was “an unprecedented rejection of the FIA leadership by the rank and 
65 Bollard, “‘The Active Chorus’”, 61.
66 Hillier, Meet the Ship Painters & Dockers, 17.
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f ile”;67 the dispute was intimately tied up with contestation over communist 
and non-communist factions within the union.
The f inal strike on the island was most interesting as workers united 
across industrial and trade lines, and with non-workers, to defend the place 
of Cockatoo Island: it was a place-based campaign, targeting the local needs 
of both production and labour. The year 1989 saw a substantial fourteen-
week occupation strike by workers to protest against the decommissioning 
of Cockatoo Island as a dockyard. This was the form of resistance taken 
against closure of the yard, as well as delocalisation. John Tognolini, one of 
the strikers, wrote that “support from the ACTU and the NSW Labor Council 
was token for a couple of weeks, and then turned into outright opposition to 
the struggle of the Cockatoo Island Dockyard workers to save their jobs”.68 
The federal government’s decision to decommission the dockyard and sell 
off the site was at the heart of this strike. Workers had been warned of this 
since 1987, but were not informed it was imminent until some workers read 
a real-estate advertisement in the Sydney Morning Herald newspaper. The 
decision to sell off the dockyard stemmed as a result of the Labor govern-
ment’s “Two Ocean” policy, which meant that the government had decided 
to relocate the Australian naval dockyard to Western Australia and close 
Cockatoo Island (which was on the east coast). As the island’s workers were 
covered by an unusually high number of unions, the collective decision to 
occupy the site was important.
Throughout the occupation, support (f inancial, political, and moral) 
came from many other unions within and outside Australia, as well as 
Aboriginal and other social groups. The island – normally with no resident 
workers – was occupied for most of three months, and it was a very notable 
occupation in Australian labour history, a rare Australian workers’ soviet. 
However the strike failed to achieve its objective. The Commonwealth 
government threatened legal action against the occupiers, and, “it broke our 
hearts to do it”, AMWU delegate Mick Christoforou said, “but we moved a 
motion to return to work and continue discussing the dockyard’s future”.69 
In March of the next year, 100 workers were retrenched, and in June the 
federal government reasserted its decision to sell the island. The f inal day 
of work on the island was 4 June 1991.
Claude Sandaljian, chairman of the island’s combined shop committee, 
said he knew early on that they could not save the dockyard, and it did not 
67 Quinlan, “Immigrant Workers, Trade Union Organisation and Industrial Strategy”, 426.
68 Tognolini, “The Cockatoo Island Dockyard Strike-Occupation”.
69 Kelly, No Surrender, n.p.
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help that the union leaders were against them. “Unless you get national 
strikes, you’re not going to win; eventually they’re going to get you. But 
the idea was, we’re not the only ones, we’re just the f irst ones – others 
are going to come. If they see that we’re f ighting, things aren’t going to go 
smooth for them. Every time they announce a closure then they’ll have a 
major strike against them. Unfortunately it didn’t happen, but that was the 
idea.”70 Although the workers were not able to save the dockyard or their 
jobs, they did achieve improvements in redundancy pay plus bonuses on 
completion of the f inal two submarines under refit. And, Sandaljian recalls, 
“Finally, when the dockyard eventually closed, there was a pool of money 
in the superannuation fund and we insisted that it be shared by everyone 
in the dockyard, rather than just to the executives.”71
International solidarity
In the short time since European settlement, Australia has a rich history of 
solidarity and activism. Australia has always had a strong union heritage 
going as far back as the sheep-shearers’ strike of 1894. Because of the nature 
of Australia as an island nation, far away from Europe and the UK, and con-
nected until the twentieth century to other countries by ship only, maritime 
and shipyard workers have a particularly long tradition of solidarity with 
their comrades overseas. The influence of communist and socialist trends 
within the unions connected with Cockatoo Island and the other shipyards 
of Australia over the years has strengthened international solidarity. Some 
unions in these shipyards, however, to the centre or right of the political 
spectrum, such as the Australian Workers’ Union, supported policies and 
activities that were more parochial and nationalist than internationalist. 
Among the Cockatoo Island unionists, the Painters & Dockers members 
were highly influenced, through the majority of their union off icials, by 
the sentiments of the Industrial Workers of the World. With its Australian 
branch formed in 1907, this was a highly influential political organisation 
through much of the f irst half of the twentieth century.
The regular movement of overseas ship workers in and out of Sydney 
Harbour brought many opportunities for international solidarity. In the late 
1940s, for instance, the communist-led maritime unions played a significant 
role in helping the Indonesian independence struggle, through shipping 
70 Cited in Steph Price, “The Cockatoo Island Occupation”.
71 Sandaljian, “Fifteen Years Since the Cockatoo Island Occupation”, n.p.
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bans on the Dutch colonial force. The bans were in place from 1945 to 1949. 
While communist-led unions initiated the bans, there was widespread 
sympathy and support for the Indonesians throughout Australia.
Through its growing involvement in world affairs, and particularly 
through the recent rapid development of transport and communications 
technologies in the past f ifty years, the Australian union movement has 
given increasing attention to international issues. Paddy Crumlin, the 
national secretary of the Maritime Union of Australia, was elected president 
of the International Transport Federation in 2010. This global organisation, 
established in 1896, now covers 708 unions representing more than 4.5 
million transport workers in 154 countries. The political solidarity work that 
this organisation carries out is notable in its support for workers worldwide. 
Crumlin takes his role seriously and performs it actively, and works hard to 
promote Australian dock workers’ international solidarity.
Relationships of production
The organisation of production at Cockatoo Island was quite complex, due 
to the variety of production tasks undertaken, the high number of people 
employed, and the large number of trade unions involved. The main areas 
of production were shipbuilding, ship repair and conversion, submarine 
manufacture and repair, and other engineering production works.
The shipyard was run with a general manager, as well as a manager 
who superintended the naval operations. They led management teams 
comprising superintendents in engineering, design, electrical, and other 
areas. Dockyard executives were active on industry bodies and associations, 
including the Australian Shipbuilders Association, the Australian Ship 
Repairers Group, the Australian Welding Research Association, the Institute 
of Marine Engineers, and the Royal Institution of Naval Architects.72
Morris notes the closed-shop situation of the Australian waterfront 
industries, where “the possession of [union] registration and a union 
ticket provide necessary and suff icient employment qualif ication”.73 The 
unions, particularly the Painters and Dockers and the Waterside Workers 
Federation, administered the labour supply to Cockatoo Island by means of 
a roster system, designed to “visibly demonstrate equity in the distribution 
72 Jeremy, Cockatoo Island, 199.
73 Morris, “The Employer’s Free Selection of Labour and the Waterfront Closed Shop”, 61.
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of work”.74 The roster system was a far cry from the earlier pick-up or “bull” 
system of employment regulation. This roster system was adopted in 1946 
and was accorded legal status; its centralised allocation of workers was more 
effective from the management’s point of view (not adding to the cost of 
labour) as well as more equitable for unionists. Richard Morris notes that: 
“employers retained unrestricted formal control of job availability for ship 
painters and dockers. Unlike the arrangements in shipping and stevedoring, 
no joint machinery evolved in shipbuilding and ship repair to determine 
port or industry-wide manning levels and manpower quotas.”75 However, 
as time passed and the industry declined in Australia, management began 
to view the roster system as “a source of ineff iciency and overmanning” up 
until the closure of Cockatoo Island as a dockyard.76
Throughout the whole of its history, the demands of shipbuilding and ex-
panding engineering works continually modified Cockatoo Island physically, 
and consequently the methods and organisation of production on the island 
were modified. In particular, the outbreak of war in 1939 saw a number of 
modernisation and modification tactics in order to cope with the added work.
There were up to f ifty trades represented at times among the workforce 
of Cockatoo Island: boilermakers, blacksmiths, ship painters and dockers, 
gas f itters and plumbers, electricians, shipwrights, storemen and packers, 
timber workers, and – the biggest group of all – ironworkers. At the period 
of its highest employment, the workers on Cockatoo Island were represented 
by twenty-two trade unions; however, most were covered by six: the Feder-
ated Ironworkers Association, the Federated Ship Painters and Dockers 
Union, the Boilermakers’ Society, the Amalgamated Engineering Union, the 
Australian Metal Workers Union, and the Waterside Workers Federation. 
The membership of these unions – and other blue-collar unions – had 
increased at the turn of the twentieth century with an improving labour 
market, a growth in shipping, and their own stronger organising and col-
lective bargaining activities.77
In Australia as in many other developed nations, union membership 
has declined rapidly in the past forty years, due to complex causes relating 
to the changing composition of employment, management strategy, and 
governmental statutory changes, including individual contract legislation, 
and the unions that were represented on Cockatoo Island have all declined 
74 Ibid., 51.
75 Ibid., 53.
76 Morris, “The Employer’s Free Selection”, 54.
77 Sheldon, “Compulsory Arbitration and Union Recovery”, 422.
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in membership since the 1960s. Compulsory arbitration of some kind has 
been in force in Australia since 1906.
The Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), the peak organising 
body of the nation, has had a very mixed history with the unions represented 
on Cockatoo Island. At some times the ACTU completely supported the 
actions of unionists there, and at others there was discord, as in the 1940s 
during the “Battle of Balmain”, when FIA Balmain delegates withdrew 
from the ACTU’s Congress, and during the 1989 occupation strike, when 
the ACTU withdrew their support for strikers. Lindy Kelly, who was on the 
island for fourteen weeks, writes of the “ACTU sellout”.78
The Cockatoo Island dockyard has been the most prolif ic, complex, and 
industrially vital shipbuilding site in Australia’s history. It was Australia’s 
largest post-First World War Commonwealth employer, and the complexity 
of its union and its history marks its industrial history as one of the most 
disputatious in the nation.
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Introduction
This chapter is in three parts. The f irst gives a general account of the post-
colonial development of the Indian shipbuilding industry with special 
reference to Maharashstra. The second part focuses on Bharati Shipyard 
Ltd (BSL), the second-largest private sector shipbuilding company in 
India. The third and f inal section deals with the historical progression 
of employer, employee, and production relationships in BSL. It will also 
highlight the current situation of the company and the working condition 
of its employees.
Historical background of the Indian shipbuilding industry and 
Maharashtra
As Daniel Todd has noted, “outside of Communist states, India is in many 
ways the apotheosis of state instigated and controlled industrialisa-
tion [and] that interventionist approach gave the tone to the country’s 
shipbuilding industry”.1 After 1918, the output of Indian shipbuilding was 
insignif icant. However, the outbreak of the Second World War prompted 
India’s then largest shipping company, Scindia Steam Navigation, to 
begin to lay out a new shipyard, later known as the Hindustan shipyard, 
at Visakhapatnam, for the construction of vessels up to 8,000 dwt. Its 
foundation stone was laid in 1941.2 When India gained its independence 
1 Todd, Industrial Dislocation, 211.
2 The Scindia Steam Navigation Company Ltd was established in 1919. On 5 April 1919 its f irst 
ship, the SS Loyalty, sailed on its maiden voyage to the United Kingdom. For the early history 
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from British colonial rule in 1947, it soon recognised the importance of 
self-reliance. Thereafter, the new Government of India initiated several 
steps to promote shipping and shipbuilding. In 1949, the government issued 
a statement of intent to reserve shipbuilding for state enterprises, but 
gave private shipbuilding companies a decade’s grace to exit the industry. 
Scindia relinquished its control of the Hindustan shipyard to the Indian 
state in 1952, but held a minority stake in the yard, which was already 
heavily dependent on government orders, and was “dogged with problems 
preventing it from producing ships at competitive prices”.3 With Hindustan 
under state control, a series of f ive-year plans followed to expand new 
construction there. By October 1961 the Shipping Corporation of India 
(SCI) had been formed at Bombay (Mumbai) as a result of a merger of the 
Eastern and Western Shipping Corporations. SCI was now a public-sector 
enterprise company and began its operations with nineteen vessels.4 Ini-
tially the Indian government acquired existing shipyards and took over 
operation of the facilities of Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers, 
in Calcutta (Kolkata), and Mazagon Dockyard in Mumbai in 1960; both 
these yards were owned by subsidiaries of the British-owned Peninsular 
& Oriental Shipping, and after nationalisation largely concentrated on 
naval work.5 The Indian seizure of Goa from the Portuguese in 1961 gave 
it a large ship repair yard, Estaleiros Navais de Goa. However, the major 
steps to further develop the Indian shipbuilding industry were taken in 
the early 1970s.
The Cochin Shipyard in the southern state of Kerala had undertaken 
a prolonged period of modernisation from the early 1960s, with the aid of 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries of Japan, but cost overruns and tardiness had 
dogged its progress. In 1972 Cochin became a public-sector enterprise unit. 
In the same year, yet another public venture, Rajabagan Dockyard Ltd, 
opened in Kolkata. Two major private-sector companies, Bharati Shipyard 
Ltd (1973) and ABG Shipyard (1985), were established in Maharashtra (a 
of the company, see its company history, The Scindia Steam Navigation Company Limited. See 
also Rao, A Short History of Modern Indian Shipping. The maiden voyage of the SS Loyalty was 
commemorated with the establishment of a National Maritime Day of India, celebrated for the 
f irst time on 5 April 1964, and annually thereafter.
3 Todd, Industrial Dislocation, 211.
4 SCI is now a huge conglomerate. Jayanti Shipping and Mogul Lines were merged into SCI in 
1973 and 1984 respectively. Since 2008, the Indian government has given SCI greater f inancial 
autonomy.
5 Mazagon Dock’s f irst modern warship, a Leander-class frigate, INS Nilgiri, was commis-
sioned in 1972. It was built under licence with the aid of two leading British warship-building 
companies, Vickers and Yarrow. 
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western coastal state of India). These establishments paved the way for 
private capital in the shipbuilding industry of India and also registered 
small prof its from their operations. The fact that both these units were 
profitable from the time of their inception hinted that there was a potential 
for growth in the Indian shipbuilding industry and also that there was 
scope for private ventures. However, in the state sphere, Indian shipbuilding 
remained relatively ineff icient. The entire thrust of government policy to 
make India self-suff icient in shipping and shipbuilding without resorting 
to autarky faced huge practical constraints. Construction times were far 
in excess of international competitors, leading to huge cost overruns and 
subsequent losses on commercial contracts.6 Indian shipyards were not 
prof itable in aggregate, but the industry could always console itself that it 
operated in a protected market.
Considering the growing importance of the shipbuilding industry, the 
Government of India decided to unify and synergise shipbuilding activi-
ties in the country. During the 1970s and 1980s the country attempted to 
achieve a measure of parity in technology and infrastructure through 
collaboration and alliances with leading shipbuilders of the world. Along 
with other coastal provinces, the western state of Maharashtra secured the 
opportunity to develop its shipbuilding industry.
Unfortunately, much of the benefit accruing from this sense of progress 
was neutralised due to circumstances such as a lack of domestic managerial 
experience and expertise in modern shipbuilding. The public-sector enter-
prise units, which were the largest among the shipyards, were entangled in 
overbureaucratic governance, and managers had little experience of manag-
ing labour-intensive large shipbuilding activities. Poor labour management 
and excessive bureaucratic control resulted in delayed decision-making and 
corruption, which obviously had a detrimental impact on the industry. The 
situation was further aggravated by the presence of militant labour unions. 
Given the rather chaotic nature of public-enterprise shipyards, the govern-
ment later changed its policy and accepted the concepts of liberalisation 
and privatisation in 1991. To counter the impact of adverse taxation schemes 
and high interest rates, the Government of India provided special subsidies 
to shipbuilding by actively promoting a PPP (public-private partnership) 
in the industry. Accordingly, 2002 is considered as a watershed year for the 
6 Todd, Industrial Dislocation, 214, points out that a construction time for cargo vessels of 
three to f ive years was common in India against eighteen to thirteen months elsewhere. Also, 
real costs incurred were far in excess of contract prices, and the lack of viability to shipyards 
specialising in commercial newbuild vessels became a stark fact of life. 
550 S.M. FaHiMuddin paSHa 
shipbuilding industry not only in Maharashtra, but also in other states 
across India. Some of the important provisions charted out were:
– The Government of India introduced a subsidy scheme in 2002 which 
provided for 30 per cent funding on the order value of ships for eight 
public- and nineteen private-sector shipyards. The subsidy neutralised 
the distortion in the domestic economic environment which previously 
had adversely affected Indian shipbuilders. This also made Indian ship-
building industry “competitive” as it matched with the direct or indirect 
support (subsidies) provided to shipbuilders in other countries.7 It was 
predicted, however, that the Indian shipbuilding industry might not be 
able to enjoy the benefits for long as the subsidy rates were expected to 
be revised down to 20 per cent and later to 10 per cent in as the years to 
come.8 Ultimately, after a f ive-year run, the programme on subsidy was 
ended on 14 August 2007, due to the high f iscal deficit faced by the gov-
ernment. This had very real effects on Indian shipbuilding’s international 
competitiveness. The subsidy scheme had increased India’s share of world 
shipbuilding orders from 0.02 per cent to 1.24 per cent, but after the expiry 
of the subsidy India’s share declined to 0.01 per cent. To date, despite 
widespread criticism by Indian shipbuilders, the Ministry of Shipping 
has not yet re-established a shipbuilding subsidy scheme. However, with 
the recent change in government, subsidies may be reconsidered.
– For the f irst time, in 2002, the Government of India opened its doors 
to the major private-sector shipyards, BSL and ABG, to partner with it. 
The partnership was based on the PPP model where the private players 
were jointly working on government projects. This policy enabled both 
BSL and ABG to take orders from the Indian navy.
– In the year 2002, the Government of India also made specif ic changes 
in FDI (foreign direct investment) policy by introducing the New 
Exploration Licensing Policy (NELP) VII to boost the production of oil 
and natural gas, by providing a level playing f ield for both public and 
private companies in the shipbuilding industry.
The impact of above initiatives was reflected in the performance of Indian 
shipyards until the ending of subsidy in 2007, which is summarised in Table 21.1.
7 “Indian Shipbuilding Industry Well Positioned for Further Growth”, Exim Bank, Machinest.
in, 2 February 2011, http://machinist.in/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3053
&Itemid=1 (accessed 20 June 2014).
8 “Indian Shipbuilding Industry: Poised for Take-off?”, Global Conference and Exposition on 
Shipbuilding KPMG in India, 2008, 3.
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A comparison of the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1997-2002) and the Tenth 
Five-Year Plan (2002-2007) shows a signif icant development in the Indian 
shipbuilding industry. This paved a new path for achieving increased turno-
ver for both the private and public sectors. Despite the ending of subsidy 
in 2007, turnover reached USD $1.6 bn in 20109 and increased thereafter. 
A positive impact on the shipbuilding companies located in Maharashtra 
region was also witnessed. Brief performance details on Maharashtra 
shipbuilding companies and turnover in 2012 are shown in Table 21.2.
Bharati Shipyard Ltd: a major player in the shipbuilding industry 
of Maharashtra
BSL is a major company in Maharashtra and an exemplar of the private 
shipbuilding industry in India. It began its operations in Ratnagiri in 1973, 
as a small venture in private hands. At present, the client base is from both 
India and abroad. It constructs ships to internationally accepted standards, 
and has attained the status of the second-largest private shipbuilding 
company in India. The company was founded by Prakash C. Kapoor and 
Vijay Kumar, graduates of the ocean engineering and naval architecture 
programme at the Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur. Kapoor and 
Kumar were also colleagues at Mazagon Dock Ltd in Mumbai. Ratnagiri is 
around 330 km from Mumbai. In its f irst few years of operation, BSL built 
f ishing vessels, trawlers, and barges but over time they have expanded their 
product range. At present, BSL builds many sophisticated vessels such as 
offshore supply vessels (OSVs), multi-purpose support vessels (MSVs), and 
anchor-handling tugs and supply vessels (AHTS). The headquarters of BSL is 
located in Mumbai and its activities are carried out in six yards: Ghodbunder 
9 The Indian Shipbuilding DIBD-OMII, Own Man in India, April 2012.
Table 21.1  Performance of Indian shipbuilding yards (USD $ mn), 2002-2007
Period Growth of export 
tonnage in dwt
Orderbook Turnover Investment
1997-2002 0.006  163.2 203.4 8.6
2002-2007 0.2 2,975.4 731.4 168.6
percentage difference 233% 1,723% 259% 1,860%
Source: KpMg and Report of Working group for Shipbuilding and Ship-repair industry for the 
eleventh year plan (2007-2012), March 2007, http://www.investingintamilnadu.com/india/doc/
infrastructure_opportunities/indian_Ship_Building_industry.pdf (accessed 23 March 2013)
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(Maharashtra), Ratnagiri (Maharashtra), Dabhol (Maharashtra) Mangalore 
(Karnataka), Kolkata (West Bengal), and Goa.
The Kolkata and Goa BSL yards are engaged in shipbuilding and ship 
repairing activities. Technically complex and larger vessels are built in 
Dabhol and Mangalore. While the Kolkata and Goa yards build Aframax-
size vessels, the Dabhol and Mangalore yards are engaged in building vessels 












1934* Manufactures warships and 
submarines for indian navy, 
offshore platforms, tankers, 
bulk carriers, platform 





private 1985 commercial vessels that 
include self-loading and 
self-discharging bulk 
carriers, container ships, 
floating cranes, split 
barges, anchor holding 
tugs, offshore supply ves-
sels, warships, ship design, 
building, and repair 






1973 design and construction 
of sea-going, coastal, 
harbour, inland crafts, and 
vessels, building tractor 
tugs, cargo ships, tankers, 








1957 Warship for indian navy 




private 1997 large crude carriers, 
cape-size bulk carriers, 
lng carriers, and warships 




private 1951 cargo vessels, mini bulk 
carrier, ore carrier barges, 
fishing trawlers, and others
 110 mn
total turnover 1.779 bn
note: * Mazagon dock was established in 1801 and registered as a public company in 1934. 
Source: companies Website and the indian Shipbuilding diBd-oMii, Own Man in India, april 2012
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of Handymax size. Ratnagiri is the oldest yard of BSL, and it is spread over 
25 acres (101,171 m2) of land. Recently Ghodbunder has become its feeder 
yard. Ratnagiri yard has its own skilled workforce along with an in-house 
training facility. In 2013, the number of employees on the BSL payroll was 
1,093, of which 608 were blue-collar workers (not sub-contracted) in the 
six shipyards. In the three Maharashtra shipyards the number of not sub-
contracted workers was 301.
Employer, employee, and production perspectives in BSL 
Maharashtra
This section describes employer, employee, and production perspectives 
at BSL. The production perspective discusses the past and also highlights 
the various production activities carried out in Ratnagiri, Dabhol, and 
Ghodbunder.
The employer’s account of establishing the company and management 
structure
Kapoor and Kumar are two technocrats-turned-entrepreneurs who estab-
lished BSL and became its joint managing directors. Kapoor is responsible 
for the development and operations of the company and for ensuring that 
it adheres to internationally acceptable standards of shipbuilding quality. 
As a co-director Kumar is involved with the design, marketing, and quality 
standards of BSL products and is actively engaged in bringing in export 
orders. The shipyards are managed by departmental heads. The three main 
departments at BSL are maintenance, electrical, and mechanical. Senior 
human resource and administration managers are in overall charge of their 
respective yards. Department heads are either supervisors or engineers 
under whom f itters, electricians, welders, gas cutters, and others work. 
There is provision for one labour off icer and one safety off icer who could 
supervise welfare activities and safety issues, but these posts usually remain 
vacant.10
10 This information has been gleaned from workers in the three Maharashtra yards who wish 
to remain anonymous.
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Employees: a historical account of work and employment relationships 
(wages, working conditions and industrial disputes)
BSL initially began at Ratnagiri with thirty-six employees in 1973. Presently 
the size of the overwhelmingly sub-contracted workforce ranges from 1,500 
to 2,000 at Ratnagiri, 400 to 450 at Ghodbunder and, 500 to 525 at Dabhol. 
Prior to the 1980s, almost all the workers were from the local community 
of the western and southern parts of Maharashtra. These workers were 
mostly hired as permanent workers; however, after the 1980s, workers were 
hired by sub-contractors on a temporary, contract basis. The industry also 
witnessed a surge in the number of migrant workers sourced from the states 
of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand, and elsewhere. At present the majority 
Figure 21.1  Location of BSL shipyards in Maharashtra region
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of workers are migrants, skilled and semi-skilled, who are primarily engaged 
in welding and gas-cutting steel. The other group of the migrant labour force 
is composed of manual labourers.11 One BSL worker at Ratnagiri highlighted 
the contract system in the company:
You will f ind around seventeen contractors in Ratnagiri, who are having 
not more than twenty or twenty-f ive workers. Most of these contractors 
are dummy and are promoted by BSL management only. As a matter of 
fact, many of them are not even contractors, but are general workers who 
are shown as contractors on paper. This is to escape from the statutory 
obligations related to employee welfare, in case the number of workers 
reaches over 100. We have been trying to resist this practice since 1991; 
however, our attempts [are] always in vain.12
Other than contractual terms, the workers also expressed their concern on 
the inadequacy of the wages received. The evolution of wages from 1973 to 
2011 in BSL is shown in Table 21.3.
In 1991 workers were getting INR 36.10/- (€0.51); in 2001, INR 90/- (€1.3); 
and in 2011, INR 140 (€2). The latter f igure of INR 140 is the statutory mini-
mum wage, and in practice it is far below accepted living wage standards; 
consequently, workers f ind it diff icult to survive on it. The situation is 
further worsened by the fact that the workers allege that they do not get paid 
on time, are duped by contractors and sub-contractors, and are provided 
with spurious excuses such as that the company is not making profits and 
therefore it is difficult to make the worker’s payment. Yet the company’s 33rd 
11 Interviews conducted during May 2013 in Ratnagiri.
12 Amol Swant, Trade Union Leader and suspended worker, interview May 2013, in Ratnagiri.





Daily wages (INR) for 
a contract worker
1973 Ratnagiri 36 46 12
1981 Ratnagiri 42 31 23
1991 Ratnagiri 44 600 36.10
2001 Ratnagiri and ghodbunder 123 + 22 758 + 321 90
2011 Ratnagiri, ghodbunder, and 
dabhol 
258 + 0 + 43 1528 + 0 + 513 140
Source: Records of Bhartiya Kamgar Sena
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Annual Report (2009-2010) states that each executive director was drawing 
INR 2.895 Crores (INR 28.95 mn = €413,571) as annual remuneration.
The 2010-2011 and 2011-2012 Annual Reports of BSL indicates expenditures 
on employee benefits and in three categories contributions are down, but 
in welfare it is slightly up (Table 21.4).
Low and irregular wages have resulted in several instances of industrial 
unrest and disputes in the company, which has hampered production. The 
f irst strike was called by workers in 1991 protesting against low wages, and 
a major strike was held in July 2001, when it was alleged that the company 
had refused to pay the minimum wage and had allegedly forced workers to 
sign on to fake muster rolls stating that they were receiving the minimum 
wage. According to workers, the company paid only INR 65/- (€0.93) whereas 
the workers were demanding at least the prevailing (2001) minimum wage 
of INR 90/- (€1.3) per workday. The matter went to a conciliation off icer but 
no tangible solution transpired; subsequently the workers lodged a case 
against BSL in the Mumbai High Court, which remains pending.13
Table 21.5 summarises major labour unrest and disputes in BSL from 
1991 to 2013.
On safety issues, the company has attempted to maintain a good profile 
and are known to follow workplace-safety guidelines strictly, particularly 
after the strike of 1991. At present, it is observed that workers are well 
equipped with safety equipment such as gloves, shoes, and goggles for 
13 The case was still pending in the court as of June 2014.
Table 21.4  Company expenses on employee benefits
Employee benefit expenses
1 April 2011 to 31 
March 2012 in mn 
euros*
1 April 2010 to 31 
March 2011 in mn 
euros
a) Salaries and incentives (including labour 
charges)
21.21 23.71
b) contribution to i) provident and other funds  0.50  0.53
ii) Superannuation scheme - -
c) gratuity fund contributions  0.14  0.25
d) Social security and other benefits plans for 
overseas employees
- -
e) Staff welfare expenses  0.66  0.65
total 22.51 25.14
note: * original data were given in inR lakh which has been changed into million euros. 
Source: BSl annual Reports 2010-11, 2011-12
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those cutting steel plates. Safety helmets and overalls are provided for those 
who lift heavy materials. In the yard everything is arranged systemati-
cally including raw materials and equipment. To prevent accidents due to 
negligence, ignorance, and haste, instructions for workers are displayed on 
the safety posters and warning signs are present at vantage points in the 
yard. There are some cases of minor burns and cuts but no fatal accidents 
were reported, except in 2010, when two workers lost their lives in Ratnagiri 
yard.14 After investigating the case, the company introduced medical staff 
and a dedicated ambulance.
Although BSL has insisted on safety over many years, it does not provide 
suff icient social protection to many of its workers. As mentioned earlier, a 
large segment of workers are outsourced and thus do not have permanent 
14 In the year 2010, two workers died when hit by a heavy object falling from a crane.
Table 21.5  Major unrest and disputes at Bharati Shipyard Ltd, 1991-2013
Year Participant Reasons Result
1991 Bharatiya 
Kamgaar Sena
demand for provident fund, 
bonus, adequate safety measures 
and abolishing of contract labour
the issue was discussed with 
the labour commissioner and 
State contract labour aboli-
tion authority. as a result, the 
company agreed to provide 
adequate safety measures. 
Some of the workers attained 
formal employment. From 
1996 onwards, workers were 
also entitled to membership 
of the provident Fund.
2001 Bhartiya 
Kamgar Sena
Workers allegedly forced by 
management to sign the fake 
muster roll where it stated that 
workers were getting minimum 
wage. When workers refused, they 
were fired by management. 
the case is still pending in the 
Maharashtra High court, and 
workers remain hopeful that 
their jobs will be reinstated.
2013 no trade union 
representation 
From august 2012 to april 2013, 
BSl Ratnagiri was closed. Workers 
were informally appraised that 
the company was losing money, 
hence the need to close the 
Ratnagiri unit. However, manage-
ment stated in the press that it was 
closed due to renovation work. 
More than 60 per cent of 
workers lost their jobs and the 
company refused to absorb 
them. they also did not get 
bonuses and other benefits. 
now workers are seeking 
support from external unions 
to address the issues. 
Source: Record of Bhartiya Kamgar Sena, court case, and interviews with workers
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jobs. Outsourced workers are not covered under any social protection scheme 
other than a provident fund.15 Even though workers are engaged in hazardous 
jobs and their lives are always at risk, there is no provision for workmen’s 
compensation, and neither workers nor their families are covered under ac-
cident or medical insurance policies. Accordingly, during contingencies, they 
do not have a safety net that would protect their family against hardship and 
deprivation. Overall working conditions at BSL are unsatisfactory. Although 
working hours and overtime duties conform to statutory requirements, other 
aspects of work and employment relations are deplorable. Basic amenities 
such as clean drinking water and sanitation are not provided, and there 
is a fear among workers that drinking water is impure and that toilets are 
unhygienic.16 There is no canteen facility for workers to have cooked meals 
and rest during lunch recess. The only canteen in BSL is out of bounds to 
workers and is reserved for managerial and supervisory staff.
Production: evolution and development of BSL yards in terms of 
clients and production relations
BSL carries out its activities from the following yards of Maharashtra.
Ratnagiri: The yard has a highly skilled workforce with its own in-house 
training facility. It is well equipped with modern plant, machinery, and equip-
ment such as automatic welding machines, automatic shot blasting/painting 
machines, computer numerically controlled plasma-cutting machines, etc. 
Presently, the company is installing a ship-lift facility, of 12,000 tonnes’ lifting 
capacity at the yard. The yard is also certif ied to International Ship and 
Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) standards. The Ratnagiri yard is presently 
capable of fabricating and erecting fourteen vessels of various sizes simultane-
ously. In recent years, modernisation and expansion of the yard have been 
carried out during which the yard was closed from August 2012 to April 2013. 
This closure was a prime example of lack of transparency. Workers were told 
that the unit was closed due to a liquidity crunch, but in press reports it was 
stated by the management that renovation was taking place in the yard.17
15 The Provident Fund is a lump sum given to workers when they retire or terminate from 
their job. 
16 As there are no personnel to clean them on a regular basis. This information is based on 
yard observation and interviews conducted during May 2013 in Ratnagiri.
17 Press clippings and interviews conducted during May 2013 in Ratnagiri.
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Ghodbunder: Bharati’s Ghodbunder yard was established in 1998, and sup-
ports the operations of the Ratnagiri facility by acting as a feeder yard. It is 
located near Mumbai and spread over 12 acres of land; it is equipped with 
four slipways that are suitable for building hulls of up to 125 m in length. 
The yard is involved in fabrication, pre-outf itting, and major piping work. 
It has modern equipment including mobile cranes, CNC plasma-cutting 
machines, panel line fabrication, automatic welding machines, etc.
Dabhol: BSL has undertaken greenfield expansion in the Dabhol area spread 
over 300 acres of land on the banks of the River Vashishti. It is one of the 
most technologically advanced yards in India. In 2007, BSL took over the 
entire equipment and infrastructure of the then bankrupt British shipyard 
Swan Hunter at Wallsend, Newcastle upon Tyne, which was dismantled and 
transported to India for installation at the Dabhol yard. The Dabhol yard 
was designed by First Marine International of the United Kingdom, and is 
capable of building larger vessels up to Aframax and Handymax size, and 
jack-up drilling rigs. It has two cranes with 180 tonnes’ lifting capacity, a 
large fabrication hall where blocks of 450 tonnes can be assembled, and a 
floating dock of about 155 m x 40 m, with 16,000 tonnes’ lifting capacity. 
This f loating dock is one of the largest in India.
In 1985, the company won its f irst export order for construction of f ive 
barges from Yemen, through Mazagon Dock Ltd. From then, their product 
range has been upgraded from simple inland cargo barges to deep sea 
trawlers and other sophisticated tugboats, and other vessels. In 1991, the 
company won an order for two specialised tugboats with installed power 
of over 4,000 bhp from the Cyprus Port Authority, and in 1997 they received 
orders for two manoeuvrable tugs from Reliance India Ltd.18
In 1999, in one of the major landmarks for BSL, it won a contract from 
Qatar Shipping Company to build a series of 55-tonne bollard pull tugboats. 
This contract was for ten years and was worth USD $15 mn. Another mile-
stone in the history of BSL was its listing on the Bombay Stock Exchange 
(BSE) and the National Stock Exchange in December 2004.19
In 2005 BSL further expanded its operations, when it acquired a 51 per 
cent majority stake in the small Goa-based Pinky Shipyard Ltd; in 2006, BSL 
won a contract from Reliance Industries Ltd, which made the company’s 
18 Off icial website of Bharati Shipyard Ltd, http://www.bharatishipyard.com/history.html 
(accessed 10 March 2013). 
19 Ibid.
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orderbook position of INR 1,586 crore (approximately USD $352 mn) 4.45 
times the turnover of the f inancial year, 2005-2006.20
A joint agreement with Apeejay Shipping Ltd for setting up a large modern 
shipbuilding yard on India’s east coast, expected to become operational in 
2009, was signed on 15 October 2007. The proposed shipyard would be 
capable of building vessels up to VLCC size, would also have ship repair 
facilities, and would require an initial investment of RS 2,000 crore.21 Also 
in 2007, as noted above, BSL announced its intention to acquire plant and 
equipment from the British shipyard Swan Hunter, and its dismantling and 
relocation to India were expected to take up to a year.22
BSL built the f irst self-elevating jack-up drill rig to be constructed in 
India in 2008, and in March 2009 secured a defence contract to build f ifteen 
interceptor vessels for the Indian coast guard worth RS 2.8 bn.23 In 2010, 
BSL acquired a majority stake worth USD $13.7 mn in Tebma Shipyard, a 
south Indian-based company, with shipyards in Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, 
and Kerala states.
As BSL’s managing director, Vijay Kumar, stated:
The company [BSL] has a robust order position, with 70 per cent of its 
orderbook for export, the majority (90 per cent) of which is for clientele 
in European countries, including Surf Bourbon, Ultra Petro in Argentina, 
MK Shipping of Holland, and Sea Cargo from Norway.24
The majority stake in Tebma gave BSL access to readymade shipyards. 
Its collaboration with Apeejay Shipping at the greenf ield yard in Dabhol, 
noted above, obviously had liquidity implications for BSL. Moreover, BSL 
with its reliance on overseas orders was not immune to the ongoing ef-
fects of the world f inancial crisis of 2008. With two greenf ield sites under 
construction at Dabhol and in Mangalore, the latter capable of building 
ships up to 60,000 dwt, BSL’s growth strategy was dependent on increasing 
overseas orders and on maintaining liquidity. At 2010, BSL was incurring 
essential capital expenditure on its greenfield sites and was in the process 






24 Kumar, “Launching India into the Global Shipbuilding Competition”.
25 BSL Annual Report, 2009-10.
evolution and developMent oF tHe SHipBuilding induStRy in BHaRati 561
By December 2011, however, the not-unexpected liquidity crunch had 
hit BSL hard, and for a variety of reasons the company – some 70 per cent 
of its customers being European – was unable to meet its f inancial obli-
gations. In part this arose from the continuing effects of the 2008 crisis. 
European bankers, in view of increasingly stringent capital adequacy 
requirements demanded by the European Union, revisited their lending 
policies to customers. This had the effect that stage payments for vessels 
ordered were deferred or delayed to BSL, and was compounded by the 
amount of capital expended up to 2012-2013, on two partially operational 
greenf ield sites at Dabhol and Mangalore. Up to this stage, there was a 
mismatch between capital expended and returns on capital at these sites, 
exacerbated by rises in domestic interest rates, which adversely affected 
net prof its. Consequently, on 16 December 2011, BSL entered a corporate 
debt restructuring (CDR) programme led by the State Bank of India and 
a consortium of twenty-six other banks formed by the Finance Ministry 
controlling working capital, salaries, and contractual payments. Some 
of the salient features of the CDR were the granting of a moratorium on 
debt repayments for a period of eighteen months from the cut-off date of 
1 October 2011, and the rescheduling the repayment schedule of term debt 
(including funding of interest accruing) and extending it over a period of 
ten years from the cut-off date.26
These measures were originally envisaged to be completed in form and 
in substance by March 2012. However, BSL could not adhere to the schedule, 
and it was therefore modif ied to make up for the loss of time which had 
in turn delayed the company’s process of revival and resulted in a loss of 
revenues and prof its. Accordingly, the revised agreement was formally 
adopted in February 2013. Some of the salient features were as follows: the 
granting of a moratorium period to June 2012 for facilities other than term 
debt; the funding of interest accruing on certain facilities other than term 
debt to June 2012; and the immediate release of funds to BSL via new loan 
facilities as envisaged in the original scheme. This scheme was dependent 
on the f inalisation of BSL accounts.27
26 BSL Annual Report, 2012-13. Other requirements were the conversion of 10 per cent of the 
outstanding debt into 1 per cent compulsory convertible debentures; concessionary interest 
rates on all loan facilities; conversion of certain devolved letters of credit and bank guarantees 
into a working capital term loan repayable in instalments; the granting of two new loan facilities 
to facilitate completion of yard and vessel construction activity; and promoters to infuse into 
BSL 15 per cent of the amount sacrif iced by banks and 25 per cent of the new loan facilities as 
margin money in the form of equity. 
27 BSL Annual Report, 2012-13.
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In this scenario, it was likely that the consequences for the BSL labour force 
would be severe. BSL had been and is extremely wary of taking the risk of 
absorbing informal (sub-contracted) workers on the company payroll as they 
do not wish to get engaged in interacting with an organised workforce. The 
closure of the Ratnagiri yard from August 2012 to April 2013 is an example of 
a lack of transparency by BSL. As noted above, workers were informed that 
due to the liquidity crunch the unit was closed, but in the press it was stated 
by the management that renovation was taking place in the yard. By July 2013, 
sub-contract workers hired by labour contractors to work at BSL Managalore 
had not been paid for six months, and these workers had been on strike for 
twenty days. The labour contractors passed the buck to BSL as the former had 
not been paid either. By 15 November, the chief general manager, Ram Mohan, 
had stated that the problems were related to a global slowdown in shipbuild-
ing and that BSL had “a liquidity crunch”. Foreign companies had cancelled “a 
lot of orders” and had taken back advances.28 His statements should be seen 
against the backdrop of corporate debt restructuring and a loss before tax 
for the period 2011-2012 of RS 4858.64, which had grown to RS 59,975.52 in 
the financial year 2012-2014.29 It is clear that BSL had overextended itself and 
that post-2008 this policy came back to haunt and eventually humiliate them 
through CDR. One must also wonder if its pared-down management structure 
also contributed to this denouement. At present much depends on the attitude 
of the Indian state as to whether BSL can survive in its present form.
In the Indian context more than 152 labour laws exist that impose restric-
tions on the industry and supposedly enforce decent work and employment 
conditions. While most of these laws are intended to protect vulnerable 
workers, the net effect is that industry f inds loopholes and bypasses these 
laws by not employing workers directly on companies’ payroll. Instead, 
the employers take the path of least resistance and hire workers through 
contractors and sub-contractors. Contractors, small entities are mostly 
outside the purview of labour union laws, do not have to comply with 
many statutory labour welfare measures. BSL, like most companies in 
other industries, practise this method and keep their labour costs low. The 
end result is that the informal (casual) labour is exploited excessively. It 
is of little surprise, therefore, that the Indian shipbuilding industry still 
lags behind in the areas of infrastructure, technology, and skill sets. The 
industry seriously needs to improve its working conditions and employment 
relationships, particularly among the lower echelons of workers.
28 The Hindu, 23 July and 15 November 2013.
29 BSL Annual Report, 2012-13.




Since the 1980s, development policies in Thailand have encouraged foreign 
investment in the production of labour-intensive goods (textiles, garments, 
footwear, and vehicles), most of which are destined for export. This has 
led to such a rapid growth in the country’s gross domestic product that in 
1993 the World Bank called Thailand one of the “high performing Asian 
economies”,2 while other scholars have called it an “economic miracle”3 and 
celebrated the birth of the f ifth “Asian tiger”.4
However, if, on the one hand, Thailand has invested public funds to 
attract foreign direct investment (FDI) through the construction of special 
economic zones, that is to say, production areas that benefit from among 
other things tax incentives and infrastructure for labour-intensive manufac-
turing, on the other hand, it has done little to incentivise capital-intensive 
production, such as shipbuilding.5 This has meant that the Thai shipbuilding 
industry, entirely run by national capital with limited public participation, 
has struggled to hold out against the emerging competitors from the Philip-
pines and Vietnam, even though Thailand’s geographical features – 3,219 
km of coastline, set in the middle of the South-east Asian seas, between 
1 This research was made possible thanks to the contribution of many people to whom I extend 
my heartfelt thanks. Among these, I have to thank F.M., whose generous and unself ish interest 
allowed me to obtain a wealth of precious data on the Thai shipbuilding sector, as well as the 
chance to contact several members of the TSBA (Thailand Shipbuilding Association), among 
whom are Mrs Warawan Nganthavee, General Secretary of the TSBA and Managing and Execu-
tive Director of the Asian Marine Services Public Company Ltd; Mr Wirat Chanasit, President 
of the TSBA and General Manager of the Italthai Marine Ltd; and Mr Sompope Chokchaiyakool, 
Vice-President of the TSBA and Director of the Marsun Company Ltd. Further thanks are also 
due to the workers and shipyard managers who opened the diaries of their lives and memories 
to me, sharing their knowledge and experiences. At their request, I shall keep their names 
anonymous. Finally, my special thanks to Prof. Michelguglielmo Torri, Prof. Alessio Patalano 
and Prof. Paolo Puddinu for precious suggestions.
2 World Bank, The East Asian Miracle.
3 Warr, “The Thai Economy”.
4 Muscat, The Fifth Tiger.
5 Todd and Lindberg, Navies and Shipbuilding Industries, 131.
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the Indian and Pacif ic Oceans – and its long tradition of shipbuilding offer 
ideal conditions for development.
That this situation arose is basically the result of the implementation 
of an economic and industrial policy in the second half of the nineteenth 
century that chose to neglect shipbuilding. In this period, the lack of solid 
state support for the transition from sail to steam and from wooden to steel 
hulls brought about a loss of know-how and a progressive decline in the 
sector. From then until today, the Thai government has never subsidised 
the shipbuilding sector, and indeed most of the Royal Thai Navy’s (RTN) 
ships are purchased from abroad. As a result, the majority of the shipyards 
found in Thailand are small, family-run businesses, with limited capacity 
and low competitiveness compared to other shipyards in the region.
As regards industrial relations within the naval shipyards, we should 
remember that, for decades, the national context has been characterised by 
policies that tend to restrict trade union activities and impede the develop-
ment of any form of workers’ movement. Based on this premise, the reduced 
size of shipyards favours the strengthening of paternalistic attitudes on 
the part of the employers, while doing little to better working conditions.
On the basis of these preliminary considerations, this chapter has two 
main aims: the f irst is to reconstruct the history of the shipbuilding sector 
in Thailand, as a means of evaluating why this sector has undergone less 
development than other industrial sectors. The second, which is contingent 
upon the f irst, is an analysis of how the shipbuilding industry has changed 
over the past thirty-f ive years, using a historical perspective of industrial 
relations to consider the role of the institutions, the private companies, the 
workers, and their union representatives in these changes. This chapter 
will attempt to show how the strengthening of a paternalistic approach to 
industrial relations just noted, instead of improving working conditions in 
terms of contract guarantees, safety, and levels of income, actually led to a 
generalised downward trend.
These changes will be observed from both a subjective and an objective 
point of view. The objective plane deals with the radical material changes 
undergone by today’s production industry within the frame of technological 
modernisation. On the other hand, the subjective plane considers how the 
workers perceive these changes and how they view themselves, which, in 
turn, regard both what modern shipbuilding work is actually about, and 
also the poor organisation of Thai unions in terms of representatives and 
representation.
As regards methodology, the analysis has tried to combine the tools of 
historical-political analysis with those used in a survey conducted in the 
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principal Thai shipyards and institutions. Historical analysis was mainly 
carried out on the basis of secondary sources, while the sociological research 
made use of semi-structured open groups and individual interviews with the 
workers, the employers (shipbuilding association), and the non-governmental 
organisations that operate in various capacities in the f ield of shipbuilding.
Research was carried out in three of the largest (and relatively modern) 
Thai shipyards: Asimar, Italthai, and Marsun.6 These were chosen in view of 
their similar technical characteristics as well as the managers’ and workers’ 
readiness to be interviewed and provide information. The data in the survey 
mainly refer to the 2010 calendar year. The interviews were part of two 
different f ieldwork surveys, one dating to 2010 and the other to 2011. For 
reasons of personal safety, the workers preferred not to have their names 
published, and consequently their statements remain anonymous.
The chapter is divided into three parts: part one gives a broad outline of the 
history of Thai shipbuilding. The second analyses the model of Thai develop-
ment that came into effect from the 1980s onwards, and the scientific debate 
that revolved around the dynamics of this development from both a national 
and a regional perspective. The third focuses on shipyard labour, and how it has 
been transformed since the 1980s, offering both subjective and objective data.
The history of shipbuilding in Thailand
Shipbuilding in ancient times
Until halfway through the nineteenth century, the Kingdom of Siam could 
boast the best shipyards and the most advanced construction techniques in 
the whole of South-east Asia. Its military fleet was one of the most powerful 
and best-equipped in the region, and it also had a great number of commercial 
vessels which guaranteed cabotage and long-haul navigation. Thai shipyards 
had gained their expertise over the centuries due to an exchange of knowl-
edge with other shipbuilders from the region and through the acquisition of 
6 Asian Marine Services was established in 1981. In 1995 it was listed as a public limited 
company and changed its name to Asian Marine Services Public Company Ltd ASIMAR in 1995. 
Italthai Marine Ltd was established in 1978 when the Italian-Thai Development Corporation and 
Italthai Holding Co., Ltd, partnered with Oriental Marine and Laminates Co., Ltd, to construct 
and repair small and medium-sized steel, f ibreglass, and aluminium ships. Established in 1980, 
Marsun Company Ltd (MCL) has delivered more than 232 various types of vessels. These include 
passenger ferries, motor yachts, fast patrol craft, research vessels, landing craft, oil-spill recovery 
vessels, multi-purpose craft, patrol gun boats, and fast-attack missile craft.
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innovative European techniques from the sixteenth century onwards.7 Fur-
thermore, Siam could count on raw materials, such as excellent-quality wood, 
and cordage and fabric for sails, to build vessels for medium- and long-haul 
cabotage, as well as river vessels.8 In the seventeenth century, the Chantaboun 
shipyards were renowned throughout the seafaring community of East Asia 
as being the yard which built the best ships. In fact, the Chinese, who held the 
monopoly of maritime trade in East Asia until midway through the nineteenth 
century, used to commission their junks from the Thai shipyards.9
Between the f ifteenth and eighteenth centuries, in the golden age of 
Ayuttaya, the kingdom’s capital, the Siamese shipyards could also rely on 
the collaboration of Dutch shipbuilders, who had come to Asia at the request 
of the Siamese king. The arrival of European ships in this period had set in 
motion a process of vessel modernisation and the hybridisation of Asian 
building techniques with those of the West.10 This led to an improvement 
in ship hulls, which were able to increase their carrying capacity and the 
armaments on board.11
Until the second half of the nineteenth century, when Western steam-
boats with their steel hulls f irst arrived in Asia, the Siamese shipyards were 
second to none, and these characteristics allowed them to maintain an 
extremely prominent role in the region, and compete with other shipyards 
in the area, such as those in Vietnam.12
With the arrival of the industrial revolution and the introduction of 
structural innovations such as steel hulls and steam engines, the Siamese 
shipyards could no longer keep abreast of the wave of modernisation, and 
lost their importance once and for all. It is true to say that the process of 
modernisation set underway by King Mongkut in the Kingdom of Siam in 
the mid-nineteenth century, and continued by his son King Chulalongkorn 
until 1910, had aspired to compete with the Japanese system brought about 
by the Meiji Revolution in the same period. These modernising kings had 
focused their attention on political and administrative reform, and had 
7 Manguin, “Trading Ships of the South China Sea”.
8 Poujade, Les Jonques des chinois du Siam; Cooke, “The Junk Trade and Commodity Production 
in Eastern Cambodia”; Li, “Ships and Shipbuilding in the Mekong Delta”. 
9 Cushman, Fields from the Sea, 2.
10 Wyatt, A Short History of Thailand, ch. 5; see also Baker and Phongpaichit, A History of 
Thailand, 10. 
11 Andaya, “Interaction with the Outside World and Adaptation in Southeast Asian Society”, 
377-378.
12 During the reign of Rama I (1782-1809), the competitiveness of Siamese shipyards had 
improved, also thanks to the presence of Cham workers, who had emigrated from Vietnam to 
Ban Khrua, near Bangkok. See Walsh, “The Vietnamese in Thailand”, 167.
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allocated substantial resources to strengthening the army and to fending off 
the attacks and attempts at colonisation on the part of the West.13 They had 
also shown particular interest in education and universities, summoning 
distinguished professors from European countries, and sending young 
students to study at the most prestigious universities in Japan and Europe. 
Substantial funding had also been set apart for the construction of major 
infrastructure works and to improve the transport system. This was the 
context which saw the building of the f irst railways and the elimination 
of the vast network of canals in river cities such as Bangkok, which were 
replaced with new road systems.
Even the shipbuilding sector, at least in the f irst part of King Mongkut’s 
reign, benef ited from the sovereign’s economic support, as he also sum-
moned expert shipbuilders from Europe.14 In Tait’s Edinburgh Magazine of 
1858, we read the following about Siamese dry docks: “A sudden bend in the 
river brought us in sight of the dry-docks of Siam, where, at the time, one 
or two stately, square-rigged ships, built strictly upon the English model, 
and under English supervision, were undergoing repairs.”15
Nevertheless, all the efforts on the part of the government to encour-
age the Siamese shipyards to be competitive proved to be inadequate and 
ineffective.
Shipbuilding from 1910 to 1970
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Siam was already integrated 
into the system of international and economic relations of the imperial 
powers. In comparison to the other kingdoms in the region, it boasted a 
privileged position, since it had managed to maintain its political independ-
ence, and not submit to colonisation by France and Britain. During the 
First World War, Siam took the side of the Allies, despite the existence of 
a strong pro-German tendency that opposed this alliance. Siam declared 
war on Germany in 1917, which actually proved to be to its great advantage, 
especially after the conflict, when it received a great number of German 
merchant ships as spoils of war.16
The end of the absolute monarchy, following the coup of 1932, caused the 
new Siamese government to tighten its political and commercial relations 
13 Tuck, The French Wolf and the Siamese Lamb.
14 Moffat, Mongkut, the King of Siam, 26.
15 William Tait’s Edinburgh Magazine, January-December 1858, Vol. 25.
16 Hall, A History of Southeast Asia, 198.
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with Japan. The new government bought warships from Japan and also some 
from Italy, in an attempt to modernise and reinforce its fleet.17 In 1935, Japan 
and Siam set up a co-operation programme that foresaw the development of 
Siam’s extensive cotton plantations by Japanese companies, and in return 
the Bangkok government agreed to purchase locomotives to modernise its 
railway system, as well as two submarines.18
In 1938, under the ex-leader Pridi Banomyong, the country took part 
in the Japanese project to create the so-called co-prosperity sphere, and 
this co-operation then continued during the years of military rule by the 
ex-Kingdom of Siam under its new name of Thailand. Furthermore, in this 
period, the alliance with Japan allowed the Thai government to annul 
the concessions that had previously been granted to the Europeans in the 
nineteenth century. During the nationalisation of foreign companies prior 
to the Second World War, Pridi’s government had tried to gain control of 
merchant shipping. This was intended to create a state shipping company 
through the purchase of steamers from Japan and Italy. At the same time, 
a series of laws had been issued to limit the number of foreign shareholders 
in the shipping companies: in fact, 70 per cent of these companies’ assets 
had to be Thai, ships had to sail under the Thai f lag, and 75 per cent of the 
crew had to be of Thai nationality.19
After Japan’s defeat in the Second World War, Thailand once again took the 
side of the West. The alliance with the United States allowed the country to 
receive substantial funding for reconstruction work, in exchange for allowing 
its territory to be used as a logistic base for military operations in Vietnam. 
In a short time, the Bangkok government managed to create an industrial 
economy but, once again, the government’s plans did not include the ship-
building sector. In fact, during the Cold War period, Thailand continued to 
buy its ships abroad or use second-hand ones donated by the Western states.
The creation of a new development model
Economic success in Thailand and in the other countries in South-east Asia 
began in the 1980s, using Japanese development as its reference model and 
with funding from American and Japanese capital.20 In fact, in the post-war 
17 Mishra, The History of Thailand, 220.
18 “Strengthening of Japanese Ties with Siam”.
19 Hall, A History of Southeast Asia, 996-997.
20 McGregor, Southeast Asian Development.
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period, the Japanese government with the economic and f inancial backing 
of the United States had set in motion a process of reconstruction and 
economic recovery which, on the one hand, privileged the exportation of 
value-added products and, on the other, favoured the accumulation of dollar 
reserves. The latter allowed the Japanese government to keep the value 
of its currency down, meaning that it was able to guarantee a continuous 
market for its products, whose quality was always improving especially in 
terms of technological innovations.
From the 1970s onwards, the Japanese development model had also been 
applied in other states in East and South-east Asia. “Thanks to systematic 
state intervention and highly organized forms of capitalism”, these countries 
were able “to realize the potential advantages of coming late, especially 
by combining ever increasing technological sophistication with relatively 
cheap labour and orienting production to exports for the world market”.21
The industrialisation process triggered by these new emerging economies 
– South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore, followed by Thailand, 
Malaysia, and Indonesia – was based on Japanese economic strategies, even 
from the point of view of the “endless purchasing” of goods in US dollars: 
“Their aim was to hold down their own exchange rates vis a vis the dollar and 
repress US interest rates, so as to subsidize US borrowing and consumption, 
in order to sustain their own export.”22
This phenomenon is often aptly explained through the “f lying geese 
paradigm”, based on the image of how geese fly in a V formation. Japan lies 
at the point of the V while the other Asian countries make up the rest of 
the formation. In political-economic terms, this means that the develop-
ment process is characterised by relocating labour-intensive sectors to 
poorer countries, while the richer ones specialise in new products.23 In 
Thailand, in particular, this process started after the Second World War, 
when the country had modif ied its agrarian economy so as to diversify 
production.24 However, projects regarding shipping, necessary to improve 
port infrastructure and facilitate maritime transport, got underway only 
in 1986, with the elaboration of a Japanese f inancial plan, under the JICA 
21 Brenner, “What Is Good for Goldman Sachs Is Good for America”, 9.
22 Ibid., 2, 36. 
23 The “f lying geese” metaphor was f irst elaborated in 1932 by the Japanese scholar Kaname 
Akamatsu, who then presented it to British academia in 1961, applying it to the case of his 
country, and within the idea of a product cycle: Akamatsu, “A Historical Pattern of Economic 
Growth in Developing Countries”.
24 Bowornwathana, “Responses of Public Administration of Thailand to Global Challenges”, 
367.
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(Japan International Cooperation Agency) to expand the Eastern Seaboard 
Development Programme.25 The project foresaw the creation of an industrial 
area on the east coast of Thailand and the construction of infrastructure 
for the transport of goods. In a short time, Japanese and American multi-
national companies started to produce textiles, garments, and vehicles on 
Thailand’s east coast. As several members of the Thailand Shipbuilding 
Association (TSBA) recall, the shipbuilding sector also expected to receive 
the same concessions and incentives as the other manufacturers, and was 
ready to move and increase its production on the eastern coast of Thailand. 
The members had already expressed a need to abandon the Samut Prakan 
region, at the mouth of the Chao Praya River, which was no longer suitable 
for creating the new dry docks, necessary to “get nearer to the new docks 
of globalisation”. However, the shipbuilding sector was excluded from all 
these investment projects, and the companies were all obliged to remain 
in dry docks in Samut Prakan (except for Unithai, the only company that 
managed to build its shipyards in the port of Leam Chabang).26
There were two main reasons why the United States had supported 
Japan in the period after the Second World War, and why, in turn, Japan 
itself had offered aid to the emerging South-east Asian economies after 
the 1970s: the f irst was of a strategic-political nature, linked to the need 
to promote the growth of capitalist economies in a context where some of 
the major satellites of the communist bloc gravitated. The second was for 
economic reasons, since it strengthened the position of the US dollar as a 
base currency for foreign exchange.
However, even though this process allowed the United States to increase 
its political hegemony in the Asian region, it is undeniable that it also 
brought about a series of negative consequences. “The nurturing of suc-
cessful capitalist economies may have fulf illed a crucial strategic objective 
in the struggle with communism, but it also created sources of relentless 
competition which would steadily undercut America’s economic strength 
at home and abroad.”27 Ultimately, the competitive mechanism triggered by 
the United States made it necessary to reduce production costs, forcing the 
American businesses into a “profit trap”, that is to say, that stage of capital-
ism when profit rates are so low that it is no longer profitable to invest.
25 JICA, Annual Evaluation Reports 2000, Chapter 3: Ex-Post Evaluation IV JICA/OECF Joint 
Evaluation”; Shimomura, “In Search of Endogenous Elements of Good Governance”. 
26 Interviews with Mrs Warawan Nganthavee, 4 July 2011; Mr Wirat Chanasit, 10 July 2011; Mr 
Sompope Chokchaiyakool, 11 July 2011.
27 Beeson, “The United States and East Asia”, § 16.
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In turn, this phenomenon which came into being in the United States 
from 1973 onwards, gave rise to two main consequences: on the one hand, 
it became essential to f ind new geographical locations to guarantee higher 
profit rates, which usually entailed outsourcing production to places where 
costs were lower, while, on the other, it forced investors to reduce wages 
and increase worker productivity.
In the 1970s, the South-east Asian countries offered the Western multi-
national corporations a way out of the profit trap. As a result, Singapore, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South Korea, and later Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
and the Philippines, all started to build the infrastructure necessary for 
accommodating the manufacturing industries of the Western world. The 
certainty of low labour costs, smooth industrial relations, regulations protect-
ing property rights and adequate infrastructure for transport and logistics 
have allowed this region to base its economy on the exportation of products.
This “developmentalist” model based on the idea of the state playing 
an active role in “governing the market”,28 which has also been adopted in 
Cambodia and Vietnam since the 1990s and, even more recently in Laos 
and Myanmar, has certainly gone a signif icant way in contributing to the 
generalised growth of the per capita income in Asian countries. However, 
it has also brought about several negative consequences, such as urban 
sprawl and environmental degradation, a drain of human resources from 
the countryside to the towns, the reduction of areas for farming, the division 
of labour in a context where welfare systems are either non-existent or in 
an embryonic state, and the stifling of workers’ rights. With the economic 
crisis of 1997-2000, these problems were further exacerbated, which is a sign 
that the myth of the “developmentalist” model, seen as the only alternative 
to the neo-classical model of development based on a free market, needs to 
be revisited. The former model, therefore, is a paradigm that reduces state-
society relations to state-capital ones and, as a consequence, to relations 
between the government and business.29 Ultimately, the state becomes the 
guarantor of the bourgeois-capitalist class and, consequently, the working 
class is in a condition of subordination. This is something that emerges from 
the empirical data on Thailand’s economic successes, which actually hide 
an increasing amount of inequality.30
28 On the developmental model and its mythicisation, see Johnson, MITI and the Japanese 
Miracle; Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant; Wade, Governing The Market.
29 Chang, “Fetishised State and Reif ied Labour”.
30 Glassman, “Economic Crisis in Asia”; Rigg, “Of Miracles and Crises”; Radice, “The Develop-
mental State Under Global Neoliberalism”; Ludden, “Imperial Modernity”. On the lengthy debate 
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For example, as regards the labour market, statistics indicate that the 
number of part-time workers in Thailand has grown from 7.7 per cent of 
the workforce in 1990 to 10.3 per cent in 2004.31 Unfortunately, the statistics 
are unable to capture other forms of labour flexibility in the formal labour 
market, such as labour agencies and hiring of casual and temporary workers, 
which trade union organisers and labour activists claim are also widespread 
in a country with very weak unions.32
Shipbuilding in Thailand, 1980s-1997
As already stated, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the shipbuild-
ing and ship repairing sector never received any particular kind of f inancial 
or f iscal incentives or developmental support from the Thai government or 
from foreign investors. The reasons for this exclusion are basically linked to 
two factors: f irst of all, the government’s choice to integrate the economic 
system into the new liberalist global order, which led them to allocate public 
funds for the construction of the infrastructure necessary for accommodat-
ing FDI only in those sectors in which the transnational capitalist class had 
expressed an interest to invest.33 Indeed, the shipbuilding sector, which has 
been progressively incorporated into the f inancialisation of the shipping 
sector, is subject to the changes that are imposed by the transnational 
capitalist class.34 It is therefore the large shipping companies, together with 
f inancial and insurance groups, that decide which shipyard is commis-
sioned to build new ships or carry out maintenance work. In Thailand, this 
is clearly evident in the fact that Thai shipowners themselves f ind it more 
convenient to buy their ships in Vietnam or in China, not only because they 
offer lower prices, but also because the country lacks a national f inancial 
and insurance system that guarantees sales.
The second factor, inextricably linked to the f irst, is an internal matter 
and refers to the endogenous critical state of the Thai industry, which is 
on the reasons behind the successes and failures of the Thai model, see Doner, The Politics of 
Uneven Development.
31 International Labour Organization, Thailand Labour Market Indicators, 2007, http://
w w w.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/-- -asia/---ro-bangkok/documents/publication/
wcms_bk_pb_136_en.pdf.
32 Ofreneo, Industrial Relations Challenges in Globalizing Labour Markets In East Asia, 25ff. 
See also ILO, Global Employment Trends 2012.
33 Sklair, The Transnational Capitalist Class.
34 Bologna, Le multinazionali del mare. 
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characterised by the shortage of raw materials, such as steel and skilled 
human resources, as well as the lack of a solid f inancial and insurance 
sector to start a shipbuilding chain.
There is also a third factor. According to several scholars, Thai shipbuild-
ing was halted by the military strategy the country adopted when it chose 
to ally itself with the liberal bloc. In this way, Thailand limited its need to 
strengthen its maritime fleet and incentivise ship production for its own 
purposes.35 However, this does not explain why other countries, such as 
South Korea, which was likewise allied with the liberal countries, were able 
to become leaders in the shipbuilding f ield during the Cold War period.
Moreover, in this regard, it is worth noting that the Thai government over 
the past f ifteen years has allocated enormous resources for the modernisa-
tion of the Thai navy’s f leet, but only a residual part of the budget has been 
used to commission national shipyards to build a few small vessels.36 Most 
of the funds for military spending have been used to buy large new vessels, 
built in shipyards abroad, or to purchase second-hand ships from Allied 
countries (especially from the United States). Examples include an aircraft 
carrier purchased from a Spanish shipyard just a few months prior to the 
crisis of 1997, or the more recent government approved spending plan to buy 
three frigates from the Korean conglomerate, Daewoo, each costing USD 
$468 mn.37 On the other hand, the members of the TSBA have been trying 
for years to receive approval of a government plan to modernise Thailand’s 
f leet of oil tankers, which foresees the replacement of 113 of the 191 vessels, 
at a total cost of around THB 50 bn (USD $1.55 bn).38
35 Heginbotham, “The Fall and the Rise of Navies in East Asia”.
36 The Royal Thai Navy has a requirement for a force of modern medium-sized patrol boats to 
conduct basic security and law enforcement (primarily counter-smuggling and piracy) opera-
tions in coastal waters. However, the Royal Thai Navy has almost always commissioned even 
medium-sized boats from abroad. For example, in September 1996, the RTN signed a contract 
with the Australian Submarine Corporation (ASC) and Silkline International Corporation to 
build three patrol boats, with an option for seven more. See “Patrol Vessel Programmes and 
Requirements in South East Asia”.
37 “Thai Navy Signs Contract with DSME for First of Two Multipurpose Frigates”.
38 The project to replace the ships is linked to the government’s need to comply with a rule 
issued by the International Marine Organisation (IMO), of which Thailand is a member, which 
forbids oil tankers exceeding 500 grt and ships aged over twenty-f ive years from cruising, effec-
tive from 2012: “Shipbuilding and Repairing Association Hopes to Snare Replacement Market 
for Coastal Ships”. At the end of 2011 a solution was still to be found. One of the main problems 
reported by the members of the TSBA is the strong competition of the Japanese shipyards, which 
had declared their readiness to offer the Thai government free design for the building of new 
oil tankers: “Federation of Thai Industries Chairman Comments on Shipping Industry”.
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Several times in the past thirty years, the members of the TSBA have 
tried to persuade the government to implement development policies 
in the shipbuilding sector, but to little or no avail. For example, in 1993, 
under pressure from the TSBA, a series of meetings with the government’s 
Maritime Promotion Commission took place to discuss and f ind a solution 
to two of the sector’s most pressing problems: the lack of skilled workers 
and the high cost of construction materials. As regards the former issue, the 
TSBA asked the government to subsidise scientif ic studies at universities, 
such as courses in naval engineering.39 In order to solve the latter problem, 
they called for tax cuts on construction materials, 90 per cent of which 
were imported from abroad with an obvious increase in production costs. 
The possibility of a brighter future for the sector seemed quite promising 
at this period, as the members of the TSBA themselves reported in various 
documents, but the 1997 crisis swept away all these optimistic forecasts.40
In a study carried out in 1997, the members of the TSBA had already indi-
cated that the lack of technology transfer and education/training had to be 
one of the priorities addressed in relaunching the sector.41 Ten years later, in 
2008, the government entrusted the Office of Industrial Economics with the 
project of co-ordinating the integration of the shipbuilding industry with 
the electrical appliances and electronics industry including Chulalongkorn 
University, aimed at adding value to these sectors amid the global economic 
crisis.42 However, f ive years on, the progress and the results obtained from 
this co-ordination project remain extremely limited. Problems related to 
39 In 2004, Thailand had one of the lowest secondary-school graduation rates among Associa-
tion of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) member countries. Although Thai universities and 
colleges graduated some 200,000 students annually (a six-fold increase in comparison to a decade 
ago), graduate skills are often misdirected or fail to match international standards. Fewer than 
20 per cent of degrees awarded are in science and technology, and less than 10 per cent of the 
roughly 30,000 registered lawyers are qualif ied in specialised business f ields: “Thailand: Labour 
Market”. Ten years later, the lack of skilled human resources seems to have worsened to the 
point that, according to Thailand’s Labour Ministry, the demand for labour exceeded supply for 
the f irst time in 2013, and the World Bank says that shortages of skilled labour are particularly 
serious and have become the biggest obstacle to doing business in Thailand: “Thailand Risk: 
Alert – Skilled Workers May Be in Short Supply”.
40 Off ice of the Marine Promotion Commission and JICA, Seminar Report on Industrial 
Cooperation Between Japan and Thailand for Development of Shipbuilding Industry, 117.
41 JICA and ARG Co., Report on the Survey on the Current Status and Industrial Cooperation of 
Shipbuilding Industry in Thailand.
42 “State and Private Sectors to Jointly Develop Shipbuilding Industry”; “OIE Plans to Integrate 
Shipbuilding Industry with Electrical Appliance and Electronics Industry”. 
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the lack of skilled workers and incentives for the production of construction 
material continue to be two of the main critical issues for the sector.43
After the fall of 1997-2000
After the 1997-2000 crisis, the chance of state funding for the shipbuilding 
sector became even more remote. As a consequence, the sector is unable to 
compete in the regional market, in a context where both regional market 
leaders, Japan and South Korea, but also emerging competitors, such as 
China, Vietnam, and the Philippines, receive substantial support from 
their own state.44 Thai shipbuilders have, therefore, practically no chance 
of competing with these producers, and production in the past decade 
appears to be generally stagnant.45
The Thai shipbuilders have used various strategies to overcome both 
the diff icult situation of the great crisis of 1997-2000, and also the latest 
international economic crisis which began in 2008. In fact, most of the 
shipyards have invested in two fundamental elements: diversif ication and 
production quality. As regards product diversif ication, the Thai shipyards 
have specialised above all in the maintenance, repair, and conversion of 
ships (but not ship-breaking).46 In this case, their experience and reduced 
43 Interviews with Mrs Warawan Nganthavee, 4 July 201; Mr Wirat Chanasit, 10 July 2011; Mr 
Sompope Chokchaiyakool, 11 July 2011.
44 In the 2004-2010 period, the shipbuilding sector in Asia collapsed in South Korea (–34 per 
cent) and in Japan (–16.3 per cent), while there was a sharp growth in China (+39.5 per cent) and 
a substantial growth in the Philippines (2.7 per cent), in Vietnam (+0.9 per cent), and in India 
(+0.9 per cent): Shipbuilders’ Association of Japan, Report 2013.
45 The members of the TSBA have reported various critical situations in the Thai sector; inves-
tors are deterred by high taxation of imported raw material, as for example, steel, aluminium, 
glass, engines, high tech, etc. Thai steel plants, in fact, can only produce thick sheet (more than 
6/7 mm), which is no good for shipbuilding. Other countries in South-east Asia for example, 
Vietnam and South Korea, have raw materials, so shipbuilding in Thailand is more expensive 
than in those countries. Thai plants can only produce welding machines for the shipbuilding 
industries: interview with Mrs Warawan Nganthavee, 4 July 2011. It is important to note that in 
2013 Thai shipping companies commissioned Chinese shipyards with the construction of cargo 
ships: Shipbuilders’ Association of Japan, Shipbuilding Statistics, September 2013.
46 Thailand’s experience in ship repair and maintenance work was strengthened by the fact 
that the vessels in the Thai military and merchant f leet had either been bought second-hand 
or had been conceded by Western countries after their dismissal. Furthermore, in order to deal 
with the 1997-2000 economic crisis, Japan, the United States, and Italy offered great support 
by f inancing the repair of ships from their military f leets. Japan, Italy, and Thailand have long 
been linked by international military treaties. 
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costs, especially in terms of labour, have been the determining factors in 
their success at an international level, because maintenance and ship repair 
costs have been constantly increasing globally ever since 2001, and look to 
become one of the most expensive items in the running of a ship.47
In terms of product diversif ication, the Thai shipyards have specialised 
in:
a The construction of f loating platforms for research and offshore crude 
oil extraction, and of offshore support vessel sector (OSV) structures. 
Currently, the more than 250 offshore platforms operating in the Gulf 
of Thailand and companies engaged in this kind of work need about 
1,000 new platforms.48
b Steel processing for uses other than in shipyards: for example, Thai 
shipyards produced and supplied the steel for covering structures at 
the new Bangkok airport.
c Logistics: for example, Unithai, has operated the only fully equipped 
private Chao Phraya River terminal since the mid-1990s.
d The production of yacht service facilities, for example, Yacht Solutions 
and Italthai Marine have signed a memorandum of understanding, 
agreeing to create Thailand’s f irst dedicated super-yacht facility in 
Bangkok, and another is currently being built at Phuket.49
The second element in which the Thai shipyards have invested has been 
improving product quality. Since 1998, Thai shipyards, unlike the ones 
in Vietnam, China, the Philippines, and India, have begun to invest in 
quality systems, guaranteed by international certif ication through the 
TSBA’s shared programme, known as the Continual Quality Improvement 
Project which, in this case, has benefited from state contributions (e.g. ISO 
9001:2008, ISO 14001 and OHSAS 18001 Policy).50 It is not by chance that the 
Thai shipyards have received commissions from Western nations (Germany, 
47 Bologna, Le multinazionali del mare, 163.
48 The market for the construction of f loating platforms has grown considerably over the past 
ten years, after the discovery of enormous offshore reserves of gas and petroleum in the South 
China Sea, and following technical advances in the extraction of gas and crude oil. Thai shipyards 
have benef ited from three factors in this sector compared to other countries in the area: high 
production quality guaranteed by international certif ication, low costs, and shipyards located 
close to the drilling zones. 
49 The Nation, 18 April 2013, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/business/Briefs-30204190.
html.
50 Unoff icial translation based on Board of Investment Announcement No. Sor 3/2552, Amend-
ment of Activity and Conditions of the Manufacture of Solar Cells and Building or Repair of 
Ships, http://www.boi.go.th/english/download/law_regulations/667/Sor%203-2552_eng_.pdf
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Britain, Ireland) and from Arab countries, where international certifications 
and quality controls on the safety of ships are indispensable.
In 2011, Thailand’s shipbuilding and ship repair industry was made up 
of seventy-eight companies with a very low capitalisation.51 Most of these 
f irms had been set up at the beginning of the 1980s, and they were all 
situated in Bangkok’s historic industrial district at the mouth of the Chao 
Phraya River (Samutprakan), an area which was embedded in the midst of 
the vast outskirts of the capital, and which was totally unsuitable for the 
development of any kind of industrial activity. Only the Unithai shipyard 
is located in the modern industrial area of the Leam Chabang container 
port, to the south-east of Bangkok.52
51 http://www.tsba.or.th/.
52 Unithai Shipyard and Engineering is the largest shipyard in Thailand. The twenty-year-old 
Unithai Shipyard covers 688,000 m2 with two f loating docks and lifting capacity of 30,000 
tonnes. The facility can service vessels up to 292.2 m long with its af loat repair service. Unithai 
Shipyard and Engineering is located within the country’s main international deep sea port of 
Laem Chabang, which is at the heart of Thailand’s chemical and oil tanker, container, dry bulk, 
car, and offshore trade. In addition, as it is within two days’ sailing from Singapore, minimal 
deviation is required for vessels to reach the yard.
Table 22.1  Thai shipbuilding capitalisation, 2010
Capital in THB mn (THB 1 mn=USD $33.500) No.
100  3
20 to 100 24
20 51
total 78
Source: thailand Shipbuilding association archives
Table 22.2  The five biggest shipbuilders in Thailand, 2010
Unithai Dock 1 50,000 dwt
dock 2 180,000 dwt 
asimar dock 1   7,000 dwt
dock 2  20,000 dwt
italthai dock   4,000 dwt
Marsun dock dock   3,000 dwt
Bangkok dock 1   4,000 dwt
dock 2   3,000 dwt
Source: thailand Shipbuilding association archives
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In 1998, only two shipyards were capable of building vessels up to 4,000 
grt and only one shipyard, Unithai was capable of repairing vessels up to 
150,000 grt.53 Table 22.2 shows how Thai shipyards have improved their 
production capacity over the past f ifteen years. However, nationally, only 
twenty-three have a shipyard and project staff. Most of the others are 
master-craftsmen who build small wooden riverine ships, f ishing boats, 
or small f ibreglass boats.
Only two companies enjoy state capital (Italthai and Bangkok Dock), 
while the others all rely on private capital. Most of these have their own 
capital, while a number, such as Asimar and Globeco SpA (Italy), are regis-
tered as joint ventures for the construction of anti-pollution vessels, or the 
Bangkok Dock and British Shipbuilder BVT Surface Fleet for the building 
of offshore patrol vessels (OPV).
In 2012, the Thai shipyard industry contributed 0.1 per cent to the 
country’s annual GDP, a meagre amount if we consider that the manufac-
turing sector contributes 43 per cent, services make up 44.1 per cent, and 
agriculture 13 per cent.54 The local shipbuilding industry posted domestic 
sales of THB 4.24 bn and exports of THB 2.82 bn in 2010 (sales increasing to 
THB 10 bn in 2008, versus THB 6 bn in 2005) while ship repairing generated 
sales of THB 3.65 bn.
Workers in Thailand: theoretical issues
The social history of Thailand has been analysed over the decades from vari-
ous perspectives with scholars generally being divided into two different 
clusters:55 f irst, the more influential liberal-pluralist group, associated with 
the modernisation theory of development. In this case, workers are seen 
as being integrated into the industrial and political structure, thanks to a 
series of grants from the state itself. Secondly, there is the Marxist approach 
which is far less accepted and more radical.
In many cases, studies on industrial relations in Thailand have often 
provided a somewhat distorted version of the country’s social history, 
particularly of the workers and their class struggles. One of the main 
reasons behind this idea is linked to the spread of essentialism, so 
53 Off ice of the Marine Promotion Commission and JICA, Seminar Report on Industrial 
Cooperation Between Japan and Thailand for Development of Shipbuilding Industry, 116.
54 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/f ields/2012.html.
55 Brown, Labour, Politics and the State in Industrializing Thailand. 
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characteristic of the ideology of Eurocentric orientalism. This therefore 
provides a theoretical approach using a comparative perspective on work-
ers in developed countries and those in developing ones. For example, 
in studies prior to the 1960s, the negative attitude of Europeans towards 
Thai workers clearly emerges, with descriptions ranging from “innately 
passive”,56 “never feeling oppressed as a group”,57 “having scarce awareness 
of their class or political group”,58 to showing “no or little interest in 
politics”.59 These descriptions were essentially based on cultural ele-
ments, such as: (a) the wrong idea of the Theravada Buddhist legacy,60 
(b) the sakdina ideology legacy (sakdina ideology produces a superior-
subordinate relationship between the ruling elite and the common 
people, between employers and employees, or (c) the lack of colonisation 
in Thailand, which created a lack of revolutionary consciousness or class 
consciousness.61
Other authors, such as Frederic Deyo, have attributed the lack of class 
unity among Thai workers to how their work is organised into labour-
intensive, export-oriented activities which in his opinion have actually 
hindered the formation of workers’ groups in the struggle against the gov-
ernment. Furthermore, the facts that most of the workers employed in the 
industry are low-skilled and often female, and that the sector itself offers 
little chance of internal mobility or promotion, are, according to Deyo, 
further factors that prevent organisational action.62
In fact, Thai social history has been characterised by intense social 
struggles, which have involved all categories of workers since the early 
part of the twentieth century, at a time when labour unions in the transport 
sector were being formed and strengthened. In fact, in 1919 and later in 1923, 
Bangkok’s tramway and railway workers organised to obtain better working 
conditions and pay. As Andrew Brown has noted, the continuous and often 
successful attempts on the part of the Thai government authorities to block 
and weaken the workers’ movements are actually proof of the great capacity 
of Thai workers to unite and f ight for their rights.63
56 Wilson, “Thailand and Marxism”, 83.
57 Blanchard (ed.), Thailand, Its People, Its Society, Its Culture, 288.
58 Thompson, Labour Problems in Southeast Asia, 243.
59 Fogg, “Labour Organization in Thailand”; Mabry, The Development of Labour Institutions in 
Thailand, 47-48.
60 Lowler and Suttawet, “Globalization and Deregulation in Thailand”, 216.
61 Phiriyarangsan, “The Formation of a Workers’ Strategic Group”, 271.
62 Deyo, Beneath the Miracle, 8.
63 Brown, Labour, Politics and the State in Industrializing Thailand, 9ff.
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From the 1970s on, and especially in the 1980s, when – due to a rapid 
growth in GDP – everybody was talking about the “Asian miracle”, industrial 
relations suffered a further short circuit, similar to the one of 1958.64 In fact, 
the new developmentalist model implemented by the government at the end 
of the 1970s not only did nothing to improve industrial relations, but actually 
caused them to deteriorate. This had nothing to do with the fact that most 
of the workers employed in the new industrial districts were women and 
young men who, as some scholars have suggested, consequently, were not 
particularly interested in taking part in any kind of industrial action.65 The 
shipbuilding sector, as we shall see in the next section, mainly employs 
men, and a certain amount of mobility is possible within the companies.
The attenuation of the conflicts within the shipbuilding companies, in 
my opinion, was a result of the government’s attitude which, on the one 
hand, favoured autonomous paternalistic management methods within 
the individual companies, while, on the other, it systematically tried to 
suppress or hinder any workers’ attempts to create unions.
There are countless examples of this; suff ice to say that the Thai govern-
ment has not ratif ied the most important international conventions for the 
protection of workers’ rights.66 As Bruno Jetin has observed, in the long and 
medium term, it can be shown that the high rate of prof it during the boom 
years was not based on a continuous process of modernisation, but rather 
on a redistribution of income in favour of capital.67
Workers in Thailand shipyards
In 2010, direct workers in the sector numbered 8,700, while 163,530 indirect 
workers were employed.68 The largest shipyards employ a few hundred 
workers (in 2010, the Italthai shipyards counted around 600 workers plus 550 
sub-contractors; the Asimar shipyards, 305 workers plus 120 sub-contractors; 
64 In 1958, Sarit Thannarat’s coup, for example, abolished the 1956 Labour Act, and all unions 
were banned under the claim that they were obstacles to economic development and gateways 
for communism in Thailand: Wehmhörner, “Trade Unionism in Thailand”, 481. 
65 On this topic, see Deyo’s analysis in Beneath the Miracle.
66 Thailand has never ratif ied the following conventions: Freedom of Association and Pro-
tection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87); Right to Organise and Collective 
Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98); Workers’ Representatives Convention, 1971 (No. 135); 
Labour Relations (Public Service) Convention, 1978 (No. 151).
67 Jetin, “Distribution of Income, Labour Productivity and Competitiveness”.
68 ISMED (Institute for Small and Medium Enterprises Development) report at http://www.
ismed.or.th/.
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the Marsun shipyards, 180 workers, no sub-contractors), while most ship-
yards have around 15- 20 workers. These f igures are obviously very low 
when compared to the huge manufacturing companies which often have 
a workforce of 7,000-8,000 workers.
In the three shipyards considered herein, the workers are predominantly 
male (89 per cent male; 11 per cent female; in particular, Italthai 520 men 
and 80 women; Asimar 289 and 16; Marsun 160 and 20). Around 80 per cent 
of females are employed in administration. There are a few exceptions, such 
as in the Marsun shipyards, where a few more women actually work in the 
shipyard itself, as they specialise in the treatment of f ibreglass.
The average age of the workers in these three shipyards is 34, and there 
are no minors under 18 years of age. The following tables show the data 
regarding the ages of the workforce in the Asimar shipyard:
As regards employment contracts, 95 per cent of the workers in these 
three shipyards have a permanent contract, while 5 per cent are on a 
temporary contract. Immigrant workers usually receive apprenticeships 
as opposed to permanent contracts.
Wages at the Asimar shipyards
The average net income in 2012, excluding bonuses, in a shipyard like Asimar 
is shown in Table 22.4.
The clear difference between the workers’ pay and a project manager’s 
salary is easily seen in Table 22.4. This is because Thailand does not have 
enough skilled workers in this sector, both due to the limits of university 
education and also because the other industries, such as the multi-nationally 
run textile and garment manufacturers, are able to offer better pay and 
Table 22.3  Age range of workers in ASIMAR Shipyard
Age Number
over 60    2
49-59   39
39-49   67
29-39 105
19-29  91
up to 19   1
total 305
Source: thailand Shipbuilding association archives
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benefits to skilled workers.69 For example, recently graduated engineers 
prefer to try and get work with one of the Japanese or Korean multi-national 
companies, since a part of their initial training will most likely be carried 
out in Japan or South Korea.
As regards workers’ pay, it is interesting to note that the shipbuilding 
industry actually offers a slightly higher amount than the minimum wage, 
which rose to THB 300 on 1 January 2013; the minimum wage had previously 
been THB 165.
Workers usually work 8 hours a day, with an hour-long lunch break, from 
Monday to Saturday, except at periods of intense labour when they also have 
to work on Sundays. Most of the employees in this sector generally benefit 
from 10 days’ holiday, as well as the thirteen national holidays (religious 
festivals, the king’s and queen’s birthdays, historical anniversaries). How-
ever, each company usually stipulates bonuses, holidays, maternity leave, 
or priesthood leave,70 etc., with the individual workers from year to year.
It is obvious that the small size of the shipyards has led the employers to 
adopt a paternalistic attitude, which is often hidden or justified by Buddhist-
traditional practices. Off icial trade unions are completely missing from 
the sector, and as I was told by Kan Matsuzaki, Asia Pacif ic’s shipbuilding 
69 In 1993, the problem of the lack of qualif ied manpower caused such great problems for Thai 
shipyards that they had to cancel important orders: “Troubled Thai Shipyard Moves to Lower 
Costs”.
70 It is worth noting that in Thailand employees’ religions are off icially respected; the Labour 
Protection Act allows male civil servants to take leave to become monks. There are no off icial 
limits to the period of leave, so supervisors make this decision (Sections 29 and 30, Off ice of 
the Prime Minister’s Regulation on Civil Servant Leave, BE 2555 (2012)). This is not restricted 
to government employees. Since 2007 the act has allowed female employees leave to practise 
dhamma for 1-3 months (Sections 1 and 2, National Buddhism Off ice’s Guideline on Female 
Employees Taking Leave to Profess Dhamma, BE 2550 (2007)). Male and female Muslim civil 
servants may take leave only for the hajj.
Table 22.4  ASIMAR net salaries 2012
Positions Net salary (USD)
project manager 2,600 per month
assistant project manager 975.29 per month
engineers 812.74 per month
Supervisors 812.74 per month
Foremen 58.52 per month
Workers 16.25 per day
Source: thailand Shipbuilding association archives
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director of the IMF (International Metal Workers’ Federations, the largest 
metalworkers’ union in the world), “there are no trades union representa-
tives in the shipbuilding sector in Thailand, because the sector is so small, 
and any matters are dealt with autonomously within each shipyard”.71 In 
fact, several shipyard managers also told us that, until the period prior to 
the 1997-2000 crisis, trade unions used to exist and were indeed extremely 
active, with at least 50 per cent of the workers being unionised.72 These 
managers stated that the economic crisis was an extremely critical period, 
since more than half of the employees in the sector lost their jobs, but it was 
also a moment when the unions were weakened.73 In fact, in the 2000s, the 
percentage of unionised workers in the whole of Thailand is around 2-2.5 
per cent74 and, based on the workers’ and managers’ declarations, there are 
no workers in the shipbuilding sector who are aff iliated to a trade union.75
The shipyard managers are clearly delighted with the fact that there 
have been no strikes or protests, nor any signs of workers’ unrest in their 
companies. In their opinion, the reasons behind this apparently peaceful 
management of relations can be traced back to the “family-run” shipyards 
and how the workers are treated “as members of the same family”. They are 
always saying “we are all in the same boat”.
This paternalistic attitude is reinforced every day, both during the 
various phases of the employee’s working life and also outside work. It 
clearly emerges in working life from the very moment work begins. In fact, 
work in all shipyards begins with group prayers with Buddhist monks who 
participate at these functions. Indeed, traditionally, Theravada Buddhism 
obliges believers to support these monk beggars with gifts of food or money. 
After prayers, before work starts, every shipyard holds a national assembly. 
In some, for example, there is a f lag-raising ceremony with the singing of 
the national anthem, while in others, they sing and dance the companies’ 
mottoes.76 Although these assemblies are an excellent way of uniting the 
71 Interview with Ken Matsuzaki, 7 July 2011.
72 Interview with managers N. 1 and N. 2, both of whom are from the same shipyard, 4 July 
2011. 
73 Interview with managers N. 1 and N. 2, both of whom are from the same shipyard, 4 July 
2011.
74 “Thailand Risk: Labour Market Risk”, Economist Intelligence Unit – Risk Brief ing, 9 October 
2013.
75 Interviews with Marsun and Italthai workers, 22 March 2010; Mrs Warawan Nganthavee, 
4 July 2011; Mr Wirat Chanasit, 10 July 2011; Mr Sompope Chokchaiyakool, 11 July 2011.
76 For example, every morning in the Asimar shipyard, the workers gather together in the 
shipyard’s largest square, standing in front of the director who conducts the assembly. Everyone 
stands more or less in a position that demonstrates the hierarchy between colleagues and the 
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group, many workers have claimed that they can never show any discontent 
or raise specif ic problems. In fact, whenever workers wish to express criti-
cism or dissatisfaction, or even when they want to request something from 
the company, they have to follow a series of unwritten rules. First of all, 
from time to time, groups of seven to ten workers, depending on their role 
and level of expertise, have to elect a leader to present their requests to their 
superiors. Only the latter can take the matter to the management, and only 
when they are unable to solve the problem themselves.
It is worth pointing out that national legislation does not take into ac-
count any official space or time for workers to hold assemblies, meaning that 
most issues are either discussed in the shipyard during breaks or outside 
the shipyard.
Traditionally, every shipyard can count on a core group (around 60 per 
cent of the workforce), made up of the most skilled workers, who manage 
the work handled by the teams of sub-contractors or temporary workers.77
As regards activities outside work, this paternalistic attitude is clearly 
seen on every occasion in which the company takes part in the family 
life of the workers. The company proposes all kinds of different activities, 
such as recreational, cultural, welfare, religious, propaganda ones, etc. For 
example, workers look forward to taking part in the periodic public prize-
giving ceremonies, when workers’ children are awarded scholarships. Then, 
additional very popular and much-awaited occasions are the gatherings on 
public holidays, when the workers’ families are offered gifts. Generally, most 
of the shipyards take pride in offering cultural or recreational activities, 
such as the organisation of group holidays and sporting events, or those to 
support and show solidarity with the religious communities or the poor, 
etc. These are usually activities aiming to keep employees happy and create 
sector to which they belong. The managers and administrative staff stand in the centre, general 
operators on one side, and the squad leaders and specialised workers on the other. The oldest 
normally stand in the front lines, while the others gradually distribute themselves in the lines 
behind. During the assembly, the managers usually inform the workers of the work to be done 
and work schedules, as well as about the after-work activities sponsored by the f irm, such as 
sport, cultural activities, etc. After this, in theory, every worker should be able to express any 
eventual opinions, criticisms, or protests regarding work or working conditions, but nobody 
usually takes the f loor. The last section is dedicated to the most important motivational part 
of the assembly in which all the workers dance or sing together the company’s four mottoes. A 
different body movement is linked to each motto. Asiamarine’s mottoes are: (1) competence and 
planning; (2) continuous improvement; (3) customer forecast; (4) team working. The working 
day starts when the assembly f inishes. 
77 Interviews with twelve skilled workers and six general workers (of whom three are Cam-
bodian) from the three shipyards analysed here. 
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emotional ties with the company and the territory. It is also worth noting 
that the largest shipbuilding companies are listed on the stock exchange, 
and that it is in their interest to advertise what they offer outside working 
hours to send a positive image of the shipyard to stockholders. In these cases, 
for example, local and national media often report news of the charitable 
work that the managers carry out in the community on religious holidays 
(for example, donating money for the building of or maintenance work on a 
pagoda, or donating foodstuffs to the people hit by the floods in 2011, etc.).
Most of the disputes within the companies are related to bonus negotia-
tion, namely, those non-contractual payments in money and/or in leave, 
which are normally renegotiated on a yearly basis or periodically, between 
the company and groups of workers on the basis of production trends. 
The structure of the Thai shipyards with their characteristic signif icant 
horizontal specialisation and low vertical specialisation is clearly mirrored 
in this particular period, since bonuses increase along with one’s hierarchi-
cal role in the shipyard, and leaders gain more importance when they are 
able to negotiate more substantial bonuses. In fact, the leaders are in charge 
of daily work assignment, and they are also the ones who authorise leave 
and days off.
In Asimar (for sub-contractors) the average work ratio of the white- to 
blue-collar workers is about 1:10, as shown in Table 22.5.
The sub-contractors
The family size of the shipyards, together with the massive use of sub-
contractors, is one of the factors that allow the companies to enjoy trouble-
free industrial relations. The situation is maintained by the managers who 
systematically make use of sub-contractors, whose number has dramatically 
Table 22.5  Ratio of white-collar to blue-collar workers
Positions Average Ratio
project manager   3
average 1:10





Source: thailand Shipbuilding association archives
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increased compared to the years prior to the 1997-2000 crisis. In this period, 
companies used to sub-contract a minimal percentage of work, around 
20-30 per cent, compared to today’s f igure of around 80 per cent.
Table 22.6 shows data from the Asimar company as a prime example of 
this policy.
In recent years, this incredible rise in the sub-contracting of work has 
caused a clear distinction between internal and external workers, and led 
to a vast disparity in both the treatment of workers and working conditions. 
In fact, in most cases, external workers do not benef it from any of the 
contractual guarantees or bonuses received by the internal employees. For 
example, they often do not receive the minimum wage and are not insured 
in case of accidents. More often than not they are hired on a daily basis or 
for piecework, and cannot even take any kind of leave. If a woman worker 
is pregnant, she does not get any compensation. This is not only a way to 
reduce labour costs, but also a way to stop workers from organising a trade 
union to act against the company.
Regular employees are aware of the different treatment and privileges 
they receive compared to the sub-contractors or temporary workers but, 
however much they regret this situation, they are also quick to say that it 
is still better than in many other manufacturing industries. In the other 
sectors, where there are thousands of workers, employees are often sacked 
as soon as production drops, unlike the workforce in the shipyards which 
is usually more stable. These facts indicate that the workers are aware of 
the general progressive situation of employment insecurity in Thailand, 
even though they do not engage in any kind of collective action, such as 
creating spaces where they can discuss and share ideas with workers from 
their own and other industries. On the other hand, the sub-contractors 
Table 22.6  ASIMAR salaried and sub-contracting personnel
Job categories Percentage
ASIMAR Sub-contractors
piping 10  90
Steel structure 10  90
Sand blasting  0 100
painting 80  20
Built-in furniture  0 100
air-conditioning  0 100
electrical system 50  50
Source: thailand Shipbuilding association archives
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have identif ied a number of issues with their working conditions, especially 
in terms of wage differences, compared to regular workers, as well as the 
constant need to move from one shipyard to another, and to follow different 
rules and procedures. Furthermore, they have complained about the lack of 
continuity from one job to another or, by contrast, the excessive concentra-
tion of working hours at certain periods that require a greater commitment. 
Even in this case, there is no sharing or discussions with other workers.
The working conditions in most of the shipyards are generally good. All 
the shipyards have adequate space for the workers, a canteen area, locker 
rooms, and bathrooms. Worker safety is a top priority, both in terms of 
on-site training from experts and the personal protective devices used by 
the workers themselves.
The depoliticisation of workers and perception of their work
Most of the workers interviewed seemed to have little interest in national 
political issues. The majority of interviews took place in 2011, just over a year 
after the terrible spring of 2010, and in the days following the general elec-
tion to appoint members of the National Assembly. The two main opposing 
parties in these elections were the Pheu Thai Party (PTP), also known as the 
red-shirt movement, founded by the tycoon and ex-prime minster Taksin 
Shinawatra, and the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), also known 
as the yellow-shirts. Since the elections had just happened, and were fresh 
in the workers’ minds, it was far easier to approach the matter, albeit only 
superf icially, due to both the workers’ diff idence, as well as their lack of 
knowledge or interest in politics. It is worth pointing out that the interviews 
were not intended to be a structured survey on each person’s political views, 
but were rather a more general attempt to gauge their level of interest. As 
a consequence, the results presented here have only an indicative value.
The managers and skilled workers clearly expressed their preference for 
the PAD, showing mistrust in the PTP’s proposals, which they considered 
populist and demagogic. In contrast, the unskilled workers showed a prefer-
ence for the proposals of the PTP, especially those related to the provision of 
health care for everybody at a cost of THB 30 (around USD $1 a year). In fact, 
it is worth mentioning that health care in Thailand is private, meaning that 
the majority of the population cannot afford the most expensive treatment, 
unless they have private insurance to cover expenses.
Whatever the case, all the interviewees showed a far greater interest in 
the topic of work in the shipyards than in politics. In fact, direct employees 
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feel far more privileged compared to the other paid workers in the industry, 
because shipyard labour offers the chance to earn bigger salaries and more 
bonuses, and, especially, to be able to live in the suburbs of a huge city like 
Bangkok. Indeed, most of the workers own a home and a car or motorbike, 
and most families have two or more wage-earners, since both parents and 
children work. All the workers were obviously pleased that their children 
could benefit from higher education, even though very few actually had a 
child at university. It is worth pointing out that many workers originally 
came from the countryside, and had moved to the metropolitan area in 
the 1980s and 1990s. They consider their jobs to be stable, in the sense that 
most workers intend to remain in the shipyard until they retire. The reasons 
behind this viewpoint are based on their confidence in Thailand’s economic 
expansion in general, and in that of the shipbuilding sector in particular 
due to its gradual growth over the past few years.
However, all the workers and managers are well aware that the massive 
use of sub-contractors is a threat to work stability. For this reason, the 
perception of work stability is radically different for direct and indirect 
workers. There do not appear to be any conflicts between the two groups 
of workers, just as there are no attempts at dialogue to try and unite and 
better their situation.
The immigrant “problem”
All Thai shipyards employ a number of immigrant workers who mainly 
come from Cambodia, Laos, and Burma. In the three shipyards analysed 
here (Asimar, Unithai, and Marsun) we f ind that around 10 per cent are 
immigrant workers (80 per cent Cambodian, 15 per cent Burmese, 5 per 
cent Laotian), who are all male.
In most cases they are illegal immigrants, in other words, they do not 
possess regular work permits. Workers who are directly employed by the 
shipyards obviously benefit from far better contractual conditions than sub-
contracted workers, as regards wages, bonuses, and contract length.78 Most of 
the immigrants are unskilled workers who either do the most menial jobs 
(e.g., cleaning) or the toughest ones (welding). The immigrants are often taken 
on as apprentices on a year-long contract, which gives companies a series of 
tax breaks. However, at the end of this contract, workers are normally offered 
the same kind of contract again without being given any choice in the matter.
78 Interviews with Cambodian immigrant workers on 5 July 2011 and with shipyard managers. 
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Indeed, immigrant workers actually act as a kind of buffer as they are 
usually the f irst to be f ired at periods when there is less work. They are 
mainly men between the ages of 18 and 30 who live in shared houses in 
groups of ten to twelve people, so as to cover the cost of the rent, allowing 
them to send most of their wages back to their families in their own country. 
According to government f igures, the number of migrants working legally 
in Thailand stood at around 650,000 in late 2010. However, the government 
also estimated that 1-1.5 million more were living and working illegally at 
that time, whereas other sources put that number as high as 3 million. Thai 
researchers in mid-2008 estimated that the Thai economy needs about 1 
million foreign workers, though the economic downturn has hit migrant 
workers especially hard.79
Sawit Keawan, who heads the State Enterprise Workers Relations 
Confederation (SERC), petitioned the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) in Geneva over the issue, claiming that Thailand “systematically 
[violates] international law by failing to protect rights of migrant workers 
from Myanmar [Burma]”. One such discriminatory practice alleged by the 
SERC, which is made up of forty-three major Thai trade unions, is the refusal 
of the Thai state to allow migrants to access the Workmen’s Compensation 
Fund, which is the usual method of compensating those injured in the 
workplace.80
Conclusion
As a conclusion to the present analysis, two points can be made. The f irst is 
that, as a rule, in newly industrialising countries shipbuilding has often been 
a primary source of exporting potential, and therefore of foreign-currency 
79 “Human Resources: Employment of Foreigners”.
80 “Burma’s Unions Criticise Thailand over the Rights of Migrant Workers”.
Table 22.7  Occupational structure in ASIMAR
Type of worker Speciality Males Females
Skilled workers
Welder 100%   0% 
Fabrication workers 100%   0% 
non-skilled workers
cleaning  20%  80% 
Scaffolding   0% 100% 
Source: thailand Shipbuilding association archives
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accumulation. However, in order to reach these objectives and to build ships 
to suff icient scale, a great deal of initial and subsequent working capital is 
needed either from private, or in most cases, from state sources. In theory, 
technology and suff icient know-how can, to a large extent, be bought in or 
acquired, and labour, which in an Asia country is usually plentiful, can be 
trained to attain the desired objectives. In the Thai case, however, the state 
has made a different choice, concentrating its resources on other economic 
activities, and causing the de facto de-development of what used to be a 
main and Asia-wide competitive industry.
The second point to be made concerns the labour situation in the reduced 
shipbuilding industry that is presently active in Thailand. Most of the 
country’s shipyards, big or small, have deliberately chosen to organise their 
work on a family scale, adopting a paternalistic attitude, whose off icially 
declared aim is to improve direct training, safety, and, ultimately, worker 
productivity. Apart from these openly declared purposes, these dynamics 
clearly often have another effect, namely, the depoliticisation of workers 
through the constant erosion of the rights of their organisations, which 
simultaneously prevents any of the evident underlying labour conflicts 
from rising to the surface.
23 The lower labour market and the 
development of the post-war Japanese 
shipbuilding industry
Takeshi Haraguchi and Kazuya Sakurada
Introduction
Japan’s shipbuilding industry experienced a dramatic surge of growth 
from the post-1954 “f irst export-ship boom”, and by 1956 it had surpassed 
Britain to become the top-ranked shipbuilding country in the world – a 
position it would retain for the rest of the century.1 Shipbuilding was seen 
as a fundamental industry for Japan’s pursuit of high economic growth. 
Thereafter until the mid-1970s, the Japanese shipbuilding industry contin-
ued to expand its share of the world market, dominating over 50 per cent of 
world shipbuilding production. However, the tendency to overaccumulation 
of market share progressively increased but was put under considerable 
pressure from the general slump in demand resulting from global oil price 
crisis of 1973 and 1974. In this context, rationalisation and reorientation of its 
productive facilities became a critical mission for the Japanese shipbuilding 
industry in the subsequent decades.2
The aim of this chapter is to clarify particular characteristics of the 
Japanese shipbuilding industry, in light of its experience of dramatic expan-
sion and decline. Specif ically, we focus on two areas: f irst, the 1970s, and 
secondly on the labour market; particularly the lower labour market.3 The 
rationale for this is that the basis of shipbuilding expansion in Japan was 
formed on sub-contract labour, and in the mid- to late 1970s these labourers 
1 This alarmed British shipbuilders greatly – so much so that the president of the industry’s 
trade association, Sir James McNeil, stated, “for the f irst time in peace-time history, the United 
Kingdom had had to take second place to a foreign power, viz., Japan [and that] all-time record 
launchings were established by Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and Norway”. In McNeil’s view 
the f igures indicated “a most def inite comparative trend”. See Johnman and Murphy, British 
Shipbuilding and the State Since 1918, 112.
2 For the industry generally, see Chida and Davies, The Japanese Shipping and Shipbuilding 
Industries. 
3 In this chapter, “lower labour market” is def ined as the labour market in which hiring is 
precarious and wages are low; it is divided from the directly hired full-time labour market. Such 
hiring includes temporary labour, contract labour, and day labour. 
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were the f irst to be sacrif iced in the restructuring of the shipbuilding indus-
try. Moreover, little attention has been paid to the supply of sub-contract 
labourers in the shipbuilding industry and its relation to Japan’s lower 
labour market generally.
In terms of structure, this chapter sets out how the production system of 
the post-1945 Japanese shipbuilding industry was formed and how it shifted, 
examining aspects of national policy, corporate systems, and technological 
innovation. Having clarif ied the status of sub-contract labourers character-
istic of the Japanese shipbuilding industry, focusing on the 1970s, we then 
discuss how shipbuilding labourers engaged in resistance, and what kind 
of opposing strategies were taken by companies in response to this. Finally, 
we consider Osaka’s riverside shipbuilding industry as a case study, and 
discuss specif ically how the capital-labour conflict played out. Further, by 
focusing on Kamagasaki, a location well known as a lower labour market 
in Japan, we clarify what relations exist between the shipbuilding industry 
and the lower labour market.
Formation and shifts of the production system in the post-1945 
Japanese shipbuilding industry
Historically, up to and through the Edo period, the Japanese shipbuild-
ing industry was limited to the construction of wooden ships for coastal 
navigation. With the Meiji Restoration, however, Japan’s social and economic 
modernisation moved at a rapid pace, but this was a process imposed from 
above by the government. Regarding shipbuilding, through government 
policy, the technological know-how and management methods for building 
steel ships were imported from overseas. In this, the navy yards of Yokosuka, 
Kure, Sasebo, and Maizuru played a leadership role. Moreover, the major 
shipbuilding centres of Nagasaki, Ishikawajima in Tokyo, and Kobe were 
opened up when government shipbuilding sites were sold off to the private 
sector (Figure 23.1). The development of Japan’s shipbuilding industry, against 
this historical background, was from 1945 onwards consistently dominated 
by the intervention of the government where a group of companies founded 
as the zaibatsu of the Meiji period continued to rule the industry from the 
top down.4 In the post-1945 shipbuilding industry, the “big seven” (Mitsubishi 
4 In comparison, small and medium-sized shipbuilding companies exist all over the country 
with a focus in west Japan, but they are particularly concentrated around the Seto Inland Sea. 
This area was dominated by pirates during the Middle Ages, with shipyards on each island. The 
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Heavy Industries, Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries, Kawasaki Heavy 
Industries, Mitsui Engineering and Shipbuilding, Hitachi Zosen, Nippon 
Kokan KK, and Sumitomo Heavy Industries) formed the core. These com-
panies all dated back to the early Meiji period; thus, the path taken by the 
shipbuilding technology of the Middle Ages was passed down for many years, becoming the 
basis of the Seto Inland Sea area small and medium-sized shipbuilding companies. See Ogawa, 
“Zosen tosan chitai/Shikoku wo iku”. 
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Japanese shipbuilding industry was, from the viewpoint of national policy 
and corporate systems, consistent in nature from the pre-war period.
However, in other aspects the difference from the pre-war era to the 
post-war one was signif icant. The point of change was in the process of 
government rebuilding through the period of American occupation of 
defeated Japan from the end of the Second World War through 1952. Through 
this process, Japan’s society and economy were strongly influenced by the 
United States, the latter mainly from the aspect of technological innova-
tion. Japan’s post-war shipbuilding industry through continuity of national 
policy, corporate systems, and technology transfer created the conditions 
for explosive development. The following three chronological divisions will 
look in detail at the development of the shipbuilding industry in each period.
1945 through the 1950s
Japan’s ship construction can be generally divided into “planned shipbuild-
ing” and “self-funded shipbuilding”.5 Of these, it was planned shipbuilding 
that formed the basis of the post-1945 shipbuilding industry. Planned 
shipbuilding meant that government determined the quantity of ships built, 
and the funding plan for every f iscal year. Planned shipbuilding began in 
1942, the year when, as the Pacif ic War broke out, increased production of 
ships and aircraft carriers became an urgent national requirement. After the 
war was lost in 1945, Allied GHQ (General Headquarters) policies focused on 
Japan’s demilitarisation, and planned shipbuilding was abolished. However, 
as the Cold War with the Soviet Union surfaced and the situation in China 
worsened, GHQ’s policies took a turn in the opposite direction: in order to 
set Japan up as a bulwark of anti-communism. Along with advancing remili-
tarisation, they also worked towards economic independence. Against the 
background of this American stance, planned shipbuilding was restarted in 
1947. When the Korean War broke out in 1950, Japan’s geo-political impor-
tance increased further. Made independent from Allied GHQ occupation 
by the 1952 Treaty of San Francisco, the Japanese government developed 
a diverse policy of ship protectionism and encouragement to expansion 
centring on planned shipbuilding. In particular, from 1954 onwards a new 
5 Self-funded ships built with commercial banks’ funding were, compared to planned con-
struction ships built with government funding, disadvantaged regarding rates of interest, etc. 
Planned shipbuilding was funded from 1947 by the Reconstruction Finance Fund and later, in 
the mid-1950s, by the Japan Development Bank. See, for example, Ten Year History of the Japan 
Development Bank. See also Kohama, Industrial Development in Postwar Japan, 132-135.
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interest support system6 was put into place regarding planned shipbuilding 
investment, and extremely advantageous conditions came to prevail for 
cost reductions in the shipbuilding industry.7 Earlier, in 1952, the Shipping 
and Shipbuilding Rationalization Council (SSRC) was established, and 
went on to play a decisive role in the oversight and management of Japan’s 
shipbuilding industry.
In addition to the policy structure above, an important change during 
this period was in technology transfer. The pre-war Japanese shipbuilding 
industry had relied on British technology. In contrast, post-war Japan was 
placed in an economic relationship with the United States. Within these 
relations, welding block-construction technology was rapidly introduced 
from the USA. Specifically, in 1951 the American shipowner, Daniel Ludwig’s 
National Bulk Carriers (NBC), leased a large area of the Kure shipyard, carry-
ing out bulk ship construction using American welding methods there until 
1962 (Figure 23.2).8 As the Japanese government had made the availability of 
American shipbuilding technology a condition for these shipbuilding facili-
ties, NBC’s techniques spread throughout each company in the shipbuilding 
industry.9 Through the spread of this technology, the construction period for 
steel ships was reduced to a third of what it had been before the war.10 In this 
way, by the early 1950s, large ships could be constructed to short deadlines, 
and at low relative cost. At the same time, planned shipbuilding, which had 
provided a foothold and then impetus for the revitalisation of shipbuilding 
after 1945, showed a sharp reduction from that year, when “self-funded 
construction” came to expand to a scope equivalent to planned shipbuild-
ing. Furthermore, as the f irst export-ship boom arrived in 1955, Japan’s 
shipbuilding industry used its short turnaround times as an advantage to 
rapidly increase its share of the world market.
1960s through mid-1970s
The Japanese shipbuilding industry, through its second (1962-1964) and 
third (1965-1970) export-ship booms, accepted an unprecedented quantity of 
6 This was intended to encourage investment by commercial banks in the gap between 
government investment interest and commercial interest, through government support of 
commercial banks. 
7 Shipbuilders’ Association of Japan, Nihon zosen kogyokai 30-nenshi, 105.
8 For this, see Davies, “The Role of National Bulk Carriers in the Advance of Shipbuilding 
Technology in Post-War Japan”. NBC employed around 2,000 workers.
9 Mizota, Zosen jukikai sangyo no kigyo system, 67-75.
10 Shipbuilders’ Association of Japan, Nihon zosen kogyokai 30-nenshi, 32. 
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orders for ships for export, and accordingly hugely increased its productive 
capacity (Figure 23.2). During this period, the structure and quality of the 
post-war shipbuilding industry solidif ied, and we now consider this from 
various aspects.
First, national policy: planned shipbuilding had already taken shape 
by the 1950s, and national support for the shipbuilding industry grew 
stronger in the 1960s. The “income-doubling plan” of 1960 involved not 
only large-scale intervention by the government in various industries, 
but also intervention into national life as a whole, as the policy which 
triggered the period of so-called high economic growth. The shipbuild-
ing industry, thanks to its position as one of the major industries in this 
economic plan, received increased government funding, and with national 
backing developed even more strongly its plan for expanding construction 
of ocean-going ships. Under this policy, planned shipbuilding continued 
to revise its highest post-war output levels. The focus within this policy 
on giving precedence to the improvement of international revenues, and 




























































Source: Shipbuilders’ association of Japan, Nihon zosen kogyokai 30-nenshi
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the expansion of possession of foreign currency, increased orders and 
construction for export ships.11
Secondly, one notable characteristic of this period of shipbuilding was 
large-scale investment in facilities, plant, and equipment. In particular, 
during the third export-ship boom which began in 1965, not only did export-
ship orders expand to unprecedented levels, the worldwide expansion 
of petroleum shipping led to the scale of oil tankers suddenly becoming 
super-sized (over 250,000 dwt) to reap economies of scale. Under these 
conditions, the Shipping and Shipbuilding Rationalization Council took the 
11 Ibid., 49. 











1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Building berth Building dock
Hauling facilities Hull parts assembly facilities
Million yen
Year
notes: 1965: 28 factories; 1967-68: 29 factories; 1969-70: 30 factories; 1971: 33 factories; 1972: 36 
factories; 1973-76: 37 factories 
Source: Shipbuilders’ association of Japan, Nihon zosen kogyokai 30-nenshi
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position that super-sized facilities were needed. With this kind of backing 
from the government, shipbuilders, in particular large corporations, carried 
out concentrated construction of super-sized shipyards from 1966 through 
1968. Moreover, as the 1970s began, the competition over facility expansion 
and new construction became ever f iercer, reaching its peak (Figure 23.3). 
In the period from 1972 through 1973, medium-sized shipbuilders joined 
the large corporations in expanding their facilities.12 In this way Japan’s 
12 This situation produced the following points as context. First, in the world context, the 
economy thrived over these two years, and a rush of orders to Japanese companies took place. 
Secondly, domestically, positive f inance based on the 1972 governmental plan of “remodeling 
the Japanese archipelago” heated up the domestic economy (ibid., 66-67). 
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shipbuilding capacity reached 19 mn dwt in total, a scale which approached 
50 per cent of world shipbuilding capacity.13
Third, at this time shipbuilding companies’ mergers and reorganisations 
were progressing (Figure 23.4). In 1960, Ishikawajima Heavy Industries 
and Harima Shipbuilding merged to launch Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy 
Industries (IHI), and in 1963-1964 New Mitsubishi Industries, Mitsubishi 
Shipbuilding, and Mitsubishi Japan Heavy Industries – once a single 
corporation which had been split in three by the post-war GHQ zaibatsu 
dissolution orders – merged to restart Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI). 
Thus the “big seven” restored in the 1960s made a mutual industry alliance 
pact; and small and medium-sized shipbuilding corporations also followed 
governmental industry reorganisational policy and merged. Through this 
process, a structure emerged in which the big seven took overwhelming 
precedence over the small and medium-sized shipbuilders.
Finally, at this time the large corporations were moving into overseas 
expansion. IHI was the f irst to move, establishing Ishikawajima do Brasil 
Estaleiros (Ishibras) in Brazil in 1959, and Jurong Shipyard in Singapore 
in 1963.14 From 1965 on, the pressures of labour shortages, diff iculties in 
f inding new locations, and rising construction costs for shipyards caused 
other shipbuilders to look to overseas expansion. From the late 1960s on in 
particular they advanced overseas in diverse forms, including technological 
support and direct investment (Table 23.1).
The mid-1970s on
Competition over facilities expansion and new construction in the Japanese 
shipbuilding industry took place on a dramatic scale from the late 1960s 
to the early 1970s, leading to an unheard-of new record for ships laid down 
in 1974. This kind of rapid increase in construction capability led to a pro-
gressive increase in the crisis of overaccumulation. In the mid-1970s, this 
contradiction burst to the surface, and building performance began to slow 
sharply (Figure 23.5). At the height of the industry facilities’ expansion in 
1973, there were already concerns regarding the worldwide oversupply of 
tankers, and as early as 1974 there was a sharp decrease in tanker export 
contracts post-OPEC. After this year, the Japan shipbuilding industry’s 
construction in hand continued to decrease, and contracts were cancelled 
one after the other. Planned shipbuilding, the basis of the post-war Japan’s 
13 Ibid., 66.
14 For this period, see Sato, “Zosen dokusen no saihen, kaigai shinshutsu, gunjika no jittai”.
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shipbuilding industry, also showed a sharp gap between plans and actual 
construction in 1975, for the f irst time after the war, and this situation 
continued through the 1970s. Here, the policy of large-scale shipbuilding 
through planned shipbuilding, which had been carried out consistently 
since the war, f inally gave way.15
In addition, the overwhelming domination of world market share by 
the Japanese shipbuilding industry could not but cause diff iculties with 
other countries, in particular the West European shipbuilding countries. 
These diff iculties came to the surface from the late 1960s through the 1970s, 
and developed into a clear opposition in 1975. At the shipbuilding session 
of the OECD of that year, Japan’s expansion and low-priced orders were 
sharply criticised by West European countries in particular. Faced with 
this kind of global pressure and domestic economic realities, the SSRC, 
15 Shipbuilders’ Association of Japan, Nihon zosen kogyokai 30-nenshi, 75. Another pillar of 
national policy, ship construction investment interest support, was wound up in the mid-1970s. 
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which until then had sung the praises of intensive increases of shipbuilding 
capacity, dramatically changed its mind in 1976, and proposed a production-
capacity reduction policy. When the Japanese government recognised the 
shipbuilding industry as a “structurally depressed industry” in 1978, in July 
of that year, the SSRC produced a policy of reducing construction capacity 
by an average of 35 per cent. Based on this policy, government leadership 
forced reductions of 40 per cent by the big seven, 30 per cent by seventeen 
mid-sized companies, and 27 per cent by sixteen medium-sized and small 
companies (Figure 23.6).
What should be emphasised in the process described above is that, f irst, 
the power relations between the big seven and the other medium-sized and 
smaller companies became even more imbalanced. During the recession, the 
large companies, in order to make up for the reduction in orders of oil tankers 
and other large ships, advanced into the construction of smaller cargo ships, 
which had until then been the speciality of smaller companies. Because of 
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this, the management crises of the small and medium-sized companies 
worsened further, and from 1977 on they began to collapse one after the 
other. Furthermore, for non-diversif ied small and medium-sized shipbuild-
ers with only one or two docks, the reduction in production capacity simply 
meant bankruptcy on the spot. In this economic climate, medium- and 
mid- to small-sized companies had no option but to form groups to manage 
the reductions. On the other hand, the big seven, more diversif ied and with 
huge capital reserves, through a shift to production to the heavy (land-
based) machines division including military industries and nuclear power 
industries, were able to maintain and expand their prof its. As the 1980s 
began, the situation of the shipbuilding industry recovered; however, in this 
period, shipbuilding companies were reduced to the two extremes of the 
big seven and the other groups. The big seven not only succeeded through 
the process described above in reducing overcapacity in the shipbuilding 
division, but by the 1980s had established a solid position as general heavy 
machine companies. Second, the production-capacity reductions of the 1970s 
pushed through not only facility reductions but also large-scale reductions 
in labour. In this period, both large and small to mid-sized companies saw 
shipbuilding labourers being laid off in large numbers.
Labour relations and the labour movement
From the mid-1970s onwards there was a large-scale reduction in the ship-
building labour force. This was a political process in which the characteristic 
relations of capital and labour in Japan’s shipbuilding industry were clearly 
on display. We clarify this process by asking two questions. First, when 
carrying out the process of labour-force reductions from the mid-1970s 
on, how did capital use the structure of the shipbuilding labour market, 
composed of full-time labourers and sub-contract labourers? Secondly, 
faced with spreading resistance against labour-force reductions from the 
labour movement, what opposing strategies did capital take?
The composition of the labour force and sub-contract labourers
In the shipbuilding industry, which has always been prone to periodic 
slumps in demand, there was a tendency to keep regular labour to the 
minimum necessary, and to compensate for this with short-term hired 
labour for temporary hiring needs. The specif ic practice of this has changed 
over time due to legal issues and the supply of labour generally.
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The short-term hired labour force before the war was usually supplied 
through local labour brokers. However, during the post-war occupation era, 
the Employment Security Act was passed, planned to eliminate labour broker-
ages from the labour market, thus the traditional supply route was largely cut 
off. More precisely, as will be explained below, work introductions through 
labour brokers received tacit permission as exceptions in certain limited 
urban labour markets. However, it is certain that the shipbuilding industry at 
least was no longer able to depend on these for the whole of its labour supply. 
In this situation, the method taken by the shipbuilding industry to procure 
its labour was the practice of using temporary labourers or sub-contract 
labourers.16 This trend became notable particularly after the 1955 first export-
16 Echigo, Nihon Zosen Kogyo ron.
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ship boom. As shown in Figure 23.7, from 1952 through 1957, the number of 
full-time labourers remained roughly stable (71,812 in 1954 to 70,353 in 1957); 
in comparison, the number of temporary and sub-contract labourers shot up 
after 1955 (temporary labourers: 11,325 in 1952 to 19,455 in 1957, sub-contract 
labourers: 97,282 in 1952 to 124,850 in 1957). As a result of this, by 1957, 43 per 
cent of all labourers were actually sub-contracted/temporary.
In this way the basic composition of the labour force of Japan’s shipbuilding 
industry was established in the 1950s. However, its inner status changed even 
more in the 1960s. The labour movement led by the All-Japan Shipbuilding and 
Engineering Union (SEU), described later, developed a campaign to eliminate 
the temporary labour system, and eventually succeeded in having temporary 
labourers hired as full-time labourers.17 The effects of this were that numbers 
of temporary labourers decreased sharply from the 1960s on, but those of sub-
contract labourers increased sharply in turn. Specifically, while there were 
88,135 temporary labourers and 13,531 sub-contract labourers in December 
1955, by 1965 there were only 6,700 temporary labourers and as many as 
63,859 sub-contract labourers. The method by which companies farmed out 
business to contractors and used the sub-contract labourers hired by those 
contractors was essentially indirect hiring. Through using this indirect hiring 
method, companies were able to pass off trouble related to hiring and firing 
to contractors, and thus to create an environment in which labour-force 
adjustments such as reductions could be carried out more smoothly.18
Furthermore, in this process from the 1950s to the 1960s, in the layer 
below full-time and sub-contract labourers, a lower labour market was con-
structed. As stated above, through the post-war Employment Security Act, 
the use of labour brokers was officially forbidden. However, the government 
was unable completely to eliminate the existence of labour brokers19 and 
changed in the 1960s to a policy of tacit acceptance, exceptionally, of their 
existence. Specif ically, the informal lower labour market in which labour 
brokers were active was tacitly permitted in extremely limited areas within 
major cities. In this context, contractors, having kept the hiring of full-time 
labourers to the minimum necessary, came to acquire the labour needed 
on and off through labour brokers from the lower labour market. Lower 
day labourers like this were usually given the most dangerous tasks on site. 
Moreover, because many of the labour brokers were so-called Yakuza, it was 
17 SEU, “Zenzosen kikai 40-nenshi”, 32-34.
18 Mizota, Zosen jukikai sangyo no kigyo system, 52. 
19 As early as 1952, the Employment Security Act was revised, and regulations on labour brokers 
were relaxed. Through this, labour brokerages run by labour bosses revived. 
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not uncommon for labourers to be forced to work in illegal conditions, or 
to be faced with violence or, in extremis, lynching.20
The structure of the shipbuilding labour market constructed through 
this process can be shown in a model such as that in Figure 23.8. Since the 
mid-1970s, as capital carried out its process of reducing the labour force, it 
made adroit use of this labour-market structure. As shown in Figure 23.9, 
the number of shipbuilding labourers rose until 1974 and fell thereafter, 
but within that it was sub-contract labourers who were sharply and hugely 
reduced. In this way, companies f irst drove sub-contract labourers who had 
been indirectly hired into unemployment, trying to achieve labour-force 
readjustment. While the exact details are not clear, many of the sub-contract 
labourers driven into unemployment are thought to have been absorbed 
by the lower labour market. However, this measure alone was not able 
to do away with the issue of overstaff ing, and reductions in numbers of 
full-time labourers began to follow those in sub-contract labourers. Behind 
these reductions were, for example, cases in which full-time labourers 
were required to retire from their positions, to be hired again by related 
20 Kamata, Document zosen fukyo, 64-98.
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contractors. In this situation, even though labourers were doing the same 
jobs at the same workplace, because their positions had been changed from 
being directly hired to sub-contracted indirectly hired, they were forced to 
accept lower wages. Through this kind of use of the multiple layers of the 
structure of the labour market, capital was able to achieve a large-scale 
reduction in the labour force.
The labour movement in the process of labour-force reduction and the 
opposing strategies of capital
The shipbuilding labour movement saw two peaks of struggle after the 
Meiji era. The f irst was from after the First World War through the early 
















































Source: Ministry of land, infrastructure, transport, and tourism (former Ministry of transport), 
Shipbuilding Statistics Directory, each year, Seizando Shoten
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1920s. In this period, against a background of good economic conditions 
from 1917 through 1921, and the international situation concerning the 
Russian Revolution and its effects, the domestic situation including the 
Rice Riots (1918) and the spread of socialist ideologies, the shipbuilding 
industry saw a large number of struggles led by the labour union movement. 
In particular, the 1921 Mitsubishi Kobe/Kawasaki Shipyard Struggle went 
down in Japanese labour history as the largest strike before the Second 
World War. The second peak was from the end of the Second World War 
through the 1950s. As the Allied GHQ f irst promoted labour unions as part 
of its policies of democratisation,21 such organisations were formed all over 
the country. Regarding the shipbuilding labour movement, at this time 
a large-scale production-control struggle took place. As Andrew Gordon 
writes, this production-control tactic “was certainly the most radical form 
of activity ever undertaken by Japanese workers”.22
The process of labour-force reduction from the mid-1970s onwards was 
one which drove a large number of labourers into the crisis of unemploy-
ment, and naturally the labour movement attempted to resist this process. 
However, compared to the major influence exerted upon labour relations 
by the two past labour-movement peak periods described above, it must be 
said that the struggles of the 1970s were unable to make a decisive impact 
on capital. Rather, in the mid-1970s, the labour movement had been placed 
in an overwhelmingly disadvantageous position with regard to capital. The 
primary factor therein was, as already stated, the fact that an overwhelming 
majority of labourers had been shifted into the position of sub-contract 
labourers through indirect hiring. For Japan’s shipbuilding labour move-
ment, based on company divisions, the shift from direct hiring (full-time/
temporary labourers) to indirect hiring (sub-contract labourers) was a major 
blow. The second factor, as will be shown below, was the marginalisation of 
the f ighting labour movement through the splitting of unions.
In 1946, after the war had been lost, unions were formed one after another 
at shipyards around the country, and a national organisation, the All-Japan 
Shipbuilding Union, was formed. The SEU joined the General Council of 
Trade Unions of Japan, the national sector body set up in 1950, and under its 
auspices took a leading role in a combative shipbuilding labour movement. 
The movement to end temporary labour was one of its activities. Against 
21 However, as a defence against the 1 February 1947 General Strike, GHQ ordered a halt in 
democratisation in the fear of expanding communism. From this point on, GHQ policy shifted 
from supporting to repressing labour unions. 
22 Gordon, The Evolution of Labor Relations in Japan, 332.
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this spreading and increasingly combative labour movement, capital con-
centrated its attacks during the corporate reorganisation period of the 1960s, 
in order to knock the feet from under the movement. One essential strategy 
was to form “a second union” in order to encourage workers to disengage 
from the SEU, thus involving the workers in the production-improvement 
movement represented by the quality-control (QC) movement. When, as 
noted above, Mitsubishi Japan Industries, New Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, 
and Mitsubishi Shipbuilding merged to create MHI, a “second union” under 
company direction was immediately formed. Starting from there, union 
splits and departures in Mitsubishi aff iliates came one after the other, and 
by 1967 the SEU had lost 20,000 members in Mitsubishi and its aff iliates.23 
Union splits due to the formation of “second unions” spread through the 
major companies in the 1960s and the medium-sized companies at the 
start of the 1970s, until the national sector Japan Confederation of Ship 
Building and Engineering Workers’ Unions was formed by co-operating 
unions in 1972.
The anti-union strategies used by capital intensif ied, and by the early 
1970s, the SEU had become if anything the minority, marginalising the 
labour movement. Nor did it stop there; rather, the labour-force reduction 
process which began in the mid-1970s was also a political strategy that 
drove the f ighting labour movement even farther into its corner. That is, 
as labourers’ layoffs increased, the f irst to be f ired were the SEU members. 
Through this kind of political process, from the mid-1970s onwards a large 
number of workers came to lose their jobs.
The case of Osaka: Kizugawa Shipbuilding and Kamagasaki
We now consider the specif ic situation of the shipbuilding industry in 
1970s Osaka as a case study (Figure 23.10). The Kizugawa riverfront in 
Osaka was a shipbuilding area from as early as the Edo period. From the 
Meiji period on, shipbuilding industries established in the Kizugawa area 
included Fujinagata Shipyards (merged into Mitsui Shipbuilding in 1967), 
Sanoyas Shipbuilding, Namura Shipbuilding, Osaka Shipbuilding, and 
Hitachi Shipbuilding. These f ive companies were collectively known as 
“Kizugawa Shipbuilding,” and were particularly active in the expansion 
of the shipbuilding industry during the high economic growth period, as 
well as serving as a core industry of the regional economy. However, from 
23 SEU, “Zenzosen kikai 40-nenshi”, 41. 
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the late 1970s on, the shipyards managed by these f ive companies were 
relocated or closed one after the other, and there are now only two remain-
ing, dedicated to ship repair rather than construction. Going through a 
dramatic reorganisation process compared to other regions, the experience 
of this area allows a clear view of the contradictions expressed here with 
regard to Japan’s shipbuilding industry.
Near this area is a lower day labour market area. This is a day labour-
ers’ gathering area known as Kamagasaki, where the labour markets are 
concentrated among more than 200 flophouses. The number of labourers 
living there is said to have been roughly 30,000 in the early 1970s. The day 
labourers paid rooming fees to flophouses to live there, travelling – being 
sent by labour brokers – to various kinds of sites in construction, dockwork, 
and manufacturing. These labour brokers, as stated above, were banned 
by the passage of the Employment Security Act after the war, but came to 
be tacitly permitted as exceptions by the 1960s. Kamagasaki is one of the 
special areas where this exceptional situation was permitted. The Kizu-
gawa Shipbuilding companies got by through not only hiring sub-contract 
labourers from contractors, but also by using this kind of lower day labour 
Figure 23.10  Locations of the Kizugawa Shipbuilding companies and Kamagasaki
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market.24 Looking at Figure 23.11, we see that the type of work entered by the 
Kamagasaki day labourers was dominated by manufacturing up through 
the mid-1970s. Actual numbers are unclear as objective data do not exist, but 
it is thought that a large portion of this work was related to the shipbuilding 
industry. In this way, at Kizugawa Shipbuilding, the multi-layered structure 
of the labour force modelled in Figure 23.8 appeared more sharply than in 
any other region.
From the late 1970s, at Kizugawa Shipbuilding relocations and closures 
of factories and docks came rapidly. Namura Shipbuilding constructed a 
large-scale dock at Imari in Saga Prefecture in 1974, and in 1977 introduced 
a policy to concentrate its new construction projects at the Imari factory, 
eliminating new construction from the Kizugawa factory in 1979. Sanoyas 
Shipbuilding built a new yard at Mizushima in Okayama in 1974 and, as 
well as concentrating its new construction there, reduced the scale of 
the Kizugawa factory and limited it to repairs. Fujinagata Shipyards also 
planned in 1978 to do away with its new construction division, shifting to an 
onshore machine factory. These transfers and closings were undertaken as 
24 Kamata, Document zosen fukyo, 64-98.
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part of a strategy to reduce the labour force on a large scale. Taking Namura 
Shipbuilding as an example, the number of labourers from 1974 to 1978, both 
full-time and sub-contract, was cut by roughly half (Table 23.2).25
An important point, as discussed above, is that this reduction of the 
labour force was carried out as part of a political strategy intended to 
deal a blow to the f ighting labour movement. By the early 1970s, the SEU’s 
labour movement was already being marginalised. For example, at Sanoyas 
Shipbuilding, through the formation of a “second union,” the 1,200 members 
of the SEU local recorded in 1972 were reduced by October 1973 to 230.26 
Once the SEU’s base had been weakened through labour reductions, those 
workers who were active with the SEU even as a minority, or those who 
objected to company policies were made targets of f iring and transfers. 
The resistance movement formed to deal with this situation was f irst to 
expand the movement from company level to community level. The union 
activists who had been marginalised at each company tried to work towards 
the solidarity of the workers at each of the f ive Kizugawa Shipbuilding 
companies, forming a common struggle group. Further, by connecting the 
withdrawal and shrinking of the shipbuilding industry directly with the 
weakening economy of the region, they called on neighbouring merchants 
and manufacturers and formed the Citizens’ Council to Protect the Employ-
ment of Shipbuilding Labourers and the Management of Merchants and 
Manufacturers. Secondly, with this kind of community-level movement 
base as a backbone, they embarked on legal attempts to protest against 
unfair f irings of union activists (“targeted firings”) and to demand their nul-
lif ication. The legal struggles were successful, and in the 1980s they received 
judgments that the f irings were invalid. However, they were unable to put 
25 Labor Research Association, “Zosen fukyo wo kojitsu ni shita futo na shimei kaiko”.
26 Kamata, Document zosen fukyo, 87.
Table 23.2  Numbers of labourers at Namura Shipyard




1977 1387  486
1978 1315  658
Source: labour Research association, “zosen fukyo wo kojitsu ni shita futo na shimei kaiko”
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a stop to the overall trend of labour-force reduction which accompanied 
the transfers and closings of factories and docks.
One more point to be noted in this process is the fact that, even within 
the structure of the labour force, labourers positioned at the lowest level 
also tried to organise themselves. Satoshi Kamata’s decisive reportage 
revealed their poor working conditions and described detailed facts in 
his in-depth interviews with labourers. One labourer related that he had 
joined a sawmill in the Sanoyas shipyard as a full-time worker, but sawing 
had been outsourced and they were sub-contracted too. He related how 
hard sub-contract work was “without any social securities such as health 
insurance or unemployment benefit, nor severance payment”, as well as 
discriminative composition of the working class he recalled that “there 
are many Korean migrants, outcast Barakumin, and also Okinawan im-
migrants in the shipyard”.27 Another labourer related how many industrial 
accidents occurred at Sanoyas, “with more than ten fatal accidents in ten 
years I have been working at this shipyard. Most of the fatalities are sub-
contracted workers. Someone falling off scaffolding, another crushed to 
death by a fallen gas tank while working inside a cargo hatch. The danger 
of the shipbuilding industries has been hidden by [the fact that the] victims 
[were] sub-contracted.”28
In order to f ight against these conditions, a labour union of sub-contract 
workers was formed at Sanoyas Shipbuilding only in 1976. Sub-contract 
labourers were fragmented as they were hired by various contractors, but 
roughly thirty of them facing unemployment assembled, and with the co-
operation of the SEU formed their union. Further, in 1977, with the support 
of the All-Japan Dockworkers Union (JDU), a labour union was based in the 
day labourers’ gathering place of Kamagasaki; a sub-contract labourers’ 
union was also formed at the Namura Shipyard. Among those who joined 
the sub-contract labourers’ union were also labourers who had been sup-
plied as sub-contract labour from Kamagasaki.29 Therefore, this was an 
unusual moment in the history of Japan’s shipbuilding labour movement, 
when the lowest-level labourers began to organise themselves. However, 
these unions were quickly forced out of existence. Sanoyas Shipbuilding and 
Namura Shipbuilding cut their contracts with the sub-contractors whose 
labourers had formed unions, and by forcing the sub-contractors to dissolve, 
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In this way, the shipbuilding labour movement of the late 1970s showed 
new developments not seen in the traditional shipbuilding labour move-
ment, in its aspects of having formed solidarity beyond companies at 
the community level, and of the lowest-level labourers having organised 
themselves. However, the f ighting labour movement was already being 
marginalised, and, as well, the f iring of contract labourers sub-contracted 
through indirect hiring was all too easy for the companies. Under these 
conditions, labour was placed in a disadvantageous position with regard to 
capital. Accordingly, the labour movement in the late 1970s was in the end 
unable effectively to stop the wholesale strategy of labour-force reduction 
by capital.
24 The evolution of labour relations in the 
South Korean shipbuilding industry
A case study of Hanjin Heavy Industries, 1950-2014
Wonchul Shin
Introduction
The latter half of the twentieth century witnessed rapid changes in the 
leadership of the global shipbuilding industry. South Korean shipbuilders 
entered the world shipbuilding market in the early 1970s and within two 
decades, almost from a standing start, its shipbuilding industry became 
the world’s second-largest producer of ships, after Japan.1 Along with the 
rapid expansion of the industry under the military dictatorships of Park 
Chung-hee (1961-1979) and Chun Doo-hwan (1980-1987), a workers’ move-
ment emerged, albeit slowly. Shipbuilding workers took the lead in the 
1987 “Great Workers’ Struggles”, which followed the “June Struggle” for 
democratisation in South Korea. They succeeded in organising themselves 
into labour unions, and achieved impressive advancements in wages and 
working conditions. However, as directly hired regular workers in the major 
shipyards, they formed a distinct group from increasingly used sub-contract 
workers, and latterly from migrant workers.2
1 For the evolution of the South Korean shipbuilding industry, see Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant; 
Amsden concentrates on the growth of Hyundai Heavy Industries. See also Jonsson, Shipbuilding 
in South Korea; Jonsson compares the South Korean experience with developments in Japan, 
the United Kingdom, and Sweden. A more recent treatment is Bruno and Tenold, “The Basis for 
South Korea’s Ascent in the Shipbuilding Industry”. Bruno and Tenold argue that the post-OPEC 
shipping crisis, which led to a dramatic decline in demand for new tonnage from the mid-1970s 
onwards, may have boosted the ascendancy of South Korean shipyards. The overall shifts in 
shares of the world shipbuilding market are discussed in Todd, Industrial Dislocation, and, with 
a specif ic focus on the shift of market share to East Asia, Todd, “Going East”. See also Cho and 
Porter, “Changing Global Industry Leadership”. Thanks to Hugh Murphy, who offered many 
helpful comments on a draft of this paper and informed me of many valuable English-language 
materials on the Korean shipbuilding industry. 
2 Migrant workers from various countries such as Vietnam, Mongolia, and Uzbekistan form 
part of workforce in the South Korean shipbuilding industry. South Korean shipbuilders were 
reported to employ 6,530 migrant workers at the end of 2012. For example, Daewoo Shipbuilding 
and Marine Engineering, Hyundai Heavy Industries, and Samsung Heavy Industries employed 
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As the world’s leading shipbuilding nation at the turn of the millennium, 
South Korea was very wary of the strong challenges posed by emerging 
Chinese shipbuilders. As such, major Korean shipbuilders such as Daewoo 
Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering (est. 1978), Hanjin Heavy Industries, 
Hyundai Mipo Dockyard (est. 1975), Samsung Heavy Industries (est. 1974), 
and STX Offshore and Shipbuilding (est. 1967) all set up global produc-
tion networks. With the increase in South Korean shipbuilders’ foreign 
investments, in China, Norway, the Philippines, Romania, Vietnam, and 
South America, South Korean shipbuilding workers, especially sub-contract 
workers, have been increasingly threatened by the loss of jobs.3
This chapter outlines the evolution of labour relations of Hanjin Heavy 
Industries (HHI) located on Youngdo island near Busan, the largest port 
city in South Korea. Initially formed by Japanese capital in 1937 as Choseon 
Heavy Industries Inc. (CHI), to build and repair steel ships; after the defeat of 
Japan in the Second World War, CHI became a semi-state-owned enterprise 
and was renamed Korea Shipbuilding and Engineering Corporation (KSEC) 
in 1950. In 1968, KSEC was privatised, retaining its name. In 1989, the Hanjin 
industrial conglomerate took over KSEC in bankruptcy, and set up HHI. 
Until the huge Hyundai shipyard was established at Ulsan between 1972 
and 1974, HHI’s Youngdo Shipyard was the largest in South Korea. By the 
millennium, HHI had become one of the world’s top shipbuilders, especially 
in the large container-ship market. In tandem, from 2007, HHI operated 
another shipyard at Subic Bay in the Philippines. Faced with the decreased 
demand for shipbuilding since the 2008 world f inancial crisis, HHI has 
reduced its workforce at the Youngdo Shipyard, which unleashed intense 
labour disputes from 2010 to 2012. Instead of modernising Youngdo Shipyard, 
HHI sought to build larger vessels at lower cost in the Subic Shipyard. Along-
side outlining the evolution of labour relations at HHI, this chapter also 
highlights major changes in labour relations at the shipyard focusing on the 
1,312, 994, and 939 migrant workers respectively. See, Korea Offshore and Shipbuilding Associa-
tion, Shipbuilding Yearbook, 20. 
3 Daewoo has a shipyard in Romania, Daewoo-Mangalia (a 50-50 partnership with the 
Romanian government), and the Yantai Block-Making Factory in Shandong province, China. 
Hanjin has a shipyard at Subic Bay in the Philippines, Hyundai Mipo Dockyard has Hyundai-
Vinashin in Vietnam, Hyundai-Mipo is a subsidiary of HHI (the world’s largest shipbuilder); 
Samsung has two block-making factories in China, located in Jiangsu province and in Rongchen 
province. STX has a shipyard and block-making factory at Dalian in Liaoning province, China, 
and f ifteen shipyards in Brazil, Finland, France, Germany, Norway, and Vietnam. In 2007, STX 
took a two-f ifths’ stake in the Norwegian Aker group, Europe’s biggest shipbuilder. In 2008 it 
took over Aker, and formed STX Europe. Due to a severe lack of liquidity, STX group was broken 
up in 2013. 
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enterprise (f irm-specif ic wage bargaining) union system, sub-contracting 
arrangements, and militant unionism, which are major features of South 
Korean shipbuilding labour history.
The evolution of the modern shipbuilding industry in Korea: the 
colonial period, 1937-1945
The origin of Korea’s modern shipbuilding industry can be traced to the 
Japanese colonial period. CHI was established in July 1937 by Japanese 
capital, including Mitsubishi, and was equipped with three building berths 
capable of constructing 3,000-ton ships, two building berths of 500-ton 
class, and two dry docks for ship repairing in 1941. With the outbreak of the 
Pacific War, CHI began to build a series of wartime-standard ships under the 
supervision and planned shipbuilding programme of the Imperial Japanese 
Navy. CHI completed ten vessels of 13,700 tons in total during the Pacif ic 
War, and expanded its facilities for engine manufacturing in the latter half 
of 1943. By 1944, CHI had produced auxiliary diesel engines of 600 hp and 
steam engines of 1,200 hp. By the end of the Second World War, there were 
approximately 2,000 workers in the Youngdo Shipyard, including about 
eighty Korean shipbuilding technicians.4
The Japanese government general of Korea controlled all employment 
relations including hiring, job training, dismissal, and wages across the 
country, especially after 1937. Korean workers were treated not as modern 
wage labourers but as national resources, or as slave-like subjects of the 
Japanese emperor. The wartime mobilisation from 1937 to 1945 in Korea 
was a form of colonial fascism. The Factory Law, enacted in Japan in 1916, 
never applied to Korean workers. The manpower mobilisation of the colonial 
period, executed through coercion and surveillance by police and adminis-
trative agencies, was not followed by any improvement in basic labour rights 
or any form of industrial democracy. While disseminating a totalitarian 
ideology of labour service, which emphasised the public spirit of workers, the 
colonial government never offered any welfare services to Korean workers. 
In co-operation with the police and administrative agencies, management 
even tried to control the private and family lives of workers.5
4 Bae, “The Management of Choseon Heavy Industries Inc.”. References written in Korean 
and Japanese are translated into English for the convenience of readers; the original Korean is 
given in the collective bibliography.
5 Shin, “Wartime Mobilisation and Its Legacies in South Korea”. 
618 WoncHul SHin 
The Japanese governor general of Korea had instituted a factory- and 
plant-based training system to cope with skill shortages during the war, 
and the f irst job training centre at CHI opened in 1939. Even though there 
were not many opportunities for Koreans to acquire technical skills in 
constructing vessels,6 Koreans did, however, get more chances arising from 
the wartime military personnel mobilisation of Japanese skilled workers 
towards the end of the war.
National liberation, the Korean War, and slump, 1946-1960
CHI was administered by the US Military Government from December 1945 
and, from August 1948, it was administered by the South Korean govern-
ment. As the Japanese emperor declared an unconditional surrender to the 
Allied forces, Korean workers began to organise themselves into a union 
called Cheonpyoung (National Council of Korean Labour Unions), which 
had a socialist leaning. At the Youngdo Shipyard, one of the most powerful 
local branches of Cheonpyoung was established, but the Local could not 
withstand the f ierce oppression of the police and right-wing semi-military 
forces. Moreover, a great number of Cheonpyoung members were killed by 
the police across the country after the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 
1950. On 2 August 1950, 292 workers at the Youngdo Shipyard were detained 
by the navy, among them were about 100 workers aff iliated with left-wing 
labour unions or political parties. In Busan city alone, more than 1,500 people 
are thought to have been killed by the military or the police. The numbers of 
victims in the shipyard detained and killed by either military or police were 
relatively small.7 The reason that most union members detained survived was 
because of their skills necessary for repairing vessels mobilised for the war.8
KSEC
With the establishment of the Law of KSEC in August 1950, CHI was 
renamed KSEC. Dr Syngman Rhee, the f irst president of the South Ko-
rean government, had appointed six directors of KSEC in the 1950s who 
were not professional managers but persons close to him. Prior to the 
6 Jonsson, Shipbuilding in South Korea, 67. 
7  Jeon, “A Study on the National Council of Choseon Labor Union of Busan City”. 
8 Kim, “The Business Management of a Korean Company and Workers in the 1950s”, 10. 
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privatisation of KSEC in 1968, the senior staff of KSEC were recruited from 
former admirals, who subsequently took their military subordinates into 
the shipyard. During the Korean War, KSEC repaired a large amount of 
tonnage. As the shipyard also had to repair welded ships during the war, 
welding technology was introduced from the USA, replacing riveting as a 
method of hull construction. In the latter half of the 1950s, KSEC expanded 
its shipbuilding facilities so as to be capable of building ships of up to 10,000 
tons and repairing ships of 15,000 tons. The cost of those facilities was aided 
by the ICA (International Cooperation Administration) of the USA. For 
the purpose of learning advanced technologies, KSEC continued to hire 
a small number of foreign technical advisers, starting with a US advisory 
group, who remained from March 1950 through January 1951. In 1959, a 
Dutch technical adviser was invited to the shipyard, and a total of f ifteen 
foreign technicians were brought in between 1962 and 1966.9 Although the 
South Korean government tried to propel “planned shipbuilding”, the total 
amount of new vessels completed in the country owing to that programme 
in the 1950s amounted to just 191 vessels of a paltry 10,157 tons. Of this total, 
KSEC had built twenty-four vessels, including eighteen customs inspection 
vessels, all of which were under 200 tons. The number of workers employed 
at KSEC dropped by nearly two-thirds, from 1,034 in 1950 to 348 in 1960.10
The KSEC Union
Although basic labour rights were off icially recognised by the Korean 
government during the Korean War, they were heavily restricted by the 
prevailing anti-communist ideology. Occupying a lowly part of the newly 
established state power, leaders of the Confederation of Korean Trade 
Unions nevertheless kept union members under strict surveillance, and 
controlled them on the basis of anti-communist ideology. The demands of 
labour unions for wage increases and better working conditions were coupled 
with discourses of anti-communist patriotism, which, in fact, were variants 
of the Japanese rulers’ totalitarian ideology on labour service during the 
9 Nam, Building Ships, Building a Nation, 297, n. 9. Nam’s book is the best monograph on the 
workers’ movement at the shipyard. In contrast to the previous studies on the Korean labour 
movement, the author emphasises the historical legacies of the Korean labour movement, 
focusing on the KSEC Union, which was the strongest and most democratic union in the country 
in 1960s. 
10 Bae, “The Attempt at Capital Accumulation and the Causes of Its Failure at the Korea 
Shipbuilding and Engineering Corporation in the 1950s”, 192.
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Pacif ic War. At the shipyard, the KSEC Union was eventually established 
on 6 June 1953 immediately after the f irst Trade Union Act was passed in 
Korea. The KSEC Union aff iliated to the Korean Seamen’s Union in July 
1957, and concluded the f irst collective agreements with the management 
of KSEC through enterprise-level bargaining in 1958. Segmented employ-
ment practices between sub-contracting workers, temporary workers, and 
regular workers were already in place at KSEC in 1958, when more than 200 
temporary workers were employed in the shipyard. Beforehand, a rule on the 
internal promotion of employees and a rule on retirement allowances were 
already enforced at KSEC in 1954, which suggests that the working conditions 
of KSEC employees were better than those of other small and medium-sized 
shipbuilders around the Youngdo Shipyard. In 1960, workers employed for 
more than five years amounted to 40 per cent of the KSEC workforce.11 Earlier, 
in 1958, as a result of the extremely poor performance of KSEC generally, the 
payment of wages for 350 workers was in arrears for 7 months. Consequently, 
the KSEC Union decided to go on strike on 13 December 1958, demanding the 
payment of wages. The strikers won a victory after a seven-day strike and 
received payments for the months in arrears owed to them.12
The steady growth and the short rise of democratic unionism, 
1961-1969
The South Korean people overthrew the dictatorship of three-time president 
Syngman Rhee during the student-led April Revolution of 1960. But on 16 May 
1961 Major General Park Chung-hee led a military coup. On seizing power, the 
military government ordered all political parties and associations, including 
trade unions, to be disbanded. Thereafter, the military nominated leaders 
of the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU), who organised fourteen 
industrial unions including the Metal Workers’ Union and the Seamen’s 
Union from above. When basic labour rights were restored, local enterprise 
bargaining was not only allowed under this pseudo-industrial union system, 
but in effect became the most important form of bargaining in the 1960s.
The KSEC Local became one of the strongest locals of the Seamen’s Union 
in the latter half of the 1960s.13 Employees, including clerical workers, of 
KSEC numbered 1,542 in 1963, and more than doubled to 3,145 in 1968. 
11 Shin, “The Formation and Evolution of Firm Internal Labour Markets”, ch. 2. 
12 Nam, Building Ships, Building a Nation, 66-68.
13 Shin, “The Evolution of the Enterprise Union System in Korea”. 
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During the 1960s temporary workers were widely employed not only in 
the shipbuilding industry but also in the heavy and light machine build-
ing industries across the country. Temporary workers at KSEC numbered 
173 in 1963, and increased to 1,162 in 1968, while the direct-hired regular 
production workers numbered 1,051 in 1963 and decreased slowly to 919 in 
1968. Temporary workers received lower wages compared to the regular 
workers, and suffered from unstable employment. In June 1960, after 
the April Revolution, the KSEC Union had demanded that all temporary 
workers should be promoted to regular workers, and that the internal sub-
contracting company be abolished. However, the management replied that 
the promotions of the temporary workers were under the control of the 
Joint Economic Committee of the United States and Korea; thus the union 
did not succeed. From the end of 1965, however, the KSEC Local aff iliated 
temporary workers within it and, in turn, temporary workers could elect 
their representatives to the Local.14
The growth of the KSEC Local was possible under the favourable labour 
market conditions extant in the 1960s – a decade in which the Korean 
shipbuilding industry showed a steady growth under the dictatorship’s 
shipbuilding promotion policy. The number of workers employed in the 
shipbuilding industry increased from 3,000 in 1960 to more than 10,000 
in 1967. Beginning with a 350-ton cargo ship in 1962, KSEC built a 1,600-
ton vessel in 1964, a 2,600-ton ship in 1966, a 4,000-ton vessel in 1967, and 
a 6,000-ton ship in 1968. The share of ship repairing in the total output 
decreased rapidly as new shipbuilding increased. KSEC’s total sales of new 
shipbuilding amounted to about four times of that of ship repairing in 
1966.15 The two cargo ships built in 1964 passed the ABS (American Bureau 
of Shipping) classif ication criteria, the f irst time this standard was achieved 
by a Korean shipbuilder. In 1965, KSEC concluded a f ive-year technical 
assistance contract with Niigata Ironworks in Japan to manufacture marine 
diesel engines, gained the ability to design a 4,000-ton cargo ship in 1966, 
and won from Taiwan the f irst signif icant export order for twenty tuna-
f ishing boats in 1968.16 As Gabriel Jonsson has noted, “Shipbuilding output 
remained low during the 1960s, but some basis for the subsequent rise of the 
shipbuilding industry was laid in technical advances and ship exports”.17 
In March 1967 the Law for the Promotion of the Shipbuilding Industry 
14 Shin, “The Rise and Decline of the Employment of Temporary Workers”. 
15 KSEC, A Thirty-Year History of the Korea Shipbuilding and Engineering Corporation, 192, 338. 
16 Korean Entrepreneurs’ Association, Korean Shipbuilding Industry, 128. 
17 Jonsson, Shipbuilding in South Korea, 71. 
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was promulgated, and in 1969 the South Korean government included the 
shipbuilding industry among the benef iciaries of its Machine Industry 
Development Fund.
Privatisation
In the late 1960s the South Korean government pushed for the privatisation 
of state-managed enterprises, and seven public enterprises including KSEC 
were privatised in 1968-1969. Namgung Yeon, the owner of the Far Eastern 
Shipping Line, became the new owner of KSEC on 6 November 1968. On 
30 November the new management issued instant dismissal notices to all 
1,174 temporary workers. Workers spontaneously began to congregate at the 
metal-structures assembly shop and refused to work. Hence illegal work 
stoppages continued and the KSEC Local decided to launch a hunger strike 
by all members, with a mould-loft shop chosen as the site of the hunger 
strike. On 17 December the management agreed to accept the majority of 
the union’s demands including revoking the announcements of further 
layoffs of temporary workers. This was considered to be the last victory of 
the KSEC Local, which was later defeated and became a “state-controlled 
union” in 1969.18
As for the KSEC labour dispute of 1969, the two main issues were collec-
tive contract revisions and a wage increase. The new management wanted 
to roll back many articles of the collective contract, which the KSEC Local 
would never concede. In April 1969, the Local had demanded a 57 per cent 
wage increase and argued that a pay rise together with workers’ participa-
tion in management were prerequisites for any productivity-based wage 
system. On 9 May, 300 workers staged a three-hour sit-in demonstration, 
and from 31 July the Local went on strike in support of their demands. On 
18 August the Local decided that all its members should stage overnight 
sit-ins, and that its strike committee members should go on a hunger strike. 
The next day the owner, Namgung Yeon, ordered a lock-out, the first lock-out 
in the history of the shipyard, as well as in the country. In response, workers 
and their family members started a sit-in demonstration on the road in 
front of the company gates, and clashed with riot police. As the lock-out 
and strike entered its second month, police began to arrest demonstrators. 
On 9 September, the company announced that it would sack sixteen union 
18 Shin, “The Formation and Evolution of Firm Internal Labour Markets”, 226-227; Nam, 
Building Ships, Building a Nation, 164-170. 
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officials and on 18 September the government invoked its power to order an 
emergency adjustment of a labour dispute. The strike ended when police 
arrested the union leaders between 2 October and 4 October. This was the 
end of the short-lived period of democratic unionism in the 1960s at the 
shipyard.19 Hwasook Nam interpreted the meaning of the strike as follows:
The 1968-69 struggles at the KSEC yard were one of the major industrial 
conflicts of the decade in South Korea, and the state’s crackdown on the 
KSEC and other unions at that juncture cleared the stage for a new era in 
South Korean labor relations and the drive for rapid economic growth.20
In 1969, labour policy became more repressive. With the strikes of the 
KSEC Local and of the Textile Union, the Korean Employers’ Association 
demanded that the government should be more oppressive to labour move-
ments, which strengthened the dictatorship of President Park.21
Explosive growth under “developmental dictatorship” and “state-
controlled” unionism, 1970-198722
President Park succeeded in revising the constitution through a referendum 
on 17 October 1969 to enable him to be elected three times. He became 
president again on 17 April 1971, and an Emergency Act for National Security 
was enacted on 27 December 1971. Park went even further and declared 
Emergency Martial Law on 17 October 1972, and became President for Life 
through the enactment of a new constitution.23 The Federation of Korea Trade 
Unions declared its support for Park’s so-called October Revitalising Reforms.
In the 1970s, the Park regime denied the workers’ basic rights to bargain 
collectively and to go on strike, regarding workers’ unions only as the 
apparatuses for promoting harmony between labour and management. 
At f irst, the legislation denying the right of workers in foreign-invested 
companies to strike was enacted on 1 January 1970. The legislation was 
a clear sign towards more oppressive labour policies. According to the 
above-mentioned Emergency Act of 1971, both labour unions and employers 
19 Nam, Building Ships, Building a Nation, 170-182. 
20 Ibid., 182.
21 Shin, “The Evolution of Korean Joint Consultation Committees”, 62. 
22 For the concept of developmental dictatorship, refer to Lee (ed.), Developmental Dictatorship 
and the Period of Park Chung-Hee. 
23 Shin, “The Evolution of Korean Joint Consultation Committees”, 63.
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should accept the arbitration ruling on wages and working conditions by 
the executive off ice. The Emergency Act of 1971 did not allow labour unions 
from a pluralist-liberal perspective, but only from a totalitarian-unitary 
view. The main task of labour administration was to prevent industrial 
conflicts by monitoring and controlling labour unions with the help of 
other government agencies such as the KCIA (Korean Central Intelligence 
Agency) and the police. In particular, the KCIA manipulated the union 
off icials of the FKTU and industrial unions, intervening in their election 
and voting processes. The police usually kept watch on the off icials and 
rank and f ile of local unions, and intervened in enterprise-level labour 
relations. Religious f igures supporting democratic unionism were also on 
the list of covert surveillance.24
As the government wanted to exclude the possibility of labour conflicts 
at the national industry level, the stipulations of the Trade Union Act pro-
moting industrial unionism were dropped in 1973. The Korea Employers 
Federation had also been critical of the pseudo-industrial union system 
since the 1960s and made repeated efforts to convert it into an enterprise 
union system in the 1970s.25 Workers’ movements were diminished by the 
Emergency Act of 1971, and at the same time the bargaining power of unions 
was weakened so much that the management began to treat trade unions 
as powerless subordinate partners to labour management.
The Park dictatorship emphasised co-operation between labour and 
management, and forced employers to establish Joint Consultation Com-
mittees from 1974. Clauses concerning Joint Consultation Committees had 
already been inserted into the Trade Union Act in 1963 under the control of 
the Military Supreme Committee. In the 1970s the South Korean govern-
ment regarded the Joint Consultation Committees as a device for advancing 
productivity and preventing labour conflicts. In 1979 the Joint Consultation 
Committees were established in 12,780 workplaces, which amounted to 96.4 
per cent of 13,256 target workplaces.26
The South Korean state had issued a series of Shipbuilding Industry Pro-
motion Plans since the 1950s. In the early 1970s shipbuilding was developed 
as one of the core export industries and received stronger support from 
the state than before. In spite of the worldwide recession sparked by the 
f irst OPEC oil crisis in 1973-1974, the South Korean shipbuilding industry 
was determined to become a major competitor in the world shipbuilding 
24 For the labour policy of the Park regime, refer to Choi, Labor and the Authoritarian State. 
25 Shin, “The Evolution of Enterprise Union System in Korea”, 135-137. 
26 Korea Employers Federation, A Forty-Year History of Labour and Economy, 192. 
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market. From 1973 under the Long-Range Plan for Shipbuilding Promotion, 
huge shipyards began to be built by Hyundai, Samsung, and KSEC. The state 
aided shipbuilders through the “planned shipbuilding” programme and by 
“f inancing for exports on deferred payments”.27
During the 1970s, KSEC-built ships reached a total of 820,000 dwt, of 
which 700,000 dwt was exported, earning USD $400 mn in foreign currency. 
In 1970, KSEC won an order from the US Gulf Oil company to build two 
product tankers of 20,000 dwt each, beating Japanese competitors in the 
bidding process. KSEC received additional orders from Gulf Oil for two 
ships of 20,000 dwt and two of 30,000 dwt in 1971. These orders could be 
interpreted as an example of foreign shipowners’ conf idence in Korea’s 
basic shipbuilding skills.28 Shortly before the Gulf Oil order, KSEC had built 
a state-f inanced 18,000-dwt multi-purpose cargo ship. KSEC obtained the 
basic know-how including design drawings from Osaka Shipbuilding in 
Japan. This experience was essential for KSEC to build the vessels ordered 
by Gulf Oil. The basic design for the Gulf Oil vessels was provided by a West 
German shipbuilder, Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft (HDW). KSEC also 
began to widen an existing ship repair dry dock to enable construction of 
ships up to 60,000 dwt, and to build a fabrication hall capable of making 
60,000 tons of steel a year in 1971. In the mid-1970s, KSEC introduced a pre-
outf itting method and improved work-flow system, and began to produce 
slides for automatic cutting machines, which had been brought in from 
HDW by 1975. The expansion of the pre-fabrication method brought about 
a scheduled improvement for works on the building berth and outf itting 
basin, which enabled the diffusion of the work-flow management system, 
the so-called Japanese production management system, into the shipyard. 
From 1980, KSEC could produce f inal detailed designs for production 
without outside assistance, and introduced a computerised design system 
in September 1982.29 In May 1981, KSEC exported a product carrier, Loja, to 
Ecuador, the f irst vessel designed exclusively by its staff.
With the completion of Hyundai Shipyard at Ulsan City in 1974, the 
available shipbuilding capacity of South Korea rose enormously, and the 
labour market also expanded rapidly. Total employment in the shipbuilding 
industry rose from 11,742 in 1973 to 48,182 in 1977. In October 1973, KSEC began 
to construct the Okpo Shipyard at Keoje Island, which was taken over by the 
Daewoo conglomerate in December 1978 when it was only 25 per cent built, as 
27 Korean Entrepreneurs’ Association, The Korean Shipbuilding Industry, 91-100. 
28 Jonsson, Shipbuilding in South Korea, 76-77. 
29 Shin, “The Formation and Evolution of Firm Internal Labour Markets”, 278-286.
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KSEC could not complete the shipyard due to weak management.30 Shipbuild-
ing facilities were, however, consistently enlarged in the 1970s at Youngdo 
Shipyard. Another dry dock equipped with three 100-ton cranes, and with 
capacity to build 150,000-dwt vessels, was completed in April 1976, with a 
loan of DM 39.8 mn from West Germany. The workforce of KSEC numbered 
2,073 in 1973 and increased to 5,734 in 1977. As more and more KSEC workers 
began to quit their jobs, searching for better job opportunities provided by 
the rapid growth of the heavy engineering and chemical industries in South 
Korea, the state took measures to meet shortages of skilled labour.
The state played a leading role in creating and administering plant-based 
job training institutions, while company managers remained passive and 
trade unions exerted no influence. Various institutions such as the shipbuild-
ing technical high school in 1950s, a training centre for skilled workers in 
1960s, and a plant-based job training centre in 1970s were established at the 
Youngdo Shipyard. More than 250 trainees per year completed the job train-
ing centre course at KSEC from 1971, and increased to around 500 people per 
year between 1978 and 1982. Despite a number of in-plant training facilities, 
a type of low-skill equilibrium was reproduced continuously, as the skills of 
the shipbuilding workers were transferable. Managers of KSEC did not invest 
much in trainees and saw them only as sources of cheap labour. Thus those 
workers employed after completing the plant-based job training programme 
made demands for improvement of their labour conditions whenever the 
union movement grew powerful as in the late 1960s or in 1987. They moved 
on to other shipyards when it was difficult for them to express their demands 
through the decade of union repression as in the 1970s. Among 3,221 workers 
who had completed the programme between 1969 and 1980, more than 80 
per cent were reported to have quit KSEC. In 1976, the shipyard hired more 
than 1,500 new employees, but about 700 left the yard, and between January 
and August 1978, 1,139 employees left. It seemed that Korean shipbuilding 
f irms could not succeed in establishing either the collectivist solution of 
the German skill-formation system, or the segmentalist one of the Japanese 
system to provide for enough transferable skills in the workplace.31
From 1973, the Park Chung-hee dictatorship tried to mobilise workers for 
the economic development of the country from above and initiated the New 
30 The Okpo shipyard was eventually completed in January 1981. See Jonsson, Shipbuilding in 
South Korea, 82.
31 Shin, “The Evolution of the Plant-Based Job Training Institution”. For discussion and com-
parison on the evolution of skill training institutions of Germany and Japan, refer to Thelen, 
How Institutions Evolve. 
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Community Movement in Industry, called “Gongjang-Saemaul-Undong”. 
The movement emphasised patriotism and a type of unitary and totalitar-
ian perspective on labour service as well. Workers were termed “industry 
soldiers”, who were to devote themselves to the rapid development of the 
homeland. In response, KSEC built its own Center for New Community, in 
which more than 3,000 employees were camp-trained until September 1978. 
According to a female worker of KSEC, who went through the camp-training 
by the Korea Commerce and Industry Councils, the trainees experienced 
many hardships similar to initial entry training for soldiers. They had to 
rise at 5:00 a.m., sing the entire four verses of the Korean national anthem 
in unison, and practice the Korean national physical exercise programme, 
before running for f ive kilometers with the rallying cry of “Unite! Passions! 
Practice!” They also had to play leapfrog and squat walk. At night they 
shouted slogans such as “I believe that the country and I are bound together 
by a common destiny.” The term of “Saemaul”, meaning new community, 
had spread so widely as to be used as names for the apartment building 
of unmarried employees of KSEC, as well as for the flower garden at the 
main entrance of the Youngdo Shipyard. On the other hand, the shipyard 
managers actively promoted the movement with a view to rationalising 
production management as well as to establishing workshop discipline. 
The managers introduced a payment-by-results scheme, the “Saemaul Wage 
Scheme”, with an individual personnel appraisal system on 1 September 
1977. KSEC also organised middle- and lower-ranking managers into an 
association whose members patrolled their own workshops, wearing a 
yellow armband to indicate that they were “establishing off icial discipline”. 
As part of the movement, a section of the shipyard began a campaign against 
“idle talk on the job” and “smoking while walking”, and promoting “standard 
haircuts” and “getting to work one minute earlier”. The KSEC Local also 
became a dependent partner of the movement. Even the executives of 
the Local patrolled the workshop for the purpose of establishing “work 
discipline”.32 Though the rank and f ile of the shipyard workers did not make 
an open stand against the movement or campaign, they seemed to keep 
some distance from it. At the levels of both state and workshop politics, 
the shipyard workers had no resources with which to organise protests 
but at an individual level they could take an exit-option in the favourable 
shipbuilding labour market.
The management of KSEC had earlier initiated a restructuring of employ-
ment relations after off icials of the KSEC Local were arrested for the strike 
32 Shin, “Gongjang-Saemaul-Undong as a Renovation Campaign of the Management”. 
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in 1969. According to a survey, f ifty-four sub-contractors were operating 
in the construction, painting, and electricity sectors at the shipyard.33 
Another of the slogans of the above-mentioned strike of 1968 was “stop 
sub-contracting”. With the expansion of shipbuilding facilities throughout 
the 1970s, construction sub-contractors had increased. Facing a shipbuilding 
depression in the latter part of the 1970s, KSEC modelled its response on that 
of Tsuneishi Shipbuilding in Japan, in which the portion of sub-contracting 
amounted to more than 80 per cent. In 1979 managers of KSEC established 
a policy of cutting down the directly hired personnel from 2,500 to 1,200 
by using more sub-contractors and reducing personnel in the management 
section.34 Moreover, six aff iliated companies were newly established, and 
around 600 workers – who had worked at shops for painting and wood 
working and also at transportation and equipment service sections – were 
transferred to those companies at the end of 1979. In the 1970s the col-
lective agreement at the shipyard did not apply to temporary workers or 
sub-contract workers. Although sub-contract workers became members 
of the KSEC Local, different collective contracts were applied to them. In 
brief, as the sub-contracting and aff iliated companies increased, the labour 
market began to be divided between regular workers and sub-contract 
workers. Both groups had aff iliated themselves with the same KSEC Local, 
but had their own collective agreements on the basis of each company, 
which continued in the 1980s.35
The “New Military”
After the assassination of President Park by the chief of the KCIA, Kim 
Jae-gyu, on 26 October 1979, the “New Military” came into power through a 
coup d’état on 12 December led by Chun Doo-hwan.36 Only after slaughtering 
hundreds of innocent people in Kwangju City could the “New Military” 
crack down on the Kwangju democratic movement in May 1980. Moreover, 
the “New Military” began a purge on union leaders in the name of the 
“campaign for social purif ication”. Regionally based small industrial or 
occupational-wide unions were compulsorily disbanded, and soon the 
33 Research Department of the Small and Medium Bank, The Reality of Subcontracting in the 
Korean Machine Industry, ch. 8. 
34 KSEC, Chogong, 22-23. 
35 Shin, “The Evolution of Enterprise Union System in Korea”, 138-139. 
36 Kim Jae-Gyu and f ive KCIA agents were tried, convicted, and sentenced to death for the 
assassination of Park Chung-hee.
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enterprise-union structure became f ixed as the only legal one. The notori-
ous clause banning third parties’ interference in labour relations was newly 
stipulated, and provided a legal basis for punishing not only the Christian 
Urban Industrial Mission’s activity, but also workers’ activities supporting 
other unions.37 Following the above campaign by the New Military, a rally 
was held to promote the purif ication of KSEC by the management at the 
shipyard. In 1981, the management began a campaign for preserving order 
which demanded that workers abide by working time and attach name tags 
to their work clothes. Moreover, the workers could neither put their hands 
into their pockets nor let their hair grow long enough to reach their collars.38
A pseudo-industrial union system changed into an enterprise union system 
in both name and reality, the KSEC Local of the Metal Workers’ Union became 
the KSEC Union under the Federation of Metal Workers’ Trade Unions in 1981. 
However, both sub-contract workers and employees of aff iliated companies 
remained as members of the KSEC Union, which could control them on behalf 
of the state and the management. Sub-contracting workers’ interests seemed 
to hardly be spoken for by the union. An anonymous sub-contract worker 
sent a letter to the president of the KSEC Union at the end of 1982:
Dear President, Why do you beg the representatives of the sub-contracting 
companies for increases in wages, [when they are] sitting comfortably in a 
tea shop? They are always playing Hwatoo [cards] in a tea shop or in an inner 
room, while we workers are working like dogs covered with sweat and dust 
[…] Though co-operation between labor and management may be important, 
please stop being a company-dominated union and face reality as it is.39
The sub-contracting worker knew that the KSEC Union was company-
dominated, the democratisation of which became the foremost demand of 
workers of KSEC in the period of the 1987 Great Workers’ Struggle.
Successes and frustrations of new democratic unionism since the 
Great Workers’ Struggle, 1988-2010
Since the second oil shock in 1979 the world shipbuilding industry faced 
several depressions throughout the 1980s. Total employment in the South 
37 Shin, “The Evolution of Enterprise Union System in Korea”, 140-141. 
38 Shin, “Gongjang-Saemaul-Undong”, 353-381, 365, 366. 
39 Shin, “The Evolution of the Enterprise Union System in Korea”, 142-143. 
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Korean shipbuilding industry dropped from 75,643 in 1984 to 49,204 in 
1988. Employees of KSEC also decreased from 5,640 in 1979 to 3,507 in 
1987. With the management crisis of the Youngdo Shipyard, most aff iliated 
companies of KSEC could not do anything but close their businesses at 
the end of 1980s.
The struggle for democratisation of the KSEC Union began when three 
workers, one of whom was a woman named Kim Jinsuk,40 were elected as 
union representatives in the slip assembly shop in February 1986. However, 
for criticising the company and the union, Kim and the other two workers 
were f ired by the company and interrogated by the KCIA and the police. 
Despite this, they kept up their activities and organised a Task Committee 
to Normalise the KSEC Union.41 As soon as South Korean people won some 
concessions for political reforms from the military government, after a 
series of countrywide demonstrations in June 1987, workers went on strikes 
all over the country. At the Youngdo Shipyard about 1,500 workers began a 
sit-in strike on 25 July 1987, the f irst strike at the shipyard since the defeated 
strike of 1969. They achieved the right to elect their union president directly, 
and an 18 per cent wage increase.
In April 1987, KSEC requested the Seoul District Court afford it protection 
from its creditors. The refusal of two Norwegian shipowners to accept 
delivery of six vessels due to shoddy workmanship hastened this deci-
sion. KSEC had reported debts of USD $675 mn against assets of USD $475 
mn.42 KSEC went into receivership under legal management in April 1988, 
was taken over by the Hanjin conglomerate in May 1989, and changed its 
name to HHI (Hanjin Heavy Industries). HHI obtained an order for f ifteen 
vessels amounting to USD $400 mn from Hanjin Shipping to escape from 
the slump, according with the state’s view that HHI would use KSEC for 
Hanjin Shipping’s vessel replacement and ship repair. This encouraged the 
state to contribute an unspecif ied amount to cancelling KSEC’s historic 
debt of USD $900 mn.43 From 1987, however, the HHI Union staged strikes 
40 In 1977, KSEC introduced a new training programme for female electric arc welding workers; 
the KSEC training institute accepted women as part of its cohort of trainees in 1981, and then 
stopped recruiting women directly. For details on women workers in the shipyard, see Nam, 
“Shipyard Women and the Politics of Gender”, 85-86. 
41 Ibid., 94. 
42 Todd, Industrial Dislocation, 195.
43 Fairplay, 7 September 1989, 6. Hanjin’s shipping interests had been significantly strengthened 
when the Economic Planning Board was forced to intervene in the affairs of the Korea Shipping 
Corporation (which was 700 mn won in debt). In order to create a viable restructuring, the f irm 
was transferred to the Hanjin conglomerate and merged into Hanjin Container Lines; see The 
Economist, 19 September 1987. All in all, six major Korean shipping lines with collective liabilities 
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demanding higher wages in every year to 1991. The shipyard workers went 
on strike for twenty-six days in 1987, sixty-six days in 1988, forty-two days 
in 1989, twenty days in 1990, and sixty-three days in 1991.44
As a new union leader, Park Changsu acceded to the presidency of the 
HHI Union on 28 July 1990; the union actively participated in organising 
the Alliance of Large-Firm Trade Unions across the country. Park died 
in May 1991 while in custody being interrogated by the police about the 
Alliance. About f ive thousand people held a rally in the Youngdo Shipyard 
on 16 May 1991 to demand the resignation of President Rho Tae-Woo and 
to condemn Park’s murder in prison. The HHI Union also went on a 63-
day strike, demanding the discovery of truth about his death. His death, 
however, was the only beginning of a series of workers’ tragic deaths in the 
shipyard, as a result of the f ierce struggles against the anti-union policies 
of the state and the management.
With the Asian f inancial crisis of 1997, the HHI management undertook 
a restructuring programme and pushed the union to accept concession 
bargaining. In 2001, the management of HHI tried to reduce its workforce, 
which brought about a series of long labour disputes from the spring of 
2002 to the autumn of 2003. In September 2001, HHI also began to press 
clerical workers to resign voluntarily, and HHI Union members were also 
made to resign from March 2002. About 650 workers were forced to resign 
including 280 union members. All workers went on a one-day strike against 
restructuring on 30 May and 3 June 2002. The management imposed a form 
of corrective training on 138 workers who had refused to resign voluntarily. 
Moreover, the management insisted on a wage freeze even though HHI 
made a clear prof it of more than USD $20 mn, and paid USD $6 mn of 
stock dividends to major shareholders in 2002. The shipyard workers had 
no doubt that the management intended to destroy the HHI Union. The 
management lodged a series of legal suits for damages against the HHI 
Union and its off icials, whose wages and homes were provisionally seized. 
Owing to union off icials’ going on hunger strike, the union had partial 
success in stopping further restructuring in 2002, but could not get any 
responses on pay rises from the management. The management even went 
as far as to pay performance-based bonuses to workers without consulting 
the union. Moreover, the management insisted on freezing wages again in 
2003, and sought to erode the rank and f ile’s resistance, threatening that 
totalling 3.2 trn won (USD $3.84 bn) were rescued by the state’s willingness to reschedule their 
debts. 
44 Hanjin Heavy Industries Corporation, “A Sixty-Year History of Hanjin Heavy Industries”. 
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they might be made selectively redundant if they were found to be present 
at union meetings.45
Kim Juik’s sacrifice
Faced with these diff icult situations, Kim Juik, the leader of the HHI Union, 
began to occupy crane No. 85, about 35 m high, on 11 June 2003 and stayed 
there until he committed suicide on 17 October 2003. Beforehand, a tentative 
agreement had been reached between the management and workers on 
19 July 2003 after the Busan Labour Off ice had intervened. Surprisingly, 
however, the HHI management broke their agreement forcing the union to 
call an overall strike on 22 July 2003. A few hundred strikers lived in tents 
at the yard until the end of the struggle. The management threatened the 
strikers that each individual striker should pay for damages brought about 
by the illegal strike, weakening the strikers’ will to f ight. Kim Juik, who 
weathered the huge Typhoon Maemi on the crane in September, wrote in 
his suicide note as follows:46
Managers seem to want blood with their naked swords. Yes! I will offer 
myself up as a sacrif ice if you want. But we badly need to get a result from 
this struggle […] Using claim for damages, provisional seizure, criminal 
charges, imprisonment, and dismissal, managers seek to change our 
union into a “vegetable union”, and workers into “human vegetables”. 
If we could not transform this labor control policy through our present 
struggle, all of us would only fall over the cliff. So, whatever it may hap-
pen, we must continue to struggle until we win. I am only thankful 
and at the same time sorry to comrades who have been with me and 
believed in me.
Two weeks after the suicide of Kim, another shipyard worker, Kwak Jaekyou, 
jumped to his death from dock No. 4. He was known to regret that he had 
not joined Kim in the strike for the last few days. Almost every worker in 
the shipyard mourned together after the tragic deaths and exploded with 
rage against the management. The management were forced to accept the 
workers’ demands including a wage increase, job security, a public apology, 
and punishment for management off icials responsible.
45 Hanjin Heavy Industries Union, The Fortieth Annual Activity Report.
46 Ibid. 
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Following the end of the tragic dispute, a temporary peace held at the 
shipyard. The Korean shipbuilding industry f lourished in a favourable 
business climate, and overall employment in the industry increased sharply 
until the worldwide financial crisis began in the USA in 2008. But the ratio of 
the sub-contract workers to the total workforce (excluding clerical workers 
and technicians) in the major shipbuilders had soared sharply from below 
20 per cent in 1990 to above 50 per cent in 2002, and to above 65 per cent in 
2008. The total employment in HHI increased from 4,804 in 2001 to 6,492 in 
2007. In the same period, however, the numbers of direct-hire production 
workers decreased from 1,787 to 1,373 while sub-contract workers increased 
from 2,044 to 3,826.47 A sub-contract workers’ union was organised at the 
Youngdo Shipyard at the end of 2004, but it could not continue when the 
HHI management withdrew permission for sub-contracting companies to 
employ union members.
At that time the Hanjin Local did not give support to the organising 
efforts of the sub-contract workers. Since the Great Workers’ Struggle in 
1987, constructing industrial unions out of enterprise unions has been a 
main goal of the new democratic unionism. As for the automobile sector, 
though most automobile workers were able to transfer to the Korean Metal 
Workers’ Union, major enterprise locals organised only by regular workers 
in each of the auto companies such as Hyundai or Daewoo still exerted 
authority over enterprise bargaining on wage issues. Most shipbuilding 
workers, however, failed to even aff iliate themselves into KMWU. The 
biggest union of Hyundai Heavy Industries Workers’ Union was expelled 
from the democratic union movement because the union did not show any 
solidarity for a sub-contract worker who had burned himself to death as a 
sign of protest against discriminatory practices. The Hanjin Union joined 
the KMWU on 5 June 2002 and became the HHI Local of the KMWU. Owing 
to the relatively small numbers employed compared to other big shipyards 
such as Hyundai or Daewoo, the workers of the Youngdo Shipyard might 
have felt more need for industry-wide solidarity.
In 2010 another prolonged strike against massive dismissals happened 
in the shipyard. Four years earlier, HHI had begun to construct a new 
shipyard at Subic Bay in the Philippines and informed the HHI Local 
about the situation of construction there in the spring of 2006. The union 
demanded special collective bargaining to deal with it. In March 2007, the 
two sides reached a special agreement which stipulated that the manage-
ment should not endanger the employment security of the union members 
47 Korea Shipbuilders’ Association, Shipbuilding Yearbook (1994-2010). 
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because of the overseas plant, and that the management should not seek 
collective dismissals as far as the overseas plant was under operation by 
the management.48 The managers of HHI did, however, propose to make 
union members redundant in the Youngdo Shipyard in February 2010. The 
management argued that the Youndgo Shipyard was so small that it could 
no longer build larger vessels to compete with upcoming shipbuilders in 
China. More than 3,000 sub-contract workers, who were not organised 
in unions, have lost their jobs since 2009.49 The HHI Local gave little help 
to those redundant sub-contract workers, but has struggled desperately 
against collective dismissals of its members since 2010.
In December 2010, the shipyard’s labour union launched a full-scale 
strike in opposition to a reduction in its workforce. This led to the company 
shutting down its main dockyard and two plants in February 2011. The 
strike, of 190 days’ duration, ended in June 2011, with HHI management 
agreeing not to continue legal actions and willing to pay workers who vol-
untarily retired. Kim Jinsuk, who was dismissed in 1986, has occupied the 
same crane, No. 85, as Kim Juik, for 309 days at November 2011. Thousands 
of citizens, university students, and various artists across the country 
gathered together in front of the shipyard taken there by “Buses Carrying 
Hope”, and backed her and the workers’ strike. With the help of a new 
social movement supporting the workers’ strike, the collective dismissals 
have been highlighted as urgent social problems. The CEO of HHI had to 
attend subsequent televised congressional hearings on 18 August 2011, which 
dealt with the collective dismissals at the shipyard. Most congressmen 
present at the hearings criticised him for collective dismissals. Finally 
he accepted the recommendation of congress members that HHI would 
re-employ the ninety-four dismissed workers in a year’s time, and support 
them with 20 mn won for living expenses. Thus the HHI Local attained a 
partial success, but still had to struggle to defend security of employment 
and union activity.50
From December 2011 the management ordered most workers to take time 
off from work, except those working on warship construction. Moreover, 
another labour union claiming to stand for co-operation between labour 
and management was organised at the shipyard and was joined by a majority 
48 Korean Metal Workers’ Union Hanjin Heavy Industries Local, The Forty-Fourth Annual 
Activity Report.
49 The number of sub-contract workers decreased from 3,652 at the end of 2008 to 501 at the 
end of 2011. See Korea Offshore & Shipbuilding Association, Shipbuilding Yearbook (2013), 15-18. 
50 Shin, “The Movement of Buses Carrying Hopes”. 
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of workers in January 2012. The management induced workers to join the 
new union, persuading them that members of the new union could resume 
their jobs earlier than those remaining in the old union. In September 2012 
the new union became the bargaining representative union according to 
Korean law, and the old HHI Local lost its bargaining rights. The dismissed 
workers were re-employed on 9 November 2012, but two days later they were 
ordered to take time off. The management continued to pursue a lawsuit 
demanding that the union pay USD $14 mn for damages brought about by 
the illegal strike. Facing these diff icult situations another worker, Choi 
Gang-seo, committed suicide in the off ice of the HHI Local on 21 December 
2012. He was a 35-year-old union off icial and demanded in his last words 
that the democratic union should be defended at all costs. Still the HHI 
Local seems to be in a predicament. Only 29 workers out of a total of 189 
members of the old HHI Local have resumed their jobs, while 321 workers 
out of 522 members of the new union have done so as of December 2013.51
Conclusion
Workers’ experiences during past periods could not but influence their 
present interpretations and ideas on their realities including labour rela-
tions. Even though they did not accept ideas or images of workers imposed 
upon them from above, such as being subjects of the Japanese emperor, the 
exemplary “industry soldiers” for the homeland, or co-operative employees 
for the company, they seemed to be unable to establish their common class 
identities or self-image, which were necessary to long-standing struggles 
for regulating collective dismissals, and lessening the inequalities of em-
ployment relations. Even though the democratic unionism in the Youngdo 
Shipyard in the latter half of 1960s and also since the 1987 Great Workers’ 
Struggle demonstrated the height of South Korean labour movements in 
those periods, the HHI Local could not overcome the oppression and “divide 
and conquer” methods of the Hanjin Conglomerate supported by the state 
apparatuses.
That the Youngdo Shipyard workers have waged f ierce struggles against 
the Hanjin conglomerate, especially after the 1987 Great Workers’ Struggle, 
is undeniable; however, they could not in the end overcome the enterprise 
51 The HHI Local (한진중공업지회), Forces of workshop (현장의힘), 477 (7 June 2012), 478 
(21 June 2012), 481 (12 November 2012), 487 (3 January 2013). See also the article by Kwon Gi-jeong 
(권기정) in Kyunghyang Shinmun (경향신문), 1 December 2013.
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bargaining system, and did not express solidarity with the sub-contract 
workers in the shipyard.52 Considering that the HHI Local was one of the 
model locals of the KMWU, the new democratic unionism since 1987 might 
have the same weakness and limits in widening workers’ solidarity, and not 
cover those suffering from the capricious market of contemporary global 
capitalism.
At the same time, through the struggle against restructuring and col-
lective dismissals, however, members of the HHI Local seemed to have 
become aware that the struggle against collective dismissals should be a 
part of the workers’ movement against injustice in employment relations 
and should also be combined with the struggle against discrimination 
affecting insecure workers including sub-contract workers. I think it is 
necessary to note and remember at the end of this paper that members of 
the HHI Local cried out together with many students and citizens not only 
against collective dismissals, but also against the non-regular workforce 
arrangements, which were the most outstanding slogans of the movement 
of “Buses Carrying Hope”. Even though they could not succeed in combining 
these two slogans in their own struggles, their painful, ongoing struggles 
suggest a direction to the workers’ movements of South Korea.
52 That South Korean workers over time struggled to improve their living standards against 
the threat of imprisonment or death in many cases is testament to their collective bravery 
and desire not to be cowed by the prevailing orthodoxy on the success story of South Korean 
economy promulgated by the state.
25 China, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, 
and Vietnam
Hugh Murphy
This short chapter is limited in that up-to-date information on shipbuild-
ing and repair in the f ive countries examined is diff icult to obtain and 
scholarly output in English is fragmented to say the least.1 Two countries, 
China and Vietnam, are avowedly communist, while Singapore is a semi-
authoritarian sovereign city-state with a unicameral parliament and is now 
an advanced industrial country.2 Taiwan, off icially the Republic of China, is 
a multi-party advanced industrial democracy with universal suffrage, but 
since 1949 has not been recognised by mainland China as an independent 
state.3 The Philippines is a constitutional republic with a presidential system 
and a bicameral legislature. What the f ive countries have in common is 
1 In addition to the trade press, classif ication society publications, national news networks and 
newspapers, etc., one can also utilise the Paris-based Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) Council Working Party Paper series, and occasional papers from 
the former International Metalworkers’ Federation (now part of IndustriALL, a global union 
federation linking workers in a range of manufacturing, mining, and energy industries based in 
Geneva), and the Geneva-based International Labour Organization founded in 1919, and from 
1949 onwards the f irst specialised agency of the United Nations. OECD Council Working Party 
Papers consulted in writing this chapter are: OECD Council Working Party on Shipbuilding C/
WP6 (2008)7/REVI The Shipbuilding Industry in China, 26 June 2008; OECD Council Working 
Party on Shipbuilding C/WP6/9 The Shipbuilding Industry in Vietnam, 30 May 2008; OECD 
Working Party on Shipbuilding C/WP6 (2009) 14 Shipbuilding Industry in Chinese Taipei, 
December 2009. This series of reports is intended to provide an insight into the shipbuilding 
sectors of both OECD members and non-OECD economies.
2 The People’s Action Party have been in control of the Singaporean parliament since self-
governance was secured from Malaysia in 1959. Trial by jury was abolished in Singapore in 1970; 
all public gatherings of f ive or more people require police permits; and protests may be legally 
held at only one location.
3 The Republic of China (ROC) was established in China in 1912. In 1945, Japan surrendered 
Taiwan to ROC military forces on behalf of the Allies. Following the Chinese Civil War, the Com-
munist Party of China took full control of mainland China and founded the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) in 1949. The ROC relocated its government to Taiwan, and its jurisdiction became 
limited to Taiwan and its surrounding islands. In 1971, the PRC assumed China’s seat at the 
United Nations, which the ROC had originally occupied. International recognition of the ROC 
has gradually eroded as most countries have switched recognition to the PRC. Only twenty-
one small UN member states currently maintain formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The 
USA maintains unoff icial diplomatic relations with Taiwan but does not recognise the PRCs 
claim to sovereignty over it.
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that all came late to industrialisation, with Singapore and Taiwan, with 
relatively small populations, being exemplars of rapid economic growth 
and consumerism, and China and Vietnam, with no hint of irony from 
their spectacularly corrupt rulers, and provincial and local governments, 
instigating market-led reforms more in tune with capitalism rather than 
communism. All f ive countries had lower shipbuilding labour costs than 
the market leaders, South Korea and Japan – signif icantly so in the case of 
China and Vietnam – but lagged in productivity.4 Factor-cost advantages 
in the cost of labour are often only fleetingly advantageous and relatively 
unsophisticated measures of competitive ability. Companies tend to employ 
more sub-contracted non-unionised labour over time as a means of keeping 
costs down. China, with its huge pool of internal migrant labour, is an 
exemplar of this practice.
The People’s Republic of China
From 1949 onwards China’s shipbuilding industry was initially fostered by 
its communist government to attain self-sufficiency in naval and mercantile 
shipbuilding. Shipbuilding was seen as a strategic industry in upgrading 
China’s military capability, driving its economic growth and as a catalyst 
for the development of its iron and steel industries, and electronic and 
machinery manufacturing plants. On the military side, Soviet-designed 
conventional diesel submarines were built in series, but the split in Soviet-
Sino relations from the early 1960s onwards hit the Chinese shipbuilding 
industry hard: only two ships were built in 1961, one in 1962, and none at 
all in 1963.5 With self-suff iciency now embarked upon by the Ministry of 
Shipbuilding, annual output by 1970 had almost reached 500,000 grt. This 
amount of tonnage was substantially aided by orders from the China State 
Shipping Corporation (COSCO) founded in Beijing in April 1961. However, 
self-suff iciency aside, only from 1975 onwards did China turn to export 
4 In the widest sense, the shipbuilding industry increases productivity by incorporating 
process enhancements or through modernisation, or by a combination of both. Process improve-
ments include any changes that affect employee training in time and quality, quality control, 
and manufacturing f lows. As shipbuilding involves a complex production process, the level of 
eff iciency (and therefore costs) can vary considerably from one yard to another. Material costs 
and availability are signif icant factors, and the aim of any aspiring shipbuilding country is to 
have as much of the process as possible under its control and manufactured domestically, from 
steel to main and auxiliary engines, cranes, and other shipbuilding equipment. 
5 Todd, Industrial Dislocation, 217.
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markets in order to make its shipbuilding industry internationally competi-
tive and to earn foreign currency; subsequently, in 1982, shipbuilding output 
broke the 1 mgt barrier for the f irst time.6
In this China had a distinct factor-cost advantage in wages over the 
vanguard of late industrialising countries (LICs), but not their experience in 
the export market for ships.7 China’s cost advantage in wages was, however, 
tempered by the relative backwardness of its shipyards in terms of technol-
ogy and product. Early attempts at the export market emanating from 
China’s “Open Door” policy of 1978 were bedevilled by poor-quality ships, 
low levels of productivity, late deliveries, and poor-quality management 
controls and f inancial accounting, and were exacerbated by poor credit 
terms in relation to competitors.8 These problems persisted, and as the 
Chinese economy boomed in its later liberalisation period, retention of 
manpower became acute. Another problematic area was the escalating costs 
of importing materials, which ate into hard-currency reserves. From 1983 
onwards, however, the Bank of China became more involved in f inancing 
export credits. Nevertheless, up to 1985, only one Chinese shipyard, Dalian, 
with British assistance in modernising its facilities,9 had the capacity to 
construct ships up to 100,000 grt. Chinese shipyards concentrated largely on 
bulk carriers and smaller container ships, but had also moved into chemical 
and product tankers.10 Although the lack of large-capacity building docks 
effectively ruled China out of the large VLCC market for some time, the 
situation had changed by the end of the 1990s, by which stage Dalian had 
the capacity to build VLCCs up to 300,000 dwt.
Earlier, in 1980, the China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) had 
been set up to co-ordinate shipyards and to encourage exports. By this 
stage, China’s gross domestic product was growing by an annual average of 
6 China’s 1982 output equalled 1,024,500 grt. Unless otherwise stated all tonnage f igures are 
from Lloyd’s Register of Shipping Annual Returns.
7 Todd, Industrial Dislocation, 214. Todd, citing an article in Business Week of 28 June 1988, 
notes that average monthly wages in China in 1988 equalled USD $40 in contrast to USD $547 
in Singapore, USD $598 in Taiwan, and USD $633 in South Korea.
8 In 2000, the European Commission in an Annex relating to China’s shipbuilding industry 
highlighted poor productivity due to the centralised system of group management, poor project 
management, ineff icient planning procedures, insuff icient knowledge of international best 
practice in shipbuilding, and corruption: Commission of the European Community, Second 
Report to the Council on the Situation in World Shipbuilding, 2000, Comm (2000) 263 f inal, Brussels, 
3 May 2000. 
9 From the nationalised British Shipbuilders Plc, in 1982.
10 For this market, see Murphy and Tenold, “Strategies, Market Concentration and Hegemony 
in Chemical Parcel Tanker Shipping”.
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just under 10 per cent. By a combination of guaranteed demand in building 
up its domestic f leet to meet the growing requirements of international 
trade, increased investment, and export promotion, China’s shipbuilding 
output had by 1985 reached its highest level to that date of 2,219,400 grt. 
In that year Chinese shipyards delivered around 0.9 per cent of all vessels 
globally. Since then, year on year, China has increased its market share in 
parallel with its accelerated economic growth, and by 2010 had entrenched 
its position as the leading volume shipbuilding nation in the world with a 
market share of around 37 per cent. Today, China is the world’s largest ship 
producer with around 40 per cent of the global market.
A major reorganisation of Chinese shipbuilding occurred in 1999, when 
the state-owned shipbuilding industry was split into two groups operating 
independently from each other; one remained the China State Shipbuild-
ing Corporation (CSSC) while the other became the China Shipbuilding 
Industry Corporation (CSIC). The CSSC and CSIC are both large, state-
owned enterprises under the direct supervision of the State Council and 
control some 70 per cent of Chinese shipbuilding output. CSIC’s aff iliated 
shipyards are mostly located around Dalian in northern China in the region 
of the Gulf of Bohai. CSSC retained the balance of facilities and activities 
and continued as a large conglomerate and state-authorised investment 
institution, directly administered by the Chinese central government. CSSC 
controls some sixty sole-proprietorship enterprises in addition to research 
and design institutes and marine-related equipment manufacturers and 
trading f irms in China. Its shipyards are principally located around the east 
coast of the Yangtze River delta and southern regions of China. Following 
on from this reorganisation, foreign partnerships and joint ventures on the 
basis of no more than a 49 per cent stake for the foreign enterprise were 
allowed as a way of modernising the industry and introducing more foreign 
technology and know-how. Foreign shipbuilders benef it from China’s 
relatively low-cost labour pool, and their presence in China in part offsets 
rising competition from Chinese shipbuilders. Singaporean shipbuilding 
and repair companies have established joint ventures in China, and major 
shipbuilders from Japan and South Korea have likewise entered the Chinese 
market through minority-stake joint ventures.11
11 Although it was possible for foreign shipbuilders to hold majority stakes in Chinese 
shipyards prior to 2006, the regulations were reinforced to limit participation in September 
2006, again restricting foreign companies to 49 per cent shares in Chinese shipyards, diesel 
engine, and crankshaft manufacturing enterprises. Japanese shipbuilders in China include 
Tsuneishi Heavy Industries at Zhoushan and Kawasaki Heavy Industries at Nantong Cosco/
KHI. The South Korean Samsung Heavy Industries has ship block-fabrication units at Ningbo 
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This top-down reorganisation of its shipbuilding and marine-engineering 
resources and China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
in 2001 further promoted the country’s integration into the global trade 
system, which has helped it to sustain economic growth, increase domestic 
purchasing power, and become the world’s leading exporter. Indeed, the 
Chinese shipbuilding industry experienced considerable expansion, and 
from 2000 onwards its yearly output outstripped that of all European Un-
ion countries combined, and its market share tripled, f irmly entrenching 
China’s position as one of the top three players in the global market.
Statistics compiled by Commission of Science Technology and Industry 
for National Defence (COSTIND) show that in 2005 there were more than 
2,000 shipbuilding companies in China, employing a workforce of around 
400,000, of which 315,000 were employed by the 480 largest companies.12 
However, it is likely that only 500 or so shipyards are capable of building 
ocean-going tonnage, and the number of yards capable of exporting their 
product is commensurately much less.
With the ongoing effects of the world f inancial crisis of 2008, Chinese 
shipyards faced the harsh reality of a downturn in demand, and the time-
worn tendency of shipowners to cancel contracts and/or seek compensation 
on the basis of late-delivery clauses in contracts. This was particularly 
the case with China’s then largest privately owned shipyard, Rongsheng 
Heavy Industries at Nantong. Chinese banks rushed to f inance shipbuilding 
after the 2008 global f inancial crisis as Beijing pushed easy credit and tax 
incentives to lift the industry and sustain industrial employment levels in 
the face of falling exports. Fees generated to banks by offering guarantees 
to shipbuilders were tempting until massive overcapacity – not just in 
Chinese shipyards – and falling demand started taking a toll on the yards 
around 2010. This led to a large degree of bank indebtedness as orders dried 
up and contracts were cancelled.13
and Rongsheng, while Hyundai have a yard at Quingdao and Daewoo at Yantai. The Singaporean 
Keppel conglomerate, which has around twenty yards worldwide, have a wholly owned yard 
at Nantong, while Yantai CIMC Raff les has an offshore and fabrication facility at Yantai, one 
of two majority-foreign-owned facilities in China, the other being the Dutch Damen Changde 
shipyards. Damen, which specialises in tug- and workboats, also has two other joint ventures 
with AFAI Southern and Penlai Bohai shipyards. The Singaporean company SembCorp Marine 
has a joint venture at Dalian, and the German company Hansa operates a joint venture with the 
Hudong-Zhonghua group at the Shanghai Edward shipyard.
12 OECD, C/WP6 (2008)7/REVI The Shipbuilding Industry in China, 26 June 2008, para. 18.
13 Ships cost millions of dollars and can take years to deliver; thus a shipbuilder generally asks 
for part of the purchase price before construction begins to cover material and labour costs. 
Buyers normally obtain a refund guarantee from a bank to ensure that their money is returned 
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Indeed, the relationship between the banks and the Communist Party 
in China is at best hazy. Enforcing legal contracts is notoriously diff icult in 
China, especially with state-owned enterprises that can use political pres-
sure as leverage. In the case of Ronsheng, the party’s policy of encouraging 
private enterprise could be severely tested. Rongsheng came on-stream 
in 2007 and at its height employed nearly 28,000 workers. At that point it 
could be stated that it was too big to fail and, if it had done, the reputational 
damage to Chinese shipbuilding in foreign ship-owning f irms would have 
been severely dented. Rongsheng employs fewer than 5,000 workers, and 
by July 2013 a small town, Changquingsha, built next to the shipyard, is 
all but empty and decrepit.14 Rongsheng posted a net loss of USD $1.4 bn 
in 2013 and is issuing bonds to remain in business. Currently, cancellation 
of orders by foreign shipowners has forced Rongsheng to cut production.15
According to Thorsten Ludwig and Jochen Tholen, the All-Chinese Con-
federation of Trade Unions (ACTU), founded in 1925, represents not only the 
rights of the employees in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and (since 2001) 
in private companies and joint ventures, but also the interests of migrant 
workers. That it can do so is obviously inherently contradictory. Historically, 
the members’ base of ACTU lay in the state enterprise sector. Setting aside 
COSTIND’s 2005 estimate for the entire industry, accurate figures of workers 
employed in Chinese shipbuilding and repair are diff icult to obtain, but it 
is reasonable to speculate that the numbers employed by CSSC and CSIC 
alone hover just above 250,000 employees, with the vast majority being 
sub-contracted or temporary migrant workers, with f inancial support from 
the state for union administration being limited. Chinese workers have no 
legal rights to strike, and wildcat strikes are severely punished. Enterprise-
related wage agreements in SOEs dominate: before 2004 labour laws were 
passed simply by the government or by the Chinese Communist Party by 
decree. From 2004, however, permanent employment contracts have been 
if the yard defaults, and the yard pays the bank’s fee for the service. It seems that in many 
cases Chinese banks did not require shipyards to pledge any specif ic collateral, partly because 
these guarantees are like a form of insurance rather than a loan. This situation leaves banks 
stuck with the default bill. Chinese shipbuilders, realising the enormity of default payments, 
particularly as the full force of 2008 world f inancial recession began to bite by 2010, tended to 
apply for local court injunctions against banks to protect themselves. However, if Chinese banks 
obey local court injunctions and hold off from issuing refunds, they risk being taken to court 
by shipowning f irms in foreign jurisdictions; indeed, clauses to this end are insisted upon by 
foreign shipowners in original contracts. 
14 BBC News, 15 July 2013.
15 Bloomberg News, 31 July 2014.
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replaced by time-limited contracts with only restricted protection against 
unlawful dismissals.16
Chinese shipyards, after steep learning curves, have now begun to 
produce sophisticated tonnage. China’s f irst LNG carrier, Dapeng Sun, 
was delivered in April 2008, despite being launched from the Hudong-
Zhonghai shipyard in Shanghai in December 2005. Chinese shipbuilding’s 
f irst ultra-large 10,000-TEU container ship, CSCL Spring, was delivered to 
China Shipping Lines at Dalian shipyard on 8 January 2014, while in May 
2014 another 10,000-TEU container ship, Hanjin Buddha, was delivered to the 
American Seaspan Corporation by Jiangou New Yangzi shipyard. China also 
announced in January 2014 that it would build its second aircraft carrier.17
What is evident in Chinese shipbuilding, particularly after the global 
f inancial crisis of 2008, is that there is overcapacity relative to demand, and 
that this is particularly the case with private shipyards, many of which are 
in trouble.18 From 2002 to 2010, the number of shipyards with a production 
capacity of 300,000 dwt or above increased from f ive to thirty-three, while 
the number of yards with a capacity of 100,000 dwt or above surged from 
thirteen to f ifty-nine. The number of shipyards in China at 2013 has swollen 
to more than 1,600, of which 60 per cent were built after 2001. Moreover, at 
August 2013, the combined profits of eighty major shipbuilders monitored 
by the Chinese Association of the National Shipbuilding Industry fell by 
53.6 per cent in the f irst half of the year to 3.58 bn yuan (USD $584.1 mn), 
while business revenues plunged 18.5 per cent to 120.3 bn yuan (USD $19.66 
bn). This led the party to express its concern over the path of the shipbuild-
ing industry; on 4 August 2013 it issued a three-year support plan, which 
included control of capacity, upgrading shipbuilding standards, and the 
development of higher value-added products.19
16 Ludwig and Tholen, “Shipbuilding in China and Its Impacts on European Shipbuilding 
Industries”.
17 Daily Telegraph, 19 January 2014. The f irst was Liaoning, a Soviet-era aircraft carrier pur-
chased from Ukraine in 1998 and ref itted at Dalian shipbuilding. 
18 For example, the Hengfu Shipyard, situated in east China’s Zhejiang province, had an annual 
production capacity of 1 mn dwt. However, Hengfu declared bankruptcy in 2011 due to a lack of 
orders and mounting debts. Zhejiang province is clustered with many shipbuilders operating 
within private shipyards. But since 2009, many of them have gone bust, like Hengfu. Although 
government-backed shipyards have on the whole fared better, the CSSC Jiangnan Heavy Industry 
Co. Ltd, one of the top f ive state-owned shipyards in China, posted a loss of 60.31 mn yuan (USD 
$9.85 mn) in the f irst half of 2013, while its business revenue plunged 39.49 per cent year on year. 
In 2012, the company registered a loss of 97.37 mn yuan (USD $15.91 mn). See BeijingReview.
com.ch, No. 34, August 2013 (accessed 1 June 2014).
19 Ibid.
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In today’s shipbuilding markets there is an increasing focus on design 
and build quality. Chinese shipbuilding largely still concentrates on lower 
value-added tonnage and has a long way to go to catch up on South Korean, 
Japanese, and – in the case of large offshore structures – Singaporean 
competition.20 Given the increasing importance placed on military con-
struction in China as it builds up its navy, it is likely, f irst, that the greater 
technological content and production standards of these vessels will have 
spill-over effect on China’s merchant shipbuilding sector, where the better-
capitalised state yards will increasingly concentrate on high-end ships 
and, secondly, that there will be a concomitant concentration of shipyards 
through bankruptcies or mergers capitalised to build them.
The Republic of the Philippines
Today, the Philippines, the world’s second-largest archipelago, is the fourth-
largest global shipbuilding nation.21 Shipping is the conduit of the vast 
majority of Philippine domestic and international trade, and the eff icient 
transport of goods and services across its vast chain of islands is a sine 
qua non for Philippine economic development, much of which has been 
foreign-led. The country’s rise to international shipbuilding prominence 
in a relatively short period is almost entirely due to state promotion of 
conditions conducive to foreign direct investment (FDI). This, in turn, has 
propelled the export growth of Philippine-built ships in the international 
market, particularly large bulk carriers, container ships, and passenger fer-
ries.22 Blessed with readily available manpower and government willingness 
20 At the year to July 2013, for example, South Korean yards produced 76.2 per cent more than 
China by dollar value: The Economist, 23 November 2013.
21 IHS Fairplay World Shipbuilding Statistics, 2013, completions by country of build. There are 
7,100 islands in the Philippine archipelago. 
22 Importation of major raw materials such as steel plates has been liberalised since 1989. 
Shipbuilders located in special economic zones enjoy tax and duty exemptions. Under the 
investor-friendly Republic Act 9295 of 2004, passed to ensure the continued development of a 
viable shipbuilding industry, there is exemption from value-added tax on the importation of 
capital equipment, machinery, spare parts, life-saving and navigational equipment, steel plates, 
and other metal plates including marine-grade aluminum plates to be used in the construction, 
repair, renovation, or alteration of any merchant marine vessel operated or to be operated in the 
domestic trade. There are net operating loss carry-over provisions and accelerated depreciation. 
For projects registered with the Philippines Board of Investments there is an income-tax holiday 
of six years for those with pioneer status (greenf ield shipyards) and four years for non-pioneer 
status. Any of the following may qualify for pioneer status: a shipyard operation with a minimum 
berthing capacity of 7,500 dwt or a project cost of at least the Philippine peso equivalent of USD 
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to promote shipbuilding and its ancillary industries, foreign companies 
such as South Korea’s Hanjin Heavy Industries shipyard at Subic Bay employ 
some 21,000 workers, overwhelmingly from non-unionised sub-contractors. 
Hanjin, which began building its shipyard on a 200-hectare greenfield site 
in Subic Bay in early 2006, launched the f irst container ship to be built 
in the Philippines in July 2008. The huge capacity of Hanjin’s dry dock 
in Subic, where four vessels can be built at a time, has resulted in faster 
production times and greater productivity. The Tsuneishi Cebu Shipyard, 
operated by Japan’s Tsuneishi Holdings Corporation since 1997, in partner-
ship with Cebu’s Aboitiz Group, has produced some 182 ships at June 2014 
on a 147-hectare site at Buanoy, Balambam, Cebu. The shipyard employs 
around 20,000 workers, mostly non-unionised sub-contractors.
The lack of trade union representation of overwhelmingly low-waged 
sub-contracted workers in Philippines shipyards has raised many health 
and safety concerns. Up to May 2014, thirty-seven workers have died in 
industrial accidents at Hanjin’s Subic Bay shipyard alone.23 There have been 
similar death tolls at the other shipyards.
The oldest foreign direct investment in Philippine shipbuilding started 
with the Singaporean conglomerate, Keppel, which began operating its ship-
yard in the Philippines in early 1994 with a capacity of twenty-eight vessels 
per year. It expanded its operation by fabricating tugboats and oil-rig hulls. 
Keppel now operates two shipyards at Subic (350,000-dwt capacity) and 
Batangas (50,000-dwt) and also undertakes ship repair and conversion with 
a full range of dry docks. Two notable smaller Filipino-owned shipbuilding 
companies are Herma Shipyard, Inc., of Mariveles, Bataan (established 
in 2000), which has recently gone into double-hulled petroleum tanker 
shipbuilding, and the older Colorado Shipyard Corporation of Consolacion, 
Cebu, established in 1972, which can build medium to large cargo ships. 
In addition, there are numerous ship repairing operations, which benefit 
from regulations that all Philippine-registered ocean-going ships have to be 
repaired Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA)-approved repair yards.24
With its almost total dependence on large foreign-owned shipyards, 
the Philippines is vulnerable to political decisions made elsewhere. FDI 
$10 mn. In addition, there is a duty exemption on imported capital equipment and spare parts, 
no restrictions on the employment of foreign nationals, and, crucially for FDI, shipbuilding is 
not covered by limitations on foreign ownership, which means foreign investors can own their 
companies 100 per cent. These concessions were due to be reassessed in June/July 2014.
23 Manila Bulletin, 12 June 2014, and http://www.unitedf ilipinoseafarers.com (accessed 1 July 
2014).
24 PD 1221 of 17 October 1977.
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can easily be advanced from abroad but it can just as easily be taken away. 
For labour, the largely sub-contracted workforce militates against greater 
unionisation, increases in wages, and improvements in terms and condi-
tions of employment. The Philippine government’s promotion of FDI in 
shipbuilding has led to a largely successful industry in a relatively short 
period of time; whether that government can envisage a concomitant 
growth in wholly owned Filipino shipyards without massive subsidisation 
is another matter entirely.
The Republic of Singapore
Singapore’s ship repair industry began to develop only after its independ-
ence from the Malaysian Federation in August 1965. Its government clearly 
envisaged Singapore as Asia’s largest ship repair centre after Japan. Sin-
gapore’s shipbuilding capacity had earlier been enhanced by a 1963 joint 
venture between the Singapore Economic Development Board (EDB, which 
held 49 per cent) and IHI (Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries) Japan 
(51 per cent) to create a shipyard, Jurong Shipbuilding, at Semulum Island, 
which also had a dry dock with a capacity of 45,000 dwt, later expanded to 
90,000 dwt and a building dock capable of handling vessels of 1,500 dwt, later 
extended to 15,000 dwt. Jurong was envisaged as capable of constructing 
IHI’s Freedom class of cargo vessels.25 When the British withdrew from 
Singapore in 1971, its former naval base had already been reconverted under 
Singaporean government control as Sembawang Shipyard from 1 December 
1968.26 Sembawang was owned by the EDB until it was publicly listed on the 
Singapore Stock Exchange and became a public listed company on 17 April 
1973. From 1968 to 1978 Sembawang was managed on an agency basis by 
Swan Hunter (International) Ltd, of Newcastle upon Tyne in the north-east 
of England, to train local personnel to supersede it. Swan Hunter also had 
managerial responsibility until 1972 for the government-owned Keppel 
shipyard, previously operated by the Port of Singapore. Keppel became 
Keppel Shipyard (Pte) Ltd, on 23 August 1968, its f irst chairman being Mr 
25 Todd, Industrial Dislocation, 161.
26 The Royal Navy’s Singapore Naval Base at Sembawang, which opened in 1939 at the then 
astronomical cost of £60 mn, covered 21 square miles and had the then largest dry dock in the 
world and the third-largest f loating dock. Britain completed its withdrawal from Singapore in 
1971. For the early history of the base and its long gestation, see McIntyre, The Rise and Fall of 
the Singapore Naval Base, and Neidpath, The Singapore Naval Base and the Defence of Britain’s 
Eastern Empire.
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Hon Su Sen, then chairman of the EDB.27 The advent of Japanese FDI in 
Singaporean shipbuilding occurred in 1970 when Hitachi Zosen established 
the Hitachi Zosen Robin Dockyard (Pte) Ltd as a 50/50 joint venture with the 
Singaporean Robin Corporation. By October 1975 Robin Dockyard employed 
1,021 workers, 98 pf whom were Japanese. From May 1973, Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries, in a joint venture with a 51/49 per cent split with the Singaporean 
government, set up Mitsubishi Singapore Heavy Industries Ltd, and by 1975 
the workforce totalled 500 workers inclusive of 59 Japanese.28 From January 
1972, Singapore’s shipbuilding and -repairing capacity was in the process of 
being further augmented by the construction at Sembawang shipyard of a 
400,000-dwt capacity dry dock for VLCCs and ULCCs, off icially opened by 
Singapore’s prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew, on 25 May 1975.29
Singapore’s advantageous geographic position, its status as a major oil-
ref ining centre, and its ability to anchor VLCCs in its deep-water port and 
to eventually accommodate VLCCs30 in dry docks led to an increase in 
employment. In 1971 some 18,000 workers were employed in shipbuilding 
and ship repair, with three large yards, Jurong, Keppel, and the specialist 
repairer Sembawang employing the majority of workers. Jurong completed 
a 300,000-dwt capacity repair dock in 1972. At its peak in 1974, shipbuild-
ing and repairing employed 30,000 workers or 10 per cent of the island’s 
manufacturing labour force.31
With f ive major shipbuilding yards, Singapore’s rise to prominence in 
shipbuilding and ship repair in a comparatively short space of time was 
remarkable and owed much to state promotion. Although there were lag 
effects consequent upon the OPEC price hikes of 1973-1974, the collapse 
of the VLCC market hit Singaporean shipbuilding hard; however, this was 
obviated by its ship repair sector and by an increasing concentration on off-
shore rig construction and repair, which accounted for half of the industry’s 
turnover in 1975.32 Another factor greatly affecting Singaporean shipbuilding 
competiveness was the cost of importing many of its materials. Japanese 
27 There is an uncritical company history of Keppel; see Lim, Tough Men, Bold Visions. 
28 Shimizu, Japanese Firms in Contemporary Singapore, 48.
29 Straits Times, 25 May 1975. The dock’s dimensions were: length 1,260 ft, breadth 210 ft, 
draught 30ft. 
30 Singapore was the only country able to do so between Portugal and Japan until a dry dock 
complex capable of repairing VLCCs opened in Bahrain in 1977. It was also the world’s third 
major oil-ref ining centre after Houston, Texas, and Rotterdam.
31 Todd, Industrial Dislocation, 163.
32 The Singaporean government encouraged US investment in rig construction in Singapore. 
Two notable ventures were Bethlehem Singapore (70 per cent Bethlehem Steel and 30 per cent 
government-owned Singapore Development Bank), and Far East Levingston-FELS (51 per cent 
648 HugH MuRpHy 
shipbuilders had a cost advantage on ship plate of 30 per cent, allowing them 
to undercut Singaporean yards’ prices by 60 per cent. Japanese encroachment 
into building smaller support vessels for offshore oil and gas activities had a 
deleterious effect on smaller Singaporean yards specialising in these markets. 
In recognition of this, the Singaporean government offered loans through 
the Singapore Development Bank for up to half the contract costs to induce 
domestic shipowners to build smaller ships up to 5,000 dwt in home yards.33
During the 1980s Singaporean shipbuilding faced many challenges, 
not least the inexorable rise of South Korea and the continued success of 
Japan. By 1985, Robin Dockyard had cut its workforce by two-thirds; it had 
abandoned shipbuilding altogether and pulled out of its joint repair venture 
with Hitachi Zosen; and Mitsubishi Singapore Heavy Industries had closed 
its giant repair dock. Ship repair rather than newbuilding again took centre 
stage with government support for rationalisation of facilities and aggressive 
price cutting making Singapore the cheapest centre for ship repair in the 
late 1980s. However, offshore construction work on mobile jack-up rigs, semi-
submersible rigs, and floating production platforms became increasingly 
important in the 1990s as did consolidation of the industry to encompass two 
major groups, Keppel Fels and SembCorp Marine, the latter being a merger 
of Sembawang and Jurong in 1997. Both Keppel and SembCorp expanded 
their activities overseas following a “near market/near customer” strategy, 
and consolidated their individual Singaporean activities in shipbuilding, 
repair, and offshore work. On 17 July 2002, Keppel Corporation Ltd, through 
its offshore and marine division Keppel Offshore & Marine Ltd (Keppel 
O&M), acquired an 85 per cent stake and later on 19 August another 15 per 
cent stake in the Dutch offshore repair and conversion shipyard, Verolme 
Botlek, for a total consideration of €22.4 mn (S$38.3 mn). The purchase price 
was based on a willing buyer/willing seller basis but did not at that stage 
include the land and dry docks, which were leased from the Rotterdam Port 
Authority. The new company is known as Keppel Verolme BV.34 In addition 
to Keppel’s three Singaporean yards, Gul yard (3 floating docks and 3 berths), 
Benoi yard (2 dry docks of 300,000 and 170,000 dwt), and Tuas yard (3 dry 
docks of 400,000, 300,000, and 150,000 dwt), it also has Keppel Nantong 150 
km north-west of Shanghai, and two shipyards in the Philippines. Keppel also 
Keppel, 49 per cent Levingston). At f irst these yards built relatively unsophisticated jack-up rigs 
but progressed to semi-submersible rigs. 
33 Todd, Industrial Dislocation, 163.
34 See http://www.kepcorp.com/en/news, 19 August 2002. In October 2010 Keppel purchased 
from the Port of Rotterdam the three graving docks within its shipyard for €10 mn: Lloyds List, 
26 October 2010. 
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owns two Brazilian shipyards, Keppel BrasFels shipyard at Angra dos Rios, 
and Keppel Singmarine Navegantes at Santa Catarina. Keppel also owns an 
offshore yard on the Gulf of Mexico, Keppel AmFels at Brownsville, Texas. In 
May 2012, Keppel sold its Norwegian offshore yard at Sandnes to a Norwegian 
company, OneCo AS, and concentrated its European activity in Rotterdam.
SembCorp Marine is currently the major shipbuilder, ship repairer, and 
offshore rig and f loating production builder in Singapore; its shipyards 
encompass Jurong Shipyard, Sembawang Shipyard, Sembawang Marine 
and Offshore Engineering (SMOE, producing offshore production platforms 
and floating production facilities), PPL Shipyard (producing mobile offshore 
jack-up and semi-submersible drilling rigs), and vessel repair company 
Jurong SML. It is planned to consolidate these enterprises at the new Sem-
bmarine Integrated Yard at Tuas by 2024. The 73.3-hectare Phase 1 began 
operations on 5 August 2013, while yard development work continues on the 
other two phases at the 206-hectare site. SembCorp Marine, like Keppel, has 
expanded overseas. In addition to its Chinese joint venture with COSCO, it 
has a joint venture in India, Sembmarine Kakinada Ltd, and owns a shipyard 
in Brazil, Estaliero Jurong Aracruz, two fabrication yards in Indonesia, and 
an offshore rig repair, upgrading, and conversion yard on the Gulf of Mexico 
at Sabine Pass, Texas, acquired in 2005.
Singapore, despite increasing competition from Japan and South Korea 
and now China, has maintained its position as a major ship repair centre 
and offshore rig and floating production facilities supplier. Its record on 
delivery, unlike China’s, is good; and its two major f irms continue to invest 
heavily to keep ahead or abridge of the competition.
Taiwan (Chinese Taipei)
In 2009, Taiwan had around 116 local shipyards, with 70 per cent being 
small (fewer than 50 employees), with the remainder being best char-
acterised as small to medium in size, and with only one company, the 
China Shipbuilding Corporation, being large by international standards.35 
Strikingly, in a capitalist-oriented economy, Taiwan’s modern shipbuilding 
industry was partly fostered by the state. Promoted on the classic nexus of 
35 At 2008, CSBC employed 2,780 on contract and 3,000 workers on sub-contracts: Industrial 
Development Bureau, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Chinese Taipei, and OECD Council Work-
ing Party on Shipbuilding (WP6), Shipbuilding in Chinese Taipei (2009). There is also a large 
yacht-building sector in Taiwan which employs around 5,500 workers.
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steel, shipbuilding, and heavy machinery fostering economic growth and 
employment,36 Taiwan’s shipbuilding industry was dominated by two large 
state enterprises, the Taiwan Machinery and Shipbuilding Corporation 
(TMSC) established in May 1946, and the China Shipbuilding Corporation 
(CSBC) established in July 1973.37 In April 1948, TMSC was split into two 
separate state-owned companies, Taiwan Machinery Corporation and Tai-
wan Shipbuilding Corporation (TSBC). The 1950s were characterised by very 
low annual output totals, reaching a total of only 23,178 gt in 1958. A year 
earlier, in February 1957, TSBC had leased its Keelung Shipyard to America 
Ingalls Taiwan Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company on a ten-year contract 
basis, an arrangement which was to last only to September 1962, when TSBC 
again assumed control of its shipyards for the Taiwanese state. Thereafter, 
in accordance with state policy, the growth in Taiwanese shipbuilding 
was f irmly linked to the expansion of the domestic shipping fleet, and its 
eff iciency was strengthened by a technical co-operation agreement with 
the Japanese major IHI, which ensured that designs and materials (mostly 
imported) conformed to international standards. A new building dock of 
100,000-dwt capacity capable of both building and repair was in operation 
at the northern port of Keelung by 1968, at which stage the largest vessel 
ever built in Taiwan, the tanker MV Yu Tsao, had been launched for the 
indigenous China Petroleum Corporation (CPC). This vessel joined two 
others in service both constructed in Japan by IHI, with another two on 
order to be built in Taiwan for CPC for delivery by March 1972.
With a giant dock of 1 mn-dwt capacity under construction at CSBCs 
shipyard at the southern port city of Kaohsiung, the OPEC crisis of 1973-
1974 could hardly have come at a worse time for a government determined 
to make its mark on world shipbuilding output. Opened in 1976, the gi-
ant Kaohsiung Shipyard entered into production just as global shipping 
markets had contracted. Tankers taken on at f ixed prices became serious 
loss-makers. The first of these, the ULCC Burmah Endeavour, of 450,000 dwt, 
then the world’s third-largest ship, was launched at Kaohsiung in June 1977.
In response to the global downturn in shipping, the Taiwanese state 
launched a shipping-promotion scheme in 1977, which envisaged Taiwanese 
36 Taiwan’s China Steel Corporation was formed in 1971 as a private company and f inally 
opened its steel mill at Kaohsiung in 1977; in July of that year it became a state-owned company. 
Thereafter, it became a major supplier of steel plate to the local shipbuilding industry, and in 
April 1995 was reprivatised with the state retaining shares in the new corporation.
37 The f irst major shipbuilding company in Taiwan, initially founded in 1937 by Mitsubishi 
Heavy Industries Corporation during the Japanese colonial period, was the Taiwan Dockyard 
Corporation.
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shipyards producing 43 vessels of 1.6 mn gt in 1981; in response to govern-
ment stimulation of demand, TSBC and CSBC merged in 1978 under the 
banner of the latter. During the 1980s and thereafter, CSBC built a range 
of very large tankers and bulk carriers and increasingly concentrated on 
building cellular container vessels. This strategy was sensible and gave the 
yard prolonged work as the Taiwanese economy began to shift towards 
knowledge-based technological industries and services.38 In 2007 Taiwanese 
shipbuilding delivered a record-breaking 79.5 mn dwt of shipping and in 
2008, just as the world f inancial crisis began to unfold, CSBC launched its 
largest container vessel to that date.39 In December 2008, following a cash 
injection to recapitalise CSBC, the Taiwanese state partially privatised the 
company through an initial public offer with the state retaining a 38.8 per 
cent share in CSBC. In the following year, Taiwan’s shipbuilding industry 
had suffered a 75 per cent fall in orders compared to 2008. Nevertheless 
more than half of the industry’s output by value came from CSBC alone. 
Given Taiwan’s limited capacity relative to China, South Korea, and Japan, 
it is hardly surprising that its indigenous shipping f irms, in addition to 
ordering from CSBC, look to these countries to build their ships. A good 
example is the Evergreen Marine Corporation which in July 2012 received 
the f irst of twenty L-type container ships from Samsung Heavy Industries 
of South Korea for delivery by July 2014.40
The ongoing effects of the 2008 f inancial crisis, with fuel prices and raw 
materials rising inexorably, have forced Taiwanese shipbuilders to design 
and develop more advanced multi-functional energy-eff icient vessels that 
are faster and larger to meet higher demands from ship buyers. With just 
under 2 per cent of world completions in 2000, Taiwan accounted for 0.6 
per cent in 2013.41
Today, Taiwan occupies seventh place in world shipbuilding output. How-
ever, the signing of an Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement with 
the People’s Republic of China in June 2010 allowed certain business-owners 
38 Three Taiwanese high-tech companies of note are ACER and ASUS, both multi-national 
hardware and electronics companies, and HTC, a smartphone and tablet manufacturer.
39 The f irst two container vessels built by CSBC, Ever Vital and Ever Vigor, were ordered in 
1977 by Taiwan’s Evergreen Marine Corporation, now the world’s fourth-largest container ship 
operator. The container vessel launched in 2008 was the YM Utopia of 101,100 dwt, 8,240 TEU, 
and 333 m in length for the Yang Ming Marine Transport Corporation of Taiwan. 
40 Information from www.evergreen-line.com (accessed 1 July 2014). A naming ceremony for 
the Ever Lissome, the f ifth L-type vessel built by CSBC for Evergreen Marine, took place on 9 May 
2014.
41 IHI Fairplay World Shipbuilding Statistics, 2013.
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to gain from preferential or zero tariffs on trading activities between the two 
sides of the Taiwan Strait. This has been, and remains, highly controversial 
in Taiwan. Theoretically a functioning agreement could lead to higher 
demand for shipbuilding as a growing amount of goods are expected to be 
shipped between coastal cities in mainland China and Taiwan. The signing 
of a Cross Straits Services Trade Agreement in June 2013 is yet to be ratif ied 
in the Taiwanese legislature and has sparked mass demonstrations in Taipei.
The Socialist Republic of Vietnam
Since reunif ication in 1976, under Communist Party of Vietnam rule, the 
centralised economy of Vietnam has been beset by considerable problems 
in production in moving from a primarily agrarian to a late industrialis-
ing country. Imbalances in supply and demand, rampant ineff iciencies in 
distribution and circulation, hyperinflation, and debt problems have hit 
Vietnam hard.42
However, with a coastline of more than 3,200 km, low labour costs, 
relatively developed domestic waterway transportation, and a large, rela-
tively young, and literate workforce, Vietnam had considerable potential 
to develop its shipbuilding industry and to attract foreign investment. 
All the more so since 1986, when the communist leadership launched a 
political and economic renewal campaign, which embarked on reforms to 
facilitate the transition from a centralised economy to – without a hint of 
irony – a socialist-oriented market economy. This combined central plan-
ning through f ive-year plans with free-market incentives, and encouraged 
the establishment of private businesses and foreign investment, including 
foreign-owned enterprises to the extent of a 49 per cent ownership cap. 
The general development strategy known as doi moi (renovation) focused 
on three elements: agricultural development, macro-economic reforms, 
and trade liberalisation. Crucially, agricultural decollectivisation, the 
42 Following the unif ication of North and South Vietnam in 1976, the communist government 
tried to extend the central planning model of development, with state ownership of industry 
and collective agriculture, to the more prosperous south, f irst by purging what remained of its 
former capitalist class. In 1978, the government imposed agricultural collectivisation on the 
southern peasantry, which met with strong resistance. This situation was aggravated by two 
factors: f irst, the dispatch of Vietnamese troops into Cambodia in 1978, leading to a cessation 
of Western aid; and, secondly, a border dispute with China in 1979, which led to the withdrawal 
of Chinese assistance. By 1980, Vietnam supported a large army in the f ield under conditions of 
severe foreign exchange shortage, falling production, and rising inflation.
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abandonment of centralised pricing, and land reforms led to a surge in 
production and exports. Beforehand, there had been only limited efforts 
to encourage agricultural growth and to cut subsidies to state-owned 
enterprises, and successive efforts at currency reform had led to increases 
in the rate of inflation: from 166 per cent per annum from 1980 to 1985 to 
371 per cent during the period 1986-1988.43
Vietnam had been a member of COMECON since 1978, and its economy 
was highly dependent on Soviet aid in the post-reunif ication decade. It 
is likely that the party leadership in Hanoi foresaw COMECON’s likely 
dissolution and planned to reorient its trade from the then Soviet Union and 
its allies, hence its policy post-1986 to liberalise trade, devalue its exchange 
rate to increase exports, and embark on a policy of economic development. 
As doi moi accelerated from 1986 onwards, prices were freed and trade was 
liberalised. The all-encompassing party-led state made itself a somewhat 
smaller part of a larger economy. State-owned enterprises began to be 
weaned from subsidies and slimmed down (but, crucially for the future, 
not dismembered or privatised). Vietnam then embarked on two decades 
of nearly 6 per cent annual growth in economic output per capita.
By the mid-1990s, the success of Vietnam’s business and agricultural 
reforms gave impetus to the enlargement of the indigenous shipbuilding 
industry, with the Ministry of Transport having responsibility for ship-
building and related services in addition to ports and regulatory matters. 
The state-owned holding company, Vinashin – founded in 1996 and with 
headquarters in Hanoi, and subsequently by 2006 with more than 200 
subsidiary companies, 30 shipbuilding companies, and 80,000 workers – was 
the country’s principal shipbuilding company with around 70 per cent 
of Vietnamese shipbuilding capacity in 28 shipyards of various sizes and 
capabilities, mainly located near large ports such as Hai Phong in the north, 
Da Nang, and Ho Chi Minh City. Vinashin also controlled Vinashin Lines, 
which included five shipping companies. It also controlled nine engineering 
and construction companies, twelve joint venture companies including the 
Hyundai-Vinashin shipyard at Khanh Hoa,44 and twenty manufacturing 
companies. The formation of Vinashin Lines gave Vietnam’s shipyards a 
43 Figures from Irvin, “Vietnam”, 729-730.
44 Established in 1996 with construction commencing in 1999, the shipyard is about one 
hour’s drive from the coastal city of Nha Trang. Hyundai Mipo Dockyard Co Ltd is a 70 per 
cent shareholder in the joint venture and controls all the commercial factors, design work, 
procurement, production, and service guarantees for all the vessels built in the yard. At the end 
of 2014, the yard was in the process of completing the third in a series of ten chemical carriers 
for an Italian company, D’amico Tankers Ltd.
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client base and an opportunity to demonstrate to international shipowners 
their shipbuilding prowess.
Vinashin’s breakthrough into the international market came in 2004 
when the Cardiff-based Graig Shipping Group ordered a potential 15 Dia-
mond 53,000-gt double-hulled dry-bulk carriers built under the supervision 
of Graig and Det Norske Veritas at Nam Trieu and Ha Long Shipyards.45 By 
this stage Graig was an established customer in China and in December 2003 
had already built twenty-four vessels there.46 The f irst of the Graig Diamond 
53s, Florence, was launched at Ha Long in July 2007 and became the largest 
vessel launched in Vietnam to that date, and it was announced in September 
2007 that a further twenty-seven of these vessels were on order.47 Linked 
to the successful Graig contracts was the f irst issue of sovereign bonds to 
the international market by the Vietnamese government in 2005. The bond 
issue raised USD $750 mn, and this sum was passed entirely to Vinashin to 
upgrade and expand existing and construct new shipyards.48
The year 2007 was also notable, after eight years of negotiations, for 
Vietnam’s accession to the World Trade Organization. Accession to the WTO 
was intended to provide a signif icant boost to the Vietnamese economy, 
and to ensure that trade liberalising reforms continued and created options 
for trade expansion. However, the WTO accession also brought serious 
challenges, requiring the economy to open up through tariff reform, to 
enhance private investment and consumption, and to enable increasing 
foreign competition.
By 2010, however, with a double-digit inflation rate in the Vietnamese 
economy, Vinashin, heavily indebted, collapsed under a debt burden of USD 
$4.5 bn. This began a process of restructuring and downsizing of its sizeable 
industrial portfolio of companies through 2011-2012. In 2013 Vinashin was 
eventually restructured as the Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (SBIC) 
with eight shipyards under its control. Subsequently, nine of its execu-
tives were given heavy prison sentences including its ex-chairman, Pham 
Thanh Binh, who was given a maximum twenty-year sentence for violating 
state rules at a court in Hai Phong. The remaining eight defendants were 
sentenced to between three and nineteen years in prison. At the heart of the 
matter was a loss of USD $43 mn incurred through ship purchases without 
45 The Motor Ship, February 2004. Of the order there were f ive f irm contracts and options for 
ten more. Of the potential f ifteen, six were to be built at Nam Trieu and nine at Ha Long.
46 Graig Horizons (the newsletter of the Graig Group), No. 8, September 2007, Ships Built.
47 Ibid.
48 Vietnam (OECD Council Working Party on Shipbuilding) C/WP6 (2008)9 30 May 2008, The 
Shipbuilding Industry in Vietnam, paras. 37 and 118. 
cHina, pHilippineS, SingapoRe, taiWan, and vietnaM 655
state approval and two failed power-plant projects. Their actions called into 
question governance and supervision of Vietnam’s state-owned enterprises, 
led to serious economic consequences, and damaged the country’s reputa-
tion with foreign investors, leading international credit-reference agencies 
to downgrade Vietnam’s credit rating.49 By December 2013 the People’s Court 
of Hanoi sentenced Duong Chi Dung, the former chairman of Vinalines, as 
the state-owned shipping company was known from 2010 onwards, and Mai 
Van Phuc, its former general director, to death for embezzlement. The two 
former executives were convicted of embezzling 10 bn dong (USD $474,000) 
each.50 These prosecutions also evidenced serious corruption with state-
owned enterprises.
SBIC now operates in a climate fundamentally different from that of 1996. 
Not only has it been signif icantly downsized, but it also needs to co-operate 
more with foreign shipbuilders. There are now seven foreign shipbuilders 
operating in Vietnam;51 however, a Japanese shipbuilder, Oshima, licensed in 
2012 to build a greenfield shipyard by 2017 at Cam Ranh Bay in Khanh Hoa 
province, has since pulled out, and may be replaced by the South Korean 
conglomerate, Samsung. Again this represents the vagaries of foreign direct 
investment; nonetheless, established foreign investors such as the Dutch 
Damen Group have continued to operate successfully in Vietnam and in 
March 2014 opened a joint venture new shipyard, Damen Song Cam at Da 
Nang.52 This confirms a trend for partnerships with foreign yards in LICs 
and allows foreign f irms to expand overseas at relatively low cost. It also 
increases the ability of Vietnamese shipyards – through technology and 
skills transfer – to expand their range of ships for export. Moreover, it should 
in the longer term encourage Vietnam to increase local manufacture of ship 
components, particularly through licensing arrangements for the manufac-
ture of high-cost items such main and auxiliary engines, and thereafter to 
expand its manufacturing capability and increase its productivity.
In a relatively short period of time, Vietnam, as the WTO has noted, has 
moved from being a low-income country with a centrally planned economy 
to becoming a market-led middle-income economy.53 Poverty levels have 
been substantially reduced, relatively high growth rates have been a feature 
49 BBC News, 30 March 2012. 
50 Bloomberg News, 16 December 2013.
51 The Dutch Damen Group with six part-owned shipyards; Hyundai; EMAS (Singapore); Piriou 
(France); Strategic Marine (Australia); Triyards (USA); and Vard (Fincantieri, Italy).
52 See www.damen.com (accessed 1 July 2014). Damen has constructed some 226 vessels in 
Vietnamese shipyards. 
53 WTO Trade Policy Review: Vietnam, 17 and 19 September 2013. 
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of the past two decades, and the country’s gradual integration in the world 
economy through a series of WTO-inspired bilateral trade agreements has 
enhanced its international standing.54 Although there are systemic risks 
facing Vietnam’s f inancial sector and structural challenges with regard to 
its state-owned enterprises, particularly as economic growth has slowed, 
Vietnam has attempted through its Master Plan for Economic Restructuring 
of 2012 to address these problems to achieve its objective of becoming a 
modern industrialised country by 2020.
54 Prior to WTO accession, Vietnam’s most symbolic bilateral trade agreement was with the 
USA, signed 13 July 2000.
26 Some final observations
Hugh Murphy and Marcel van der Linden
Global labour history is the attempt to understand the uneven and com-
bined development of the world’s working class, and it allows for many 
different approaches. We may write biographies of workers who lived 
“transcontinental lives”; we may study commodity chains in order to 
understand the connections between groups of workers in different parts 
of the world; we may analyse transcontinental waves of protest (1916-1921, 
1965-1975) or international labour movements; and we may study separate 
occupational groups or segments of the working class across the globe. The 
present collection of essays belongs to the last-mentioned category, and is 
part of a larger number of explorations.1
The foregoing case studies of largely empirical research, inter alia, high-
light the development and continued relevance, or not, of trade unions, 
aspects of industrial relations, strikes, lock-outs, technological change, 
social and cultural differences and synergies, labour regulation and de-
regulation, forms of employment, working conditions, and shipbuilding 
labour’s linkages to general protest movements connected to rapid political 
change. Shipbuilding and ship repair are truly global industries supplying 
the major conduit of globalisation – shipping.
After 1950, world shipbuilding has been completely transformed – not 
only in the numbers of participating countries engaging in the market, 
reflected in changing market shares, but in the actual process of shipbuild-
ing itself. Shipbuilding had always been an assembly industry requiring 
the input of a great number of specif ic trades as ships were largely bespoke 
in nature and in operation. However, over the course of the twentieth 
century, the earlier emphasis on long-term apprenticeships to inculcate 
skills relevant to the division of labour required in shipyards has been 
fundamentally altered. Technological change through increased automa-
tion of processes in shipbuilding is easily transferable; however, the costs 
of setting up new greenfield shipbuilding sites are hugely prohibitive. The 
1 In the introduction, we have already mentioned global research projects on dockers and 
textile workers: Davies et al. (eds), Dock Workers; Heerma van Voss, Hiemstra, and van Nederveen 
Meerkerk (eds), The Ashgate Companion to the History of Textile Workers. In addition we make 
reference to: Hoerder, van Nederveen Meerkerk, and Neunsinger (eds), Towards a Global History of 
Domestic and Caregiving Workers; Lichtenstein and de Vito (eds), Global Convict Labor; Rodríguez 
García, van Nederveen Meerkerk, and Heerma van Voss (eds), Selling Sex in the City.
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block-assembly method of construction, while not universally followed, 
is now the dominant process in large shipyards around the world, often 
undertaken in giant fabrication sheds adjacent to building docks. Blocks 
of ever increasing dimensions are built and transferred by giant cranes to 
the dock, and thereafter welded together in sequence.
The multiplicity of hull trades once common to shipbuilding are now 
largely a thing of the past: just as caulkers and riveters eventually gave 
way to welders, so too have welders been subjected to the ever increasing 
use of automatic welding machinery away from the ship. The use of optical 
marking and plate-cutting machines and computer aided manufacturing 
fundamentally altered the trade of ships’ platers, as did computer aided 
design for ships’ draughtsmen. Technical advancement in shipbuilding 
has resulted in fewer jobs overall and drastic curtailment of training for 
individual trades.
As competition between nations has intensif ied, employers have at-
tempted to cut costs, especially those of labour. Workers’ terms and condi-
tions of employment vary greatly in global shipbuilding and repair. Lack 
of trade union representation and precariousness of employment due to 
hiring and f iring sometimes on a daily basis, but essentially short-term 
sub-contracted work – especially in late industrialising countries such as 
China, India, the Philippines, and Vietnam, but also in advanced capital-
ist countries such as Japan, as Takeshi Haraguchi and Kazuya Sakurada 
demonstrate – have considerably worsened workers’ terms and conditions. 
In this there is a historical parallel with the British shipbuilding and repair 
industry in the early twentieth century when daily hiring and f iring was 
the norm even though trade unionism was highly organised. Short-term 
contracts not giving def ined social benefits such as pensions, sickness pay, 
or accident compensation without recourse to long legal processes are now 
ubiquitous in shipbuilding and -repair around the world. This situation 
is reinforced by the increasing use of non-union migrant labour in many 
countries. Where trade unions are not recognised or their activities are 
severely curtailed by repressive governments or unscrupulous employers, 
then great sacrif ices are required by workers to improve their collective 
lot, as evidenced by Wonchul Shin’s chapter on Hanjin Heavy Industries 
in this volume.
Clearly the extent of trade union or other forms of workplace organisation 
is crucial in the protection of workers’ rights and conditions of employ-
ment and ultimately in managing contraction, as are the labour laws of 
individual countries. This is particularly true in the case of West European 
countries. The United Kingdom shipbuilding industry is a classic example of 
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managed contraction over time from global market dominance to relative 
insignif icance. As Hugh Murphy notes, its solutions to its ever decreasing 
market share after 1950 – closures of shipyards, numerous government-
sponsored reports on aspects of shipbuilding, and attempts to increase 
competitiveness by mergers, increasing use of planned redundancies, 
and ultimately state direction leading to nationalisation, during which it 
had recourse to European Community (EC) aid through the Shipbuilding 
Intervention Fund, and back to privatisation – were mirrored in Sweden 
and the Netherlands. The shipbuilding industries of Finland, Italy, and 
Germany increasingly concentrated on high value-added tonnage such 
as cruise liners as Western consumers’ disposable incomes grew, and new 
entrant countries gained increasing market shares. Norwegian shipbuilders 
diversif ied their productive resources towards new markets in oil and gas 
exploration in the North Sea, and were far more successful in doing so than 
their British counterparts. In the late industrialising countries such as South 
Korea, low value-added tonnage such as very large crude carriers initially 
dominated output. Western technical know-how and equipment aided 
quick market penetration and cost-cutting in labour, and this, reflected in 
lower ship prices, further augmented market share.
Indeed, over time, East Asian competition led to increased labour-market 
uncertainty and intervention in West European economies. Existing labour 
laws and regulations were questioned as competition impacted negatively 
on shipbuilding and -repair. In looking at the history of workers’ organisa-
tions generally in Western Europe, one f inds that trade union leaderships at 
the national levels, in their own interests to preserve employment, largely 
tend to accommodate the status quo rather than challenge it. Only when 
extant working practices are challenged or when businesses are failing do 
they become divorced from management orthodoxy and challenge it. How-
ever, this observation has to be tempered according to each country’s level 
of social provision regarding ex gratia payments and redundancy owing to 
length or service or not. In this regard, West European and Scandinavian 
countries have social provision that is far superior to that of their East Asian 
or South American counterparts.
In reading this volume, one can see a clear divergence in the treatment 
of shipbuilding and -repair workers in late industrialising countries in 
comparison with West European nations, where the dominant theme after 
1970 has been managed contraction in countries of the European Union, 
in direct contrast to expansionist East Asian countries. No revolutionary 
activity occurred as volume merchant shipbuilding all but disappeared in 
the UK, Sweden, and the Netherlands, for example. Moreover, within Europe 
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as a whole, for a substantial part of the twentieth century, there had been 
a great divergence between workers in liberal democracies and those in 
the authoritarian dictatorships of Spain and Portugal, or the former Soviet 
satellites of Poland and Romania. States were direct producers or regulators 
of production and, crucially, provided either direct f inance to companies or 
subsidised them through loan guarantees, access to foreign capital, grants, 
or other f inancial incentives including taxation before their collapse. Work-
ers in Argentina and Brazil also had to endure military dictatorships, and 
their eventual collapse exposed their respective shipbuilding industries to 
the stark realities of withering international competition.
As Rubén Vega García shows, closure was f iercely resisted in the Asturian 
city of Gijón, in post-Franco Spain, where “organisational loyalties and 
forms of collective action that had originated at the end of the dictatorship 
crystallised in the years of democratic transition”, and “remained almost 
immutable in the following decades through productive restructuring, 
defence of employment, and the struggle for the survival of the shipyard”. 
As José Gómez Alén shows, the Spanish state, following the merger of 
Astilleros Españoles SA (AESA) and Empresa Nacional Bazán, began the 
commitment to the restructuring of the public shipbuilding sector only in 
December 2000 with the newly created state conglomerate, IZAR, which 
included the Bazán-Ferrol shipyard in northern Galicia. As in the UK in 
its nationalisation phase in 1977 under British Shipbuilders Plc, IZAR “in-
tegrated loss-making shipyards, some in their terminal phase, with others 
that were more profitable but had to take a share of the losses of the whole 
sector, as was the case of Bazán-Ferrol”. As a member of the European 
Economic Community from January 1986 (Portugal joined the EEC at the 
same time), the Spanish government’s attempts to prop up IZAR through 
subsidies fell afoul of the European Commission rules on subsidisation 
through state aid, giving an unfair advantage over companies from other 
member states. By a decision in October 2004 the Commission ruled that 
€556 mn of state aid to IZAR was not compatible with EU state aid rules 
and had to be recovered. Spain invoked the national security exception of 
the EU Treaty, and transferred IZAR’s naval warship-building and -repair 
shipyards to a new public company, Navantia, owned by a state-holding 
company. This decision effectively left Gijón in terminal diff iculty. Before 
Spain’s accession to the EEC, there had been reluctance to curb shipbuilding 
capacity through wholesale yard closures or rationalisation schemes. EC 
membership entailed acceptance of managed contraction of shipbuilding 
capacity in response to East Asian dominance on a community-wide basis 
after 1990.
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As was the case in Spain, Portuguese shipbuilding was also hit hard 
in the wake of the 1973-1974 OPEC crisis, particularly in those shipyards 
set up for VLCC construction. In both the Spanish and Portuguese cases, 
construction of hulls to be outfitted in Northern Europe offered a temporary 
respite, as it did later in Poland and Romania. In Spain and Portugal, the 
preservation of employment trumped economic reality, as it did to differing 
extents in Western and Northern Europe. Shipbuilding and -repair in terms 
of national economies contributed less and less to gross national product, 
but in regional terms within countries shipyards were important to local 
economies – not just the yards themselves but those who supplied them with 
services, and for the cumulative purchasing power of those employed. These 
factors also applied to the late industrialising countries, where shipbuilding 
was seen as a growth area with many benefits, strategic and economic, not 
least, as Nicola Mocci notes, as a “primary source of exporting potential, 
and therefore of foreign-currency accumulation”.
Unlike all European countries, Japanese shipowners did not desert their 
domestic shipbuilding industry, leaving at least a base level of demand to be 
f illed. Japan’s response to the huge drop in demand for VLCCs post-OPEC 
was to rationalise its productive resources to f it the new reality, and to 
reorient its productive strategy accordingly. Similarly, the nascent South 
Korean industry did likewise over time, and both it and Japan later invested 
heavily in overseas shipyards with much lower labour costs and regulation 
in countries such as Brazil, the Philippines, Romania, and Vietnam. Dutch 
ventures such as Verolme in Brazil and in the Republic of Ireland were less 
successful owing to that company’s eventual bankruptcy, although the 
Dutch Damen group is now heavily involved in Vietnam. Italy’s state-owned 
Fincantieri, the largest shipbuilder in Europe and the fourth-largest in 
the world, now owns numerous shipyards around the globe, including in 
the USA, perhaps the last redoubt of high-cost shipbuilding, both in the 
merchant ship- and naval warship-building sectors, but an industry which 
has had a base level of work owing to its Jones Act protectionism reserving 
the building of American merchant ships to American yards. Setting aside 
the USA, in the highly competitive international market for ships, to cut 
labour costs, both Japan and South Korean shipyards over time have placed 
greater reliance on cheaper sub-contracted labour forces, as have many 
other countries. The Western idea that a full-time, socially protected, and 
insured workforce is necessary in shipbuilding has rapidly gone out of 
fashion. In economies with little social provision, and high birth rates such 
as India, China (in the private shipbuilding sector), and the Philippines, 
workers are easily exploited by unscrupulous employers and agencies. 
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Ironic, then, that exploitation of agency workers still persists in Japanese 
shipbuilding and that, given the struggles of South Korean workers, their 
counterparts in South Korean-controlled shipyards in the Philippines are 
much worse off in comparison.
Clearly East Asian dominance of shipbuilding is likely to continue; what 
is left of European volume shipbuilding, with some exceptions, is largely 
dependent on warship construction, which is conveniently not subject to 
European Union rules on subsidies and competition. We can therefore 
state with some certainty that those states with active navies will retain 
shipbuilding capability, and therefore a measure of employment. Overall, 
rather than the private sector, ultimately it is state influence as the arbiter 
of domestic economies that is crucial. State intervention was crucial in the 
cases of Argentina and Brazil, where Cintia Russo and Juliana Frassa note 
that a neo-liberal privatisation agenda had taken hold, only for the state to 
renationalise the industry. In Australia, as Lisa Milner notes, Australian 
strategic policy militated against the retention of its oldest shipbuilding 
and repairing centre, Cockatoo Dockyard. That its labour relations closely 
followed the British model no doubt also had an impact. As Mocci notes, 
Thailand can be distinguished from the norm of state intervention, as 
the Thai state “has made a different choice, concentrating its resources 
on other economic activities, and causing the de facto de-development of 
what used to be a main and Asia-wide competitive industry”. Moreover, 
in what remains of Thai shipbuilding, the paternalistic depoliticisation of 
workers through the constant erosion of the rights of their organisations 
has simultaneously prevented underlying labour conflicts from rising to the 
surface. In India, examined by S.M. Fahimuddin Pasha, overbureaucratic 
governance and a managerial cadre that had little experience of manag-
ing labour-intensive large shipbuilding yards obviously had a detrimental 
impact on the industry. Given the industry’s lack of competiveness, the 
Indian government belatedly accepted the concept of liberalisation through 
privatisation in 1991, and provided special subsidies to shipbuilding by 
actively promoting a PPP (public-private partnership) in the industry. How 
serious the Indian government takes rampant corruption in its economy 
remains open to question as does its policing of its multifarious labour laws, 
which are all too easily subverted by unscrupulous employers. One can also 
pose the same question of many of the countries considered in this volume.
Shipbuilding and -repair do not exist in a vacuum. To some extent 
the concerns of other workers in different industries mirror those in 
shipbuilding and -repair where workers are not immune to the general 
economic, political, and social situation in their respective countries. Issues 
SoMe Final oBSeRvationS 663
of identity, class, gender, race, and ethnicity are common to all countries. 
Labour history, whether it is undertaken by an approach of history “from 
below” by emphasising workers’ collective contributions and identities in 
the workplace, or by highlighting the contributions of neglected groups 
such as sub-contracted or agency workers, remains a vital area of study in 
an increasingly globalised world.
What seemingly unites shipbuilding and ship repairing labour at present, 
despite social, economic, and political divergences between countries, is the 
increasing precariousness of employment through widespread use by em-
ployers of sub-contracted and/or temporary labour. Shipbuilders in Western 
Europe and in Japan and South Korea have increasingly concentrated on 
sophisticated tonnage, whereas China initially focused on tanker and bulk 
carrier construction, but this is changing as military shipbuilding forms 
a more technologically sophisticated part of Chinese state shipbuilding. 
China’s initial cost advantages in labour are likely to decrease over time 
as has been the case in Japan and later, South Korea, as labour eventually 
organises and demands better terms and conditions of employment, but 
not without struggle.
However, there has been a marked trend towards labour-market de-
regulation around the world in line with neo-liberal free-market ideology. 
That ideology has increasing come under criticism since the 2008 world 
f inancial crisis, where now it is generally accepted that the prime cause 
was the deregulation of f inancial markets and therefore lack of state su-
pervision in the USA, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere. Costs of ships 
remain the major preoccupation of shipowners, with quality, delivery, and 
advantageous post-delivery credit packages next in importance. Shipping 
has always been an industry subject to trade cycles, with shipbuilding more 
so: shipbuilding labour unions have always known this, as have employers. 
Governments, to preserve employment, have historically come up with a 
plethora of f iscal arrangements and subsidies to ameliorate this market 
reality. The danger to workers is that a race to the bottom to win orders is 
a real danger, where their plight is seen as secondary in terms of remaining 
internationally competitive. Shipbuilding and -repair workers around the 
globe are in the same boat as regards their occupation, but evidently not in 
their living standards and future prospects. There remains a huge gulf in 
social provision between West and East and between Latin America and 
North America.
This volume, through its case studies, enhances our understanding of 
global shipbuilding labour. Although labour historians have other preoc-
cupations and areas of interest, this and similar studies of other occupations 
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give comparative ballast to present and future studies in labour history. If 
labour history is to continue to be meaningful, then labour historians need 
to have a continual cross-national comparative dialogue; in that manner 
the future of the discipline can continue to be debated, and the voices of 
repeatedly dispossessed and exploited labour so often ignored by govern-
ments can continue to be heard.
 Appendix 1: The effects of the oil price 
shocks on shipbuilding in the 1970s
Hugh Murphy and Stig Tenold
This small chapter attempts to give the reader an appreciation of the effects 
of the two oil price shocks on the market for ships. We address changes 
both on the demand side (shipping) and the supply side (shipbuilding) in 
the 1970s and early 1980s. It is not, however, an exhaustive explanation but 
an indicative one.
In the 1950s and 1960s the search for economies of scale led to increased 
demand by shipowners for larger and larger tankers. From 1967, with the 
closure of the Suez Canal consequent on the Arab-Israeli war and its con-
tinuing non-use to 1975, this trend accelerated, as vessels now had to take the 
far lengthier route around the Cape of Good Hope.1 A dearth of shipbuilding 
capacity led to an increase in newbuilding prices, motivating speculative 
demand. Some VLCCs were sold immediately after they had been completed 
at a considerable premium to the price originally contracted for, while 
other contracts were even sold at a prof it before the building of the ship 
was f inished.
The quest for economies of scale had important implications for the 
shipbuilding industry. The average size of the vessels on order more than 
trebled in the decade after 1962. Shipyards had to adjust to this, only to 
see the development stagnate, then reverse, after the 1973-1974 oil price 
increase. This is undoubtedly one of the roots of the crises in shipping and 
shipbuilding. Figure A.1.1 shows the growth in the average size of tankers 
ordered in the 1960s and f irst half of the 1970s, and the drastic reduction 
in average size after the freight market broke down.
The hump-like properties of the orderbook and deliveries in Figure 
A.1.1 are echoed in – and partly explained by – the development of the 
demand for oil transport. Again, strong growth in the 1960s was followed 
by stagnation, then by an absolute decline from the last part of the 1970s 
onwards.
1 A tanker sailing from Bombay to London via the Suez Canal travelled roughly 6,200 nautical 
miles. The same tanker taking the Cape of Good Hope route travelled 10,800 nautical miles.
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The basis for the breakdown of the tanker freight market was the Or-
ganization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)2 price hikes of 
1973-74, with its associated embargoes following the Yom Kippur War. These 
eventually led to a tripling and then quadrupling of the price of a barrel 
of crude oil.3 The price increase had profound effects on the demand for 
shipping and shipbuilding and on Western economies as a whole, which 
were plunged into recession. The effects were further compounded by 
another rise in the oil price in 1979-80. Then, hoarding of oil as a result of 
2 OPEC was created at the Baghdad conference on 10-14 September 1960 by f ive founder 
member countries: Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. They were later joined 
by Qatar (1961), Indonesia (1962), Libya (1962), United Arab Emirates (1967), Algeria (1969), 
and Ecuador (1973). OPEC was originally headquartered in Geneva but moved to Vienna on 
1 September 1965. Its formation was a direct challenge to the then hegemonic position of the 
seven oil majors. OPEC’s original rationale was to co-ordinate and unify petroleum policies 
among member countries, with the aim of giving a fair return on capital. Before the concerted 
actions in late 1973 and early 1974, the organisation did not succeed in acting as a cartel. 
3 The posted price increased from USD $3.011 per barrel up until 16 October 1973 to USD $11.651 
per barrel after 1 January 1974: OPEC, OPEC 1989 Statistical Bulletin, 126-127.



















































Existing tankers Orderbook Deliveries
Source: Based on dwt-figures for oil tankers from Fearnley and eger, Review, various issues
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the Iranian Revolution, which deposed the shah of Iran, pushed oil prices 
even higher.4 As Daniel Todd put it:
Upsurges in oil prices in 1973 and 1979 … also suff iced to scuttle the oil 
carrying trades. From an unprecedented boom in 1973, the tanker market 
slid into the depths of a Stygian slump.5
At the beginning of 1973 ships that could transport oil – tankers and com-
bination carriers – made up more than 80 per cent of the orderbook, and 
during the year the share jumped to more than 85 per cent.6 Then new orders 
for tankers and combination carriers more or less dried up – the share of 
new orders fell to around a f ifth in 1975, 1976, and 1977.
In the aftermath of the f irst oil price hike, between the end of 1974 and 
the beginning of 1976 some 50 mn dwt of world tanker tonnage on order 
was summarily cancelled – a f igure which reached 60 mn dwt by 1977.7 
4 In the twelve months following the Iranian Revolution, the price of a barrel of crude oil 
rose from an average of USD $16 per barrel to just under USD $40 per barrel. 
5 Todd, Industrial Dislocation, 4.
6 Based on dwt f igures from Fearnley and Eger, Review, various issues.
7 Beth, Hader, and Kappel, 25 Years of World Shipping, 36, and OECD, Maritime Transport, 
1976, 80.
























































Crude oil transport demand
Source: Based on ton-mile figures for crude oil from Fearnley and eger, Review, various issues
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The effects of the crisis lasted longer than anticipated, and by 1978 there 
was more than 30 per cent oversupply of tanker tonnage. With the second 
oil price hike of 1979 the situation worsened, and by 1982 more than 60 per 
cent of the tanker fleet was surplus to demand.8 In that year, demand for 
tanker shipping was slightly lower than it had been in 1970, but over the 
same period the tanker fleet had increased by almost 150 per cent.9 Table 
A.1.1 shows the immediate effect of the oil crisis on the annual volume of 
orders placed, with completions exceeding new orders by 1974.10
The shipbuilding industry had experienced a latent demand surplus 
throughout the f irst post-war decades, leading to a substantial increase in 
the volume of outstanding orders. The industry responded as expected – by 
increasing capacity. Ironically, when the production capacity reached the 
scale needed to fulf il the anticipated demand, the new orders collapsed. 
Figure A.1.3 shows the gap between new orders and deliveries in the second 
half of the 1960s. By 1973 shipbuilding production capacity had increased 
to more than 60 mn dwt – more or less exactly the average annual ordering 
over the f ive previous years. From the following year onwards, the demand 
for new ships collapsed.
Again, the shipbuilding industry response lagged – the decline in new 
orders fell faster than the industry could adjust its capacity. However, by 
the early 1980s a new equilibrium was reached, at around the half of the 
level from the early 1970s.
8 Todd, Industrial Dislocation, 5.
9 Tenold, Tankers in Trouble, 86.
10 For a more expansive introduction to the shipping crisis, see ibid, passim.
Table A.1.1  Annual volume of orders placed and annual completions 1970-1976 
(mn grt)








Source: Lloyd’s List Statistical Reports, various years
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There were also lag effects affecting both shipowners and shipbuilders,11 
but the latter were potentially the hardest-hit, as they tended to be the bigger 
f irms in the industry with many orders in hand – simply because of the 
size of the product – and had oriented their productive resources, particu-
larly steel output and plant and equipment towards VLCC construction.12 
Although there was a short-term inelasticity of demand for oil, the crisis 
hit relatively quickly, shipbuilders were left to f inish contracts, which were 
11 The lag between contracting and delivery when shipbuilders had large orderbooks led to a 
rise in the tanker f leet post-OPEC. Shipowners were also slow to adapt to oversupply as cyclical 
downturns, usually of short duration, had always been a feature of the market and, by the time 
that all concerned realised that expected growth had failed to materialise, the diff iculty of 
adapting supply to changed market circumstances was apparent. 
12 This was particularly true in the UK case where its three largest shipbuilders and employers, 
Swan Hunter on the Rivers Tyne and Tees, Scott Lithgow on the Lower Clyde, and Harland and 
Wolff at Queens Island, Belfast, all made disastrous entries into the VLCC and ULCC market 
in a period of intense international competition. All were hit badly by cancellations and legal 
wrangling post-OPEC and by the collapse of Maritime Fruit Carriers, originally an Israeli reefer 
company, which had moved into VLCC tankers on a speculative basis and had gone bust in 
1976, when its orders comprised some 35 per cent of all work in UK shipyards. By the time the 
industry was nationalised in July 1977 all three f irms were basically bankrupt.
























































Contracting (cycle average) Deliveries
note: in order to neutralise the effect of the variations along the shipping cycle, the contracting 
figures are presented as seven-year average, corresponding to the “rule-of-thumb” size of the 
cycle. 
Source: based on dwt-figures for world contracting and world deliveries from Fearnleys, Review, 
various issues
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semi-finished or fitting-out, or on which steel had already been ordered with 
no other alternative for its use. Shipowners found it easy – but expensive – to 
cancel contracts not yet begun. Usually the penalty was around 10 to 20 per 
cent of the contract price, but in some cases the yards demanded as much 
as two-thirds of the price.13 As receiving a superfluous vessel would be even 
more costly, shipowners were willing to pay substantial cancellation fees. 
One Norwegian company paid a cancellation fee of around USD $20 mn for 
a tanker on order in Germany, but “[d]espite the size of the amount, this 
loss can, in hindsight, be regarded as a good investment in the continuing 
existence of the company”.14
Some owners were left in a dilemma when construction was at an ad-
vanced stage, with no real prospect of a charter. Many refused delivery of 
vessels, dragging out contracts by picking faults, which would have been 
largely ignored if lucrative charters had been forthcoming. Such legalistic 
wrangling had always been a feature of the shipbuilder-client relationships 
and, as such, contracts were far more tightly drawn up than in the past to 
compensate. An alternative for shipowners was to lay up tonnage to save on 
operating costs, or, alternatively, to use it for storage of oil, but both options 
had cost implications.15 Many of the tankers still operating reduced speed to 
conserve fuel following the increase in the cost of bunkers; in the latter half 
of the 1970s such “slow steaming” absorbed a larger share of the surplus than 
laid-up ships.16 As the shipping crisis intensif ied it was not uncommon for 
laden tankers to anchor off land-based terminals for unspecif ied periods. 
This allowed oil companies to supplement their storage capacity in line 
with market movements.17
From 1974 onwards, shipbuilders’ rationale was to get VLCCs off their 
premises as quickly as possible in order to mitigate the effects of increasing 
inflation, as many of these contracts had been taken on at f ixed prices, given 
the increasing competition in this market. In 1974 and 1975 the amount of 
tanker tonnage completed and delivered reached record levels and more 
13 Letter from a Norwegian shipowner, dated 24 November 1975, in Archives of Norges Red-
eriforbund, folder 6B K 75 – Krisen 1975/IV/011075-301175.
14 Nerheim and Utne, Under samme stjerne, 250.
15 According to OECD, Maritime Transport, 1976, para. 221. The cost of laying up a VLCC might 
be as much as USD $75,000 per month, and the one-off cost of preparation or of site acquisition 
could be in the region of USD $700,000.
16 Tenold, Tankers in Trouble, 79. Slow steaming is undertaken when the fuel cost savings are 
higher than the prof its foregone in additional voyages.
17 In 1978, 5 mn dwt of tanker capacity was used for storage purposes off the coast of Japan: 
see Fearnley and Eger, Review, 1978, 38.
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than 40 mn dwt was delivered in 1976. An alternative strategy was to convert 
tanker newbuildings contracts to dry bulk or general cargo carriers, though 
these types of tonnage in terms of cost per ton were more expensive than 
VLCCs. In 1975 alone, around 10 mn dwt of tanker tonnage was converted 
to other ship types, and according to Fearnley and Eger in 1977 a f igure of 
15 mn dwt was registered as conversions.18
The tonnage conversion, as well as the redeployment of combination 
carriers from wet to dry markets, combined with the general recession to 
give a surplus of ships outside the tanker sector as well.19 The end result was 
a rapid deterioration of new orders, in spite of a subsidy race to ensure that 
the shipbuilding capacity was utilised. The biggest subsidies came in the 
countries that were the least competitive; the Swedish Guarantee Fund, for 
example, offered public money to lend as much as 75 per cent of the value 
of vessels that shipyards built for stock, i.e. ships for which no orders had 
been received.20
Shipbuilders in many countries experienced a marked diminution 
in demand for new ships as lack of demand and overcapacity of supply 
predominated in a period of intense international competition. Table A.1.2 
gives an indication of the drop in demand in four established shipbuilding 
18 Fearnley and Eger, Review, 1976, 5.
19 In 1972 less than 20 per cent of combination carriers operated in the dry bulk market; by 1981 
the corresponding f igure was more than 75 per cent. The combination carriers increased the 
supply of dry bulk tonnage by around 25 per cent, with the evident effect on freight rates – and 
newbuilding demand – in this market; data from Fearnley and Egers, Review, various issues, 
Tables 3 and 15.
20 Stråth, “Industrial Restructuring in the Swedish Shipbuilding Industry”, 233.
Table A.1.2  Annual tonnage launched in selected countries, 1975-1983 (000 grt)




Brazil Sweden UK World
1975 17,987  441 2,549 389 961 1,304 35,897
1976 14,310  689 1,792 426 957 1,341 31,047
1977  9,943  455 1,390 572 360 1,119 24,167
1978  4,921  424  600 698 360  813 15,407
1979  4,317  479  385 467 229  610 11,788
1980  7,288  629  462 615 227  244 13,935
1981  8,857 1,229  669 549 364  339 17,066
1982  8,247 1,530  722 455 434  528 17,290
1983  7,071 1,201  651 359 525  527 14,888
Source: Lloyd’s Register Statistical Reports, various years
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countries, Japan, West Germany, Sweden and the UK and in two new 
entrants, South Korea and Brazil. The sheer scale of the drop – in addition 
to the relocation of the remaining production – indicates an industry going 
through seismic changes.
In 1975, the leading shipbuilding nation, Japan, launched just over 50 per 
cent of the world total; by 1983, it was 47.5 per cent, with large fluctuations 
in demand in between necessitating a drop in full-time employment and a 
concomitant rise in a part-time and sub-contracted workforce . By this stage, 
both the UK and Sweden had nationalised from 1977 their shipbuilding 
industries to preserve employment. In both countries, market realities, 
particularly the trend shift of shipbuilding production to the Far East with 
South Korea, by this stage the major competitor,21 made nationalisation an 
expensive gamble. It was one that both countries ultimately lost, with seri-
ous effects on employment and the loss of merchant shipbuilding capacity.22 
Table A.1.3 gives an indication of the long-term effects of the shipping crisis 
on employment levels in f ive established shipbuilding nations.
Over the period 1975 to 1990 British shipbuilding retained just 13 per 
cent of the workforce employed in 1975. Corresponding percentages for 
West Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, and Japan are 32, 2, 19 and 35 per 
cent respectively. Over the period, Sweden experienced a precipitous drop 
in employment of 98 per cent, and Japanese shipbuilding lost far more 
21 For this, see Bruno and Tenold, “The Basis for South Korea’s Ascent in the Shipbuilding 
Industry”.
22 See Johnman and Murphy, British Shipbuilding and the State Since 1918. For the consequences 
of state intervention and the impact on shipbuilding f irms in four established shipbuilding 
nations, see Berggren, “The Effects of the Shipbuilding Crisis in Malmö”, Devos, “The Belgian/
Flemish Shipbuilding Industry”, Johnman, “Public Intervention and the Hollowing-Out of 
British Shipbuilding”, and de Voogd, “Public Intervention and the Decline of Shipbuilding in 
the Netherlands”. 
Table A.1.3  Employment in newbuildings of merchant ships in five countries, 
selected years 
Year UK West Germany* Sweden Netherlands Japan
1975 48,000 47,000 25,000 21,000 256,000
1980 25,000 25,000 12,000 10,000 164,000
1985 13,000 22,000  6,000  6,000 134,000
1990  6,000 15,000   553  4,000  89,000
note: * excludes the former east german shipyards. in 1990 these had 19,000 employees. 
Source: de voogd, “public intervention and the decline of Shipbuilding in the netherlands”, 252
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employees than the other four nations combined. Many of these losses had 
resulted from planned redundancies, shipyard closures, and rationalisa-
tion of production through mergers. Still, what ultimately determined the 
scale of job losses after the oil crises of the 1970s despite the high levels of 
government subsidies was the market, and which nations had the f inancial 
resources and the willpower to remain in merchant shipbuilding and to deal 
with oversupply and cutthroat international competition. Nevertheless, 
as the Swedish and UK cases show, government largesse by taking the 
industries into public ownership for employment reasons was not sufficient 
to ensure their survival.23
23 For the losses involved in the British case under public ownership, see Johnman and Murphy, 
British Shipbuilding and the State Since 1918, 240.

 Appendix 2: Shipbuilding in 2013: an 
analysis of shipbuilding statistics
Victoria Culkin
From 1956 onwards, Japan remained the world’s major producer of ships 
in the latter half of the twentieth century. By the 1980s, and almost from a 
standing start, South Korea had become a major challenger, followed in the 
mid-1990s by the People’s Republic of China. That South Korea and China 
vied to become the principal shipbuilding country in the world in little more 
than three decades is indicative of a paradigm shift of world shipbuilding 
production to East Asia.1 Statistics for 2013 show that more than 93 per 
cent of world shipbuilding completions were built in China, South Korea, or 
Japan.2 This appendix seeks to address this shift in the world shipbuilding 
industry using statistics from Lloyd’s Register’s Statistical Tables, Lloyd’s 
Register- Fairplay Statistical Tables, and IHS Fairplay Statistics. I examine 
the shipbuilding statistics further, looking at the categories of ships and 
countries of build during 2013, as well as the vessels currently on order.
Lloyd’s Register is the world’s oldest classif ication society and its f irst 
surveyor in Japan was appointed in 1885. By 1959 Lloyd’s Register employed 
55 surveyors in Japan and today retains the largest share of classif ication 
work of ships built in Japan for export.3 Lloyd’s Register’s work in China has 
continued since 1869, and in 1978 it signed a reciprocal survey agreement 
with the Register of Shipping of the People’s Republic of China (now the 
China Classif ication Society), and became the f irst foreign classif ication 
society to be invited into the country. It now has off ices in many of the 
major ports in China, which reflects the major growth in shipbuilding in 
the area.4 Lloyd’s Register’s work also grew rapidly in South Korea during 
the 1970s and thereafter as that country took a leading position in world 
shipbuilding.5
1 For this, see, Todd, Industrial Dislocation, and Todd, “Going East”. For South Korea, see 
Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant, Jonsson, Shipbuilding in South Korea, and Bruno and Tenold, “The 
Basis for South Korea’s Ascent in the Shipbuilding Industry”. For Japan, see, Chida and Davies, 
The Japanese Shipping and Shipbuilding Industries.
2 IHS Fairplay, World Fleet Statistics 2013 (Statistical Notes, Note 5 Shipbuilding Statistics).
3 Watson, Lloyd’s Register 250 Years of Service, 330-331.
4 Ibid., 314-315.
5 Ibid., 332-333.
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Figure A.2.1 shows the gross tonnage of completions by country of 
build from 1991 through to 2012. This shows the overall growth of the 
now principal shipbuilding countries, China, South Korea, and Japan in 
relation to the rest of the world. We can see that the tonnage f igures for 
the rest of the world remained relatively stable between 1991 and 2012, 
remaining on average around 6.3 mn grt. There was a dip in output for 
the rest of the world in 1997 when the gross tonnage dropped from 7.2 mn 
in 1996 to 5.9 mn the following year. The rest of the world output grew 
steadily until 2007-08, until output peaked at just over 8 mn grt, then 
dropped to approximately 6 mn grt before rising slightly again over the 
next three years.
Japan remained the dominant shipbuilding country until 2000 when 
the output of South Korea slightly overtook that of Japan, in terms of gross 
tonnage, with 12.28 mn grt to 12.02 mn grt respectively. South Korea’s output 
continued to rise from 2000 to 2010, peaking in 2011 with 34.8 mn grt, before 
dropping slightly in 2012 to an output of 31 mn grt. In 2013, South Korea’s 
output stood at approximately 23.8 mn grt.6 In 1991, the shipbuilding output 
of China stood at 509,795 grt; by 1994, China had nearly doubled its output 
6 IHS Fairplay Shipbuilding Statistics for the quarters ending March-December 2013. 
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Source: Lloyd’s Register Statistical Tables 1991-2012; Lloyd’s Register-Fairplay Statistical Tables; IHS 
Fairplay Statistical Tables
appendix 2: SHipBuilding in 2013: an analySiS oF SHipBuilding StatiSticS 677
to 1.07 mn grt. Another signif icant rise occurred between 1996 and 2002, 
from 1.07 mn grt to 2.2 mn grt. Thereafter, output rose again with China 
increasing its output by a couple of million tons each year until 2008 when 
the rise was more marked. In 2007, gross tonnage stood at 10.2 mn; in 2008 
it was 13.5 mn followed by a huge leap in 2009 to just over 21.5 mn grt. The 
year 2010 saw another large increase in Chinese output to just over 35 mn 
grt, which rose steadily until 2012. China’s completions for 2013 stand at 
25.5 mn grt:7 with South Korea overtaking China for two quarters of 2013 
(June and March) in terms of output.
Tables A.2.1 and A.2.2 show the completions by gross tonnage and country 
of build for 2013. When we analyse the number of ships built during 2013, 
the top three shipbuilding countries are China (41.7 per cent), Japan (15.2 per 
cent), and South Korea (12.3 per cent). In terms of gross tonnage completed 
during the year, the top three shipbuilding countries are China with 36.9 
per cent of world output, South Korea with 35.1 per cent, and Japan with 20.9 
per cent of world output. These f igures show that, in terms of the number 
of ships, Japan ranks higher than South Korea with 540 ships completed 
to South Korea’s 386.
The difference between China and South Korea is more marked in terms 
of the number of ships completed in 2013. China built almost three times 
the number of ships that South Korea did, but again when we look at the 
gross tonnage of the ships completed in 2013 we see that the difference 
between China and the second-largest shipbuilding country, South Korea, 
is only 536,000 tons. This is because South Korea builds larger and more 
sophisticated ships.
Nearly a third of the ships built in 2012 in China are for the domestic 
market, totalling 11.5 mn grt. In comparison, those built in South Korea for 
the domestic market total one-tenth and the percentage of ships built in 
Japan for the domestic market is well over half at 65 per cent. In terms of 
gross tonnage, South Korea completed more ships for the export market, 
totalling over 28.4 mn grt, but built far less for the domestic market, totalling 
thirty-four ships with a gross tonnage of 2.7 mn.
The top three shipbuilders for 2012, in terms of gross tonnage, are all 
South Korean, Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering (sixty-six 
ships, 6.3 mn grt), Hyundai Heavy Industries, Ulsan (sixty-four ships, 5.4 
mn grt), and Samsung Heavy Industries (f ifty ships, 4.5 mn grt).8 In fact, 
of the largest shipbuilders by gross tonnage, seven are based in South 
7 Ibid.
8 IHS World Fleet Statistics, 2012: Statistics Notes 5&6 (IHS Fairplay, 2013).
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Table A.2.1  Completions by country of build, 2013





















Source: IHS Fairplay World Shipbuilding Statistics, 2013
Table A.2.2  Completions per quarter for 2013 and 2014
Month Number of ships Gross tonnage
March 2013  881 22,900,000
June 2013  772 18,800,000
September 2013  739 15,600,000
december 2013  658 12,900,000
Total 3,050 70,200,000
March 2014  781 18,000,000
June 2014  697 17,200,000
Total (January-June 2014) 1,478 35,200,000
Source: IHS Fairplay Shipbuilding Statistics, March-december 2013 and March-June 2014)
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Korea, with 26.8 mn grt and 350 ships. More than 86 per cent of South 
Korea’s output was built at seven of the largest shipbuilders. China’s largest 
shipbuilders produced far fewer ships than those of South Korea: they built 
just over 12 mn grt and 146 ships. Japan’s largest shipbuilder built 1.4 mn 
grt, or 9 ships.9
Table A.2.3 shows that the majority of ships completed in 2013 were bulk 
carriers. Overall output for the year shows that 95 per cent of ship types 
were cargo-carrying. In 2012, bulk carriers made up over 34.3 per cent of 
the world merchant fleet (in terms of gross tonnage), with an average age of 
nine years for a bulk carrier. In 2013, the bulk carrier f leet was 39 per cent 
of the total overall world fleet.10
Orderbook – 2013 onwards
The orderbook for 2013 shows 3,964 ships on order. Over 80 per cent of these 
ships will be built by the three principal shipbuilding countries and 41.3 
per cent (or 1,637 ships) will be built in China.
The orderbook, when viewed by country of build, shows that little will 
change in the position of the shipbuilding countries. China will remain 
the dominant shipbuilding nation, closely followed by South Korea and 
then Japan. As we would expect, the statistics for each country vary greatly 
depending on the type of ships. Typically, Germany, Italy, and Finland still 
dominate large cruise-ship output, and China remains the leading country 
for bulk carriers. For the December quarter of 2013, there were more than 
1,500 bulk carriers on order.11 Although China has more container ships 
on order in terms of numbers, when we consider the tonnage (in this case 
deadweight tonnage) we see that South Korea has far larger container ships 
on order.
9 Ibid.
10 ISL, Shipping Statistics and Market Review, 57, 9/10 (2013), 17, Table 1 World Merchant Fleet.
11 IHS Fairplay, World Shipbuilding Statistics for the Quarter Ending December 2013, Notes 3: 
Summary of shipbuilding activity for the quarter by top twenty cargo-carrying ship type.
appendix 2: SHipBuilding in 2013: an analySiS oF SHipBuilding StatiSticS 681
Conclusion
The far more export-oriented South Korean shipbuilding industry has 
increasingly concentrated on building larger and more specialised high-
value ships compared to those being built in China. Although South 
Korea produced fewer ships, there is very little difference in gross tonnage 
between South Korea and China. A major difference is the amount of 
domestic tonnage built, and China’s output was far greater than the other 
two largest shipbuilding countries in terms of the number of ships as well 
as the number of ships completed. In 2005, China completed 6.3 mn grt of 
merchant shipping, but by 2012 this had rocketed to 38.2 mn. China has 
increased its shipbuilding output by six times in terms of the tonnage of 
ships and by nearly four times in relation to the number of merchant ships 
produced, which rose from 310 ships in 2005 to more than 1,160 ships in 2012. 
The orderbook and schedule for completion show that China will remain the 
dominant shipbuilding nation, closely followed by South Korea and Japan.
Table A.2.5  Orderbook (2013) by ship type
Ship type No of ships GT
liquefied gas  289 15,475,788
chemical tanker  490 10,618,795
oil carrier  386 22,110,372
Bulk carrier (dry cargo) 1,575 70,092,930
cargo (general)  382  3,772,177
container ship  490 38,968,122
Ro-Ro (passenger and cargo)  208  5,871,438
passenger and cruise ship   69  2,580,621
Source: IHS Fairplay, World Shipbuilding Statistics 2013, table 7

 Glossary of shipping and shipbuilding 
terms
Block assembly
The block-assembly method, as a result of the shipbuilding industry’s 
principal method of metal joining – welding – is the most common method 
of shipbuilding today and involves the assembly of pre-fabricated sections, 
which are in effect cross-sections of the superstructure. Blocks are normally 
constructed in covered fabrication shops and then transported to the build-
ing dock. The pre-erected block weight depends on available crane capacity. 
Three-dimensional blocks are designed by CAD (computer-aided design) 
methods. Production phases are the manufacture and assembly of f lat 
and curved steel panels, pre-assembly of stiffeners on plate, assembly of 
the pre-assembled parts in sections, assembly of blocks, and then erection 
of and subsequent joining of blocks by welding on building berths. Block 
assembly utilises fully and semi-automated machine welding techniques 
and insertion of pipework, plumbing, and electrical cabling etc., before 
transfer to the building dock. The proportion of welding carried out by 
various processes and the amount of mechanisation vary from shipyard to 
shipyard. Blocks are often primed or fully painted beforehand. It follows that 
the extent of automation utilised can have a great impact on productivity 
and on staff ing levels. Process planning is of particular importance in this 
type of construction. However, the capacity of the physical facilities will be 
limited by the eff iciency with which they are operated. Productivity is to 
some degree determined by equipment but is more to do with organisation 
and operating systems and the way in which the facilities are managed. 
The planning of the production process and the details of design have a 
major influence on the level of performance and thereby the output that a 
shipyard can achieve.
Bulk cargo carriers
Tankers: The use of the word tanker alone generally refers to oil tanker, 
carrying either crude oil or oil derivatives (normally referred to as “oil 
products”) such as petroleum, kerosene, or naphtha. Generally speaking, 
crude oil moves in large amounts in very large ships (normally above 100,000 
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dwt) and products in smaller “parcels” in smaller ships (up to around 70,000 
dwt, but typically in ships carrying up to around 45,000 dwt).
Bulk carriers: Normally refers to “dry bulk” cargoes as opposed to tankers 
that carry “wet bulk” cargoes. The major bulk cargoes, including coal, grain, 
and iron ore, generally move in large quantities up to around 170,000 tonnes. 
Minor bulk cargoes, including for example animal feed or bulk sugar, are 
typically transported in ships carrying up to around 50,000 dwt.
Combination carriers: An ore-bulk-oil carrier, also known as combination 
carrier or OBO, is a ship designed to be capable of carrying wet or dry 
cargoes. The idea is to reduce the number of empty (ballast) voyages, in 
which large ships only carry a cargo one way and return empty for another.
Container ships: Carry containerised cargoes, sometimes referred to as 
“unitised” cargoes. There are a wide range of sizes of ships on a wide range 
of routes, typically following an established “hub and feeder” pattern. Very 
large ships (the largest of which now rival the largest category of tankers 
in terms of physical dimensions) carry containers on trans-oceanic routes 
serving the main hub ports in the Far East, Europe, North America, and 
the Middle East. Smaller “feeder” ships then distribute the boxes from the 
main hub ports to local ports. The contents of the containers are made up 
of “general cargo”, and may include diverse items such as machinery, white 
goods, clothing, electronic equipment, etc.
The above four ship types make up by far the largest portion of the world 
f leet and a signif icant proportion of the output from the shipbuilding 
industry.
Contracts and finance
Having selected the preferred bidder, the ship owner will normally sign a 
“letter of intent to build” and will then proceed to negotiate the contract, 
either directly with the shipyard or through a ship broker. In the latter 
case, tenders will be solicited from a number of shipyards. Central to the 
negotiation in each case will be price – the key factor – which will have been 
specified in the original offer, but which will be negotiated against the terms 
of the contract. Traditionally, payment terms were normally made by the 
owner in stages during the construction of the ship to assist with working 
gloSSaRy oF SHipping and SHipBuilding teRMS 685
capital in the shipyard: initial signing of the contract, ordering of steel, 
laying of the keel, launch, and completion. The balance of these payments 
will have signif icant cost implications for the owner and the shipyard, and 
these implications will be taken into account in determining the f inal price. 
Traditionally, payment was by five instalments of 20 per cent spread over the 
duration of the contract period; however, this has largely been superseded in 
recent years by payment terms that are advantageous to the buyer, used as 
an incentive to attract business by the shipyard. Financial terms of contracts 
stipulating as much as 70 per cent of the payment delayed until delivery 
have become common in recent years, and place a great burden on the 
shipbuilder to maintain liquidity, that is, working capital in the business.
Guarantees: Owners require guarantees for return of downpayments in 
the case of default by builders. Such guarantees must be acceptable to the 
owner’s f inanciers. A shipyard that is unable to provide such guarantees as 
a result of a poor credit rating is unlikely to be able to sell ships.
Delivery date: The owner’s aim is likely to be to obtain delivery as fast 
as possible, but this has to be balanced against the shipyard’s existing 
orderbook commitments.
Penalty clauses: All contracts will include penalty clauses to cover the 
eventualities that the shipyard may not perform in delivering the ship 
on time or that the ship does not perform to the specif ied operational 
capabilities. Both situations will have serious f inancial implications for 
the buyer and will be covered by f inancial penalties for the shipbuilder.
Specification: The shipyard may offer a standard design at the price origi-
nally offered. The owner may subsequently seek to change details of the 
design or to add extra features. In this case, the shipyard will charge such 
changes as extras. The builder may also offer a standard list of manufactur-
ers of major equipment, such as engines, pumps, electronic equipment, 
etc. However, the owner may seek to substitute his own preferred makers, 
which will have an implication on the price.
Options: The owner may seek to reserve additional slots in the builder’s 
programme to add further ships under the contract at a later date, normally 
at the same price. These reservations will be held for a limited time period 
only, after which time the slots will be offered to others. The degree of power 
in each side of the negotiation will depend to some degree on the nature of 
686 SHipBuilding and SHip RepaiR WoRKeRS aRound tHe WoRld
the buyer. Established shipping companies with extensive fleets are likely 
to be regular buyers of ships and as such wield a greater level of influence 
than one-off or occasional speculative buyers. Major shipping companies 
are also more likely to have their own technical departments with their own 
views on the detail of design and the manufacturers’ list. The power balance 
also depends on the state of the market and the backlog at the shipyard. 
A shipyard with a full orderbook is likely to negotiate harder than one in 
need of work. Having placed the order, the buyer will make provisions for 
the supervision of the construction of the ship. The owner is entitled to 
have representation on site during the building period to monitor activity 
and ensure that the work is to standard. This role is in addition to the 
supervision by the classif ication society chosen. Many owners have their 
own staff on site to undertake this role, acting directly on their behalf. For 
smaller owners the work may be sub-contracted to the classif ication society 
or surveyors contracted for the purpose. In addition to inspections by the 
owner and the classif ication society, the flag state authority under whose 
jurisdiction the ship is to be registered will also seek to inspect the ship, in 
particular with relation to safety features. After delivery, the shipbuilder 
provides a warranty covering workmanship, equipment, and materials 
normally lasting for one year.
Financing the order: In addition to negotiating for the construction of the 
ship, the owner will also have to negotiate a f inance package to support 
the purchase. Newbuild f inance is a highly complex and specialised f ield. 
The f inancial package behind the purchase is likely to consist of a number 
of instruments, but the buyer is likely to have to include some of his own 
capital as part of the deal to satisfy the requirements of lenders. There are a 
number of banks that specialise in newbuild f inance through syndicates of 
banks, rather than individual banks, to spread the risk. Regular buyers are 
likely to have established links to preferred banks with which they have a 
good credit record. In particular cases, funding may be raised through the 
financial markets using instruments such as rights issues. Such mechanisms 
are normally used when the ship has the prospect of guaranteed employ-
ment such as through long-term charters. In other cases investment by 
private individuals may be possible through syndicates formed specif ically 
to provide funding for ship purchase. Such syndicates may be encouraged 
by favourable tax regimes for shipping investment. In some cases, the opera-
tor may lease the ship back from a leasing company that will f inance and 
purchase the vessel on his behalf. Some lenders may also require an interest 
in a ship as security for a loan through a ship mortgage, which legally consists 
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of three parts: the mortgage loan, the mortgage deed, and the rights derived 
from the mortgage deed onto the lender. Ship mortgages differ from other 
types of mortgage in three ways. First, some privileged claims could have 
a higher ranking over that of mortgagee against the ship. Second, ships 
naturally move between jurisdictions. And, third, a ship is always at risk of 
partial or total loss at sea. To take effect, ship mortgages must be registered.
Jumboisation
This consists of enlarging a ship by adding an entire section to it, allowing 
an increase in its value and utility without purchasing or building a ship 
from scratch. Large vessels such as tankers often have uniform mid-sections, 
which lends itself to jumboisation as the ship is cut into two sections and 
an additional section is inserted in between. The type of additional section 
depends on the purpose of the ship – for example, it can be an oil tank, dry 
bulk hold, or a group of cabins. Smaller vessels with less uniform profiles are 
usually jumboised by replacing the entire bow or stern section of the ship.
Lloyd’s Register of Ships
Lloyd’s Register (LR) provides the most complete database of the world’s 
merchant fleet that is available. LR has maintained a listing of ships since 
the eighteenth century and the current database lists around 90,000 ves-
sels, including ships on order as well as existing ships. All ships have to be 
registered with a national authority to be able to trade. Lloyd’s Register 
includes a list of all registered ships and is regarded as the “off icial” listing 
of the global fleet. This database has been used as the source of fleet and or-
derbook statistics. (It should be noted that the LR organisation also includes 
a classif ication society that provides quality assurance services to shipping 
and shipbuilding, among other industries, and a publishing company.)
Niche ship types
Construction of niche ship types is restricted to a small number of builders. 
Entry costs are very high due to high capital costs and the high cost of 
technology development to meet the demands of these most technologically 
sophisticated of ship types.
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Cruise: The characteristics that mark cruise ships out from other market 
sectors are the complexity of the product (arguably, along with major 
warships, these are the most complex products produced by any industry) 
and the standard of f inish required. The size of ships has been increasing 
over time: for example, the Queen Mary II, at some 140,000 cgrt, dwarfs 
the Titanic at around 30,000 grt. The construction cycle is measured in 
years, rather than in months as is the case for bulk ship types, and much 
of the work involved in construction is related to f itting of public spaces 
aboard the ship and the increasingly complex systems for running the 
vessel.
LNG: Liquid natural gas (methane) is carried at temperatures of around 
–160 °C and as such presents very signif icant technical diff iculties in 
the design of the cargo containment system. The ships are large and the 
potential hazard represented by the cargo (an explosion of one of these 
ships would represent a blast of several mega-tonnes) dictates that the 
standards of construction are higher than any other class of ship. Con-
struction is therefore restricted to a small number of licensed builders, 
and entry costs into this sector are very high. Two containment systems 
have been developed. The original system used spherical tanks and is 
based on a design by the Norwegian shipbuilder, Moss Rosenberg. These 
ships are often called “Moss type” or “spherical type”. The alternative 
system uses more conventionally shaped tanks based on designs by the 
French Gaz Transport or Technigaz, normally referred to as “membrane 
type”.
Other types of ships
Suezmax: Refers to the largest tanker that can transit the Suez Canal fully 
laden, around 150,000 dwt.
Aframax: AFRA stands for “American Freight Rate Association”. This term 
has become the standard designation of smaller crude oil tankers, typically 
around 115,000 dwt.
Panamax: This refers to the maximum size of ship that can transit the 
Panama Canal, with a width restriction of 32.2 m. This is a relatively new 
class in the products tanker fleet (Panamax is traditionally a dry bulk ship 
classif ication) with a size typically around 70,000 dwt.
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Handysize / Handymax: Typical products tankers are between around 
35,000 dwt and 45,000 dwt. The designation “handysize” is taken from a 
similar ship size in the dry bulk fleet, traditionally the workhorse of the 
dry bulk trades and thus earned the designation. The size of ships in this 
category has gradually increased giving rise to the term Handymax, which 
has no specif ic limit.
Capesize: Refers to ships that are too large to transit the Panama Canal and 
therefore have to route around Cape Horn. These ships carry major bulk 
cargoes on long-haul routes and are typically around 170,000 dwt.
Post-Panamax: Refers to container ships that are too large to transit the 
Panama Canal (Panamax container ships of 3,000 to 4,500 TEU can). This 
class of ship tends to work on trans-oceanic routes, and the largest ships 
now rival VLCC tankers in terms of physical dimensions. The size range 
was typically around 5,500 TEU (i.e. capacity to carry 5,500 containers) 
up to over 8,000 TEU. However, the maximum size of ship is continuously 
increasing (now 10,000 TEU).
Other cargo-carrying ship types
Chemical tankers: Designed to carry relatively small parcels of higher-value 
chemicals, such as acids or polymers. Ships are typically relatively small, up 
to around 25,000 dwt. Chemical tankers are classed according to categories 
dictated by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) which classes 
chemicals according to the level of hazard they represent. IMO class I 
represents the greatest hazard and requires ships with sophisticated tanks 
and cargo-handling systems; often manufactured from stainless steel, these 
types of vessels have also been used to transport alcohol such as vodka. 
IMO class II represents a lower class of hazard with relatively normal tanks 
and cargo-handling systems. IMO class III refers to low-hazard chemicals, 
such as many petroleum products. There is a blurring of the distinction 
between products and chemical tankers for these lower classif ications. 
(Lloyd’s Register’s classif ication “chemical/products carrier” normally refers 
to a products tanker rather than a chemical tanker.)
LPG tankers: Designed to carry liquefied propane or butane under pressure, 
with typical sizes up to around 25,000 dwt. The level of sophistication in 
the cargo containment system is relatively high compared to crude oil or 
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petroleum products tankers, but is far below the complexity of an LNG 
(methane) carrier.
Ro-ro: An acronym standing for “roll-on-roll-off”, which refers to the method 
of loading the cargo on wheeled vehicles, or trailers via ramps that lower 
onto the quayside. Subtypes include dedicated vehicle carriers for transport 
of cars and other vehicles from the manufacturer to the distributor. Such 
ships can be large and there is no typical size. The characteristics of this ship 
type are large cargo capacity and multiple internal decks. The complexity 
in building largely arises out of the complexity of the structure, the thin 
nature of the plate from which the ships are fabricated, and sophisticated 
hydraulic ramps and other cargo-loading systems.
Ferry: Designed for transporting passengers and often vehicles as well; the 
market divides into three main groups. Ro-ro ferries tend to be large ships, 
often operating on relatively short sea routes such as across the English 
Channel or within archipelagos. A new generation of ships has emerged 
for longer routes, known as cruise-ferries, which offer a higher standard 
of passenger accommodation and some of the facilities offered by cruise 
ships. Finally there are fast ferries that tend to be smaller, may have multiple 
hulls (catamarans), and are often built from aluminium rather than steel.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
Working Party on Shipbuilding
The Paris-based OECD established on 30 September 1961 (now with thirty-
four member countries) has maintained a shipbuilding working group for a 
number of decades. The aim of this group has largely been to work to achieve 
a level playing f ield in the shipbuilding industry, and it has undertaken 
research in particular relating to capacity and price. The group publishes 
regular papers on the results of its research.
Overcapacity
Simply put, overcapacity occurs when there are too many shipyards chasing 
too few orders. The ill effects of overcapacity have long been known in 
shipbuilding and the control of capacity was at the core of the restructuring 
of the industry in the 1970s and 1980s in both Europe and Japan. Within 
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the European Community, from the 1970s, shipbuilding subsidy directives 
permitted subsidy to shipbuilding while simultaneously restricting capacity. 
No capacity development was permitted, and during the 1980s large-scale 
shipyard closures and job reductions were seen throughout Western Europe. 
In Japan the rationalisation programme also saw a major reduction in the 
workforce along with rationalisation of shipyards. In addition to this the 
Japanese government controlled the rate of intake of new orders to stop any 
tendency towards capacity expansion as order volume eventually improved. 
These measures were aimed specif ically at trying to ensure that, once 
the market had recovered, the industry globally could return to normal 
economic conditions.
Shipbuilding
The hulls of the vast majority of commercial ships are constructed from 
steel. A small number of specialised types (notably some fast ferries) are 
built from aluminium. Composites (f ibre- or glass-reinforced plastic) are 
very rarely used in commercial ship construction.
Shipbuilding can broadly be classed as an assembly industry. The tradi-
tional view of the process is that it has two distinct stages:
Steelwork: The pre-fabrication, assembly, and erection of the steel structure 
of the ship.
Outfit: The installation of the main and auxiliary engines, steering gear, 
pumps, lifting gear-deck cranes, equipment, and f ittings into the ship.
Traditionally, the two parts of the process were undertaken sequentially, 
with outf itting starting once the steel structure had been f inished. Since 
the 1960s, however, with the rise of block-assembly methods of production, 
the two stages have been undertaken as far as possible in parallel to improve 
eff iciency. The basic unit of the ship’s structure is a steel panel constructed 
from plate to which steel bars are welded to give adequate stiffness. The 
majority of panels in a ship will be flat but a proportion has to be shaped in 
two or three dimensions to provide curves. Steel plates and bars are cut to 
a pre-determined shape prior to fabrication, with the cutting process being 
automated in a fabrication shop in a modern shipyard. Much of the flat-
panel production can also be automated using “panel-assembly lines” that 
require little human intervention to produce large quantities of fabricated 
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steel. Flat and curved panels are joined together to form three-dimensional 
steel assemblies. As much of the outf it equipment and f ittings as possible 
is incorporated into these assemblies at the earliest stage since the cost 
of outf itting increases signif icantly as the shipbuilding process proceeds. 
Assemblies may be further blocked together before f inal erection in the 
building dock or on the building berth. Most leading shipbuilders now build 
in docks. The limit on the size of block that can be erected is determined 
by the capacity of the dock, the overhead gantry cranage, and/or adjacent 
berth cranage. Fundamentally, the larger the block that can be erected at 
this stage, the more eff icient the shipyard can potentially be. The steel and 
outfitting work on the ship will be completed as far as is practical in the dock 
before the dock is f looded and the ship floated out: the modern equivalent 
of launching from an inclined slipway. After f loat-out, the systems will 
be commissioned and tested, and the ship will complete a series of trials 
including reaching contractual speed before delivery.
While it has been possible to automate some shipbuilding processes, in 
particular at early stages of production, shipbuilding remains a relatively 
highly skilled enterprise. It also remains labour-intensive with the number 
of man-hours required for the production of a ship typically being of the 
order of 0.3 to 1.5 mn. The major trades used include steelworker, welder, 
pipef itter, mechanical f itter, electrician, sheetmetal worker, and joiner/
outf itter. The shipyard is likely to carry most of these skills itself but a 
proportion of the production work will be sub-contracted to specialist 
companies. Traditionally, sub-contracting covered installation of air 
conditioning, hydraulic systems, and painting; however, sub-contracting 
now covers most shipyard trades, as employers strive to cut costs in an 
increasingly competitive market for ships.
The balance of skills, in particular between the steelworking and outf it-
ting trades, varies by type of ship. The characteristics of the shipbuilding 
facilities also vary by type and size of ship. For example, a shipyard set up to 
build tankers in series, with high-volume throughput and a predominance 
of steelwork, will be less eff icient at building niche ship types with a high 
outfit work content and low throughput. Such ships can be built in the same 
facilities but it may be diff icult to achieve this mix economically without 
signif icant investment to avoid disruption to the main production flow.
In addition to the production capabilities of a shipyard (incorporating 
the characteristics of physical facilities and the balance of workforce skills), 
management and organisational skills are of paramount importance in the 
shipbuilding process. A typical ship will involve the assembly of millions 
of parts, and the logistical skill of a yard in planning work and controlling 
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material f low is one of the keys to its effectiveness. Design skills are also a 
key to eff iciency. Design at all levels of detail can have a major effect on the 
eff iciency of the production process, as well as the operational eff iciency 
of the f inished ship. The products of the modern shipbuilding industry are 
among the most technologically sophisticated produced by any industry.
Shipbuilding costs
The basic relationship between production costs and price are that direct 
costs plus overhead costs equal operating costs plus interest costs and 
depreciation equal breakeven cost plus prof it-loss-subsidy.
Direct costs: The direct costs for the production of the ship include four main 
elements: material costs (including sub-contracts), labour costs, working 
capital costs for the construction of the ship, and other direct charges in-
cluding classif ication fees, design costs, warranty provision, and insurance.
Overhead costs: The revenue from the ship must make a contribution 
to overhead costs. The main categories are costs of sales and marketing, 
general costs, and administration costs.
Operating costs: The sum of the direct costs and overhead provision gives 
the operating cost, and the difference between this value and the price 
gives the operating profit. It is often the operating profit that is quoted by 
shipyards when discussing profit. This is not a measure of profitability of the 
company, however, because it does not include provision for below-the-line 
items, in particular the f inancial burden imposed by the investment in the 
facility. In shipbuilding this can be very high because of the high cost of 
developing facilities and technology.
Interest costs: This category includes the cost of interest in relation to the 
development of the shipyard and the overall f inancial situation of the 
company, rather than working capital interest, which is included in direct 
costs. Interest costs in shipbuilding can be substantial, because of the high 
cost of development of the facility and, in some cases, the high cost of 
f inancing accumulated losses.
Depreciation: The contract should make a contribution to the cost of de-
velopment of the facilities in which it is constructed. In the profit-and-loss 
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equation this is done through depreciation. In terms of cash f low the 
contract should make a contribution to the debt-servicing commitments 
of the company in cash terms. In a shipyard, cash to repay loans has to 
be generated from the construction of ships, and the price must include a 
provision to reflect this.
Breakeven cost: This is the level at which profitability should be measured. 
In shipbuilding, when prices are low, it is often convenient for shipbuilders 
to price with reference to the operating cost without taking below-the-line 
costs into account. The alternative may be not to take the contract, an 
outcome that is diff icult to accept in shipbuilding because of the impera-
tives of keeping a large workforce and expensive facilities busy. This is a 
high-risk strategy, given the sizeable cost of operating a shipyard.
Profit-loss-subsidy: If the breakeven cost is lower than the price, then the 
shipyard will generate a prof it. Alternatively the contract will make a loss. 
In a healthy business the occasional loss over a contract could be regarded 
as normal. If too many of the contracts are loss-making, however, a subsidy 
will be required to keep the business open. Subsidies, overt and covert, have 
been consistent features of shipbuilding.
Added value: Added value is, effectively, that portion of the revenue from 
the ship that is available to run the business of the shipyard, covering labour 
costs, overhead, interest, depreciation, and profit.
Shipbuilding and ship-repairing labour
Shipbuilding and ship repairing are relatively skills-intensive supply-side 
industries, and direct and indirect jobs have always been at the mercy of 
global, sectoral, and regional collapse in shipping. Although the sector 
has historically been highly unionised in North America and Western 
Europe, the amount of direct and unionised employment has steadily 
fallen over the past century, and the trend continues as competition for 
available orders intensif ies. Changes in production and technological 
progress have impacted strongly on trade boundaries and employment, as 
have the increasing use of sub-contract and mostly non-unionised labour. 
Outsourcing of hull production to cheaper countries has also had an impact 
on the balance of trades in shipbuilding, and in ship repair, given global 
competition, sub-contract workers predominate over directly employed 
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workers in the business models of ship repairing f irms. The number of days 
worked is directly related to orders won by f irms, a situation that gives rise 
to precarious employment with insuff icient social compensation from 
governments. Within the European Union, where workers have a right to 
work in any member country, there has been a great deal of continental 
migration of workers in shipbuilding.
Ship conversion
Normally, but not exclusively, undertaken in ship repairing establishments. 
Oil tankers, for example, can be converted into floating production storage 
and offloading units.
Ship ownership and nationality
The ownership and nationality of a ship are complex issues. It should be 
noted that terminology varies and definitions are open to debate.
Registered owner: The registered owners of all ships are listed in Lloyd’s 
Register of Shipping; there are, however, a number of complications 
that cloud this category. First, the registered owner may be a f inance 
company providing a mortgage on the ship or a leasing company that 
leases the ship to an operator. Such an ownership gives no indication of 
the effective buyer of the ship. Second, it is common practice that ships 
are purchased through limited companies specif ically formed for the 
purpose of owning that single ship. This company may well be part of a 
web of companies, and such companies are normally registered offshore 
in countries such as Panama. The registration of the company therefore 
is not a reliable guide to the nationality of the buyer or the effective 
operator of the ship.
Beneficial owner: This term refers to the owner that derives benefit from 
the operation of the ship. The beneficial owner may be the registered owner 
or may operate the ship on behalf of others. Such third-party operations 
may be in the form of a manager of the ship on behalf of another owner 
or as the effective owner of a ship that is technically the property of a 
f inancial institution, such as a bank or leasing company that buys the ship 
on the owner’s behalf. Lloyd’s Register uses the term “country of economic 
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benefit” to designate the best country in which to count ownership, based 
on beneficial ownership.
Ship manager: The ship’s owner may not wish to operate the ship at all, 
in which case it may be given to a ship-management company to handle 
day-to-day operations. Major owners often operate a fleet that is made up of 
ships they own directly (albeit through single-purpose offshore companies), 
ships owned by f inancial institutions but for which they are the beneficial 
owner, and ships managed on behalf of others.
Charterer: Ships are commonly operated on a charter basis in the shipping 
industry. The basis of the charter may be a contract to use part of the ship 
for a specif ic cargo, an entire ship for a specif ic voyage, or a contract to 
operate the ship for a specif ic period. This latter arrangement is known as 
a “time charter”. Under a time charter the owner or manager may operate 
the ship on behalf of the charterer or the charterer may seek to operate the 
ship himself, using his own crew and ship-management facilities. In this 
case the charter is known as a “bareboat charter”, and the ship will appear 
to all intents and purposes to be owned by the charterer. This will often 
include having the ship repainted to match the charterer’s livery and using 
the charterer’s own crew. In recent years there has been an increase in 
the number of ships purchased for specif ic time charters. In this case the 
effective owner of the ship may be regarded as the charterer rather than 
the registered owner. As a consequence of this ownership structure, the 
notion of an importing company for the goods produced by a shipyard is 
obscured. For example a German container ship operator may acquire a ship 
bought on their behalf by a group of German private investors through a 
single-purpose company registered in the Bahamas. The ship will be leased 
or chartered back to the operator.
Ship repairing
In ship repair, time and tide are most important for shipowners. Ships 
are mobile and expensive items of capital equipment and are required 
to earn as much as they can over their lifetimes. Time spent in port or 
in dock therefore limits earning potential. Shipowners obviously prefer 
having their vessel repaired in the terminal port in which it was based or 
where it discharged its cargo and awaited a new cargo. Historically, ship 
repair f irms grew to service the type of vessels using the port, small or 
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large, cargo vessels, passenger ships, bulk carriers, tankers, etc., and the 
size of ships dictated the size of dry docks. Ship repair therefore, grew as 
a service to shipping where f irms traded in commodities. Ship repairing 
ranges from routine maintenance of vessels over a short duration on an 
annual or bi-annual basis: de-fouling, repainting of the hull to prevent 
excessive corrosion, overhauling of main or auxiliary engines, etc., to voyage 
repairs, or major damage repairs or conversions, including jumboisation, 
which could last weeks or months. Ship repairers use the same techniques 
as the hull side of shipbuilding and the same machinery as the specialist 
marine-engine builder. Historically, labour in the ship repairing industry 
was casualised (workers being hired for the day or for a f ixed term and 
being paid wages in cash) and this has persisted, but in the different form 
of sub-contracting. Modern ship repairing f irms tend to employ a very low 
percentage of full-time workers requiring pensionable employment and 
contractual legal obligations.
Sub-contracting
A sub-contractor is either an individual or in many cases a business that 
signs a contract to perform part or all of the obligations of another’s contract. 
Sub-contractors are normally hired by a general (or prime or main) contrac-
tor to perform job-specif ic tasks. The incentive to hire sub-contractors is 
either to reduce labour, taxation, pension, and welfare costs, or to mitigate 
project risks where the shipbuilder has little expertise at lower overall risk.
Tonnage
Gross registered tonnage (grt): A measure of volume, not weight. It meas-
ures the volume of enclosed space in a vessel, one gross registered ton being 
the equivalent of 100 cubic feet of volume. Merchant shipbuilding output 
in launching and completion was commonly expressed in terms of grt.
Compensated gross registered tonnage (cgrt): Since 1978 (sponsored by the 
OECD, with the joint agreement of the Association of Western European 
Shipbuilders and the Shipbuilders Association of Japan) this is the now 
generally accepted measure as it became widely understood that it took 
considerably longer to build a container ship rather than a simple bulk 
carrier. The grt measure made no allowance for variations in work content 
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in tonnage produced. The cgrt measure is calculated by multiplying gross 
tonnage by agreed coefficients that measure the work involved in producing 
different types of ships. The coeff icients are designed to reflect standard 
man-hours required to produce different types of vessels. It is now common 
practice to record national shipbuilding statistics in cgrt.
Deadweight tonnage (dwt): A true measure of weight not of the ship, but of 
the maximum tonnage of cargo and fuel when the vessel is loaded down to 
its summer load line. It is widely employed on vessels such as tankers and 
bulk carriers, but is not usually applied to passenger vessels.
Standard displacement tonnage (std): Exclusively applied to naval vessels 
as a measure of the weight of water displaced by a warship when fully 
manned and equipped, including stores and ammunition, but exluding 
fuel and reserve water.
TEU: Denotes “twenty-foot equivalent unit”, this is the key measurement 
of the cargo-carrying capacity of a container ship. One TEU is the standard 
shipping container that can be seen on trucks and train carriages; it is a steel 
box with dimensions of 8’6” high and wide and 20’ in length. While there 
may be some variation within that space, for example possibly incorporating 
a tank for carrying liquids or a refrigerated space, the dimensions of the unit 
will not vary. However, some routes and ships permit the use of a double-
sized box at 8’6” high and wide and 40’ in length. This may be referred to 
as one FEU or “forty-foot equivalent unit”, or two TEU.
Cubic capacity: Certain ship types may have a size designated by the cubic 
capacity of the cargo it carries. Chief amont this category are liquid gas 
carriers with size designated in cubic metres, equivalent to the volume of 
liquid gas they may carry.
Other measures: Specif ic ship types may have their capacity designated 
in the most appropriate units, for example in number of cars for a car 
transporter, in number of passengers for a cruise ship, or in the number of 
animals for a livestock carrier.
ULCC: Ultra-large crude carrier: the biggest tankers of 400,000 dwt and 
above.
VLCC: Very large crude carrier: a large tanker of 200,000 dwt and above.
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